Abstract
Much philosophy of science is methodology of science. How should one go about doing and evaluating it? The question is one of the methodology of methodology, i.e. of metamethodology. There is a vague thesis common to Descartes and more recent philosophers such as Quine and Lakatos: that what is good methodology, good evidence, good reason for accepting, rejecting or revising beliefs in mathematics and in the sciences properly so called, does not differ in significant kind from what is good methodology, evidence or reason elsewhere, even in epistemology and ethics; and further, that mathematics and the natural sciences provide good paradigms for methodology generally. Following von Hayek,1 I call this form of epistemological and methodological monism: Scientism.
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Fox, J.F. (1996). Towards Metamethodology: For the History and Philosophy of Science. In: Riggs, P.J. (eds) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_7
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