Abstract
In this paper, three characterizations are given of a rule that models list systems of proportional representation the plurality ranking rule. It is shown that a social preference rule is the plurality ranking rule if and only if it satisfies three independent conditions: consistency, faithfulness, and first score cancellation. It is also shown that first score cancellation is implied by neutrality, anonymity, and topsonlyness. This means a second characterization is found, containing deeper axioms than the previous one. A third characterization contains the notion of top monotonicity. In order to motivate topsonlyness, we show that a scoring seat allocation rule is proof against party fragmentation if and only if it is topsonly. Various other properties of the plurality ranking rule are related to its characterist properties.
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van der Hout, E., de Swart, H. & ter Veer, A. Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 459–475 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0103-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0103-5