Abstract
This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. We first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest. In contrast to the previous work, we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large.
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We wish to thank Claire Armstrong, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the Universities of Tromsø and Bergen for helpful comments. Errors are our responsibility.
This work is part of the project “Regulation under asymmetric and incomplete information” financed by NORAS.
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Clark, D.J., Riis, C. A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest. Public Choice 87, 177–184 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151735
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151735