Abstract
This chapter lays out fundamental aspects of Xunzi’s political philosophy, arguing that his political thought is best understood as a virtue-based theory naturally extending from his virtue-based moral theory. In developing this interpretation, this chapter looks at the arguments that Xunzi uses in constructing his vision of political order, in particular analyzing why Xunzi believes humans need to live in society, the features of both human nature and the external world that make this challenging, and how to overcome them. By examining the differences between the hegemon and the true king, the essay lays out and analyzes Xunzi’s arguments for why his political theory is more effective than any alternative not grounded on virtue.
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Notes
- 1.
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Xunzi and other Chinese texts are according to the numbering system of the ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series developed by the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Institute of Chinese Studies, identified by the initials of the text being cited (the Xunzi concordance—Lau and Chen 1996—is designated separately here as “HKCS”), with the English translation of Eric L. Hutton (2014) also referenced (as “H,” followed by page.line number). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted, although I have been heavily influenced by Hutton’s translation.
- 2.
Given the potentially confusing nature of these changes, I follow my translations of key terms in the translations with the romanization in parentheses. I also do so in the main text in numerous places to call attention to the fact that I am referring to particular technical terms.
- 3.
While Shen Dao is not a Confucian, there is evidence that Xunzi was familiar with his ideas. This evidence comes from two main sources. The first is the Xunzi itself. In chapters 6, 17, and 21 we see mention of S<Emphsis Type="SmallCaps">hen</Emphasis> Dao and a familiarity with his ideas. Furthermore, S<Emphsis Type="SmallCaps">hen</Emphasis> Dao was thought to be a member of the Jixia (稷下) Academy, with which Xunzi is also thought to have been affiliated. For the most detailed English-language discussion of the Jixia Academy , see Sato 2003. Furthermore, the story quoted below survives in several versions in numerous texts including the Yinwenzi 尹文子, the Shangjunshu 商君書 , the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 , and the Hou Hanshu 後漢書. As such, we can conclude that Xunzi was familiar with such stories and their implications. For an argument that S<Emphsis Type="SmallCaps">hen</Emphasis> Dao was the source of Xunzi’s concept of fen, see Sugamoto 1992.
- 4.
For example, Y<Emphsis Type="SmallCaps">u</Emphasis> Mingguang 余明光 , in arguing that Xunzi appropriates his understanding of fen from the Huang-Lao 黃老 tradition, claims that fen has three parts—gradations in the status of the people, divisions of the responsibilities of government officials, and the divisions of social roles. See Yu 1996: 40.
- 5.
Masayuki Sato identifies six essential social divisions (fen) prescribed by Xunzi. See Sato 2003: 352–53.
- 6.
This is not explicitly stated in the Xunzi. However, insofar as the tyrant has rules and regulations, different levels of officials, and indeed, society at all, he must employ allotments (fen) of some sort, as these are all examples of allotments.
- 7.
The term qi refers to a kind of vital energy that is found both within the human body and in the atmosphere more generally.
- 8.
I analyze the term yi 義 later in this chapter, and as I offer a controversial interpretation, I prefer to leave the term untranslated until I have defended my analysis.
- 9.
Such a claim is supported by the fact that nowhere in the Xunzi do bees or ants, the most prominent example of animals that do engage in such activity, appear. In fact, according to Joseph Needham , it is not until the seventh century A.D. that we see reference to birds and bees as forming complex societies (Needham and Wang 1956: 447–48).
- 10.
If we were to seek unique human characteristics, a sense of history or tradition would fare much better than anything that Bodde has offered.
- 11.
Unfortunately, Jia is not as clear as one might wish about how she is taking the concept of divisions and whether her “distinctions between lord and subject, old and young, and close and distant relatives” refers to divisions (fen) or not.
- 12.
The same sentiment is repeated almost verbatim twice more in chapter 10. See HKCS 10/42/17, H 83.25–27; and HKCS 10/43/9, H 85.105–8.
- 13.
While I have only shown one other example where Xunzi clearly uses a term in both a descriptive and a normative sense, numerous other terms throughout the text are also used in these two different ways. The term junzi 君子 almost always has normative force, referring to a morally cultivated individual and often translated as ‘gentleman.’ However we do see it being used in a descriptive sense to refer to a prince in HKCS 19/97/8; H 214.516. Another term often used in both ways is wang 王, which sometimes refers simply to a ruler who holds this position while other times referring normatively to a ‘true king .’
- 14.
I provide a fuller analysis of the term Way (dao 道) as Xunzi understands it in a subsequent section.
- 15.
The distinction between grouping together on the one hand and organizing oneself in a self-conscious social arrangement is quite important. It is of a piece with Xunzi’s argument in passage [6] that only human beings make distinctions. It is also closely related to Xunzi’s arguments about acting (wei 為) and engaging in deliberate effort (wei 偽 ). For more on this, see the chapters on moral psychology and moral cultivation in this volume.
- 16.
The slide comes when, after saying that it is because of allotments that humans are able to form community, Xunzi continues by allowing for the possibility of having community but lacking allotments.
- 17.
It does not matter for this point that Xunzi is factually incorrect in this matter, only that it is plausible that he did not understand the animal kingdom in sufficient detail to know that there are, in fact, certain species that do engage in goal-directed group activity. Indeed much of the research that has led to this conclusion has come in recent years, and so it should be no surprise that someone living some 2500 years ago took animals as incapable of this sort of interaction.
- 18.
The term wuwei is often associated with Daoist thinkers, but we find this concept employed by numerous early Chinese philosophers. Literally, it means ‘non-acting,’ and here we can think of it as referring to a spontaneous as opposed to a planned-out action.
- 19.
Although he does not put it in these exact words, this conception of political organization is borrowed from Alan Gewirth . See Gewirth 1965: 12.
- 20.
See, for instance, Cua 2005: 17–20 and Dubs 1928: 96. Cua also offers an interpretation of yi that argues that it can be explicated as a deontic, an aretaic, an epistemic, or a psychological term. However, while he is making this claim in reference to the Xunzi, he remarks in a footnote that he makes no claim to textual fidelity, seriously undermining its value for understanding Xunzi’s thought. See Cua 2005: 126–32, esp. n. 29.
- 21.
See Zhongyong 20.5 in LJ 32.14/144/26.
- 22.
- 23.
Kim-chong C<Emphsis Type="SmallCaps">hong</Emphasis> does note a relationship between fen and yi, taking yi to mean “the human ability to make social distinctions.” See Chong 2007: 87.
- 24.
The analysis of early Chinese thought by means of a focus on thin concepts or definitions and their corresponding thick concepts or definitions is a hallmark of Van Norden’s work and allows him to make numerous interesting insights. See for example Van Norden 2003.
- 25.
- 26.
The actual passage says, 義者, 宜也, and sentences of the format A者, B也 are sometimes translated as ‘A is B’. However, understanding the two terms as identical is certainly not necessary, and in many cases simply inappropriate. Take for example the beginning of chapter 20, where Xunzi says, 夫樂者, 樂也. Here, he is pointing to a relationship between 樂, which pronounced as yue means music, and 樂, which pronounced as le means joy. He is certainly not saying that music is identical with joy, but rather telling us that one aspect of joy is music. See HKCS 20/98/14; H 218.1.
- 27.
I borrow the term ‘happy symmetry’ from Philip J. Ivanhoe . See Ivanhoe 2014.
- 28.
Further examination of the exact differences between ritual and yi would take us too far from the topic of this paper (for more discussion, see chapter 3 of this volume). While important, these differences also do not help us to further clarify those aspects of Xunzi’s political philosophy discussed here. Hutton argues that “one’s yi dictates what kind of person one ought to be, rather than specifying particular actions to do, and ritual is what spells out in detail the kind of conduct that normally expresses this character” (Hutton 1996: 21).
- 29.
See Nivison 2000 for a similar view.
- 30.
For a discussion of a guarantee of a certain minimum for everyone in society, see Rosemont Jr. 2000.
- 31.
It should also be noted that Hart is talking about laws, while Xunzi is talking about ritual, which is a different method of organizing society. Xunzi himself contrasts ritual and law , believing that there is a place for both within his system.
- 32.
Mozi is certainly the thinker in ancient China who most closely resembles contemporary consequentialists. For an insightful analysis of Mozi in this light see Van Norden 2007.
- 33.
Although it is not clear simply from this particular passage, when Mozi talks of “profit,” he is taking it in a consequentialist vein, as profit or benefit for everyone in the world.
- 34.
Eric L. Hutton offers the following analysis of why Xunzi at times appears consequentialist: “Insofar as the Dao [Way] is a pattern which the virtuous agent aims to instantiate, Xunzi’s ethics is teleological; it aims at putting the world into a certain shape, and that is why it at times appears consequentialist. Yet, because the Dao [Way] is not an end-state or utopia separate from the actions that make it up, at least some actions can be right or wrong regardless of whether or not they maximize the overall good. In other words, the way the agent instantiates the Dao [Way] is precisely by conforming his actions to its pattern , and so certain acts are ruled out because they generally disrupt the pattern , no matter how much apparent good they might do” (Hutton 2001: 262–63).
- 35.
One might argue that Xunzi is presenting us with a two-tiered argument in which the ruler’s motivations are distinct from the justification of rule. That is, perhaps the justification of rule is consequentialist in nature, while the motivations of the ruler are virtuous. While this is a possibility, two-tiered systems of this sort are notoriously problematic. Take for example rule-consequentialism. Here, consequentialism is the justification for the moral system, but members of society are to act in accordance with sets of rules, even if they, in a particular instance, violate fundamental consequentialist dictates. As Xunzi nowhere indicates that he is developing a two-tiered system, and as it is possible to consistently read him as not doing so, and as such an interpretation avoids the problems of the two-tiered system, I shall not further entertain such a two-tiered argument.
- 36.
- 37.
For a further discussion of this, see Harris 2013.
- 38.
This is not to say that his reasoning is consequentialist, however, for his priority is not maximizing benefit to the greatest number of people.
- 39.
In a similar vein, Kim 2013 argues that Xunzi re-appropriates the concept of the ba dao 霸道 (“the Way of the hegemon”) as a “morally decent” method of statecraft.
- 40.
This is not to say that others have not supported this understanding of Mengzi . Wei Zhengtong 韋政通 argues that revering the true king and dismissing the hegemon began with Mengzi (Wei 1992: 126).
- 41.
A li 里 is a unit of distance approximately equal to a third of a mile.
- 42.
- 43.
This is, of course, not to say that Xunzi believes that becoming moral is an impossible task for the hegemon. As he makes extremely clear, the choice between becoming a true king and a hegemon is a true choice that everyone has. Any ruler can become a true king, just as he can become a hegemon or a tyrant. The decision rests entirely with the individual. He says, “As for becoming a true king or a hegemon, surviving securely, existing in danger, or being extinguished, control over this lies in oneself, not with others” (HKCS 9/40/19–20; H 79.460–62). The differences between Mengzi and Xunzi that are apparent here are likely explained by their different theories about human nature and self-cultivation.
- 44.
Actually, there is one place where the hegemon is spoken of as relying on a semblance of benevolence. However, here, unlike what we see in Mengzi , it is clear that he is not acting in accordance with benevolence. Rather, he is tricking people into believing that he is benevolent while focusing on profit. See HKCS 7/25/20–21; H 48.47–48. This passage is translated later on as passage [24].
- 45.
See also footnote 43 for a passage where Xunzi makes it abundantly clear that the choice between becoming a true king or a hegemon is completely in the hands of the individual himself.
- 46.
I often take fa 法 in its earlier and broader sense of a ‘model.’ However, I sometimes translate it as laws, rules, or regulations, when I believe that this brings out features that should be noted, or when I feel that it better clarifies a point I am trying to make.
- 47.
This is an important distinction between Xunzi and thinkers like Shang Yang , Shen Dao , and Han Fei . While all of these thinkers emphasize laws, the latter three do not relate them back to rituals and yi, and, indeed, are diametrically opposed to such a move. For a deeper study of the role of the law in Han Fei’s thought, see Harris 2011, and for Shen Dao’s ideas on law, see Harris 2015.
- 48.
Although Xunzi is not specific here, I take him to be saying that the true king is one who makes the people’s hearts submit, not simply their bodies. While a hegemon can achieve compliance and submission from the people, only the true king, in Xunzi’s mind, is able to attain the people’s hearts. The inability of the hegemon to attain people’s hearts is made clear in passage [25].
- 49.
See, for example, SJS 4/7/25: “If the state can be governed during the day, then it will attain supremacy. If the state can be governed by spending the day and evening at work, then it will be strong. If the [ruler] spends all day and all night governing, then the state will be weak.”
- 50.
See the section of the Xunzi immediately preceding passage [21]: HKCS 12/63/3–7; H 131.531 – 132.559.
- 51.
There does remain the question of whether a king who lacks ritual and yi but who selects a prime minister that does uphold these standards would be converted to virtue by such a minister.
- 52.
The material skipped here is a verbatim repetition of parts of passage [24].
- 53.
That is, in the passage, 德雖未至也, 義雖未濟也. I have taken the zhi 至 to mean ‘arrived’ rather than ‘perfected,’ and the ji 濟 as referring to ‘filling up (something empty)’ rather than ‘augmenting (something already there).’
- 54.
The relevant passage reads, 絜國以呼功利, 不務張其義, 齊其信. I follow Wang Xianqian 王先謙 , who notes that the Qunshu zhiyao 群書治要 has 濟 ji instead of 齊 qi. The use of 齊 qi for 濟 ji is also attested to in the Erya 爾雅. See (Wang 1997: 205).
- 55.
In chapter 26, Xunzi does seem to indicate that the hegemon may follow some rituals, indicating that such individuals possess an impure form of ritual. This is consistent with my argument, given that I take Xunzi to be worried because the hegemon does not reliably practice ritual and whatever practice of ritual he does engage in is not regulated by ren and yi. See HKCS 26/123/11–12; H 277.1 – 278.33.
- 56.
Indeed, we may see this in the case of Duke Huan of Qi and his prime minister Guan Zhong , the latter of which was commended by Kongzi . See LY 14.9/37/26–30, 14.16/38/20–21, 14.7/23–25.
- 57.
In his chapter on military affairs, Xunzi goes into greater detail about when it is permissible to engage in warfare , as well as explaining why it is that a true king would rarely need to actually fight. He sees military forces as the means by which to prevent violence (HKCS 15/71/21–27; H 155.348 – 156.378) and argues that true kings such as the sage king Yao 堯 were able to order the world by killing only one person and ordering the execution of a further two more (HKCS 15/73/8–9; H 159.463–65). For more on Xunzi’s military thought, see Stalnaker 2012 and Twiss and Chan 2012a, b.
- 58.
Of course, there is the question of whether instilling virtue in the people of the state might be thought of as a desirable thing for the ruler to do from a consequentialist perspective.
- 59.
There are two circumstances in which a hegemon might not prevail. The first, of course, is if he were to go up against a true king. The second is if he were not the only hegemon, for another hegemon could conceivably best him. See HKCS 9/37/1–17; H 72.167 – 73.215.
- 60.
An objection might be raised here based on Xunzi’s vociferous attacks on Mozi , thought by many to be an ethical consequentialist. However, it is not prima facie evident that it is necessary to be a consequentialist in one’s moral thought in order to be one in one’s political thought. As such, Xunzi may well be viewed as a consequentialist in his political thought, while remaining a virtue theorist in his moral thought. A distinction similar to this is what we see in Roetz 1993.
- 61.
The term deyin 德音 first appears in the Shijing 詩經 . I follow the majority of Chinese commentators and translators in rendering it as ‘virtuous reputation.’ See, for example, Li 1979: 205n3, Xiong 1984: 183n23, and Wang 2005: 434n17. In explaining this term, Knoblock says, “The idea is that the ‘sounding’ of the true ‘inner power’ produces change in all that hear it, his charisma transforms all who know of him, just as a sound struck on one instrument produces sympathetic vibrations wherever it extends” (K II.125n43).
- 62.
For an excellent analysis of the early Chinese conception of de , see Nivison 1996b: especially his articles “‘Virtue’ in Bone and Bronze,” 17–30, and “The Paradox of ‘Virtue,’” 31–43. In these articles, Nivison lays out the early Chinese concept of de , pointing out the ways in which de encompasses aspects of the contemporary notion of virtue, while also noting characteristics of de that are quite distinct and have no correlative place in our own notion of virtue. See also Barnwell 2013.
- 63.
See also HKCS 15/73/16, H 159.493–94 for a similar passage.
- 64.
The term ‘hundred surnames’ refers to the people of the state. One might suspect that Xunzi is here borrowing from the Daoist tradition, as virtue ( de ) is seen in this tradition to have a calming quality. For an analysis of the Daoist conception of virtue ( de ), see Ivanhoe 1999.
- 65.
While it may initially seem implausible that such a moral force exists, Philip J. Ivanhoe notes that this is “the same kind of feeling that people claim to have experienced in the presence of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr.” See Ivanhoe 2000: xiii.
- 66.
For example, Xunzi tells us in chapter 9 that Guan Zhong did not cultivate ritual (HKCS 9/36/16; H 71.119–21). In addition, passage [25] emphasizes that the hegemon is deficient in yi.
- 67.
Xunzi does not explicitly tell us that the hegemon avails himself of divisions and allotments. However, as we saw in passage [1], without allotments, then the people will struggle amongst themselves and order will not be possible. Passage [5] continues by arguing that allotments are necessary for people to be stronger than the animals. Therefore, insofar as order advances under the hegemon (passage [25]), he must make divisions and allotments. In addition, the hegemon rules over a hierarchical society, with a prime minister, officials, etc., and makes divisions by way of laws, among other things. Furthermore, the hegemon’s bestowing of rewards and punishments presupposes a notion of allotment.
- 68.
Further, many of the actual hegemons with whom Xunzi may have been familiar did not come to good ends. For example after the death of Guan Zhong , Duke Huan’s state of Qi fell into chaos. In contrast, it is clear that Xunzi does not foresee such an end in store for sage kings or their immediate successors.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Eric L. Hutton, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Elijah Millgram, Richard Kim, Chandran Kukathas, and Cynthia Stark for their comments on various versions of this chapter, as well as two anonymous reviewers from Springer.
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Harris, E.L. (2016). Xunzi’s Political Philosophy. In: Hutton, E. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7745-2_4
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