Abstract
We prove that the Banzhaf value is a unique symmetric solution having the dummy player property, the marginal contributions property introduced by Young (1985) and satisfying a very natural reduction axiom of Lehrer (1988).
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Nowak, A.S. On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom. Int J Game Theory 26, 137–141 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262517
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262517