Abstract
We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences.
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Morimoto, S., Serizawa, S. & Ching, S. A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents. Soc Choice Welf 40, 871–911 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9