Abstract
We prove the existence of the minmax and the maxmin for a repeated game with lack of information on both sides and signalling matrices which depend on the state.
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Sorin, S. On a repeated game with state dependent signalling matrices. Int J Game Theory 14, 249–272 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769311
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769311