Abstract
An example is provided showing that Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set is not identical to the minimal covering set of Dutta.
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References
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Dutta B (1988) Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence. J Econ Theory 44: 63–80
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Schwartz T (1990) Cyclid tournaments and cooperative majority voting: a solution. Soc Choice Welfare 7:19–29
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Dutta, B. On the tournament equilibrium set. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 381–383 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376285
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376285