Abstract
This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.
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I wish to thank J. Abdou, who introduced me to this field of research, and S. Sorin for his constant help, support and fruitful discussions. My special thanks go to Amrita Dhillon and Denis Gromb for very helpful discussions.
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Gossner, O. The Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. Int J Game Theory 24, 95–107 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258206
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258206