Summary.
We consider an OLG model with accumulation in human capital and analyze the economic implications of information about individual skills. Agents in each period differ by the random innate ability assigned to each individual. When young, all agents are screened for their abilities and this screening process (signal) constitutes a public information which is used in choosing the level of private investment in education. We demonstrate that in the presence of risk sharing markets better information may be harmful for all in equilibrium, and find conditions under which better information either enhances growth or reduces growth.
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Received: 8 September 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D80, J24.
Correspondence to: Bernhard Eckwert
We are pleased to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of R. Benabou, Z. Eckstein, E. Helpman, B. Ravikumar and D. Tsiddon. Also, special thanks are given to two anonymous referees. This research was supported by a Grant from G.I.F., the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.
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Eckwert, B., Zilcha, I. Economic implications of better information in a dynamic framework. Economic Theory 24, 561–581 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0503-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0503-7