Abstract
In this paper we contrast the use of the NRL Protocol Analyzer and Gavin Lowe's use of the model checker FDR [8] to analyze the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol. This is used as a basis for comparing and contrasting the two systems and to point out possible future directions for research.
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Meadows, C.A. (1996). Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol: A comparison of two approaches. In: Bertino, E., Kurth, H., Martella, G., Montolivo, E. (eds) Computer Security — ESORICS 96. ESORICS 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1146. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61770-1_46
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61770-1_46
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