Abstract.
In this paper we present a constructive, behavioural and axiomatic approach to the notion of a stable set as a model of the standard of behaviour of a social organisation. The socially stable set we introduce is a generalisation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. In contrast with the original version, our stability concept is always solvable. The standard of behaviour, reflecting the established conceptual order of a society or organisation, emerges from a dominance relation on alternative conceptions that are relevant with regard to a certain issue. This common social choice phenomenon, that permeates our societies and organisations, we have tried to clarify. Two axiomatic characterisations as well as a construction algorithm for socially stable sets are presented. These characterisations are based on behavioural postulates regarding the individual or collective strategic behaviour of effective sets. Relations between socially stable sets and other notions of stability are discussed.
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Received: 4 May 1998/13 March 2000
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Delver, R., Monsuur, H. Stable sets and standards of behaviour. Soc Choice Welfare 18, 555–570 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000076
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000076