Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness.
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I am very much indebted to William Thomson for his invaluable suggestions.
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Kesten, O. Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems. Int J Game Theory 38, 17–21 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3