Abstract
Motivated by certain paradoxa that have been discussed in the literature (Ostrogorski paradox), we prove an impossibility theorem for two-stage aggregation procedures for discrete data. We consider aggregation procedures of the following form: The whole population is partitioned into subgroups. First we aggregate over each subgroup, and in a second step we aggregate the subgroup aggregates to obtain a total aggregate. The data are either dichotomous (1 — 0; yes-no) or take values in a finite ordered set of possible attributes (e.g., exam grades A, B,...F). Examples are given by multistage voting procedures (indirect democracy, federalism), or by the forming of partial grades and overall grades in academic examinations and similar evaluation problems (sports competitions, consumer reports). It is well known from standard examples that the result of such a two-stage aggregation procedure depends, in general, not only on the distribution of attributes in the whole population, but also on how the attributes are distributed across the various subgroups (in other words: how the subgroups are defined). This dependence leads to certain “paradoxa”. The main result of the present paper is that these paradoxa are not due to the special aggregation rules employed in the examples, but are unavoidable in principle, provided the aggregators satisfy certain natural assumptions. More precisely: the only aggregator functions for which the result of a two-stage (a fortiori: multi-stage) aggregation does not depend on the partitioning are “degenerate” aggregators of the following form: there exists a partial order (“dominance”) on the set of possible attributes such that the aggregate over any collection of data is always equal to the supremum (w.r.t. dominance) of the attributes occurring in the data, regardless of the relative frequnencies of these occurrences. In the voting context, degeneracy corresponds to the unanimity principle. Our theorem is true for arbitrary partitionings of arbitrary (finite) sets and generalizes the results of Deb & Kelsey (for the matrix case with dichotomous variables and majority voting) to general two-stage aggregation procedures for attributes belonging to a finite ordered set. The general result is illustrated by some examples.
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This paper was completed during a visit to the University of Bielefeld. I am much indebted to the Faculty of Economics there for its hospitality; in particular I should like to thank Gerhard Schwödiauer and Walter Trockel for their support.
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Nermuth, M. Two-stage discrete aggregation: the Ostrogorski paradox and related phenomena. Soc Choice Welfare 9, 99–116 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187236
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187236