Abstract
We study private-value auctions with n risk-averse bidders, where n is large. We first use asymptotic analysis techniques to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids and of the seller’s revenue in any k-price auction (k = 1, 2, . . .). These explicit approximations show that in all large k-price auctions the effect of risk-aversion is O(1/n 2) small. Hence, all large k-price auctions with risk-averse bidders are O(1/n 2) revenue equivalent. The generalization, that all large auctions are O(1/n 2) revenue equivalent, is false. Indeed, we show that there exist auction mechanisms for which the limiting revenue as \({n\longrightarrow \infty }\) with risk-averse bidders is strictly below the risk-neutral limit. Therefore, these auction mechanisms are not revenue equivalent to large k-price auctions even to leading-order as \({n\longrightarrow \infty }\).
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Fibich, G., Gavious, A. Large auctions with risk-averse bidders. Int J Game Theory 39, 359–390 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0181-6