Abstract
The present note reformulates Amartya Sen's (1970) result on the ‘impossibility of a Paretian liberal’ in a collective choice framework in which both individual and social preferences are allowed to be fuzzy: the result of this exercise is not found to be encouraging in terms of escaping Sen's liberal paradox in the exact framework.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Barrett CR, Pattanaik PK, Salles M: On the structure of fuzzy social welafare functions. Fuzzy Sets and Systems (forthcoming)
Karni E (1978) Collective rationality, Unanimity and liberal ethics. Rev Econ Stud 45:571–574
Sen AK (1970) The impossibility of a paretian liberal. J Polit Econ 78:152–157
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Subramanian, S. The liberal paradox with fuzzy preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 213–218 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433946
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433946