Abstract
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is Approval Voting and interpret this result as an extension of May’s theorem (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that Approval Voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of Baigent and Xu (Math Soc Sci 21:21–29, 1991).
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Vorsatz, M. Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 127–141 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4