Abstract
We deal with the approach, initiated by Rubinstein, which assumes that people, when evaluating pairs of lotteries, use similarity relations. We interpret these relations as a way of modelling the imperfect powers of discrimination of the human mind and study the relationship between preferences and similarities. The class of both preferences and similarities that we deal with is larger than that considered by Rubinstein. The extension is made because we do not want to restrict ourselves to lottery spaces. Thus, under the above interpretation of a similarity, we find that some of the axioms imposed by Rubinstein are not justified if we want to consider other fields of choice theory. We show that any preference consistent with a pair of similarities is monotone on a subset of the choice space. We establish the implication upon the similarities of the requirement of making indifferent alternatives with a component which is zero. Furthermore, we show that Rubinstein's general results can also be obtained in this larger class of both preferences and similarity relations.
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The nontransitiveness of indifference must be recognized and explained on any theory of choice and the only explanation that seems to work is based on the imperfect powers of discrimination of the human mind whereby inequality becomes recognizable only when of sufficient magnitude.
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Aizpurua, J.M., Nieto, J. & Uriarte, J.R. Choice procedure consistent with similarity relations. Theor Decis 29, 235–254 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126804
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126804