Summary.
In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is “closest” to being a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method, or any other positional voting procedure. In addition, we demonstrate that Dodgson's Method does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom.
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Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: June 7, 2001
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Ratliff, T. A comparison of Dodgson's method and the Borda count. Econ Theory 20, 357–372 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100218
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100218