Abstract.
The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.
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Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999
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Derks, J., Haller, H. & Peters, H. The selectope for cooperative games. Game Theory 29, 23–38 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050003
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050003