Abstract
In this paper, the competitive interactions of radio devices dynamically accessing the radio spectrum in the cognitive radio network are studied. The dynamic spectrum access is modelled by a game with incomplete information. The notion of incomplete information means that some players do not completely know the structure of the game. This paper provides a spectrum auction to address the problem of radio channel allocation for cognitive radio networks. The VCG auction to maximise the auctioneer’s revenue or maximise social welfare in the spectrum auction is also examined. A dynamic programming algorithm is then applied to solve the spectrum auction problem. Some simulation results are provided.
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Martyna, J. (2013). Spectrum Access Game for Cognitive Radio Networks with Incomplete Information. In: Kwiecień, A., Gaj, P., Stera, P. (eds) Computer Networks. CN 2013. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 370. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38865-1_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38865-1_24
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