Abstract
If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is “small”.
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George, K., La Manna, M.M.A. Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership. Rev Ind Organ 11, 853–860 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00174411
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00174411