Abstract
Software counter measures against side channel attacks considerably hinder performance of cryptographic algorithms in terms of memory or execution time or both. The challenge is to achieve secure implementation with as little extra cost as possible. In this paper we optimize a counter measure for the AES block cipher consisting in transforming a boolean mask to a multiplicative mask prior to a non-linear Byte Substitution operation (thus, avoiding S-box re-computations for every run or storing multiple S-box tables in RAM), while preserving a boolean mask everywhere else. We demonstrate that it is possible to achieve such transformation for a cost of two additional multiplications in the field.
However, due to an inherent vulnerability of multiplicative masking to so-called zero attack, an additional care must be taken to securize its implementation. We describe one possible, although not perfect, approach to such an implementation which combines algebraic techniques and partial re-computation of S-boxes. This adds one more multiplication operation, and either occasional S-box re-computations or extra 528 bytes of memory to the total price of the counter measure.
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Keywords
- Smart Card
- Advance Encryption Standard
- Counter Measure
- Advanced Encryption Stan Algorithm
- Cryptographic Hardware
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Trichina, E., De Seta, D., Germani, L. (2003). Simplified Adaptive Multiplicative Masking for AES. In: Kaliski, B.S., Koç, ç.K., Paar, C. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002. CHES 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2523. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_15
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