Abstract
In liberal democracies constitutional courts or ‘Supreme Courts’ are typically empowered to undertake constitutional review of parliamentary statutes. This often involves balancing constitutional rights against other constitutional rights and/or collective goods. To be sure, the court empowered to undertake constitutional review has to pay deference towards balancing decisions taken by the democratically legitimated parliament, which are reflected in the statute. The argument from democracy does not render parliamentary statutes completely immune to review, it justifies, however, a limitation of review. ‘Limited review’ represents a compromise between ‘strict review’ and ‘no review at all’. This chapter illustrates prominent instances of such limited review and explores its characteristics as a legal phenomenon. Limited review will then be reconstructed in the weight formula as brought about by means of a formal principle. The insights into the structure and the properties of this formal principle will yield a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of the constitutional courts’ deference towards parliamentary statutes or the ‘margin of appreciation’ that the Member States of the ECHR enjoy before the European Court of Human Rights—to mention only two prominent instances of limited review.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
On proportionality in the assessment of rights claims, see generally Alexy (2002a), pp. 66–69. On the proliferation of proportionality see Beatty (2004); Stone Sweet and Matthews (2008), pp. 112–160; Barak (2012), pp. 181–210; Bernal Pulido (2013). On the German origins of proportionality, see, for example, Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2010), pp. 271–275; Arai-Takahashi (2013), p. 447.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
See, for example, Alexy (2002a), pp. 67–68.
- 6.
There are cases in which balancing leads to a stalemate—one cannot say either that the interference with the right outweighs the promotion of the end pursued by public authority or vice versa. On such cases, see Alexy (2002b), pp. 408–414. The question of which side enjoys the benefit of the doubt is a normative rather than a structural issue.
- 7.
Borowski (2018), pp. 191, 336 et passim.
- 8.
On the ‘margin of appreciation’, see Sect. 1.3.
- 9.
- 10.
This deference assuages the concern that constitutional review of parliamentary statutes by means of proportionality deprives the democratic process of the central role it deserves. On this concern, see, in particular, Böckenförde (2017), p. 258.
- 11.
BVerfGE 50, 290 (333).
- 12.
Dworkin (1977), p. 38.
- 13.
See, for example, Nettesheim (2005), p. 1091.
- 14.
- 15.
See, for example, Brenner (2018), marginal number 29 with further references.
- 16.
The phrase ‘ordinary courts’ (Fachgerichte) refers to all courts of the five jurisdictions just mentioned in the text, as opposed to the GFCC and the sixteen constitutional courts of the German states (Länder).
- 17.
‘The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.’
- 18.
See, for example, BVerfGE 18, 85 (93); 102, 347 (362); 111, 366 (373).
- 19.
Named after the seminal decision of the GFCC, BVerfGE 6, 32 – Elfes, in which the fundamental structure of assessing claims stemming from liberty rights was introduced.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
See, for example, Schlaich and Korioth (2018), marginal number 285, with further references. See also BVerfGE 22, 93 (98); 51, 130 (139); 96, 27 (40).
- 23.
These phrases were introduced in BVerfGE 7, 198 (207) and have been repeated in numerous decisions ever since.
- 24.
See Schlaich and Korioth (2018), marginal numbers 301-304 with further references.
- 25.
See, for example, BVerfGE 43, 130 (138); 59, 231 (270-271); 71, 162 (178-179); 77, 346 (359); 95, 28 (37); 97, 391 (406).
- 26.
See Sect. 2.1.
- 27.
See, for example, Schlaich and Korioth (2018), marginal numbers 295-297 with further references.
- 28.
See the references in Schlaich and Korioth (2018), marginal numbers 307-309.
- 29.
BVerfGE 50, 290 (333).
- 30.
Borowski (2016), p. 127.
- 31.
See, for example, European Court of Human Rights (2006), marginal number 140.
- 32.
Article 1 of this Protocol reads: ‘At the end of the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be added, which shall read as follows: “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention”. This Protocol will enter into force once all 47 Member States will have ratified. Currently 46 member states have ratified, except Italy.
- 33.
European Court of Human Rights (1976), marginal number 48.
- 34.
Jurisconsult of the ECHR (2010,) marginal number 45.
- 35.
See Schabas (2015), pp. 81–82 with further references.
- 36.
Jurisconsult of the ECHR (2010), marginal number 9. In the same direction, for example, European Court of Human Rights (2012b), marginal number 58: ‘[W]here a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State is correspondingly narrowed’.
- 37.
Jurisconsult of the ECHR (2010), marginal numbers 27-39 with further references.
- 38.
See note 33 and the accompanying text.
- 39.
Borowski (2018), pp. 166–167.
- 40.
It has proven impossible to establish a hierarchy, let alone a strict hierarchy, between and among the different canons of interpretation. This and the practice of legal interpretation suggests that the canons exhibit the dimension of weight and can be balanced against each other in subsumption judgments, see Borowski (1998), p. 315; Borowski (2009), 103; Borowski (2018), pp. 166–167, footnote 389; see also Sieckmann (2009), pp. 164–166.
- 41.
- 42.
European Court of Human Rights (2012a), marginal number 88.
- 43.
See Borowski (2014), p. 779.
- 44.
See Sect. 1.1.1.
- 45.
Of course, one can also distinguish more than three levels of intensity of review. The number of levels depends on how many levels of intensity of review can be meaningfully distinguished in the relevant context.
- 46.
- 47.
Alexy (2002b), p. 422.
- 48.
Epistemic uncertainty is a necessary condition of limited review and the degree of uncertainty is key for the extent of the limitation of review, see Sect. 4.
- 49.
Alexy (2002a), p. 54.
- 50.
A legal system that contains principles necessarily contains rules dependent on balancing principles. This is not to say that it necessarily contains any rule independent from balancing principles. What is more, the rule that is created according to the law of competing principles has definitive legal validity only in the respective legal system, (1) if all relevant principles in this legal system are considered in the balancing, and (2) if all relevant factual circumstances (which are expressed by ‘C’ in the law of collision) are considered. Only under these circumstances the rule established in the balancing is fully concretized. If not all relevant principles or not all relevant facts are taken into consideration, a merely partially concretized norm is created.
- 51.
- 52.
Borowski (2018), p. 127: ‘materielles Abwägungsgesetz’.
- 53.
Alexy (2002a), p. 102.
- 54.
Alexy (2002b).
- 55.
Alexy (1985).
- 56.
Alexy (2002c).
- 57.
- 58.
Alexy (2003b).
- 59.
- 60.
On this modification in the corresponding German version of the weight formula, see Borowski (2013a), p. 168.
- 61.
- 62.
- 63.
- 64.
For an explanation of ‘classification propositions’, see Sect. 3.2.6.
- 65.
In the context of balancing individual rights and collective goods, this is a plausible reading. There are other contexts in law, in which it might be useful or required, however, to set a threshold value for reliability in the sense of an all-or-nothing fashion, see Borowski (2013a), pp. 172–173.
- 66.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
Borowski (2013a), pp. 176–177.
- 70.
- 71.
Alexy (2007), p. 27.
- 72.
Ibid.
- 73.
- 74.
See, in particular, Dworkin (1977), pp. 22–45.
- 75.
See, in particular, Dworkin (1985), p. 119 et seq.
- 76.
- 77.
- 78.
For an alternative reconstruction, see Borowski (2010), pp. 31–32.
- 79.
- 80.
- 81.
So far, I completely agree with Robert Alexy: ‘[F]ormal principles play no role with respect to substantial discretion’, Alexy (2014), p. 519—he uses ‘substantial discretion’ as a synonym for ‘structural discretion’, ibid.
- 82.
See Sect. 3.2.5. This formal principle is considered only in the ‘review decision’, not in the ‘decision to be reviewed’.
- 83.
The formal principle is the ‘third principle’ in cases in which two substantive principles compete. If there is a competition between and among three substantive principles for the ‘balancing decision to be reviewed’, the formal principle is the ‘fourth principle’, and so on.
- 84.
See, in particular, the analysis in Borowski (2013a), pp. 165–181.
- 85.
- 86.
- 87.
Alexy (2014), p. 520 et passim.
- 88.
See Borowski (2018), p. 183, footnote 482.
- 89.
Borowski (2013a), p. 180.
- 90.
Alexy (2014), pp. 520–521.
- 91.
- 92.
See, supra, Sect. 3.2.2.
- 93.
- 94.
Alexy (2014), p. 523.
- 95.
See Sect. 3.2.7.1.
- 96.
Alexy (2014), p. 519.
- 97.
See above, Sect. 3.2.7.1.
- 98.
See, in particular, Borowski (2013a), pp. 195–199.
- 99.
References
Alexy R (1985) Theorie der Grundrechte. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Alexy R (1989) A theory of legal argumentation (trans: MacCormick ND). Clarendon, Oxford
Alexy R (2002a) A theory of constitutional rights (trans: Rivers J). Oxford University Press, Oxford
Alexy R (2002b) Postscript. In: Alexy R (ed) A theory of constitutional rights (trans: Rivers J). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 388–425
Alexy R (2002c) Verfassungsrecht und einfaches Recht – Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarkeit. Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 61:7–33
Alexy R (2003a) Die Gewichtsformel. In: Jickeli J, Kreutz P, Reuter D (eds) Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Sonnenschein. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 771–792. Translation into English: Alexy R, The weight formula (Alexy R 2007)
Alexy R (2003b) On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison. Ratio Juris 16:433–449
Alexy R (2007) The weight formula (trans: Brożek B, Paulson S L). In: Stelmach J, Brożek B, Zaluski W (eds) Frontiers of economic analysis of law – studies in the philosophy of law, vol 3. Jagellonian University Press, Cracow, pp 9–27
Alexy R (2009) On constitutional rights to protection. Legisprudence 3:1–17
Alexy R (2012) Comments and responses. In: Klatt M (ed) Institutionalized reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 319–356
Alexy R (2014) Formal principles: some replies to critics. Int J Const Law 12:511–524
Alexy R (2015) Menschenwürde und Verhältnismäßigkeit. Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 140:497–513
Alexy R (2016) The absolute and the relative dimension of constitutional rights. Oxf J Legal Stud 36:1–17
Arai-Takahashi Y (2013) Proportionality. In: Shelton D (ed) Oxford handbook of international human rights law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 446–468
Barak A (2012) Proportionality, constitutional rights, and their limitations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bauer H (2015) Artikel 82. In: Dreier H (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar, vol 2, 3rd edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 2128–2149
Beatty DM (2004) The ultimate rule of law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Bernal Pulido C (2013) The migration of proportionality across Europe. New Zealand J Public Int Law 11:483–515
Böckenförde E-W (2017) Fundamental rights as constitutional principles (trans: Dunlap T, Zimmerling R). In: Künkler M, Stein T (eds) Böckenförde, E-W Constitutional and political theory, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 235–265
Borowski M (1998) Prinzipien als Grundrechtsnormen. Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 53:307–335
Borowski M (2009) Die Bindung an Festsetzungen des Gesetzgebers in der grundrechtlichen Abwägung. In: Clérico L, Sieckmann J-R (eds) Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 99–128
Borowski M (2010) The structure of formal principles. Robert Alexy’s ‘law of combination’. In: Borowski M (ed) On the nature of legal principles. Steiner, Stuttgart, pp 19–35
Borowski M (2013a) Formelle Prinzipien und Gewichtsformel. In: Klatt M (ed) Prinzipientheorie und Theorie der Abwägung. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 151–199
Borowski M (2013b) Absolute rights and proportionality. German Yearb Int Law 56:385–423
Borowski M (2014) Subjekte der Verfassungsinterpretation. In: Isensee J, Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol 12, 3rd edn. C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, pp 761–782
Borowski M (2016) Die verfassungsgerichtliche Rechtfertigung des Grundrechtseingriffs – Teil II. Studentische Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft Heidelberg:115–128
Borowski M (2017) Alexys drittes Modell formeller Prinzipien. In: Borowski M, Sieckmann J-R, Paulson SL (eds) Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie – Robert Alexys System. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 449–476
Borowski M (2018) Grundrechte als Prinzipien, 3rd edn. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Brenner M (2018) Artikel 82. In: von Mangoldt H, Klein F, Starck C (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar, vol 2, 7th edn. CH Beck, Munich, pp 2401–2422
Cohen-Eliya M, Porat I (2010) American balancing and german proportionality: the historical origins. Int J Const Law 8:263–286
Craig P, de Burca G (2015) EU Law, 6th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Crawford J (2012) Brownlie’s principles of public international law, 8th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Dworkin R (1977) Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
European Court of Human Rights (1976) Plenary, 7 December 1976, Handyside v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5493/72
European Court of Human Rights (2006) Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 26 March 2006, Scordino v. Italy I, Appl. No. 36813/97, ECHR 2006-V
European Court of Human Rights (2012a) Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 7 February 2012, Axel Springer AG v. Germany, Appl. No. 39954
European Court of Human Rights (2012b) Jugdment of the Fifth Section, 21 June 2012, E.S. v. Sweden, Appl. No. 5786/08
Greer S (2004) Balancing and the European Court of Human Rights: a contribution to the Habermas-Alexy debate. Camb Law J 63:412–434
Harris D, O’Boyle M, Bates E, Buckley C (2014) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Hillgruber C, Goos C (2015) Verfassungsprozessrecht, 4th edn. CF Müller, Heidelberg
Jurisconsult of the ECHR (2010) Interlaken follow-up on the principle of subsidiarity, 8 July 2010; https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-up_ENG.pdf. Accessed at 10 Nov 2020
Kolb R (2016) Theory of International law. Hart, Oxford
MacCormick ND (1978) Legal reasoning and legal theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Moreso JJ (1996) On relevance and justification of judicial decisions. Erkenntnis 44:73–100
Nettesheim M (2005) Die Aufgaben des Bundespräsidenten. In: Isensee J, Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol 3, 3rd edn. CF Müller, Heidelberg, pp 1073–1103
Newton M, May L (2014) Proportionality in international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Peers S, Prechal S (2014) Article 52. In: Peers S, Hervey T, Kenner J, Ward A (eds) The EU charter of fundamental rights – a commentary. Hart, Oxford, pp 1455–1521
Peters A (2012) Article 25. In: Simma B, Khan D-E, Nolte G, Paulus A (eds) The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary, vol 1, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 787–854
Rivers J (2006) Proportionality and variable intensity of review. Camb Law J 65:147–207
Schabas WA (2015) The European Convention of Human Rights – a commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Schlaich K, Korioth S (2018) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 11th edn. CH Beck, Munich
Sieckmann J-R (1990) Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Sieckmann J-R (2002) Grundrechtliche Abwägung als Rechtsanwendung. Das Problem der Begrenzung der Besteuerung. Der Staat 41:385–405
Sieckmann J-R (2009) Recht als normatives System. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Sieckmann J-R (2018) Rechtsphilosophie. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Stone Sweet A, Matthews J (2008) Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism. Columb J Transnational Law 47:73–165
Weatherill S (2016) EU Law, 12th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wróblewski J (1971) Legal decision and its justification. In: Hubien H (ed) Le raisonnement juridique – actes du congrès mondial de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale. Bruylant, Brussels, pp 409–419
Wróblewski J (1974) Legal syllogism and rationality of judicial decision. Rechtstheorie 5:33–46
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Borowski, M. (2021). Limited Review in Balancing Constitutional Rights. In: Sieckmann, JR. (eds) Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights . Law and Philosophy Library, vol 136. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77321-2_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77321-2_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-77320-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-77321-2
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)