Abstract
Empirical research about corruption is quite a new undertaking. In an attempt to determine the causes and consequences of corruption academics have lately concentrated on cross-country analysis. At the center is mostly the use of some professional assessment of the degree of corruption in various countries. Such assessments are sometimes conducted by agencies in an attempt to determine country risks and sold to investors. Other sources such as surveys have been conducted in recent years and contributed to a cross-country assessment of the extent of corruption. These data have been fruitfully applied to the investigations about the following relationships.
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Lambsdorff, J.G. (1998). Corruption in Comparative Perception. In: Jain, A.K. (eds) Economics of Corruption. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 65. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_5
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