Abstract
We prove that the Shapley value of every two-sided exact assignment game lies in the core of the game.
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Hoffmann, M., Sudhölter, P. The Shapley value of exact assignment games. Int J Game Theory 35, 557–568 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0068-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0068-8