Abstract
This essay aims to clarify the relationship between the substantive and procedural reviews of legislation in the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. While substantive review of legislation, owing to the constitutional guarantees of Article 93 Grundgesetz, is beyond question and makes up the bulk of Bundesverfassungsgericht adjudication, procedural review still encounters objections. Nevertheless, the German Federal Constitutional Court has adopted the idea of procedural review, while upholding substantive review as its main tool. This contribution argues that the Court only adopts procedural arguments as an adjunct to substantive review. This raises questions concerning the functioning of a model that merges standards deriving from different philosophies that are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. The article demonstrates that the regular dual assessment of procedural and substantive merits and downsides of a piece of legislation requires a preference rule that informs the judiciary on how to handle conflicting results. The Court evades this difficulty by shifting judicial review to the due process of lawmaking only when the substantive merits of a law are hard to assess because of the complexity of the matter. Whether the standards of substantive review are likely to relax owing to the emergence of procedural review requires a decision of fundamental significance, carefully avoided so far by the courts and academia.
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Notes
- 1.
Starting with Linde (1976).
- 2.
In the adjudication of the German Federal Constitutional Court – see in general Wintgens (2002b: 32 – 34, drawing on literature research) – numerous decisions refer to some sort of rationality review. Key decisions are 7 BVerfGE 377 at 409 et seq. – Apothekenurteil ; 33 BVerfGE 303 at 351 – Numerus clausus I; 39 BVerfGE 1 at 51 et seq. – Schwangerschaftsabbruch I; 39 BVerfGE 210 at 226 – Mühlenstrukturgesetz; 50 BVerfGE 50 at 52 et seq. – Neugliederungsgesetz; 50 BVerfGE 290 at 333 et seq. – Mitbestimmungsurteil ; 54 BVerfGE 173 at 191 – Grundsätze der Kapazitätsberechnung; 65 BVerfGE 1 at 55 et seq. – Datenschutz; 66 BVerfGE 214 at 223 – Unterhaltsaufwendungen; 68 BVerfGE 143 at 153 – Atomwaffenstationierung; 79 BVerfGE 311 at 344 – Staatsverschuldung; 82 BVerfGE 60 at 88 – Kindergeldbemessung; 88 BVerfGE 203 at 263 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch II; 98 BVerfGE 83 at 97 – Landesabfallabgabe; 98 BVerfGE 106 at 125 et seq. – Kasseler Verpackungsteuer; 106 BVerfGE 62 at 148 et seq. – Altenpflege; 111 BVerfGE 226 at 255 – Juniorprofessur; 120 BVerfGE 125 at 155 – steuerliches Existenzminimum; 121 BVerfGE 317 at 354 et seq. – Rauchverbot; 122 BVerfGE 210 at 230 et seq. – Pendlerpauschale; 125 BVerfGE 175 at 224 et seq. – Hartz IV ; 128 BVerfGE 1 at 37 – Gentechnik; 129 BVerfGE 124 at 182 et seq. – Griechenlandhilfe; 132 BVerfGE 134 at 165 et seq. – Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz. Some of these decisions are analysed in this essay and/or in other contributions to this volume. The American debate on rationality review has been summarised and criticised as well by Posner (2014: 900–902).
- 3.
Alemanno (2013: 3).
- 4.
It is in this respect that this contribution differs from the approach of Susan Rose-Ackerman. The comparative study of Rose-Ackerman, Egidy, and Fowkes (2015: 4) emphasizes both the role of positive political economy and different constitutional structures of the jurisdictions at issue (United States, South Africa, Germany and European Union). However, as to judicial review, some differences between Germany and the US may be overstated. I cannot help thinking that this is also a way to reconcile the study’s sceptical view of the US Supreme Court federalism cases with its far more positive attitude towards procedural review in Germany (cf. p. 161–215). Of course, it cannot be denied that the US debate is more fundamental than the German, in that even inapt methods of achieving the statute’s declared purpose, according to the mainstream of US constitutional law thinking should not invalidate it, cf. Posner (2014: 901). Moreover the independent role of due process of law in US administrative law must be taken into account, cf. Lepsius (2010: 46–48), with further references.
- 5.
See Simon (1979).
- 6.
See, however, Martí Mármol (2005).
- 7.
See Cohen (2003: 27–38). The eminent theory of democratic proceduralism by John Hart Ely (1980) cannot be transferred easily to the constitutional system of Germany.
- 8.
Martí Mármol (2005: 263). Leading political philosophers like Dworkin, Elster, Habermas, Rawls and Raz, to name only a few, have previously commented on this problem.
- 9.
See Stone Sweet (2000).
- 10.
- 11.
Bar-Siman-Tov, ibid.
- 12.
The international debate may be different, cf. Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 280–299).
- 13.
- 14.
Vermeule (2003: 15).
- 15.
I use this term in an independent way, not in conformity with the US rational basis test, cf. Meßerschmidt (2000: 621–626), with further references, and Meßerschmidt (2000: 777–807, expounding my own view). See on the notion of rational lawmaking in general Wintgens (2002a); on the various dimensions of legislative rationality see Oliver-Lalana (2005: 248–249).
- 16.
Overview by Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015).
- 17.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012).
- 18.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 272–274).
- 19.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 292).
- 20.
Alemanno (2013).
- 21.
- 22.
It seems to me that Bar-Siman-Tov concentrates on the methodology of procedural review whereas Alemanno is predominantly interested in its historical roots and practical outcome. Alemanno may be right that the novel procedural review reflects changes in the law-making process. However, this debate evokes the chicken-egg-situation. Moreover, the situation may change from country to country. Suffice to state that better regulation and rationality review develop in tandem.
- 23.
Coenen (2002).
- 24.
Therefore, Goldfeld (2004: 373) calls it a misnomer.
- 25.
For a definition, see van Gestel (2007).
- 26.
See Meßerschmidt (2012: 353–355).
- 27.
- 28.
Goldfeld (2004: 408)
- 29.
See Goldfeld (2004: 412).
- 30.
See Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 21).
- 31.
In this vein, Martí Mármol (2005) argues for the superiority of the procedural view. He distinguishes between “radical proceduralism” and “radical substantivism” and detects intermediate positions (e.g. soft proceduralism), see at p. 263.
- 32.
See Tribe (1975: 290).
- 33.
See Hill (1982: 61). The Constitutional Court highlights the procedural and transparency aspect of decision-making in ESM judgment from 19 June 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, 131 BVerfGE 152 paras 113 et seq.
- 34.
Goldfeld (2004: 379): “minimally satisfactory level of deliberation”.
- 35.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2011: 1923).
- 36.
Schlaich (1981: 109). This basically means that it is the sole duty of the legislator to enact the law.
- 37.
BVerfG, judgment from 19 October 2006, 2 BvF 3/03, 86 BVerfGE 148 at 241 – German Länder fiscal equalization scheme. See Meßerschmidt (2000: 845).
- 38.
Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 175).
- 39.
See Linde (1976: 239): “Government is not to take life, liberty or property under color of laws that were not made according to a legitimate law-making process.”
- 40.
Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 184). Another catalyst of procedural review is the allocation of competencies.
- 41.
See Meßerschmidt (2012: 379) for further references.
- 42.
- 43.
See Popelier (2012: 270).
- 44.
BVerfG, joined Cases 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 3/09, 1 BvL 4/09 (125 BVerfGE 175); also available in English at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/). For a detailed analysis in English see Meßerschmidt (2013a: 243–244) and Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 178–186).
- 45.
Para 142.
- 46.
In previous contributions I refer to many examples from the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which rely on evidence and procedural review, e.g. the Numerus Clausus case, which deals with the admission to university in view of scarce study places (BVerfG, judgment from 18 July 1972, 1 BvL 32/70 and 1 BvL 2570, 33 BVerfGE 303 at 351; 54 BVerfGE 173 [1980] at 191). Cf. Meßerschmidt (2012: 361–364) and (2000: 723–776, 926–1040). In another landmark decision, the first judgment on abortion law (“Fristenlösungsurteil”), the Court scrutinized whether the legislator has grounded the statute in factual reality (judgment from 25 February 1975, 1 BvF 1/74 etc., 39 BVerfGE 1; English translation in 9 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 605 [1976] at 649; available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/nvp/german/german_abortion_decision2.html). In the equally famous “Mitbestimmungsurteil ” on Worker’s Codetermination Act respectively board-level employee representation in companies (judgment from 3 March 1979, 1 BvR 532/77 etc., 50 BVerfGE 290 at 331 et seq.) the Court acknowledged the prerogative of the legislator on the one hand, and urged the legislature to draw on existing knowledge by using the available material, consulting experts , and conducting hearings in the preparatory as well as the enactment stage, on the other hand. Cf. Wiedemann (1980). Another interesting example provides the decision on “Mühlenstrukturgesetz”, requiring the legislature to ascertain the legislative facts correctly and in a sufficient manner (judgment from 19 March 1975, 1 BvL 20/73 etc., 39 BVerfGE 210 at 226). Although the German Federal Constitutional Court started to publish English translations of landmark decisions, most interesting references are only available in German (e. g. judgment from 27 November 1978, 2 BvR 165/75, 50 BVerfGE 50 – Neugliederungsgesetz; judgment from 24 October 2002, 2 BvF 1/01, 106 BVerfGE 62 paras 343 und 347 – Altenpflegegesetz – and judgment from 27 July 2004, 2 BvF 2/02, 111 BVerfGE 226 at 255 resp. para 102 – Juniorprofessur).
- 47.
See Meßerschmidt (2000: 777–816).
- 48.
- 49.
See the contributions of Christian Bumke and Matthias Rossi to this volume.
- 50.
See the contribution of Roland Ismer to this volume.
- 51.
See Wallerath (2012:418–421), with further references.
- 52.
See Bumke (2010).
- 53.
According to Bickenbach (2014: 430).
- 54.
Schlaich (1981: 109).
- 55.
Waldhoff (2007).
- 56.
Schwerdtfeger (1977).
- 57.
Lücke (2001).
- 58.
Kloepfer (1988).
- 59.
Meßerschmidt (2000: 808–816).
- 60.
- 61.
Lenaerts (2012: 7).
- 62.
Popelier and Verlinden (2009: 31).
- 63.
- 64.
Lenaerts (2012: 4).
- 65.
Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 175).
- 66.
Ibid.
- 67.
Popelier and Verlinden (2009: 33).
- 68.
Posner (2014: 17).
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
Sweet Stone (2000: 204).
- 72.
- 73.
See Lenaerts (2012: 15).
- 74.
See Dobner and Loughlin (2010).
- 75.
- 76.
See the following case analysis and as an example of the overacting of the Court its negative attitude towards the sunset clause contained in the Code of Social Law which indicates in the Court’s opinion that the legislature itself considered that it had not found a lasting, methodologically consistent solution (para 202), whereas in general the establishment of a sunset clause is appreciated as a rational instrument of legislation.
- 77.
Case C-310/04. ECR I-7285 para 122 – Spain vs. Council. See for comments Lenaerts (2012: 8–9).
- 78.
Ibid., para 13. In this Case the ECJ annulled the contested regulation because neither the Council nor the Commission had provided sufficient factual input to back-up their decision to fix the amount of the specific subsidy for cotton at 35% of the total existing aid under the previous scheme.
- 79.
Case C-58/08, judgment of 8 June 2010, ECR I-4999 – Vodafone and Others.
- 80.
Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 15).
- 81.
Cf. Christian Waldhoff in this volume.
- 82.
- 83.
Goldfeld (2004: 400–402), drawing on Justice Brennan’s dissenting vote in United States Railroad Retirement Board vs. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166 (1980) at 183 and 188.
- 84.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
- 85.
The federalism decisions excepted, see Goldfeld (2004: 371).
- 86.
Shapiro (1992: 180).
- 87.
See for an explanation in more detail Meßerschmidt (2000: 875 et seq). Meanwhile the German Federal Constitutional Court takes the same view, see 125 BVerfGE 175 at 226 and judgment of 18 July 2012, 1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11, 132 BVerfGE 134 at 166 et seq., para 99 (also available in English on Bundesverfassungsgericht homepage; unfortunately numberings differ, in the English translation look for para 75).
- 88.
Austin (1869: 414–415).
- 89.
Cf. Alemanno (2011: 500).
- 90.
Goldfeld (2004: 383).
- 91.
This is my main objection to Merten (2015: 359), though I promoted the “Obliegenheit” idea more than a decade earlier.
- 92.
Case C-310/04. ECR I-7285 para 99 – Spain v. Council.
- 93.
Alemanno (2008: 17).
- 94.
Goldfeld (2004: 407) drawing on Justice Steven’s dissenting vote in Fullilove vs. Klutznick, 448 U. S. (1980) at 551–552.
- 95.
Cf. Popelier (2012).
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Mann (1918/1960: 247).
- 98.
- 99.
Effron (2014: 140.
- 100.
Effron (2014: 128).
- 101.
- 102.
Graeber (2015: 41).
- 103.
- 104.
See Alemanno (2011). Verschuuren and van Gestel (2009: 260) propose to consider both types of evaluation to be complementary.
- 105.
As the popular wisdom has it: “Hindsight is easier than foresight” respectively “Man ist immer klüger, wenn man vom Rathaus kommt”; also: “Durch Schaden wird man klug” („experience is a hard teacher“).
- 106.
See on retrospective evaluation van Aeken (2005: 83–86).
- 107.
Cf. Verschuuren (2009) and, in particular, the contributions of Larouche, Bohne and Verschuuren and van Gestel.
- 108.
It requires the judiciary to judge under a veil of ignorance which may be a fascinating metaphor within der Rawlsian philosophy but hard to accomplish.
- 109.
This conforms to the suggestion of Bar-Siman-Tov that semiprocedural judicial review should be viewed as more respectful and less intrusive towards legislatures than substantive judicial review (2012: 286).
- 110.
See Meßerschmidt (2012: 366).
- 111.
39 BVerfGE (1975) 1; English translation in 9 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 605 [1976] at 649.
- 112.
Popelier and Verlinden (2009: 34–35).
- 113.
Constitutional Court No. 44/2007, 21 March 2007, Official Gazette 25 May 2007 (www.courconstitutionelle.be) and No. 79/2004, 12 May 2004, Official Gazette 10 August 2004 (www.courconstitutionelle.be).
- 114.
See in general Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 284).
- 115.
- 116.
Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association of the U.S. vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
- 117.
- 118.
Meßerschmidt (2012: 352).
- 119.
See Meßerschmidt (2000: 621–622).
- 120.
Lenaerts (2012: 12).
- 121.
50 BVerfGE 290 [1979] at 332 et seq. See for explanatory comments Meßerschmidt (2000: 1045–1052). See also 57 BVerfGE 139 – Pflichtplatzquote, paras 75 et seq. [1981]; 88 BVerfGE 203 – Second abortion case, paras 187 et seq. [1993]; 94 BVerfGE 115 – Asylum Seekers case , paras 87 et seq. [1996]; BVerfG, judgment of 23 July 2014, 1 BvL 10/12, BvL 12/12, 1 BvR 1691/13, 67 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 3425 (2014) paras 82 and 87 – Regelbedarf, to name only some.
- 122.
Ibid. at 334: “Es handelt sich also eher um Anforderungen des Verfahrens. Wird diesen Genüge getan, so erfüllen sie jedoch die Voraussetzungen inhaltlicher Vertretbarkeit; sie konstituieren insoweit die Einschätzungsprärogative des Gesetzgebers, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht bei seiner Prüfung zu beachten hat.”
- 123.
BVerfG, Order of 24 January 2012, 1 BvL 21/11 – Smoking ban in restaurants and pubs, para 41: “Depending on the subject governed and the differentiating elements, the limits imposed upon the legislature by the general principle of equality vary, ranging from relaxed compliance that is limited to a prohibition of arbitrariness to strict adherence to proportionality requirements (see BVerfGE 126, 400 [416]; 127, 263 [280]; established case-law). Differences in treatment always require objective justification which is appropriate to the aim of the differentiation and the degree of the unequal treatment. In this context, a single review standard applies under constitutional law that is based on the principle of proportionality and whose content and limits are not abstract, but can be determined solely on the basis of the differences in the facts and areas of regulation affected in each case (see BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 21 June 2011 – 1 BvR 2035/07 –, NVwZ [Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht] 2011, p. 1316 [1317], with further references). The legislature may be bound to a more stringent standard, depending in particular on the liberty rights affected (see BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 21 June 2011, loc. cit.); the more the unequal treatment can negatively impact the exercise of freedoms that enjoy constitutional protection, including the freedom of practice of occupation or profession protected by Article 12.1 of the Basic Law, the narrower the operating latitude of the legislature becomes (see BVerfGE 121, 317 [370], with further references).” In the preceding Branntweinmonopol case of 3 July 2010 (1 BvR 2337/00 and 2338/00, 21 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [NVwZ] 197 [2002] paras 37 et seq.) the Court pointed out that, “[a]s concerns the unequal treatment of groups of persons, parliament is subject to such a strict obligation. This also applies if the unequal treatment of facts indirectly results in the unequal treatment of groups of persons. In such cases, the Federal Constitutional Court examines in detail whether there are reasons for the planned differentiation that are of such extent and carry such weight that they justify the unequal legal consequences that result from the differentiation (cf. BVerfGE 101, p. 54 [at p. 101], with further references). On the other hand, parliament’s legislative discretion is broader in the sphere of state activities that involve the granting of rights than in the sphere of activities that administer encroachments upon rights. This especially applies in cases in which the state grants benefits not because: (1) it wants to counteract an urgent social need; or (2) wants to comply with an (at least moral) obligation of the polity, but on its own initiative promotes, by way of financial grants, a specific behaviour on the part of the citizens that the state regards as desirable under economic policy, welfare and other social policy aspects. Parliament, as the state legislator, is largely free in its decision as to which persons or enterprises to promote. It is true that the state may not use irrelevant standards when distributing its benefits. As concerns subsidies, justifications under the aspect of the public good must be provided if they are supposed to continue to exist when weighed against the principle of equality before the law. However, as regards relevant aspects on which parliament can rely, parliament has a very wide scope of such aspects at its disposal; as long as the regulation in question is not based on an assessment of the respective living conditions that clearly contradicts all experience of life, and especially as long as the group of those favoured by the regulation is appropriately delimited, the regulation cannot be regarded as constitutionally objectionable (cf. BVerfGE 17, p. 210 [at p. 216]; 93, p. 319 [at p. 350]).”
- 124.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 294).
- 125.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012: 291).
- 126.
E.g. Nolte (2013: 240).
- 127.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947)2 All ER 680; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
- 128.
See also Popelier and Verlinden (2009: 37).
- 129.
- 130.
BVerfG, judgment of 3 July 2010, 1 BvR 2337/00 and 2338/00 – Branntweinmonopol, para 38.
- 131.
Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015: 186).
- 132.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 18 July 2012, 1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11, 132 BVerfGE 134 at 166 et seq., paras 72–73, 80–81 (also available in English on Bundesverfassungsgericht homepage). See for the case history Kingreen (2010).
- 133.
Para 72: “The fundamental right to the guarantee of a dignified minimum existence derived from Article 1.1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Article 20.1 of the Basic Law does not entail specific obligations regarding the legislative process; the decisive point is whether the legal claim to existential benefits can be substantiated in a rationally differentiated way by realistic, plausible calculations.”
- 134.
- 135.
See van Gestel and van Dijck (2011).
- 136.
BVerfG, judgment of 23 July 2014, 1 BvL 10/12, BvL 12/12, 1 BvR 1691/13, 67 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 3425 (2014) paras 76 et seq. on the one hand, and para 84 on the other hand – Regelbedarf.
- 137.
Cf. Martí Mármol (2005: 263).
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Meßerschmidt, K. (2016). The Procedural Review of Legislation and the Substantive Review of Legislation: Opponents or Allies?. In: Meßerschmidt , K., Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Rational Lawmaking under Review. Legisprudence Library, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33217-8_15
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