Abstract
We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Aşan G, Sanver MR (2002) Another characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 409–413
Benoit JP, Kornhauser LA (1994) Social choice in a representative democracy. Am Polit Sci Rev 88:185–192
Bradley WJ, Hodge JK, Kilgour DM (2006) Separable discrete preferences. Mathe Soc Sci (forthcoming)
Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1993) Yes–No voting. Soc Choice Welfare 10:35–50
Brams SJ, Kilgour DM (2001) Fallback bargaining. Group Decision Negotiation 10:287–316
Brams SJ, Kilgour DM, Zwicker WS (1997) Voting on referenda: the separability problem and possible solutions. Electoral Stud 16(3):359–377
Brams SJ, Kilgour DM, Zwicker WS (1998) The Paradox of multiple elections. Soc Choice Welfare 15:211–236
Brams SJ, Kilgour DM, Sanver MR (2004) A minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties. In: Matti Wiberg (ed). Reasoned choices: essays in honor of Academy Professor Hannu Nurmi. The Finnish Political Science Association, pp. 108–139
Kilgour DM (1997) Separable and nonseparable preferences in multiple referenda. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University (in press)
Lacy D, Niou EMS (2000) A problem with referendums. J Theor Polit 12(1):5–31
May K (1952) A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica. 20:680–684
Woeginger G (2003) A new characterization of the majority rule. Econ Lett 81:89–94
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper has been presented at the Murat Sertel Memorial Conference on Economic Theory, 14–16 May 2004, Istanbul; at the Third Meeting of the Society for Economic Design, 30 June–2 July 2004, Mallorca and at the Seventh Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, 21–25 July 2004, Osaka. We thank all the participants. We are particularly grateful to Steven Brams, Christopher Chambers, Franz Dietrich, Tarık Kara, Marc Kilgour, Semih Koray, Jean-François Laslier, Christian List, Thomas Ratliff, Maurice Salles, Tayfun S önmez, Harrie de Swart and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. We thank the faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences of Bilgi University for supporting our participation in these conferences. Our research is part of a project on Electoral System Design which is financed by Bilgi University Research Fund.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Özkal-Sanver, İ., Sanver, M.R. Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 211–219 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7