Abstract
Klima’s chapter offers a precise positioning of Buridan’s metaphysics of the soul on the theoretical spectrum ranging from materialistic monism to Cartesian dualism, contrasting, within that range, Aquinas’ and Buridan’s versions of a hylomorphic account of the human soul as the single substantial form of the human body, as opposed to various versions of pluralist theories of substantial forms which they both denied, as well as to the materialistic version of hylomorphism offered by Bill Jaworski in the recent literature on the philosophy of mind.
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Notes
- 1.
But one can always count on this sort of claim in one form or another in the works of a somewhat motley crew of philosophers often designated, for better or worse, by John Haldane’s coinage, ‘analytical Thomists’. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytical_Thomism
- 2.
Of course, the guiding principle here is the Aristotelian idea of the convertibility of being and unity. For more on this issue, see Klima (2013). In general, as I am using these phrases here, a primary unit is something that is counted as one in a process of counting, and relative to which everything else that is not a primary unit is counted as a secondary unit, which is either a part or a (possibly structured) collection of primary units.
- 3.
“… nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare naturam unius muscae”.
- 4.
For an excellent historical summary, see Callus (1967–1979).
- 5.
It must be remarked here that although Aquinas allows that a substance and a substantial form have the same esse, nevertheless, he carefully distinguishes between the ways in which each possesses the same esse: the substance has it as that which is [ut id quod est], whereas an inherent form has it as that by which something (namely, the substance) is [ut id quo aliquid est]. For more on this distinction and its role in the consistency of Aquinas’ conception of the human soul, see Klima (2009). In any case, in possession of this distinction he can coherently hold that no two inherent forms can share the same act of being, for then two entities would have to have the same act of being in the same way, even if a substance and its substantial form can share the same esse, because they do not have it in the same way, whence they are not entities in the same sense, countable together in the same order of entities.
- 6.
See, e.g., SN2 d. 18, q. 1, a. 2 co. “… cum omnis forma det aliquod esse, et impossibile sit unam rem habere duplex esse substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substantialis adveniens materiae det sibi esse substantiale, quod secunda superveniens det esse accidentale...”
- 7.
For more on this, see Klima (2011a).
- 8.
See Calvin Normore’s contribution to this volume.
- 9.
Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet I, q. 4, a. 1, s.c. “Sed contra, omnis forma adveniens existenti in actu, est forma accidentalis. Forma enim substantialis facit esse actu simpliciter.”
- 10.
Cf. Nagel (1974).
- 11.
- 12.
Nevertheless, see Henrik Lagerlund’s contribution devoted to this issue in this volume.
- 13.
- 14.
“Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicimus totam animam esse in qualibet parte corporis, intelligimus per totum perfectionem naturae suae, et non aliquam totalitatem partium; totum enim et perfectum est idem, ut dicit Philosophus.” Cf. Aristotle, PHYS III, 6, 207a13, 4. See also De spirit. creat. a. 4, co; ST Iª q. 76 a. 8.
- 15.
See 4SN d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3 co. “tota forma substantialis ligni est in qualibet parte ejus, quia totalitas formae substantialis non recipit quantitatis totalitatem, sicut est de totalitate formarum accidentalium quae fundantur in quantitate, et praesupponunt ipsam”
- 16.
“Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum. Nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis nisi quantitas. Unde dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem individuationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis.” Together with the quote in the previous note, this passage clearly entails the claim made here. For further discussion, see Klima (2006).
- 17.
For a detailed discussion of what I take to be the most effective of Aquinas’ arguments for this claim, along with a discussion of Buridan’s critique of this argument, see Klima (2015).
- 18.
“Praeterea, animal est quod est compositum ex anima et corpore. Si igitur anima esset in qualibet parte corporis tota, quaelibet pars corporis esset animal, sicut quaelibet pars ignis est ignis. Ergo etc.” Cf. De spirit. creat. a. 4 obj. 2.
- 19.
“Ad secundum dicendum, quod perfectibile debet esse proportionatum suae perfectioni. Anima autem quamvis sit forma simplex, est tamen multiplex in virtute, secundum quod ex ejus essentia oriuntur diversae potentiae; et ideo oportet corpus proportionatum sibi habere partes distinctas ad recipiendum diversas potentias; unde etiam anima dicitur esse actus corporis organici. Et quia non quaelibet pars animalis habet talem distinctionem, non potest dici animal. Sed animae minus nobiles quae habent parvam diversitatem in potentiis, perficiunt etiam corpus quod est quasi uniforme in toto et partibus; et ideo ad divisionem partium efficiuntur diversae animae actu in partibus, sicut etiam in animalibus annulosis et plantis. Non tamen ante divisionem in hujusmodi animalibus quaelibet pars dicitur animal, nisi in potentia; sicut nullius continui pars est nisi in potentia: unde nec pars ignis est aliquid actu, nisi post divisionem.”
- 20.
“Ad septimum dicendum quod duplex est operatio intellectus, sicut dicitur in III de anima. Una qua intelligit quod quid est, et tali operatione intellectus potest intelligi essentia rei et sine proprio et sine accidente, cum neutrum eorum ingrediatur rei essentiam; et sic procedit ratio. Alia est operatio intellectus componentis et dividentis; et sic potest substantia intelligi sine accidentali praedicato, etiamsi secundum rem sit inseparabile: sicut potest intelligi corvus esse albus. Non enim est ibi repugnantia intellectuum, cum oppositum praedicati non dependeat ex principiis speciei, quae signatur nomine in subiecto posito. Hac vero operatione intellectus non potest intelligi substantia sine proprio: non enim potest intelligi quod homo non sit risibilis, vel triangulus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: hic enim est repugnantia intellectuum, quia oppositum praedicati dependet ex natura subiecti. Sic igitur potest intelligi prima operatione intellectus essentia animae, ut scilicet intelligatur quod quid est absque potentiis; non autem secunda operatione, ita scilicet quod intelligatur non habere potentias.” For more detail on Aquinas’ vs. Buridan’s conceptions on the relationships between the essence of the soul and its powers, see Adam Wood’s chapter in this volume.
- 21.
“Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae dicuntur in anima separata remanere ut in radice, non quia sint actu in ipsa, sed quia anima separata est talis virtutis, ut si uniatur corpori iterum potest causare has potentias in corpore; sicut et vitam.”
- 22.
“Unde si consideretur anima prout est forma et essentia, est in qualibet parte corporis tota; si autem prout est motor secundum potentias suas, sic est tota in toto, et in diversis partibus secundum diversas potentias.”
- 23.
“Unde sic accepta totalitate animae secundum virtutem, non solum non est tota in qualibet parte, sed nec tota in toto: quia virtus animae capacitatem corporis excedit, ut supra dictum est.”
- 24.
This paragraph is just a brief paraphrase of 1SN d. 37, q. 3, a. 1.
- 25.
See Klima (2001).
- 26.
See Klima (2012).
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Klima, G. (2017). The Trivia of Materialism, Dualism and Hylomorphism: Some Pointers from John Buridan and Others. In: Klima, G. (eds) Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51763-6_3
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