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The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Nevada, Reno. Suggestions, assistance, and comments on an earlier draft by Gordon Tullock and Nic Tideman are gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.
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Dobra, J.L. An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension. Public Choice 41, 241–250 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00210358
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00210358