Cosmopolitan Idea of Global Distributive Justice

Abstract

The problem of how justice should be considered at the global level has provoked one of the most controversial discussions in contemporary political and moral philosophy. An aim of these polemics has been to find an adequate answer to the question of whether global distributive justice should be understood as social justice in the sense that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should be extended to all mankind or, just the opposite, if global justice should be understood as an international justice, which requires the development of the principles that would enable fair interactions between nations and countries, which should be quite different from those principles that allow interindividual equity within nations or nation states. The chapter briefly discusses the reasons why philosophers like Beitz and Pogge are convinced that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should also apply to the world as a whole and, on the other hand, why Rawls, Nagel, and some others think just the opposite. I argue that, from the cosmopolitan point of view, principles of global distributive justice should apply equally and impartially to all human beings (Kok-Chor Tan) as citizens of the world and that commitment to cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice does not entail commitment to a world state (O’Neill, O. (2008). Rights, obligations and world hunger. In T. Pogge & K. Horton (Eds.), Global ethics, St. Paul: Paragon House, 139–155).

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Although there are different interpretations of cosmopolitanism and different conceptions of cosmopolitan justice,¹ it seems justifiable to assume that the idea of cosmopolitan distributive justice – which some philosophers identify with economic justice – is based on some common characteristics of cosmopolitanism. According to Sebastiano Maffettone, there are mainly three such characteristics: individualism, universalism, and egalitarianism. Cosmopolitanism in its pure form is, firstly, “typically individualist, because it sees the relations between persons on the planet as the very starting point of every inquiry and practice,” and for this reason, “all the relevant relations are so inter-individual ones.”² Secondly, it “is also universalist in the Kantian meaning of the term,” since “its ethical and political norms are valid for all persons … in the same way.”³ And thirdly, cosmopolitanism is “egalitarian, even if often in a sophisticated way.”⁴ Maffettone stresses that it is egalitarian because “it maintains that all people must be treated equally, like universalism itself requires. It does not maintain however that all people have a right to the same amount of resources. Some inequalities, for example, can be justified within pure cosmopolitanism in the light of a plausible incentive system. To keep the egalitarian assumption, it is here sufficient that these inequalities have effects that can be considered beneficial for everybody.”⁵

These characteristics of cosmopolitanism and particularly its impartial egalitarianism are essential to the great majority of conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice as well. On the other hand, precisely these characteristics are the main reason that the cosmopolitan idea of distributive justice is constantly accused of neglecting “the special ties and commitments that … are associated with nationalism and patriotism.”⁶ Another reason why this idea is a target of severe criticism is the fact that at least some cosmopolitan conceptions of global justice are based on the assumption that some principles of distributive justice “apply between individuals across societies and not just within a single society.”⁷

However, the problem of how justice is to be considered at the global level has provoked one of the most controversial discussions in contemporary political and moral philosophy. The main aim of these polemics has been, as Philippe Van Parijs stresses, to find an adequate answer to the question of whether global distributive justice should be understood as social justice in the sense that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should be extended to all mankind or, just the opposite, if global justice should be understood as an international justice, which requires the development of the principles that would enable fair interactions between nations and countries, which should be quite different from those principles that allow interindividual equity within nations or nation states.⁸

Looking from the cosmopolitan point of view, principles of global distributive justice should apply equally and impartially to all human beings regardless of their nationality and citizenship.⁹ Among the philosophers who are convinced that the principles of justice accepted at the national level should also be applied to the world as a whole are Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. They both argue that such a principle is also the famous John Rawls’s difference principle of justice, which requires social institutions to be arranged in such a way that social and economic inequalities “are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.”¹⁰ However, some other political philosophers, for instance, Nagel and, what is indicative, Rawls himself, unequivocally reject such interpretations. Moreover, they claim that global distributive justice is – in the world as it is now – impossible. In their opinion, it is impossible because there is no global justice without either a global people, or global democracy, or a global state, or a global basic structure.¹¹ Some among these opponents of global distributive justice think that only humanitarian duties are needed on global level.¹²

If they are right, then those who think that we need also duties of global distributive justice¹³ are wrong and vice versa. Suppose now that we have only humanitarian duties. In this case, the question arises as to whether there are any moral or legal obligations of justice to diminish or, if possible, to abolish injustice at the global level. The answer is affirmative. There are both legal and moral obligations. Legal obligations are usually understood as obligations of the nation states, while moral obligations are duties of individuals and institutions.¹⁴ In the case of extreme inequality and poverty in the world – which are two distinctive sorts of such injustice – the moral obligations toward the poor of the globe, as Maffettone emphasizes, do not “depend directly on the existence of a controversial global basic structure”¹⁵ or, we can add, on a global people, a global democracy, or a global state. He argues that there is universal duty of justice, according to which “we have a duty to protect human dignity in all its forms, regardless of the presence of a real global basic structure.”¹⁶ This duty requires us to “help whoever is in extreme difficulty” regardless of whether or not “we are personally or collectively responsible for his or her hopeless situation.”¹⁷ Understood in such a way, a universal duty of justice – which is a form of positive duty to help – differs considerably from the negative duties not to harm the global poor, advocated by Pogge.¹⁸ Although Pogge does not deny the existence and importance of positive duties of assistance, he argues that negative “moral duties are more stringent than positive ones.”¹⁹ His intention is to show two things: first, that “existing world poverty manifests a violation of our negative duties,” that is, “our duties not to harm,”²⁰ and, second, that citizens of rich countries, who “benefit from a system that foreseeably and avoidably causes widespread misery,” are in fact “violating negative duties not to harm the global poor.”²¹ In consequence, they have not only a duty not to harm but also “to compensate for any harm” that they “do cause”²²and “to avert harms that one’s own past conduct may cause in the future.”²³ These duties are, in his opinion, “of a very different nature from a duty to assist.”²⁴ The so-called intermediate duties are different from positive ones because they presuppose that rich countries – and at least indirectly their citizens as well – are responsible for severe global poverty. According to Pogge, they are responsible for harming the global poor by shaping and imposing on poor countries the new unjust global economic order, that is, “the social institutions that produce these deprivations.”²⁵ However, although he is persuaded that negative and intermediate duties are more stringent than positive duties, he does not think that they should replace positive duties. What he claims is that it is not sufficient to appeal only to positive duties if we want to diminish global poverty.

On the other hand, positive duties to assistance do not presuppose that we have such duties because of our direct or indirect responsibility for global poverty. We have already mentioned that, according to Maffettone, we have to take up our universal duty of justice regardless of whether or not we are personally or collectively responsible for extreme global poverty. Peter Singer in his famous article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” – which can be seen as a paradigmatic example of the utilitarian cosmopolitan approach to global justice and inequality – also argues that the well-off people in rich countries have a moral duty to help poor people in poor countries. He interprets this duty as a logical conclusion that follows from the following two premises:

• 1. “Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.”²⁶

• 2. “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”²⁷

The conclusion which follows – if we accept both premises and assume that people in rich countries can prevent the “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care” in poor countries – therefore, is people in rich countries have a moral obligation to help those in poor countries.

What is important to stress here is that, according to Singer, the application of the second premise does not imply that the moral obligation of rich people depends either on the physical proximity or distance between rich and poor or on the fact that there are many rich people who can help.²⁸

On the one hand, he argues that mere distance in space is in itself irrelevant to the determination of what one ought to do. “If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever,” says Singer, “we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us.”²⁹ This is, in fact, his answer to the following frequently used objection to help poor countries: “suffering outside one’s country just is not something one has a duty to help alleviate, because those suffering belong to a different society, and hence a different moral community. Duties arise between members of single communities, bound by ties of mutual co-operation and reciprocity.”³⁰

On the other hand, he refuses the view that numbers diminish moral obligation. In his opinion, “it does not matter morally to the question, what you ought to do, how many people could help the situation.”³¹ In addition, it seems that he also thinks – like Maffettone, but opposite to Pogge – “that the causes of poverty are irrelevant to our moral obligations to the world’s poor.”³² This obligation to help those in poor countries is understood as a strict moral duty. This means that such help should not be considered as an act of charity or what “philosophers and theologians have called ‘supererogatory’ – an act that it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do.”³³ Charity is not an obligation. It is “something that we are free to do or to omit.”³⁴ As such, charity is not a satisfactory solution of the problem of global poverty.³⁵ The claim that we have a duty to help others is therefore much more demanding than our moral obligations are usually understood. The usual interpretation of one’s strict duty is not to harm others. But helping others is morally optional.³⁶ Such an interpretation of our duties is – as we have already seen – acceptable neither for Pogge nor for Maffettone. Although it is true that Pogge prefers negative and intermediate duties, he does not claim that positive duties to help are morally optional. Maffettone is in this regard even much more unambiguous. His universal duty of justice is a strict positive duty. It is a duty to protect everybody’s human dignity in all its forms. In order to protect it, we must make sure that a few fundamental basic rights – such as socioeconomic human rights to subsistence, health, and a minimum education – are guaranteed.³⁷

Therefore, in addition to this moral duty of individuals, there is, as we have already mentioned, the legal obligation of nation states as well. This obligation corresponds to the right to an adequate standard of living, which is recognized as a human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ³⁸ and also as “a fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”³⁹ In addition, nation states have the same legal obligations also concerning the right to education,⁴⁰ protected by the same (and some other) international documents of human rights. This means that all national states must be organized so that all of their citizens can fulfill this right. If they do not organize themselves in such a way, then they violate not only the right of their citizens but also the previously mentioned “negative duty of justice, namely, the duty not to impose unjust social institutions on its members.”⁴¹

However, in many poor countries, their citizens cannot enjoy even a few basic human rights, including the right to elementary education,⁴² although these states have the legal obligations to guarantee these human rights. Since they are universal rights, every human being has them. Despite this, many people – especially in very poor countries – have no opportunity at all for fulfilling them. The problem is that human rights, as Habermas emphasizes, have at the same time moral content and “the form of legal rights. Like moral norms, they refer to every” human being, “but as legal norms they protect individual persons only insofar as the latter belong to a particular legal community – normally the citizens of a nation state. Thus, a peculiar tension arises between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realizations: they should have unlimited validity for all persons,”⁴³ but until now, this ideal has not yet been achieved. At the moment it is still so that nobody can attain the “effective enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen,” because an “actually institutionalized cosmopolitan legal order” has not yet been established, although “Article 28 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights refers to a global order ‘in which the rights and freedoms set in this Declaration can be fully realized’.”⁴⁴

Therefore, at the international or global level, there are no appropriate mechanisms in place to enable effective action in cases where countries do not fulfill their duties and thus violate this important human right. In such cases, according to Onora O’Neill, the role of the state should be assumed or at least supplemented by international institutions, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, even in this case, we are not absolved from the previously discussed negative and positive duties, that is, from our moral obligation not to harm others and to help them.