Abstract
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule (A) and the constrained equal-losses rule (L). The family is defined by means of a parameter \(\theta \in [0,1]\) that can be interpreted as a measure of the distributive power of the rule. We provide a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family and its connections with the existing literature.
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Moreno-Ternero, J.D., Villar, A. The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 231–249 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0121-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0121-3