Summary.
We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class of monopolistic competition models.
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Received: April 13, 2001; revised version: December 18, 2001
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ID="*" The result in this paper generalizes a result in my PhD dissertation supervised by M. Ali Khan and Joe Harrington. I thank them for support and encouragement. I also thank Sung Kim, Bruce Nanney, Ashvin Rajan, Kali Rath, and an anonymous referee for comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Rauh, M. Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players whose payoffs depend on summary statistics. Econ Theory 21, 901–906 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0252-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0252-9