Abstract
In contrast to a social choice function, a social choice procedure is proposed which depends both on the way a set of alternatives is broken up into the subsets and the sequence in which each of these subsets is taken up for consideration. This article investigates the Arrow question in this generalized framework.
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Bandyopadhyay, T. Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions. Soc Choice Welf 37, 597–608 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0583-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0583-9