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Research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, SES-8105848. I would like to thank Michael McGinnis for his help. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Mel Hinich who commented on my paper and to the others at the Conference who also gave many useful suggestions. I alone remain responsible for the contents.
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Aldrich, J.H. A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics. Public Choice 41, 63–100 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124050
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124050