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The present paper was written during a one year visit to Stanford. I wish to thank the Stanford Philosophy Department for providing me the opportunity to work in their nice atmosphere. I am grateful to Nuel Belnap, Solomon Feferman and Peter Woodruff for stimulating discussions.
This paper is a successor of an earlier unpublished draft “Sketchy Notes on Four Valued Logic and a ‘Solution’ of the Liar”. Shortly after writing Sketchy Notes I received Peter Woodruff's “Paradox, Truth and Logic. Part I: Paradox and Truth”. In the process of transmutation of “Sketchy Notes” into the present paper I have not hesitated to use certain ideas of Peter Woodruff — especially his notion of overlap — to improve both contents and presentation.
Section 3.3 on Iterations is an adaptation of Herzberger's earlier work on iterations. Most of the ideas of that section have to be credited to him.
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Visser, A. Four valued semantics and the Liar. J Philos Logic 13, 181–212 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00453021
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00453021