Marianna Papastephanou *Editor*

Cosmopolitanism: Educational, Philosophical and Historical Perspectives

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Chapter 1
Editor's Introduction

Marianna Papastephanou

The interest in the theory of cosmopolitanism has been growing within various disciplines. Debates on cosmopolitanism and on its several aspects (e.g. cultural, legal, moral, etc.) exert influence on philosophers, educators, social theorists, cultural critics and political scientists. But such debates also matter to the broader, indeed, global public. For, as Ulrich Beck (2004) argued, the interconnectedness of the globalized world has now rendered some of the issues of such debates (e.g. risk, ecology, rights, etc.) vital in the cosmopolitan-universalist sense of affecting us all.[1] Yet, the impression of a universal interconnectedness that raises new ethico-political expectations is much older. As early as 1795, in his essay 'Perpetual Peace', Immanuel Kant made the following statement: 'the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere' (Kant 1992: 107–8).

Daniele Archibugi (2015: 5) rightly considers Kant's statement 'very far-sighted'; however, in my view, the over-generalizing tone of the statement should be considered and mitigated. Some 'power' qualifications should be added as to the degree and variety of universal, indeed, cosmopolitan awareness of rights violations. A violation of rights in one part of the world is not felt everywhere in an unqualified sense or uniformly. Some such violations remain unknown not only to global publics but even to experts and academics (Papastephanou 2015). It is nevertheless true that preconditions of knowing a violation of rights occurring elsewhere are often available. At least, the technological opportunities (Peters 2013) for such awareness have immensely increased. Still, this in no way entails that knowledge of

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[1] In my view, cosmopolitan issues should matter for purely normative reasons even if they do not affect us as a human community. But this claim cannot be unpacked here.

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violation of rights is actually obtained or that cosmopolitan awareness is heightened, especially when the violation of rights occurs in a distant land or when it is carried out by major global players.[2] In my view, it is debatable whether the social forces that drive the world beyond territorial limits (making it supposedly borderless) merit the attribute 'cosmopolitan' as many theorists too quickly (and uncritically) assume. This is already one reason why conceptual work on what counts as cosmopolitan and how it is theorized cannot be sidestepped.

Nevertheless, the 'cosmopolitanization' of awareness (as well as the instances of marked suspension or of lack of cosmopolitan awareness) of some injustices and violations provides to the engagement with debates on cosmopolitanism a greater sense of urgency, beyond the confines of academic activity. For one thing, realities that affect us all or in which we are involved make it all the more pressing to debate stakes such as what cosmopolitanism is, whether it is an accomplished state of global, social ontology or an ideal to be pursued and furthered. Moreover, awareness of globally meaningful realities does not guarantee thoughts and actions that deserve the characterization 'cosmopolitan'. Hence, it is also important to explore how cosmopolitanism differs from cognates that often appear to cover its ground or hold its place (e.g. internationalism, universalism and globalization). Certainly, this introduction merely sets the broader stakes in order to justify why, apart from the theoretical significance of cosmopolitanism in its own right, engagement with cosmopolitanism is urgent also for empirical reasons. The aim of the introduction is not to say much about such stakes, nor detail how they have been investigated, least of all provide the relevant answers. But the present book does aspire to contribute to debates on cosmopolitanism in distinct and elaborate ways. Indirectly, the book also touches upon contestations of cosmopolitanism that emphasize its proximity to its undesirable doubles, e.g. expansionist internationalism, toxic universalism and rampant globalization. All in all, the book aims to contribute to a scholarship that critically discusses the demands that a principally ethico-political ideal such as cosmopolitanism makes on people across space. For, to make the most of the term itself, *cosmos* and *polis*/politics, we must keep in mind that cosmopolitanism is about a political ideality of cosmos.

The urgency to debate cosmopolitanism feels even greater if we realize that this notion has increasingly been regarded less as a purely theoretical product and more as a (collective or individual) self-description of, say, the 'cosmopolitan' scholar, the managerial and other mobile classes, the dissident or the 'hybrid' subject. Certainly, there have been criticisms of those earlier elitist rigid distinctions between cosmopolitans and locals that had painted cosmopolitanism as 'the class consciousness of the frequent traveller' and the 'domain of the white, male, middle class' (Jonas 2013: 118). But the tendency to theorize 'cosmopolitan' consciousness and/ or identity has proven resilient. This tendency is very much present in the educational strand of cosmopolitanism where, as Hannah Spector (2015: 423) remarks, 'much attention has been placed on theorizing and describing who is cosmopolitan'.

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[2] Elsewhere I deploy this idea by reference to Chagos as a case in point (Papastephanou 2015).

Whilst this tendency has been heralded by many scholars as a positive development away from abstraction, it requires, or so I believe, fresh, critical perspectives. Such perspectives must complicate facile assumptions of cosmopolitanism as an already accomplished or almost unreflectively attainable ideal. After all, as much as the effort to present cosmopolitanism as embodied, feasible and viable may come from a laudable motivation to associate cosmopolitanism with practice and real-life situations, it does invite the charge of a deep-down exclusionary vision in presupposing a soteriological (redemptive) collective subject[3] discernible from (as yet?) non-cosmopolitan persons or groups. As a collectivity, 'we, cosmopolitans' (e.g. scholars, travellers, dissidents and artists or in more 'vernacular' versions, the migrant, the worker and the refugee) presuppose a distinction from the non-cosmopolitan, rooted or illiberal 'others'.

Perhaps over-relying on Stephen Toulmin's acclaimed *Cosmopolis* (1992) or on the general tendency of Social Theory and International Relations to treat cosmopolitanism as a mode of existing and acting embedded in real social structures and practices, many theorists use cosmopolitanism as something already 'there' and in need of study as an empirical phenomenon/reality. They thus project on the ideal and normative plane of cosmopolitanism the descriptive premises in which the modern Western imaginary attempted to ground cosmopolitanism. For much (post) modern discourse, those premises are rootlessness, mobility, curiosity, adventure, expansion, fluency in languages, familiarity with cultures and with a variety of lifestyles. In this vein, most accounts of cosmopolitanism (especially of the kind that was often popularized at the expense of a more legal and moral – Kantian-like – cosmopolitanism) have been culturalist in making multiculturalism acquire an inflated normative character. By implication, much cosmopolitan ideality has thus been monological in being reflected back upon the Cartesian subject. For culturalist cosmopolitanism involves an enrichment of the Western burgher's existential and cultural choice with little concern for relational normative possibilities such as the responsibility for the treatment of, and relation to (real or imagined), human and nonhuman otherness.[4] In my opinion, typical of such monological operations is Jeremy Waldron's (2000: 227–8) discarding of the -ism of cosmopolitan*ism* through a conception of the adjective 'cosmopolitan' as the lifestyle and attitudes of the mixed-up self-living in a mixed-up world. Such conceptions do not escape from the danger of sliding from self-description into self-prescription; their purported rootlessness can be charged with reproducing stereotypes, Eurocentrism and toxic universalism (Papastephanou 2012).

Because cosmopolitanism should be about cosmos and politics, and not about the cultural preferences or the enrichment of the lifestyle of a global class, it should

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[3] New cosmopolitans who consider themselves radical intellectuals 'like to think of themselves as living in a critical moment of history and playing a pivotal role in its outcome' (Fine 2003: 465).

[4] The much celebrated respect for diversity supposedly enhanced by multuculturalist structures or mindsets typically stops short when diversity escapes harmless and liberalized limits and, much worse, when the harkening to the other requires more than tolerance or verbal political correctness.

denote an ideal about humanity's relation to the variegated localities that compose it and to the environment. Seen thus, cosmopolitanism comprises ontological, ethical, legal, historical, ecological, aesthetic, economic, emotional and cognitive aspects that denaturalize established *world* views (ibid). As such, cosmopolitanism is poly-prismatic, that is, it involves many prisms on whose complex synergy and mutually corrective and directive effects much ideality depends. Evidently, such cosmopolitanism does not only transcend the culturalist, mainstream account of it as mobility or contact with otherness and border crossing. It also complicates the facile 'political' and by now theoretically 'mechanical' (automated, unreflective) and fashionable assumption that all it takes for one to be cosmopolitan is to be 'kind' and respectful to the stranger, to the 'sans-papiers' or to the migrant and asylum seeker and to grant citizenship rights to people ashore. As important as this may be (and, sadly, a still unfulfilled political promise, despite its academic discursive hegemony and the endless sloganeering that followed its becoming conventional academic claim), it does not exhaust the normative content of a cosmopolitanism that deserves the name. It does not exhaust the demands that cosmopolitanism should make on us all. Such demands comprise: responsibilities to others who may not be visiting us, e.g. to those who may wish to remain rooted[5], or to the other who prefers to have a real choice of residence along lines of capabilities instead of being a recipient of our 'benevolent' granting of space; and also responsibilities to other sentient and non-sentient cosmos. Thus, in my view, a more demanding cosmopolitanism should shake us more, should make us reconsider our new ideological comfort zones and should be about a responsible, lawful, loving and thoughtful treatment of the whole *cosmos* (humanity, other biota, natural and human-made realities).

I think that, despite relying on various conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism, there seems to be a tacit convergence of the chapters here that cosmopolitanism is an ideal and virtue to be explored as a possibility. Regardless of whether the contributors to the volume share the above reflections or engage critically with them, they seem to me to explore cosmopolitanism as a possible *a-venir*: to be normatively disentangled from those existing modes of living that clamour for the badge of the 'cosmopolitan' and to be set as a goal (educational and other) for approximation. This alternative normativity keeps away the kind of mere descriptivism[6] that ultimately affirms reality in ways that would attract only the discomfort of a more hermeneutically 'suspicious' political thought. Nor does this alternative normativity draw the objection of prescriptivism, as it does not set bullet points of 'requirements' for meriting the badge of the cosmopolitan (e.g. imagine a popular book title: '50 ways of being cosmopolitan'). Instead of prescribing one normative

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[5] Consider here again the case of Chagos (Papastephanou 2015). The claims of the Chagossians are mainly and primarily to return to their homes from which they were exiled by the UK and the USA, not to acquire citizenship rights away from home.

[6] By this, here I mean descriptions of particular modes of living, often privileged and elitist (or, to a lesser extent, of the marginalized and excluded), as cosmopolitan in a romanticized and idealized sense. As said above, such descriptions often single out the scholar, the exile, the immigrant or the traveller as the avatar of cosmopolitan selfhood.

content, the book implicitly combats the fallacy of extracting the Ought of cosmopolitanism from the Is of the globalized reality (to adapt here David Hume's famous idea of a naturalistic fallacy).

Nevertheless, and somewhat unexpectedly, even ironically, cosmopolitanism has, in the relevant literature, attracted important criticisms more in its legal-moral version rather than in its culturalist version. As James Brassett (2008: 337) puts it, 'there are those who would surely, and quite persuasively, tie the history of cosmopolitan ethics, particularly the liberal kind, to the history of imperial domination'. Hence they would 'infer a far deeper, causal relation between cosmopolitanism and terrorism, i.e. cosmopolitan ethics are part of the apparatus of imperialism, an apology for its excesses and moral buttress for its procedures'. Even critics sympathetic to the cosmopolitan trend in legal studies, social theory and IR, such as Robert Fine, emphasize the shaky premises of the so-called new cosmopolitanism (2003: 457), especially when it comes to the time consciousness of such cosmopolitanism and the moral point of view towards the past that it adopts (459). From another perspective, an environmental one that Spector (2015) makes relevant to educational cosmopolitanism in exciting and thought-provoking ways, the articulation of cosmopolitanism as ethico-political responsibility to human rights and global justice stands accused of anthropocentrism. It is true that some adherents to liberal conceptions of legal and moral cosmopolitanism often overlook how cosmopolitanism made common cause with, or was co-opted by, expansionism and involved an objectifying attitude towards nature. And they also overlook overt or subtle exclusions, be they relevant to nature or to human life, and other such faults of standard approaches to legal and moral cosmopolitanism. Though there is no compelling argument why such charges would be pertinent to just any sense of ethico-political cosmopolitanism, it is indeed true that most liberal approaches to cosmopolitanism still fail to take into account and respond to new critical perspectives.

Many publications emerge from frameworks that consider only the affirmative conceptual history of cosmopolitanism as a desirable ideal and virtue. Some of those publications transfer received views on cosmopolitanism to education. But, even when cosmopolitanism occasionally receives disparaging treatments and dismissive comments, this is not always for the right reasons. Sometimes, critics of cosmopolitanism one-sidedly and uniformly identify it with theories that have, in the course of European thought, ended up in pernicious systems or '-isms', thus missing more complex connections that allow a surplus of cosmopolitan normativity to become a critical tool for differentiating standard and complicit conceptions of cosmopolitanism from a cosmopolitan theory and practice yet to come. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is charged with Eurocentrism, toxic universalism, anthropocentrism, utopianism and developmentalism. Even theorists such as Fine, whose critical arsenal does not rely on these terms, seem to reduce the shortcomings of current cosmopolitanism to abstraction and fixity and to see as an urgent task 'to take the 'ism' out of the cosmopolitan' (Fine 2003: 466). I am not sure that this will solve the problem because I believe that a mere verbal modification that is not accompanied with a deeper and broader conceptual reformulation leaves the undesirable dimensions of modern cosmopolitanism untouched. Worse, this taking the -ism out

of the cosmopolitan sometimes resembles the 'semantic cosmetics' that is part of what Habermas sees in his new book as a repeated attempt of academic literature to answer questions of transnational democratic deficits with embellishments that cast such deficits 'in a flattering light' (Habermas 2015: 33).

Negative critique may be directed at usurpations of cosmopolitanism, facile accounts of it and un-cosmopolitan, contradictory employments of the term. But the most vehement critiques of cosmopolitanism engage head-on with it and challenge not so much its -ism but rather its core idea of universality. Criticisms[7] vary in how they are directed at cosmopolitanism, as some criticisms concern the standard theoretical assumptions (modern or postmodern) of cosmopolitanism; another set of criticisms concerns the cosmopolitan diagnoses/descriptions of the times in which we live and yet another set concerns the normative contents of cosmopolitanism. Educational discourses (especially the practice oriented or the educational policy oriented) often jump on the bandwagon of a popularized culturalist or globalist sense of cosmopolitanism. They do so with such astonishing 'innocence', as if diverse and severe criticisms such as the above have never been issued and as if an unqualified welcome to just about anything that passes as cosmopolitan is the best that education can do. I believe that, if educational discourses wish to employ cosmopolitanism (e.g. as a curricular aim, as an ideal to guide practice, etc.), given the amassed relevant literature, they can no longer opt for easy and uncomplicated accounts of it. On its part, educational theory, often mediating between philosophy and educational studies, can play a significant role in promoting some necessary complexity. The diverse sets of criticisms should not be lumped together, and they can certainly not be met by the same responses. Some attacks on cosmopolitanism may be off the point, others are valid, and some may be pertinent regarding specific conceptions of cosmopolitanism, though they should not be projected on the ideal of cosmopolitanism as it could be reformulated (thus they do not neutralize a redefined cosmopolitanism that staves off older dangers). For example, the charge of anthropocentrism does not apply uniformly to just any formulation of cosmopolitanism in ethico-political terms. Whereas some such formulations do indeed neglect the global threat of environmental degradation (Spector 2015), which is, after all, an

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[7] 'Critics of cosmopolitanism point to the particularistic cultural assumptions, national prejudices and power positions that remain intact behind its universalistic discourse and institutions. They reject cosmopolitanism either as an abstract ideal irrelevant to the real world or as a mask that the sole remaining superpower, America, uses to conceal its own political and financial interests. They depict the new cosmopolitanism as an ideology for a new state system under American dominance, arguing that its repudiation of the sovereignty of nation states when they violate human rights in their own territories and its defence of the legality of humanitarian intervention coincide with the interests of American hegemony and are invoked only when American interests are at stake. They maintain that cosmopolitanism perpetuates the illusion that the current global order is ruled by universal ideals and by a supranational body authorized to enforce these ideals, whereas in fact it is ruled by a hierarchy of co-operating and competing nation states – different from the Westphalian order only in the fact that never before has one nation dominated others as does the USA today (Fine 2003: 464). Many educational engagements with cosmopolitanism not only fail critically to respond to such challenges but even perform their theories as if such challenges have never been aired.

ethico-political issue, since, as Spector herself admits, it is a 'threat largely created by human beings' (2015: 423), not all reformulations of cosmopolitanism along lines of global justice bypass nature. Some such reformulations frame ethico-political responsibility as relevant to all cosmos – the latter being a term that includes the environment. In fact, they are often in a better position to theorize the complex relation between global injustices and environmental destruction than those alternative approaches that focus exclusively on environmental issues.

To distinguish between demanding, self-reflective cosmopolitanisms and time-honoured, expansionist cosmopolitanisms, we need terms to describe the latter. The relevant literature does not always provide neat distinctions. This may have the positive effect of keeping away a deep-down un-cosmopolitan obsession with order. But, even if fuzzy, some distinctions are needed, so as to avoid the following predicament. Theorists aware of what cosmopolitanism is accused of but unwilling to jettison it altogether feel unease about the employment of the same term for denoting both the cultural theses of modernity and the critical surplus that contests those theses. I take Thomas Popkewitz's (2008) effort to justify his use of the term 'cosmopolitanism' as emblematic of this predicament. Pointing out that cosmopolitanism can be something other than its modern instantiation is a legitimate theoretical move. But the recourse to this same term again, for lack of an alternative one that would signify the modern instantiation, backfires because it reinforces what it sets out to criticize. Inevitably, the conclusion is that if we wish to talk about cosmopolitanism, all we have to rely on is the specific modern Western conception that now acquires transcendental value. Therefore, all we can do is just to be aware of its duplicities and cautious regarding its dangers. The notion of paradox comes handy in this case as an easy and quick solution[8]: cosmopolitanism is exhausted in its modern semantic contents that merely reflect the supposedly inherently paradoxical nature of the ideal. Against hasty recourses to paradox, when dealing with ideals, I argue, we need a sense of surplus, of a normativity that goes beyond and contests the consolidated meanings of the ideal, urging us to redefine it and to draw relevant distinctions.

My suggestion is that we maintain the normativity that, despite ruptures, accompanies the term 'cosmopolitanism' from antiquity to the present by distinguishing it from the 'universalization' that the cultural theses of modernity have favoured. Following Zygmunt Bauman (1998), I take the term 'universalization' – by now fallen into disuse and by and large forgotten – to encompass concepts such as 'civilization', 'development', 'convergence', 'global progress' and many other modern ideas and visions. It conveys

> the modern, Western hope, the intention and the determination of order-making. Those concepts were coined on the rising tides of modern powers and the modern intellect's ambitions. They announced the will to make the world different from what it was and better than it was, and to expand the change and the improvement to global, species-wide dimensions.

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[8] Another solution that has been proposed in the amassed literature is the qualification of cosmopolitanism with adjectives such as 'new', 'critical', 'vernacular' and so on (for more on this, see my Coda in this volume).

It also declared the intention to make the life conditions of everyone everywhere, and so everybody's life chances, equal. (Bauman 1998: 38–9)

However, despite declarations, universalization rationalized Eurocentrism, expansionism, developmentalism, exploitation and so on. I believe that, thus defined, universalization covers the conceptual ground of the version of cosmopolitanism that Popkewitz rightly chastises. And it is, in a temporal sense, a more accurate term to account for modern thought. Normatively, it is less overarching and less self-transcending than the ideal of cosmopolitanism. The modern vision of universalization must be distinguished from the vision of cosmopolitanism because the former is deep-down exclusivist, elitist and too affirmative of the Western culture that it aspired to promote in a process-like and globalizing manner.

The need for such distinctions between cosmopolitanism and simulacra is also evident when we realize that a loose and too elastic employment of the term 'cosmopolitanism' brings along some forced and sweeping theoretical treatments and misrepresentations of the term's conceptual history (that cannot be thoroughly discussed here). Those treatments of the term could have been avoided, had political, philosophical and educational scholars opted for different and more complex conceptual handlings.

For example, how is cosmopolitanism opposed to, say, internationalism or universalism?[9] That cosmopolitanism involved a normative-legal surplus beyond the accomplished realities of mere international relations was a modern thesis developed by Kant. As Archibugi (2015: 6) remarks, Kant 'indicates that it is conceivable to build a new branch of law' distinct from international law. The relevant term is 'cosmopolitan law'. Whilst 'international law governs the relationship amongst states, cosmopolitan law does not originate from states, much as states, as well as individuals, should respect its prescriptions'. Thus, Kant 'believes that a further, independent branch of law should be created and that such branch should not be constrained by interstate relations' (ibid). From then on, as Fine (2003: 452) explains, it has been acknowledged that 'there is a large grey area between international and cosmopolitan law'. But the core analytical distinction, even if often disputed within legal theory, 'is between a form of international law that recognizes only states as legal subjects and one that both descends below the level of states to that of individual right and ascends above the level of states to that of a higher legal body' (Fine 2003: 453). Therefore, it is no wonder that cosmopolitanism often portrays internationalism 'as a politics that allows some national interests to masquerade as universal and suppresses other national interests in the name of class solidarity, as if the former were all-bad and the latter all-good' (461). As another option we have also Habermas's 'transnationalization' which denotes a process that aims to create a 'supranational' democracy above the organizational level of the state (2015: 29). Solidarity, in this case, is political as it has to be created and does not depend on an existing social context. However, for Habermas, this is not equated

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[9] I am indebted to Springer's anonymous reviewer for pointing out the need to deal with this question in the introduction.

to the solidarity of a global class much less that of a rootless, mobile traveller whose utopianism is charged with unrealistic nostalgia (27). Still, against attempts to maintain and reformulate the relevant distinctions, there have been approaches that tackle cosmopolitanism as a political task of freeing ourselves from a conceptual world that no longer exists.[10] *Contra* such approaches we may argue that their claim about such distinctions revolving around supposedly no longer operative notions of state sovereignty is empirically untenable and theoretically inoperative. Instead of hoping for a modernist, full rupture with a conceptual world that we assume as no longer existing, I believe that we should approach cosmopolitanism itself as a commitment to construct a conceptual world that is possible and desirable though not yet existing.

The book reflects the above-mentioned complexity and takes into account both affirmative and negative stances to both cosmopolitanism and its educational significance. It relies on such stances as background material in order to transcend them and offer fresh perspectives on cosmopolitan stakes. It makes use of a recent tendency in political, philosophical and cultural-critical debates that opens a possibility of more nuanced approaches to old '-isms'. Such approaches detect in several '-isms' ambiguities, ambivalences and hidden complexities. In this way, idea(l)s such as cosmopolitanism or discourses such as the post-colonial or politicized spatialities such as the European attract new theoretical negotiations and framings within which dichotomous thinking is challenged and sweeping positions, be they glorifications or incriminations, are 'queered'. Faithful to the above assumption that complexity must be acknowledged when dealing with current global realities and concomitant theoretical responses, the book brings together educational, philosophical and historical outlooks and highlights the multiple entrances of cosmopolitan debates.

Some chapters have undertaken to specify the educational discourses that benefit from our political-philosophical intervention and to unpack the relevance to education in ways far more concrete and focused than this introduction allows. Then again, the book aims to connect theoretical developments with educational discourse beyond facile logics of transference to, or impact on, education that render the latter a passive recipient of historical or philosophical theorizations. It does not aim to focus on a specific constituency (e.g. with the one that grapples with educational policy or goals) to the exclusion of less specialized and broader stakes that are inextricably connected with and relevant to educational cosmopolitanism. Can educational theory endorse a curricular task of cultivating cosmopolitanism without paying attention to necessary shifts of the cosmopolitan meaning away from facile and modernist accounts of feeling at home everywhere and nowhere? A slave trader can very well fit in this description, but we would feel some unease to typecast him as cosmopolitan or opt for an education that does not facilitate a discerning eye as

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[10] New cosmopolitans 'too quickly discard the core concepts of the social sciences because of their national associations, too quickly overstate the crisis of the nation state and the newness of the present condition, too quickly stigmatize nationalism as one-sidedly negative and elevate cosmopolitanism into an ideal' (Fine 2003: 465–6).

to what or who passes for cosmopolitan. However, this does not mean that the book concerns only political philosophers and critical theorists. As a collection of essays, the book aims to bring together voices from diverse disciplines in an inclusive though modestly indicative manner and to host a plurality of theoretical frameworks of cosmopolitanism and related ideas.

The book aspires to engage in the new dialogue on cosmopolitanism from a variety of outlooks and also to advance it and, at the same time, to problematize it through as yet unexplored paths. The included chapters investigate cosmopolitanism with an eye to its possible connections to other '-isms' such as Eurocentrism, postcolonialism, universalism, liberalism and utopianism. Thus, the comprehensive range of perspectives that is pursued includes a historical scope concerning conceptions of cosmopolitanism from antiquity to postmodern times as well as truly searching, thematic investigations of existing cosmopolitan theory. Unlike collections that have a more synchronic feel, the book includes material associated with all temporalities (past and present, historicizing or futurist). It regards such material as no less pertinent than that associated with 'current' discourses. From antiquity down to (post-)modernity, there have been important dimensions of politicizing sites of human entanglement that deserve attention. Yet, despite the accommodation of historical exploration, the emphasis of the book is clearly on a thematic basis that gives voice to newest and most diverse (culturally, geographically and theoretically) perspectives on cosmopolitanism. The authorial voices of the book represent a rich variety of standpoints, a variety that reflects efforts to avoid gendered selections of contributors or authority-based exclusions. Against such un-cosmopolitan attitudes of subtle privileges or even overt exclusions, the book includes voices of young academics as well as of established scholars, of European spatiality as well as of places beyond Europe and so on. In *performing* such diversity, the book differs from collections of essays on cosmopolitanism which glorify diversity yet include almost exclusively textuality from the major northwestern global cities and universities or centralize their approaches around a key figure of the field. In its effort to *enact rather than preach* cosmopolitanism, the book, both in its content and in its performativities, attempts to constitute a contribution of practical intent and theoretical import.

In accordance to the above rationale and description, the book is polycentric and, to adapt Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's view concerning minor writing (1986), it allows many entrances. Its four parts intersect and overlap without losing their self-standing position and distinctive character. That the first part touches upon instances in the conceptual history of cosmopolitanism does not entail a linear approach to cosmopolitan ideality. Rather, *Part One* complicates current treatments of cosmopolitanism by reminding us the rich, though now largely neglected, hermeneutic material of the past that contemporary views on (educational) cosmopolitanism cannot but presuppose and cannot but require ultimately to deal critically with.

The problematization of the rigid divisions in political ideality that affects our conceptions of cosmopolitanism and, further, our making them relevant to action (educational and other) is not only a matter of historicizing, enriching and revisiting our understandings of past stakes of cosmopolitanism. It is also accomplished with

a head-on, theoretical discussion, amongst other things, of dichotomies that ground polemical exclusions. A major such dichotomy related to the paths explored in *Part One* is that of 'patriotism versus cosmopolitanism' and that is precisely explored in *Part Two*. A commitment to undoing rigid demarcations of political ideality has been a common *topos* (yet certainly in different ways) of persuasions as diverse as critical pragmatism (Apel 1998) and deconstruction (Derrida 1990). However, little of this kind of work has been applied to the 'patriotism versus cosmopolitanism' dichotomy, despite theories such as those of rooted cosmopolitanism (Appiah 1997) that facilitate a more critical and less dichotomous engagement. This affects educational goal setting in multiple though as yet minimally explored ways. The second part of the book aims to direct investigation towards such as yet poorly theorized paths. The implications of this investigation are crucial for a cosmopolitanism whose acknowledgement of its rooted character does not diminish its ethico-political aspirations up to universal principles of justice.

Cosmopolitan theories that make demands on the self at the level of critique, justice and responsibility cannot but rely, ultimately, on the complex construction of the self, the shaping of a critical consciousness and the early cultivation of ethico-political mindsets. In other words, the critical edge of the cosmopolitanism(s) and patriotism(s) of the *second part* of the book can be driven home through associations with education and its moulding effects on the pliable human being. The *third part* undertakes such associations without 'easy' transferences from philosophy to education that render the latter a passive and less 'theoretical' recipient of the 'advances' of the former. Rather, *Part Three* begins with educational and institutional challenges that philosophy confronts. It then complicates the empirical grounds assumed by much educational cosmopolitanism questioning both the feasibility and desirability of such grounds. Educational cosmopolitanism thus emerges as a more complex and difficult operation than so far acknowledged, though certainly no less urgent for that matter. Its complexity and urgency is shown with regard to the example of Europe as well as Europe's 'beyond' in the figure of the (post)-colonial place.

Thinkers of cosmopolitanism now confront new tasks, whilst new philosophies are also invited to respond to cosmopolitan challenges, one of which, as we may extrapolate from *Part Three*, involves political education. *Part Four* begins with the challenge of political education and a most innovative response to it, namely, that of the French philosopher Alain Badiou and his renewal of universalism. It then proceeds with the ontological questions that universalism and cosmopolitanism confront to explore such questions through diverse perspectives ranging from philosophical framings such as Jane Bennett's, Giorgio Agamben's, Jacques Derrida's, Hannah Arendt's and Ernesto Laclau's. Yet, conceptual challenges thematized as early as in the first chapters of this book persist throughout it and are in no way resolved or superseded in a fashion that would justify a linear sense of readerly progression. Thus, as stated above, the polycentric structure of the book is further affirmed and valued as a discursive and edifying cosmopolitanism.

Coda tries to avoid the performativities of conclusions and last words and aspires only to problematize the concentric versus polycentric model of thinking about

cosmopolitanism. To this end, it introduces the eccentric geometrical metaphor of cosmopolitan ideality as an as yet neglected possibility of theorizing cosmopolitan allegiance and identification. The eccentric is not presented as a replacement of the concentric circles or of the rhizomatic model of cosmopolitanism but rather as an additional corrective and directive of them.

1.1 Part One

Olav Eikeland offers the relevant perspective for historicizing the cosmopolitanism of antiquity (against uniform accounts of it) and for contesting received, fashionable and uncritical associations of the history of cosmopolitanism with Stoicism alone (especially of the late Roman style). There is the assumption (also disseminated in educational theory) that ancient cosmopolitanism favours a utopian break with *topos* and roots. This still determines, for instance, Martha Nussbaum's accommodation of later Stoic denial of local attachment within the concept of cosmopolitanism as such (Nussbaum 2008: 80), even if only to reject it for the sake of a globally sensitive patriotism in her more recent works (ibid). Against the exclusive conceptual association of cosmopolitanism with, say, Marcus Aurelius, Eikeland makes an extremely important contribution to cosmopolitan literature by taking us some centuries further back to Aristotle and to his implicit cosmopolitan idea(l)s. Eikeland shows that what he terms Aristotle's *koinopolis* qualifies as an earlier than the Stoic concern with cosmopolitan views minus the unwarranted assumption of rootless and a-topic existence.

Topos, locality, as determining of conceptions of cosmopolitanism and visions of unity that marked the self-understanding of European modernity and purported to be universalist is most clearly illustrated in **Jouni Ahmajarvi's** study of Gunnar Landtman's nineteenth century vision of a united Europe. Against its own aspirations towards a detached, universalist ideal that resonates with 'human nature', Landtman's ideality emerges from Ahmajarvi's account as a truly rooted and spatio-temporally determined critical engagement with Darwinist evolutionist assumptions about humanity. Landtman's vision thus becomes available to the reader for a deconstruction of its claims as typical of its era and fraught with the '-isms' of that spirit of the time [*Zeitgeist*]. We may read this also as proof of the fact that cosmopolitanism is rooted, amongst other things, in the epistemological sense, that is, as an ideal about the world beyond *topos* that cannot be dissociated from the cognitive *topos* that generates it.

It is true that 'a more historical understanding of relations between past and future would no longer conceive of them in terms of a rigid *dichotomy* of perpetual violence and perpetual peace' (Fine 2003: 459). Challenging the view of some specific historical topoi as deprived of cosmopolitan (with or without quote marks) visions and debates, **Tommaso Visone** investigates the ideological wars of the early twentieth century with an eye to their 'universalism versus particularism' dilemmas. He turns to their paradigmatic certainties as well as to their explorative meanderings

in the 'Idea of Europe' to assert that, much against current uniform accounts of that era as exclusively or primarily focused on nationalist ideals, the 30s comprised a rich set of responses to various crises of the times that can be informative to our current conceptions of Europe. Therefore, Visone's essay constitutes yet another significant contribution to the prismatic and multidimensional undoing of the wrong-headed assumption that certain -isms are separated by huge divides.

1.2   Part Two

Just as local attachment has, historically, gone hand in hand in multiple ways with visions of the transcendence of its limits, patriotism and cosmopolitanism can also prove compatible as mutually corrective and directive ideals. To this end, as **Claudia Schumann** argues in her critique of Nussbaum's turn to a globally sensitive patriotism, we require a critical patriotism as much as we require a critical cosmopolitanism. Critiquing reified cultural identities relies on the assumption of the possibility of non-reified such identities and the possibility of reified globalist identities. Intricacies related to our inescapable situatedness and to the context-specific character of our critical stances compel us, according to Schumann's valuable perspective, to consider the prospect of patriotism beyond Nussbaum's rather uncomplicated endorsement of it and beyond the often uncritical reception of Nussbaum in education.

   The diachronic, historical view on modern assumptions about local attachment and detached identities, on the one hand, and the synchronic, theoretical treatment of patriotism and cosmopolitanism as allied ideals, on the other, as I have so far presented them in this deployment of the book, should not themselves give the impression of a binary opposition. As becomes evident in **Pradeep Dhillon's** engagement with Immanuel Kant and Walt Whitman, the historical optic of fully retrieving now neglected aspects of a philosopher's political ideals and of a poet's epic can make common cause with the critical-theoretical aspiration to rework the relation between cosmopolitanism and patriotism head-on. Dhillon's thought-provoking and highly original essay juxtaposes Kant's cosmopolitan and (usually overlooked) patriotic discourse with Whitman's "Passage to India". In so doing, Dhillon not only brings together philosophy and poetry *contra* a bipolar reasoning that often keeps them apart but also adapts them to a specific context, the American, to make them relevant to a critical educational cultivation of political ideals as a task of practical philosophy and educational theory.

   One of Whitman's verses asks: 'For what is the present after all but a growth out of the past?' (1, 13).[11] Regarding our topic, the past and present meet in various ways; chief amongst them is the manner in which the 'patriotism versus cosmopolitanism' debate has marked the issue of moral obligations (and their teaching in schools). Tensions of patriotism and cosmopolitanism constitute an underlying

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[11] http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/wwhitman/bl-ww-passagetoindia.htm.

assumption of much discourse concerning global distributive justice. Duties to our near and dear and duties to distant others are often differentiated and contrasted in order to ground different senses of justice. **Zdenko Kodelja** thoroughly and cogently explores social and global conceptions of distributive justice that have long been associated with obligations within the nation state and obligations beyond it, respectively. With valuable explanatory force, Kodelja's chapter examines why the main theoretical figures associated with social and global justice adopt their respective positions and then makes us think why a cosmopolitanism worthy of the name cannot be thought independently of global principles of justice. Likewise, it is made clear that the universality of law does not require global governance.

1.3   Part Three

In the context of an empirical reality where law and justice are mainly treated as intro-state operations and taught in schools in like manner, what are the challenges faced by a philosophical ideality of complex -isms that make demands upon the self? What subjectivities can match the critical cosmopolitan and critical patriotic expectation and how can such subjectivities be constructed or cultivated? Pedagogies of cosmopolitanism raise important issues concerning the teaching of philosophy, writes **Denise Egéa** in her inspirational contribution that pertinently draws on Jacques Derrida's right to philosophy and other insights that deconstruct some simplistic liberal equations. **Egéa** directs our attention to non-European institutional models and to a cosmopolitan education that heightens our sense of responsibility to otherness.

The picture of educational cosmopolitanism as it is often construed today is further complicated by **Niclas Rönnström's** insightful critique of the tendency to rely on the empirical grounds of cosmopolitanization. Introducing important distinctions from a socio-theoretical and philosophical scholarship, Rönnström convincingly argues that empirical grounds of cosmopolitanism that are now so popularized and disseminated in social sciences and educational discourses do not meet cosmopolitan normative requirements neither at the level of feasibility nor at that of desirability. Drawing on K.A. Appiah's philosophy, Rönnström promotes a notion of educational cosmopolitanism that is more demanding that the fashionable globalist one, more necessary in everyday schooling and more aware of its possible quality as a performative attitude.

Eli Vinokur's profound critique of less imaginative European ideality responds to yet another theoretical tendency that glorifies the empirical in an instrumental way: educational discourse on European citizenship today often ignores some deeper pedagogical-philosophical stakes of cosmopolitanism, as it remains engaged in and fascinated with the 'identity versus supra-identity' dilemmas that still inform many of its debates today. Vinokur astutely traces the normative deficits of educational discourse on Europeanness and of the European discourse on education back to the founding moment of the 'European Union' to its mainly monetary unifying

aspirations and its lack of a more radical vision of a cosmopolitan future. Vinokur's suggestion of an escape route comprises a decisionist framework of an either/or choice: confronted with a dilemma of imagining or perishing, Europeanness is invited to reinvent itself in more ethico-politically responsible and edifying ways beyond its current experience.

Yet, empirical reality and research can prove to open refreshing and nourishing paths to thought. Thus, the critique of the facile reliance on the empirical up to this point should not be construed as directed at the empirical as such but rather as a straightforward challenge at particular and theoretically impoverishing glorifications of current experiences or realities. **Penny Enslin** offers us another way out of the 'theory versus practice' straits. She pertinently begins with the issue whether cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism are easy or difficult bedfellows through an educational example. The example derives from a research project involving partnerships between Scottish pupils and their counterparts in Malawi. Enslin thus illustrates how the history of colonialism might be addressed by those who experienced it (unevenly, of course). She elegantly argues that material from this research resolves some apparent theoretical tensions and sheds light on some of the stakes of Europeans' relations with their former colonies.

1.4   Part Four

Bridging the third with the fourth part, **Torill Strand's** chapter introduces a most original perspective on both political education and philosophy's universal truth aspirations. She draws on Alain Badiou whose notion of a truth procedure breathes new life into the ideal of the universality of law and provides fertile ground for reworking cosmopolitan themes. Strand raises questions related to political education and to a renewed universalism by exploring Badiou's hypertranslation of Plato's *Republic*, a Badiouian work that aspires inclusively to 'synchronize' a diachronic pantheon of philosophical perspectives on truths and idealities. She thus makes known and available to philosophy of education an as yet under-theorized text of extreme relevance to an important direction that cosmopolitan theory may follow.

If one challenge and task confronting contemporary theory relates to the '-polis' part of cosmopolitanism, that of the universality of truths, of responsibility and of justice and the concomitant educational cultivation of such subjectivities, another challenge and task is ontological and concerns the 'cosmos' part of cosmopolitanism. Associating speculative materialism with cosmopolitanism, **Benhur Oral** undertakes this venture and sketches a new ontological horizon as an appropriate framework for cosmopolitan debates. Avoidance of old anthropocentrisms by enlarging the ontological scope of what counts as cosmos and as cosmopolitan response to otherness has clear and important political (and pedagogical) implications that Oral engagingly unravels. Chief amongst such implications is the undoing of rigid demarcations of human and nonhuman politicizations and the revisiting of the notion of global publics.

From a different ontological standpoint, one related to the 'accident' of human positioning in political conditions of life, **Nick Peim** sets out to explore biopower and to test the limits of cosmopolitanism in connection to encampment and the figure of the refugee. Employing state-of-the-art philosophical material such as Giorgio Agamben's notion of the camp, Peim's masterfully crafted chapter illustrates a (post) modern encampment through metaphorizing a TV programme and then draws on Derrida's cities of refuge and the aporetic character of hospitality along with the Derridean questioning of the homeliness of monolingualism. The ontological framework that emerges raises questions regarding the optimism of accounts of educational cosmopolitan potentialities and regarding the pessimism that attributes to education *qua* biopower an encampment nature.

Much of what is at stake in cosmopolitanism depends on the ontology and the conception of universalism that underpins cosmopolitan discourse. Heightening our awareness of this, **Tomasz Szkudlarek** turns to Ernesto Laclau's reformulation of universalism. Szkudlarek informatively broaches this subject by examining four dimensions of Laclau's revisiting of universalism that explain how the ethical void protects Laclau's universalism from falling into traps of metaphysics of presence. Through the distinction between the ontic realm of diverse plurality and the ontological realm of universal structures, Laclau's universalist ontology emerges as a possible reconstruction of cosmopolitan ideality through the analysis of rhetorics rather than of logics of social change. Thus, Szkudlarek's chapter adds, amongst its other important interventions, also significant nuance to the idea that runs through the book concerning the possibility of a non-toxic (Enslin and Tjiattas 2009) universalism and cosmopolitanism.

In the relevant and vast literature of cosmopolitanism (educational and other), the typical metaphor has, for years, been the concentric circles where the self enjoys an exclusive centrality even when the self appears attached to the outer circle of belonging (namely, the cosmopolitan). **Marianna Papastephanou**'s *coda* presents how the concentric circle metaphor has been challenged amongst other thinkers by Homi Bhabha and W. E. Connolly. The concentric is typically contrasted to the polycentric and the rhizomic. Papastephanou critiques these options (concentric, polycentric and rhizomic) and directs attention to the possibility of another geometric metaphor, that of the eccentric circles. The latter may illustrate a kind of de-centration of the self that enriches the cosmopolitan perspective with ever shifting circles. In eccentric cosmopolitanism, the centre is often the other, demanding a justice that ranges from discursive types up to more material types. This other invites us not quite to shrink our distance from her (something that can happen even in less cosmopolitically demanding cases of *modus vivendi* and *co-existendi*) but rather to create a critical distance from what appears to be our own, what pertains to our self, what comprises, for instance, our consolidated practices, perceptions, interpretations and actions that affect otherness.

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Part I
Antiquity and Modernity

Chapter 2
Cosmópolis or Koinópolis?

Olav Eikeland

2.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss similarities and differences between Aristotle and the ancient Stoics, relevant for approaching old and new concepts of *cosmópolis*.[1] The text is part of a more comprehensive work in progress that compares Aristotle's ethico-political thinking with that of the Stoics.[2]

Stoicism typically gets credit for the concept of "cosmópolis". The Stoic influence reflects, according to some, the imperial and universal ambitions of the Hellenistic era. Conversely, many see Aristotle's ethics and politics as clearly pre-cosmopolitan, i.e. conventional; ethnocentric, excluding foreigners, women, manual workers and

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[1] Discussions about the nature and relevance of cosmopolitanism have been running intensively over the last decades (e.g. Brown and Held 2010; Brock and Brighouse 2005; Appiah 2006; Beck 2006; Benhabib 2008; Delanty 2009; Harvey 2009; Kleingeld 2012; Lourme 2012; Zarka 2014). Papastephanou (2013) criticises some of these for focusing too much on descriptive and cultural aspects and too little on normative and ethical, as if cosmopolitanism consisted merely in acquiring a modern or postmodern, urban multicultural identity and attitude, relativising moral and political standards and cultural conventions, disdaining local ways and mores and cutting or "de-privileging" local loyalties and bonds. I sympathise with Papastephanou's critique, but this chapter will not intervene in this discussion directly.

[2] The Stoics came to dominate philosophy during the Hellenistic period (from 323 to 31 BC), after the death of both Aristotle (384–322 BC) and Alexander the Great (356–323 BC). It is unfortunate (and unfair) that we know ancient Cynicism and Stoicism only through fragmentary or secondary sources, doxographies and contemporary critics and opponents. Still, the differences between the schools depicted by these mediators and critics are important. Having worked on Aristotle for years (Eikeland 1997, 1998, 2008a, b), I will inevitably interpret other schools through Aristotelian coloured glasses. Space restrictions and selective use of source material and secondary literature make this chapter more like a prelude to the comprehensive argument.

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"natural slaves" from full citizenship; and bound to the size, form and culture of his contemporary Greek city-states, unable even to register the approaching doom of these city-states entailed in Alexander's contemporary military campaigns and imperial ambitions. The picture is more complex, however. As I indicate, some Aristotelian ideas involve a potential for conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism.

Concerning the genealogy, the Cynics, who apparently coined the concept "cosmópolis", were older than both Aristotle and Alexander. The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium in Cyprus (334–262 BC), started teaching philosophy more than 20 years after Alexander's death. The philosophers who influenced Alexander's presumed "universalism" and "cosmopolitanism" were not the Stoics. The idea of a cosmópolis appeared decades before Alexander's campaigns. The concept could not simply have been a *post factum* reflection of his ambitions and conquests. Empires, like the Persian, already existed as dominant and threatening powers.[3]

Certainly, there are reasons why Aristotle's philosophy appears pre-cosmopolitan, since, according to some interpretations, he left basic principles of ethics – the virtues (aretai) – outside the realm of reasoning or lógos and relegated them to conventionality and habit as "given".[4] Also, his suggested specific measures and provisions for the design of city-states seem parochial and dated. As active epistêmai, Aristotle's ethics and politics are deliberative (not deductive). As such, they may not contain much critical potential. However, I challenge (Eikeland 2008a) conventional interpretations, by reading Aristotle's ethics and politics as interconnected with the *Topica*, his mostly neglected, underrated, and misunderstood work on dialectics. Also, unlike current neo-Aristotelians, I read his dialectical theoretical and practical philosophy interconnectedly, not separately. There are underutilised potentials in Aristotle for an alternative, more productive and adequate conceptualisation of ethico-political ambitions similar to those of Cynic-Stoic cosmopolitanism. Explicating these aspects of his philosophy makes differences between Cynic and Stoic concepts more salient. Hopefully, this also shows how Aristotle – despite core differences – was more in line with the Cynics than with the Stoics.

Elaborating on similarities, differences and potentials is important for theorising *cosmópolis* or the koinópolis as we may call the Aristotelian version of cosmópolis.[5] Such theorisation can also prove relevant to current discussions about cosmopoli-

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[3]The Greeks considered such empires non-political, even antipolitical (Aristotle, Pol1313a34-1314a29), and perceived the enormous Persian Empire mostly as a giant oikos, or household, with a despótês, or, in political terms, a tyrant, on top (Llewellyn-Jones 2013:49). The Persian Empire was multi-ethnic but it was not a model for political ideas about cosmópolis. Neither was the cosmópolis identical to the oikouménê or known, inhabited world.

[4]Bernstein (1986:71–72/110–111) questions both Aristotle and Gadamer about what kind of discourse is appropriate when questions about the validity of basic norms (or universals) are raised and how modernity has removed their given, traditional character, supposed to be implied by Aristotle.

[5]The concept koinópolis is introduced and explained in Eikeland (1997:182–224, 387 and 400, and 2008a: 327–342, 370–371, 413, 422, 426, 434–447, 476, 489, 491, 497, 501). Koinópolis is not used in Greek, but koinopoliteía is; it signifies "commonwealth" or in German *Gemeinwesen*. The

tanism and "*Bildung*", or character formation, and for practical objectives connected to informal and non-formal organisational learning, personal mastery, etc. (Eikeland 2008a). Based on the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and on how ancient sources present differences between Cynic, Stoic and Peripatetic philosophy, I aim to elicit Aristotelian ethico-political thinking related to cosmopolitanism and to discuss some methodological principles and challenges inherent to different philosophical approaches.

Elsewhere (Eikeland 1997, 1998, 2008a, b) I reached conclusions similar to Schofield's (1999: 58, 97, 150) concerning the Stoics. He claims that Zeno's cosmópolis is a projection of the Stoic philosophy circle. The community of wise individuals is the model for the ideal constitution, suggested even by Diogenes Laertius (IV.15) when claiming that Socrates' follower, Antisthénês (446–366 BC), laid the practical foundations for the Cynic-Stoic constitution (politeía) through *personal* traits. As Schofield formulates it (1999:150):

> My guess is that Zeno thought that in a sense the informal community of teachers and students he presided over (…) in the Painted Stoa did itself constitute an attempt at forming a "city of virtue".

My own claim – *quod demonstrari debet* – is that while Schofield's conjecture may be hard to defend concerning the Stoics, Plato and Aristotle did work with the idealised relationships of the philosophical practice in their communities as a political standard and yardstick.[6] I believe this is the key to understanding how philosophy or wisdom as activity (sophía *and* phrónêsis) – not philosophers as conventional kings (*pace* Plato) – could provide political standards for citizenship. The perspective is indicated by Aristotle in stating that living in the company of good people is like training for virtue (áskêsís tis tês aretês) where people become constantly better (beltíous gínesthai) by activating their friendship and correcting each other (EN1100b20, 1159b3-7, 1165a29, 1165b13-23, 1169b28-1170a12, 1172a8-14).[7] The question is what constituted these communities and their internal relationships in the thinking of the Cynics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, respectively. What was their constitution (politeía)? Although their main criteria of design were superficially the same, i.e. reason and virtue, the philosophy schools came up with quite different answers to political challenges. These standards were universal, however, not merely Greek, indicating that they served a function similar to the Cynic cosmópolis.

Neither the Stoic cosmópolis nor the Aristotelian koinópolis is separate and independent from their respective general approaches to philosophy. Their respective "formulas" are integrated. They serve universal purposes specific and internal to their respective philosophies. Though this may be obvious concerning Stoicism, it needs to be shown in the case of Aristotle. To accomplish this, several aspects of

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point here is to pursue the comparison between this and the Cynic and Stoic concepts of cosmópolis.

[6] Richter (2011:63) too emphasises continuities between the political philosophy of Aristotle and the Stoics.

[7] In fact, I believe this represents Plato's somewhat mystical "seventh constitution" (hebdomê politeía) in the *Statesman* (303B).

these schools of thought, e.g. their different concepts of reason and, consequently, argumentative strategies, dialectics and reasoning, their different concepts of virtue, the nature of soul and mind, the role of emotions and the nature of and preconditions for "happiness" (eudaimonía), must be discussed. Such differences position the cosmópolis and koinópolis quite differently in relation to local traditions, habits, opinions, etc. Hence, the difference is *not* that Aristotle was local, conventional and "pre-cosmopolitan" while the Stoics were universal, nonconventional and cosmopolitan. Neither of them was conventional. Both promoted nonconventional, universal claims. Their way of relating the local and the universal is significantly different, but, I claim, the Aristotelian version is stronger in that it secures the universal, the particular, and their unity better than the Stoic version does.

Despite appearances, ancient cosmopolitanism was not primarily concerned with a transnational or supranational "world" state, government or apparatus nor with the paraphernalia of cultural urbanism in any modern sense. Nor did it simply mean abandoning local norms and values in favour of some kind of apolitical "natural life" outside any local pólis. Still, the philosophical cosmópolis was not a figment of the imagination. It was real, though non-local in a double sense. It was different from any historical, local city-state, wherever located and whatever size, since the cosmópolis was not located anywhere in particular, neither temporally nor spacially.

However, all this is stated here indicatively and inconclusively. Suggestions, outlines and sketches are, for reasons of space, only preliminary indicators of directions. In what follows, I discuss, nevertheless, in more detail a conflation that operates in discussions about ancient cosmopolitanism owing to the lack of analytical distinction between the "social" and the "political", and differences in Aristotelian and Stoic concepts of politics and law. These are all important for understanding the contents and differences between the Stoic cosmópolis and my suggested Aristotelian koinópolis. First, let me outline the philosophical background that frames ancient cosmopolitanism.

2.2   Ancient Cosmopolitanism: The Background

Ancient sources, e.g. Cicero (106–43 BC) (*Tusc*.V.xxxvii.108), Musonius Rufus (30–108 AD) (*That Exile Is No Evil*, in Nickel 1994, 451), Plutarch (46–120 AD) (*De Exilio* 600F–601A) and Epictetus (55–135 AD) (I.iv.6, III.xxiv.60–70), claim that Socrates (470–399 BC) considered himself a cosmopolitan (kósmios/*mundanum*). Socrates certainly *could* have called himself a kosmopolítês, judging from ways of thinking and acting ascribed to him by his contemporaries like Xenophon in *Memorabilia* (IV.iv.19–25) and Plato in the *Republic* (500E, 590A–592B. Cf. *Timaios* 90A, *Laws* 715E–717A). However, in Roman times, both non-Stoics such as Cicero and Plutarch, and Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus, saw themselves as kosmioi or kosmopolitai. They all claimed that the same, divine laws have validity for everyone (hoi autoì nómoi pásin), with a justice (dikê) used by everyone in

relation to everyone else *as citizens* (<u>polítas</u>). There is no longer any natural father-land (<u>phúsei gàr ouk ésti patrís</u>) (Plutarch, *De Exilio*, 600E–601B).[8]

Ethical and political tensions introduced by Socratic philosophy were discussed in terms of what is ethically, politically, technically, epistemically and similarly *good* and *bad* (<u>agathos</u> versus <u>kakos</u>/<u>phaulos</u>/<u>ponêros</u>), i.e. as tensions between knowledge and ignorance (<u>gnôsis</u>/<u>epistêmê</u> versus <u>ágnoia</u>, <u>amathía</u>, etc.) and between skill, competence or excellence and incompetence (<u>empeiría</u>/<u>aretê</u>/<u>tékhnê</u> versus <u>apeiría</u>, <u>amathía</u>, <u>agnôsía</u>, <u>kakía</u>) in different fields.[9] The main impact of Socratic philosophy, however – for some subversive and for others edifying – was the theorisation of nonconventional, if not *post*-conventional, excellence or virtue (<u>aretê</u>) and its individual, relational and institutional preconditions and ramifications in ethics and politics.

Definitions of virtue – its "what it is" (<u>tò tí estin</u>, <u>tò tí ên einai</u>) – were controversial, as most of Plato's dialogues attest. According to Aristotle (EN1120a6, cf. 1106a14-26, 1107a8, MM1185a39), however, the basic general meaning of <u>aretê</u> is what makes any "thing" or activity work at its best (<u>áristos</u>). According to Zeno of Citium, <u>aretê</u> is the perfection of anything in general (DL VII.90, 94). We may think of virtue as acquired skill, competence or excellence, in any field. Yet, increasingly, in ancient philosophy virtue meant acquired *ethical* and *political* excellence, *distinguished from* technical perfection. All the Socratics considered achievement of virtue and performance of virtuous acts something for which we deserve personal praise and, correspondingly, personal blame for their absence or neglect. Acquiring virtue and performing virtuously are not merely given by nature without effort, or products of external, circumstantial causes (like eye colour, weather conditions, etc.). Like achieving and maintaining physical fitness, attaining virtue and performing virtuously are *up to us*. Our personal will and intentional effort are required. Consequently, at least to an extent, we are personally responsible for their acquisition and performance (Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, 13–19, etc.).

More broadly, then, the philosophers struggled with normative *dimensions of validity* – i.e. distinctions between true and false, right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, useful and harmful, beautiful and ugly, praise and blame, etc. – and their application to ethics, politics, knowledge, acquired experience (<u>empeiría</u>), and

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[8] *Every* land is fatherland to me (<u>pasa gê moi patrís</u>), Philo Judaeus (20 BC–45 AD) writes (*Quod Omnis*, 145).

[9] The concepts and role of reason (<u>nous</u>, <u>lógos</u>), pleasure (<u>hêdonê</u>), nature (<u>phúsis</u>), habit/*habitus*/character (<u>éthos</u>/<u>héxis</u>/<u>êthos</u>), exercise/practice/habituation (<u>áskêsis</u>/<u>melétê</u>/<u>ethismós</u>), teaching (<u>didaskalía</u>) and learning (<u>máthêsis</u>) and written and unwritten, natural (<u>phusikós</u>), conventional (<u>nomikós</u>) and positive rule or law (<u>nómos</u>/<u>thesmós</u>) were also discussed (DL II.31–33, VI.8, VI.10–11, VI.11, VI.12). In light of later tradition, these distinctions are often interpreted moralistically, as merely moral (as arbitrary "values" or opinions) *rather than* cognitive. For both Socrates and the Stoics, however, moral errors were mainly cognitive and hardly separated. Although both moral and cognitive errors and insufficiencies may be within our own power and responsibility to control or influence and hence justified as objects of praise and blame, sorting morally evil intentions from cognitive incompetence and inability (lack of knowledge, inexperience, stupidity) is a continuous challenge.

every local habit and skill (DL VI.8, DL VI.10–12). What *is* ethical and political <u>aretê</u>? What is the nature and role of reason (<u>nous</u>/<u>lógos</u>)? How do these relate and apply to conventional daily life, ways of doing things, opinions, attitudes, customs, traditions and external, causal nature or fate?

Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics all found the nonconventional standard of virtue and the ultimate good in nature as its perfection (*perfectio naturae*) (Cicero, *Academica*, I.v.19–20). Nothing contrary to nature is noble, as Aristotle maintains (Pol1325b9-10). The question is, however, what this "nature" (<u>phúsis</u>) could mean. It was not identical to the extraneously reified and material "nature" of the philosophy of nature or modern science, with its "laws of nature". Nor was it merely a-conventional; independent from, external and prior to culture and civilisation; and the abandonment of all culture, civilisation and conventions.

2.3   Cynic Cosmópolis

The earliest known, explicit pursuers of cosmopolitanism were the Cynics, issuing directly from the circle of Socrates' immediate followers in the late fifth century BC.[10] The Cynic philosopher Diogenes[11] – an older contemporary of Aristotle – was the first to claim explicitly to be a citizen of the world, a <u>kosmopolítês</u> (DL, VI.63). He is considered among the first to uphold a form of cosmópolis as a normative standard of measurement for judging local conditions, by declaring "the only true (or correct) commonwealth (or constitution) to be the universal one (<u>mónên te orthên politeìan einai tên en kósmô</u>)" (DL, VI.72). Accordingly, he did not see local city-states as truly political or constitutional. Diogenes did not identify with any local community or household and was deprived of a fatherland (<u>ápolis</u>, <u>áoikos</u>, <u>patrídos esterêménos</u>) (DL VI.38). He adopted a highly unconventional lifestyle, spectacularly breaking and provocatively challenging as unnatural, most of the local and conventional opinions and rules of conduct and decency in Athens and other city-states (DL VI.71).[12] The Cynics strongly influenced the early Stoics. The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, was an apprentice of several philosophical

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[10] This ancient school of philosophy is different from modern so-called cynicism, however. The ancient Cynics were "self-sacrificial", i.e. willing to sacrifice *themselves* through their personal lifestyle, for ideas and standards from philosophical ethics. The modern cynics are willing to sacrifice *others* for arbitrarily chosen causes, whether grand political designs or selfish interests.

[11] Diogenes (404–323 BC) was an exile from Sinope on the southern coast of the Black Sea. This status as a stranger to all local conditions and circumstances – at home nowhere but able to adapt anywhere (DL VI.12, 22, 49) – seems to have been important for his self-perception as a philosopher (DL VI.49, VI.30, 36). It became important for later Stoics too.

[12] Diogenes roamed the city-states searching with a torch in broad daylight for "a man" (<u>ánthrôpon zêtô</u>, DL VI.41, 27, 32, 60), presumably a "true man" or a "true citizen" of the only "true" commonwealth or city, i.e. another <u>kosmopolítês</u> like himself. Diogenes Laertius (V.17) ascribes similar sayings to Aristotle.

schools and individuals. Chief among the Cynic influences on Zeno was that of the "third-generation" Cynic philosopher, Crates of Thebes (365–285 BC) – who, like his teacher Diogenes, claimed to be a cosmopolitan (DL VI.93, 98).

Besides cosmopolitanism, the Cynics and the early Stoics shared a disdain for emotions (tò apathés) and pleasure (hêdonê) (DL VI.2–3,15); an elevated arrogance and condescending scorn towards conventional values, customs and opinions (DL VI.42–43, 47, 71, 83, 104); and a contempt for conventional status and authorities (DL VI.38, 72, 92, 104). The Cynics even considered disrepute (adoxía) and toiling labour (pónos) good things (DL VI.11). Both Cynics and Stoics searched for "virtue" (aretê), construed virtue as natural (kata phúsin) (DL VI.71, VII.128, AD 11b) and thought that, as a standard of excellence, virtue was *not* conventional. However, virtue was attainable *through* reason and careful practical training (DL VI.24, 27, 43, 70–71), not through abandoning reason and civilisation.

Both Cynics and Stoics thought of virtue as an inalienable weapon, *sufficient* in itself for "happiness" and protected by walls of impregnable reasoning (DL VI.11–13, VII.40, Philo, *Quod Omnis*, 151–152, Cicero, *De Legibus*, I.xxiv.62). They considered virtue the same for women and men and esteemed honesty above family ties and local loyalties (DL VI.12, VII.120).[13] Nobility belongs *only* to the virtuous, not to any traditionally established social groups (DL VI.10–11). By definition, virtuous, wise individuals are friends of each other and of the gods and, by sharing reason (lógos), belong to the community of the gods (DL VI.37, 51, 72). The wise individual does nothing wrong (anamártêtos).

Finally, to the Cynics, whatever is *between* virtue and vice, like wealth, health, looks, fame, pedigree, social status, local traditions, fate, strokes of good or bad luck, pleasure and pain, and even life and death, is totally indifferent for virtue or happiness. They are externalities which we cannot fully control or be personally responsible for. As such, they are intermediates of no ethical concern. This view is important for understanding the context and the gradually emerging difference between Cynicism and Stoicism (DL VII.160, 165). Mainstream Stoics modified and finally abandoned this view about the intermediates being completely indifferent. For the Cynics, however, such intermediates constituted dimensions of diversity that did not make any ethical difference, nor did they influence "happiness" (DL VI.105). Making the intermediates indifferent sets you free from fate *qua* external determination. The radical trivialisation and relativisation of everything outside the categories of ethical virtue and vice also contribute much to understanding the indecencies of the Cynics as practical demonstrations that such intermediates really did not matter when judging the character or êthos of an individual. It emphasised that a ravaged beggar or "barbarian" slave could be morally virtuous and ethically far superior to any opulent Greek king or "nobleman", who often was an utterly vicious slave of his passions and other worldly interests and forces. These are all

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[13] Aristotle held similar views. The proverbial *amicus Plato*, *sed magis amica veritas* paraphrases Aristotle's remark in EN1096a11-17.

fourth-century Cynic opinions, elaborated further in the third by early Stoics like Zeno, Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 BC) and Chrysippus of Soli (280–207 BC).[14]

A major difference, however, between Cynics and early Stoics was the antitheoretical attitude and claim of the Cynics that the acquisition of virtue was primarily practical (tôn ergôn) (DL VI.11). Accordingly, the Cynics, like the deviant early Stoic, Ariston of Chios, paid close attention to ethics – i.e. to practical character formation (êthos) – but did not care much about natural philosophy and logic, declaring "dialectical reasonings" (dialektikoi lógoi) to be useless artefacts resembling spiderwebs (DL VI.73, 103, 160–163, Cicero, *De Legibus* I.xiii.38). Although lógos was needed (DL.VI.24), Cynicism was mainly a way of life – a practice – and was nicknamed a shortcut to virtue (súntomos ep'aretên hodós) (VI.103–104, VII.121). The mainstream Stoics, however, emphasised theory, doctrine, and formal reasoning in order to attune themselves to the more elevated "lógos" they perceived as a comprehensive and rational law permeating the cosmos. The Stoics were Socratic in emphasising the epistemic aspects of virtue. For both the Cynics and Aristotle, however, virtue was not primarily epistêmê in this narrow sense but skill, competence or "know-how". The Stoics, reconnecting to Presocratic natural philosophy, derived their ethics more or less deductively, directly from natural philosophy (DL VII.40). Pradeau (2015) emphasises this strand within ancient cosmopolitical thinking from the Presocratic philosophers of nature, via Plato, to the Stoics in their common effort to harmonise the individual, the city, and the universe. The Cynics could hardly have shared this view, however, since they consciously neglected formal logic and the philosophy of nature as unimportant. In fact, these strands constitute a fault line between the Cynics and Aristotle on the one hand emphasising practice and ethics, and the line of continuity drawn by Pradeau on the other hand, where ethics and the philosophy of nature are mixed or even conflated.

With some exceptions, the Socratic philosophical schools were not antipolitical or apolitical. The Cynic Antisthénês, referring to non-local standards, claimed that the wise "will take part in politics (politeúsesthai), not in accordance with the established, conventional laws but in accordance with the law of virtue" (DL VI.11, 104). This displays the tension, not only between Cynicism and local customs but, more generally, between Socratic philosophy and conventionality as such. Antisthénês claimed that city-states unable to distinguish the ethically bad from the ethically good were doomed (DL VI.5–6, cf. Aristotle, Rh1360a23-32, EN1126a12-13). Like Socrates, who paradoxically claimed to be one of very few practising politics in democratic Athens (Plato's *Gorgias*, 521D), Diogenes claimed his art to be "governing men" (anthrôpôn arkhein) (VI.74, VI.29, Philo *Quod Omnis*, 123), indicating that philosophical practice, in itself and at its core, was considered political, in fact,

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[14] It is important, however, to remember that the early Stoics in the third century BC differed decisively from later Stoics, ranging from Panaetius (180–110 BC) and Posidonios (135–51 BC) to Seneca (4–65 AD), Musonius Rufus (20–101 AD), Epictetus (55–135 AD) and Marcus Aurelius (121–180 AD), on points central to this discussion. The Anti-Stoic Plutarch, or Cicero, both belonging to a Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, differed much less from their approximately contemporary Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus, than Plato and Aristotle differed from early Stoics.

the epitome of politics. At least nominally, the Cynics sought ethico-political nobility (kalokagathía) like Plato and Aristotle (DL VI.27, Epictetus III.xxii, 69) and praised freedom (eleuthería) and frankness or freedom of speech (parrhêsía), above all else (DL VI.69, 71).

For Aristotle (Pol1294a11-12, 1290b1-20, Rh1366a3-7), the standard of measurement (hóros) in an aristocracy is *virtue*, while in a democracy it is *freedom*, presumably *true* virtue and *true* freedom. Aristotle, however, criticises ancient democracies for misunderstanding what freedom is (Pol1310a26-35, 1318b39-1319a2). The philosophical conception of freedom was no *laissez-faire*, letting everyone act arbitrarily, at will, without knowledge and understanding. True freedom is having the authority to act independently or autonomously (exousían autopragías), not being pushed, pulled, seduced, or subdued by other individuals or circumstantial forces. For the Cynics and Stoics, only the wise are free (DL VII.121–122). Bad men are slaves of emotions and determined by social, economic, psychological, biological efficient causes and other extraneous, situational, material, and circumstantial forces. Hence, not every inclination or voluntary preference reflects autonomy, competence, or freedom. Nor are nobility, liberty, and liberation formal designations or statuses, transferable by inheritance or achievable by ritual proclamations. Only real, personal knowledge or competence renders its carriers or performers free, since freedom and autonomy require competent and conscious adjustment to the general nature of the case and to current circumstances. Ancient democracy, in Aristotle's terminology (Pol1319a1-2, 1317a40-b17), was based on the "negative" concept of freedom as the simple removal of external restrictions, but it did nothing to promote, individually or collectively, the virtue needed by everyone to become "masters of living". Mastery and living in freedom require knowledge of and skill in handling certain "things" (pragmata) (Eikeland 2008a :198–202). In Stoic terms, it was an art (*ars vivendi*) requiring personal practice, knowledge, effort, and will. Negative freedom was a necessary precondition for the development of this art, but not sufficient.

The early Socratics differed in their conceptualisations of the relationship between the public citizen relations of the pólis and the private, complementary, and role-based relations of the oikos or household. Still, their philosophical solution was not generally to restrict formal, negative freedom for citizens, although this is where Aristotle and the Stoics agree and differ from Plato and Socrates. The latter two did not recognise any difference of principle between a small pólis and a large household. According to Aristotle, however, assimilating or conflating a pólis and a household conceptually and practically would destroy the pólis by redefining citizens from free individuals to subordinated, heteronomous servants, slaves, and subjects in an authoritarian, hierarchical household constitution (oikos) (Pol1274a16-18, 1328b14-15). Philosophy's ambition and project was to unite true freedom (true democracy) and true virtue (true aristocracy) in a community of constitutionally ordered citizenry (politeía). Epictetus (III.xxii.24, III.xxii.67) claims that Diogenes considered himself a political scout or avant-garde (katáskopos) through his personal lifestyle, exploring the "city of the wise" (pólis sophôn) before

others and providing practical personal testimony among his contemporaries as a messenger from this latent or emergent city.

2.4 Stoic Paradoxes: An Outline of Differences Between Aristotle and the Stoics

Cicero (*De Finibus* III.ii.5, III.iii.10, III.xii.41, IV.iv.8, IV.v.13; *De Legibus* I.xiii.38) claims that the differences between the early schools of Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics are terminological. Zeno invented new *terms* but did not discover new ideas (*rerum*). Hence, in substance, they all agreed. There are, however, many differences, hardly as superficial as Cicero claims. Most have a bearing on how the cosmópolis is conceptualised. Delving critically into them is part of explaining how an Aristotelian koinópolis can safeguard cosmopolitan ambitions and intentions better than the Stoic conceptualisation.

The Stoics are famous for formulating their philosophy in paradoxes, i.e. claiming as true provocative assertions that apparently contradict prevailing common opinions. Before them, one of Socrates' strategies was to put forward paradoxical and thought-provoking claims to his interlocutors.[15] Generally, the Cynic and Stoic strategy of paradoxical argumentation consisted in attempting to prove that something widely accepted as "good" in some sense, rightfully belonged only to the wise and virtuous, i.e. to the knowledgeable. Their starting point is the commonsensical distinction between real, true, or perfect representatives of any category and incomplete or fake particulars, the realisation that not every glimmering thing is gold. The Socratic turn in philosophy based itself on the perceived difference between real wisdom (sophía) and fake pretenders like the sophists (Aristotle, SE165 a 20–25).

Aristotle discusses parádoxa – assertions contradicting éndoxa or prevalent opinions – as part of a conversational approach in the *Topica* (104a11-12, 104b18-28). Although he considers it right to include paradoxical statements made by presumably wise individuals as theses or hypotheses in critical dialectical exchanges (APo72a6-25), he is not fond of using paradox as an argumentative strategy. Revealing impasses or aporias may promote further inquiry. Catching people purposely in perplexity or stalemates over paradoxes is a sophistical and rhetorical technique, however (Top111b32-112a15, SR165b15, 172b29-173a32, 174b12-18, EN1146a22-30, Rh1399a35-39). Aristotle is irritated with people purposely defending paradoxical statements.[16] The paradoxical strategy was part of the Cynic and early Stoic contempt (kataphrónêsis, oligôría) towards everything conventional.

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[15] Cf. the "proto-Stoic" Socratic strategy in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (III.ix.10–11) claiming that only those who know how to govern are real kings, not those who happen to find themselves on a throne.

[16] Such as the later Stoic opinion that the wise will be happy even on the torture rack (EN1095b31-1096a4).

Posing paradoxical theses against local customs and opinions was deliberately provocative, confrontational and antithetic, springing from an arrogant and condescending attitude of firm belief in the stupidity of conventions and reasoning as a fortified stronghold of truth.

Aristotle generally recommends a different approach in serious dialogical encounters, not *contradicting* common opinions directly (paradoxa) but moving critically *through* common opinions (dià éndoxôn); playing out; distinguishing and exploring ambivalences, inner tensions and contradictions; proving them right in certain senses but not in others; and solving or dissolving paradoxes. This strategy was not confrontational but critically dialogical or dialectical, working from within the habitual, and based on an initial confidence in the experience (empeiría) of everyday practitioners (Eikeland 1997:224–237; 2008a:205–270).[17] Aristotle recommends dealing with posed paradoxes by developing and extracting definitions in this way (Metaph.1012a18-24, 1012b5-9). Within Stoicism, Panaetius (185–110 BC) arrived at a final settlement with what he considered arrogant and confrontational Cynic residues in Stoicism. He explicitly endorsed the Aristotelian méson or middle (*modestia/mediocritas*), bringing with it revisions of several other early Stoic dogmas (Eikeland 1997:467–470). Other school differences concerned the nature and role of dialectics (formal and deductive *versus* informally inductive), the nature of virtue (discontinuous *versus* continuous, knowledge versus skill), the nature of soul and mind (unitary *versus* diverse), the nature and role of emotions (eradicate mental perturbations *versus* cultivate psychological powers) and the nature of and preconditions for happiness (virtue alone *versus* virtuous practice combined with other goods).

A paradox posed by the Stoics was the claim that only the wise is dialectic (dialektikòn mónon einai tòn sophón) (DLVII.83). Only educated people already knowledgeable of logical rules could really argue; hence, only the wise is dialectic. The general Stoic emphasis on theory made them more didactic and their concept of dialectic more formal and deductive. The Stoics neglected the inductive, topical part of dialectic (*ars inveniendi*), while they followed the Peripatetics in the deductive part (*ars disserendi*) (Cicero's *Topica*, I.6, XIV.56–57 and *De Finibus*, IV.iv.8–10). The Stoics tended to reduce dialectic to the application of formal rules of inference (Eikeland 1997:415–447). Aristotle thinks differently about dialectic, which is directly relevant to the conceptualisation of koinópolis and universalism. Dialectic was *not* merely the application of formal rules of inference. Aristotle *introduced* the term lógos logikós to distinguish formally correct juggling with words as sophistical, from serious dialectic (Eikeland 2008a:236 and 244). For Aristotle, dialectic was not something only the wise could legitimately engage in, nor was it juggling with words, however formally correct. The common principles of dialectic or what Aristotle called tà koiná – inductive, deductive, informal, and formal aspects – are

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[17] Its primary aim was to develop habits into virtue practically, starting with prevalent opinions (éndoxa) within experienced communities of practice and how members talk about their expertise and experiences (legómena), critically examining how things appear (phainómena), sorting different meanings of words (posakhôs légetai), examining the different opinions and meanings (tàs doxas exetazein), arguing *pro et contra* to make solutions (lúseis) emerge.

all always already in use by everyone, significantly for how we should theorise universalism. Most users are neither aware of them nor able to articulate them clearly (SE172a21-b4). In Greek both ancient and modern, the expression tà koiná – literally, the commons – means common or public affairs *res publicae* in Latin and forms the basis for the Aristotelian koinópolis.

This, again, reflects another difference between Aristotle and early Stoics. For Aristotle, there is an important distinction between continuous and discontinuous dimensions or entities. There are either few or many apples in a bucket but there is more or less water, not few or many. The amount of apples is discontinuous, the amount of water continuous. Like water, for Aristotle, powers or potentials, practices, habits, skills, and virtues – *including dialectic* itself – were continuous. Hence, there are and must be subconscious seeds of all the virtues inchoately present in everyday practices, which can and should be cultivated, developed, and extracted. This was an important premise for his thinking about ethical perfection as hitting the middle (of a target) (tò méson) (EN1106a26-29, EE1220b21-27). Hence, we can be more or less competent and knowledgeable, not just either competent or not. We can even miss our target in different directions, by either exaggerating or under-achieving and understating.

For the Stoics, however, the field of virtue and knowledge was discontinuous. Virtue and knowledge were separate, like apples, sharply defined and segregated from all forms of insufficiency and error. As with a mathematically defined straight line, there are only two categories, straight or crooked and right or wrong. Even minimal aberrations are wrong or crooked. Hence, all errors were equal – another famous paradoxical statement (DL VII.120–121), related to the Cynic assertion that anything between virtue and vice is indifferent (DL VII.127). The early Stoics apparently exacerbated the dichotomy, however. With only two mutually exclusive relevant categories and no continuity or degrees, no more or less, it did not matter *how* wrong you were. Accordingly, there is no "more or less" concerning virtue and, one would think, hardly any ethically indifferent intermediates. Either you are a wise individual, perfect in virtue and knowledge or a fool who fails. Whether you drown in shallow water (close to perfection) or in deep water (far from perfection) is indifferent, and so it is with virtue and vice. Whether you are almost perfect, or a serious sinner, is indifferent. Consequently, according to opponents, the concept of progress or improvement (prokopê/*progressio*) became impossible to understand.

The Stoics used much effort defending, explaining, and modifying this dogma over the centuries.[18] Ultimately, Panaetius and his contemporary Stoics abandoned it (Eikeland 1997:467–470). Posidonius' (135–51 BC) "proof" that virtue is real by reference to the progress (prokopê) made by the pre-Stoic Socrates, Antisthénês and Diogenes indicates how the dichotomous perfectionism of the older Stoics tended to make virtue merely theoretical and progress impossible (DL VII.91). It also indicates that Socrates and the early Cynics did not share this kind of perfectionism (DL VI.64). According to the Peripatetics, there were *not* only indifferent things between

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[18] With more space, discussing the Stoic concept of oikeíôsis and their modifications of the intermediates into preferables and non-preferables would be appropriate. Cf. Bees (2004).

vices and virtues of the soul. Although not part of the virtues themselves, external (wealth) and bodily goods (health) count as instruments to be used for bad or good purposes and supporting "happiness". Progress or improvement is also *between* vice and virtue. This is *not* indifferent but *essential* for the Aristotelian koinópolis as a way (hodós) forward or upward (DLVII.127, Cicero, *Academica*, I.v.20).

Virtue was mainly knowledge (epistêmê) for the Stoics. They did not recognise any ontological distinction between soul (psukhê/*animus*) and mind (nous/*mens*), important for Plato and Aristotle. The Stoic soul was unitary and cognitive. According to their doctrine, cognitively based virtue was the only real good, sufficient for happiness. Aristotle emphasised that happiness or eudaimonía consisted of activities of virtuous practice. Both Cynics and Stoics also recommended apatheía or a lack of emotions. The Stoics were radical cognitivists. They argued that emotions were disturbed thinking (*perturbationes*), binding people to externalities. They should be eradicated by means of correct and clear thinking. For Aristotle, however, emotions were semi-rational motivational forces of the soul (psukhê), ontologically different from thoughts of the mind (nous). Although he saw uncultivated emotions as obstacles to clear thinking and to ethically good judgement, emotions should not be eradicated. They should be cultivated to support the search for knowledge, competence, and ethico-political virtue. According to the Peripatetics, emotions were motivators. Eliminating them was like removing the motor moving us. All the formally correct and convincing arguments in the world in support of loving your parents would never alone be able to make you actually love your parents, as Plutarch points out (*De Virtute Morali*, 445 B–446 D). Something different from argumentation is required.

The Stoics also based their epistemology on perceptual impressions (Inwood 1985). Despite an apparent similar empiricism in Aristotle, his understanding of knowledge and its generation was practically based (Eikeland 1997, 2008a). Finally, the Stoics were determinists concerning everything external including our own bodies. We cannot control external things, which constitute a world of deterministic causality and unfreedom. How we take things, however, depends on us, i.e. how we evaluate and judge what we perceive. This was the realm of (inner) freedom and personal responsibility. Zeno's successor Cleanthes appears to have used a simile of a dog tied to a horse and cart to illustrate the human condition (Long and Sedley, 62A). The dog following willingly is free. The resisting dog is unfree. Aristotle's thinking about continuous potentials and activities gave space for a different, more dynamic approach, illustrated by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD) in his *De Fato*.

2.5   Neither Greek Nor Jew: The Unity of Mankind?

Plutarch's summary in *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* (329A-B, 342A-B) of Zeno's work *Politeía* has served as a basis for connecting the Stoics and Alexander, crediting this connection with first introducing an unqualified idea of "the unity of

mankind", putting aside the division between "Greek" and "Barbarian", and for identifying this with cosmopolitanism.[19] Plutarch (329B–D) claims that Alexander realised Zeno's dream of a well-ordered philosopher's commonwealth (eunomías philosóphou kaí politeías) by asking everyone to consider the whole inhabited world (hê oikouménê) as their fatherland.

Yet, for chronological reasons, Alexander's empire could not have been a realisation of the *Stoic* cosmópolis. The philosophers closest to Alexander were Cynics and Peripatetics. He knew both Diogenes and Aristotle (DL V.4–5, VI.32, 38, 60, 68). In Plutarch's narrative, Aristotle counsels Alexander to treat non-Greek peoples in despotic ways as if they were animals or plants (329B). However, Aristotle's discussion of relations to foreign peoples and states in *Politics* (1323a14-1328a22) indicates the opposite. He criticises Plato for recommending harshness towards strangers (1328a9-11). Aristotle himself writes:

> it is not right to be cruel against anybody, and men of great-souled nature (hoi megalópsukhoi) are not fierce except towards wrongdoers (adikountas).

Ethical error and injustice exist within all peoples. Aristotle finds the same diversity concerning suitedness for virtue and political life among the Greeks as between different non-Greek peoples (1327b33-34).

Nevertheless, Plutarch reintroduces a philosophical distinction in order to qualify the empire's universalism. Alexander did not extend citizenship to everyone. He wanted "world citizenship" to be the privilege of "the good" (tous agathous), while "the wicked" (toùs ponêroús) were to be excluded, as if Alexander intended to make his empire consist of philosophically virtuous individuals regardless of ethnicity. The change as reported by Plutarch might seem more "cosmetic" than cosmic, however.[20] To Plutarch, the intention was to start defining "a Greek" not by Greek language, clothes, manners, food, etc. but by ethical virtue (aretê) regardless of any ethnic characteristics, i.e. to let "good people" qualify as "Greek". In the same way, ethnicity should no longer define "Barbarian" but simply ethical "badness" (kakía).[21]

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[19] Plutarch writes: "the much-admired *Republic* (Politeía) of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect (haíresis), may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity (allà pántas anthrôpous hêgômetha dêmótas kaì polítas), and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all (heis dè bíos ê kaì kósmos), even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field (hôsper agélês sunnómou nomô koinô suntrephoménês). This Zeno wrote, giving shape to a dream or, as it were, shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth (eunomías philosóphou kaì politeías)" Schofield (1999:104–111) dismisses Plutarch's summary as a replication of Zeno's Politeía and interprets it as Plutarch's own dream. Bees (2011:311–327), on the other hand, sees Plutarch's summary as «*zweifellos authentisch*».

[20] Schofield (1999:107) writes, "few today, (…), believe that Alexander was any sort of philosopher or that his campaigns were conceived in the hope of instituting a single community of all good men everywhere". This is probable, but does not exclude influence on Alexander by any philosophical ideas.

[21] Strabo (64 BC–24 AD) (*Geography* I.4.9) ascribes the same story to Eratosthénês of Cyrene (276–194 BC), this time simply replacing the terms "Greek" and "Barbarian" with "virtuous" and

The story echoes Antisthénês' warning that communities unable to distinguish the ethically good from the bad would be doomed, and his recommendations to count all wickedness foreign (<u>tà ponêrà nómize pánta xeniká</u>) and everything between vice and virtue – i.e. all kinds of merely ethnic differences – indifferent.

2.6   Concepts of Unity, Sociality, Politics and Law

When searching ancient sources for cosmopolitanism, (1) the socially amiable attitude of solidarity and care for humanity and all human beings[22] must be distinguished from (2) the exclusivist Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism. Ancient cosmopolitanism is not reducible to asserting the social nature of man plus a philanthropic attitude reaching out to all human beings. Both the Cynics and the early Stoics restricted true citizenship – i.e. membership in the cosmópolis – to the wise, even to the never erring, perfectly wise individuals (DL VII.33).[23] Aristotle expressed similar sounding ideas about both the social nature of man and citizenship, which still turned out very differently within his philosophical approach.

Aristotle recognises a universal and natural mutual affection and friendliness within species, *particularly* among human beings (EN1155a19-22), a community (<u>koinônía</u>) and a kind of justice (<u>díkaión ti</u>), reaching beyond any local <u>pólis</u> (EE1242a26-28). To him (Pol1278b20-22, EN1169b17-21, MM1210a4), human beings also desire each other's company and living together even without direct interdependence. Universal philanthropy is praiseworthy, he writes. Philanthropy is not necessarily cosmopolitanism, however. The late Stoic Hierocles' (fl. second century AD) famous but unoriginal argument about expanding concentric circles of ethical concern (Ramelli: 2009:91 ff.), sometimes invoked as cosmopolitanism, also concerns philanthropy and the *social* nature of man, hardly politics or cosmopolitics. Hierocles is strictly conventional, placing his universal philanthropic concern fully inside given social roles. Philosophical-political cosmopolitanism transcends such roles, however. Although the Stoics may have thought differently, it is not *qua* players of specific but indifferent social roles that Cynics qualify as members of the cosmópolis. It is *qua* being *more* than restricted and indifferent roles, systemically defined within the local <u>pólis</u> or <u>oikos</u>, as Aristotle indicates.

Aristotle (EN1161a31-b10) points out that there can be no friendship with a slave *qua* slave, any more than there can be friendship with inanimate things. A slave is some master's living tool. The slave role is conventional and socially or systemically defined, however, although Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoics all

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"bad", respectively, without redefining "Greek" and "Barbarian". As Strabo writes, there are many bad Greeks and many virtuous Barbarians.

[22] Described by Epictetus (I.10–15, 19, 20–21, II.15–16, 22), Cicero (*De Finibus* II.xiv.45, III. xix.62–66, IV.vii.16–17, V.xxiii.64–68, *De Officiis*, I.54) and many others

[23] Philo Judaeus writes (Leg.All.III.1–3), "virtue is a city-state peculiar to the wise (<u>pólis oikeía tôn sophôn hê aretê</u>)".

considered some people as "slaves" or "servants" by nature, due to their soul's condition. Still, Aristotle distinguished this from "conventional slavery" in which anyone arbitrarily could become the legal property of somebody else by force or decree (Pol1255a4-6). Hence, there *can* be friendship with a slave *qua* human being, i.e. outside the conventional role, as far as she/he can communicate and share in law (nómos) and contract (sunthêkê), i.e. to the extent that she/he masters lógos. For Aristotle, friendship and justice are coextensive with some sort of community and equality, and this does exist among all human beings as such. The question is what kind of community or equality among all human beings the thinking of Aristotle allows for, besides biological species membership.

Concerning concepts of politics and law, Plutarch's summary (329B) raises crucial questions:

> that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law.

Schofield (1999:104–108) alludes to "legislation" and discusses "the image of the people as a herd *and of the king as herdsman*", concluding that, although widespread in Greek literature, this imagery "does not reflect a Stoic view of kingship or statesmanship". Plutarch's summary, however, mentions neither "kingship", "statesmanship" nor "legislation", only what appears pregiven as a "common law". Furthermore, Schofield (p. 109) declares himself "unable to find in texts representing the early Stoics any subsequent use of kósmos in the sense of an ordering of society". Finally, although he refers to Aristotle's discussion in *Historia Animalium* Book I.1, Schofield fails to take into account its most crucial distinction.

The definitions of "politics" differed between Socrates and Plato, who did not see any principal difference between a small pólis and a large oikos, and Aristotle, who emphasised this difference. This is reflected in the *Republic* (590C-591A) where Plato envisaged an ideal city-state where only the rulers are good and wise, while the others are not *but still citizens*. Both Aristotle and the Stoics had objections but differed among themselves as well. In *Historia Animalium*, Book I.1 (487b34-488b30, EN1162a17-29, EE1242a23-b1, Pol1328a25-28), Aristotle discusses different ways of life and conduct among different animals. Some are solitary (monadiká) and others gregarious (agelaia) living in herds. Schofield, however, misses the crucial difference between kinds of gregarious animals. Gregarious animals are either scattered (sporadiká) or political (politiká). Scattered herd animals flock together but live mostly parallel lives in "crowds" without division of labour and cooperative interaction. They are *social* but not political since they hardly cooperate in solving tasks. Only those for whom there exists a common task are political. This is not so for all gregarious animals (HA488a8-10). Aristotle lists human beings, bees, and ants as political. Chimpanzees and dolphins are political *mammals*. Gregarious animals are not necessarily political, however. The discussion in *Historia Animalium* points out:

> The only animal, which is deliberative, is man. Many animals have the power of memory and can be taught; but no other animal but man can recollect.

This marks a transition to human beings as lógos users, distinguishing us as political to a greater degree than other species (EE1242a23-b2). Aristotle writes in *Politics* (1253a7-18) that:

> why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. (…) man alone of the animals possesses speech (lógos). The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well. (…) But speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other (dimensions of validity, OE), and it is a partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.

Hence, there are several fundamental reasons – pertaining to the peculiarly human function (tò ídion érgon tou anthrôpou, EN1097b22-1098a17) – why, not merely Greeks, but human beings, as such, are *political* animals. Humans cooperate in solving tasks within a division of labour. Lógos enables them to distinguish within the previously mentioned normative dimensions of validity, to deliberate and to recollect. Shared access to these dimensions constitutes human, political and household communities.

Even the everyday, pre-theoretical Greek concept of "politics" (politikós) entails a cosmopolitan impulse.[24] Generally, the political in ancient Greece concerned citizens or politai, that is, full members of a pólis. Since there are many non-political ways of being social, indicated, for example, by Aristotle's distinction between oikos and pólis, this implies more. There are even different ways of being political. Ancient politics was emphatically *not* reducible to what modern politics has become: a fight – mostly without physical violence – for power in an organisational system or "machinery", public or private. Politics concerned the relations between individual or groups of citizens and their handling of common tasks (tà koiná or *res publicae*). Arendt (1958:23f) warned against conflating the social with the political, reducing politics to sociality, the way mediaeval translations of politikós to *socialis* in Latin invited.

The meaning of pólis was non-local from the start. Talking about Athens or other pólis, the ancients talked about the community members (Athênai = Athenians) who formed the citizenship, not the city's buildings or location. According to Aristotle, a pólis was not even identical to its specific members. It was more "de-ethnified". The pólis was the citizens united in a community (koinônía politikê), i.e. the *form* of their citizenship and body politic. The city-states or polis differed according to what kind of community they constituted. The relations and responsibilities allotted between different citizens and groups of citizens constituted different constitutions or politeia. The pólis is a community (koinônía) of a certain *kind*. Its practical identity and unity over time lie neither in location nor in specific members but in its working *form* and constitution (politeía) as a certain organisation (taxis tis) and a way of life (bíos tis), i.e. in certain practical patterns of relationships –

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[24] See Finley (1983) for a discussion of the concept of politics in Greece and Rome. Cf. Eikeland (2008b).

a certain concord (homónoia) (EN1167b3-4) – among its members and their activities. Only a lógos community and mastery can provide full practical and theoretical access to the pólis.[25]

Aristotle points out in his *Politics* (1252a1-b31) that the pólis is one among several kinds of community (koinônía), different in form and purpose. It is the most advanced form, encompassing the others (EN1160a8-30, 1162a16-33, EE1241b25). Historically, there are lower-level partnerships, formed from necessity and for safety by interdependent individuals naturally forming a household (oikía). Several households form a village. Ultimately, several villages may become a pólis but not merely by growing in size or letting time pass without conscious effort or cultivation. The pólis is not only the final stage in a temporal development. Temporally later *in* nature, it is still prior *by* nature – i.e. logically or conceptually *by* human lógos nature – to each of us individually and to households and villages (Pol1252b28-1253a40). This is why there is an impulse (hormê) among all human beings to form political partnerships and why political relations somehow function as a preset télos – an immanent standard and "gravitational" attractor – within all the temporally prior partnerships. Understanding the exact nature of this teleological predetermination of human sociality is crucial.

Both Aristotle (Pol1253a30-40, 1280b11-13) and the Stoics connect the pólis intimately with law (nómos), meaning customary regularity or rule more than either written promulgated positive law or scientific law of nature. For Aristotle, regulation by law as a mutual covenant (sunthêkê) is one pólis criterion. Justice *is* political (hê dè dikaiosúnê politikón), he writes (Pol1253a38-39, EN1134a25-1135a5). Why? In pre-political or extra-political non-human nature outside community and communication, there is no justice, as we know it. Someone or something always consumes everybody and everything else without mercy! Noncommunicating nature is not fair or just. Living scattered in a state of apolitical nature is unnatural among human beings, however. As lógos users, we never did (*contra* Hobbes). Only divine beings and lower animals might do without the pólis (Pol1253a27-29). Human beings become the worst kind of animal if stripped of virtue, law, and justice (1253a32-40), which are all intrinsic to the pólis. There is no justice outside the communal mutuality of lógos users, and lógos users are political, i.e. tend to form póleis. Political relations are intrinsic to the nature of lógos and vice versa. Hence, justice, as such, gradually enters the world with the emergence of lógos, pólis, and political relations. Lawless states were known, of course. Plato (Laws, 715A–D) refused calling a city-state caught in internal strife a proper pólis. Being lawless, it was not a politeía but a stasioteía or a "factioned deadlock". A politeía is by definition ruled by laws. What kind of pólis, political relations, and laws are we talking about here?

As indicated in Eikeland (2008a:413–422), several concepts of "politics" are at play in Aristotle. He distinguishes between (1) politics as found "empirically", surveying contemporary extant societies; (2) politics as it should be, dealing with

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[25] Pol1274b39, 1275a7, 1276a18-b15, 1295b1, cf. 1278b9-12, 1279a26-27, 1280b30, Metaph1016b6-16

everyday matters; and (3) what he calls true and primary politics or the truly political. These are not clearly separate in practice. The first form suffers from all kinds of insufficiencies, since, as Aristotle claims, people engage mostly for private and egotistical purposes (EN1141a21-b1, EE1216a23-27). The second sets standards for everyday politics: negotiations, exchanges, covenants or contracts, and common decisions. It is the appropriate field for rhetoric and phrónêsis (EE1242b22-1243a34, Pol1274a16-18, 1328b14-15, Rh1359b19, 1360a34-42). True politics, however, contains and articulates ultimate standards for how lógos users must relate in order to realise the ultimate purpose of the pólis and politics. These standards provide preconditions for the development of virtue and virtuous activity (EE1215b3-4, 1216a23-27, 1248b38-1249b25, Pol1260a15-18, 1280b5-11, 1288b27, 1289a7. Cf. Pol1288b10-1289a25, EN1102a7-8).

Justice *is* political, and "true justice" is only possible when "good citizens" are also "good human beings". In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1134a-25-1135a5), Aristotle writes interchangeably and simultaneously about absolute or unmodified justice and political justice, as if they are identical. The unmodified and political standard of justice is defined as what counts between free and equal individuals (eleuthérôn kaì ísôn) living a communal life (koinônôn bíou) and not between unfree unequals without community. Law (nómos) *naturally* regulates relations among free and equal individuals (1134b15) who rotate being rulers and ruled, not, however, among unequal members of an oikos where everyone is confined to a niche role and task. In true politics, individuals step out of systemically defined niche roles. True law regulating true politics springs from virtue (EN1130b23-29). It is not merely "positive law" as an arbitrary covenant (sunthêkê) or decision (psêphisma) (Pol1292a5-37) or, worse, an arbitrary tyrannical promulgation. Truly, virtuously lawful, political relations inhere in lógos use among free and equal individuals.[26]

After asserting that he is simultaneously searching for absolute and political justice, Aristotle states that *political* justice is of two kinds, one natural (phusikón) and another conventional (nomikón) (EN1134b18-1135a5, MM1194b30-1195a7). Judging from his *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, this entails that absolute or unmodified justice is natural justice, while conventional justice corresponds to rules and covenants specific to different local constitutions (EN1135a4, 1133a29-32). In the *Rhetoric* (1368b7-11, 1373b1-29, 1375a24-b9), he takes for granted that law (nómos) is *either* particular (ídios) and usually written *or* common (koinós), unwritten, universal and natural (katà phúsin) (EN1162b22-23). He ends the discussions in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by stating cryptically that although what is natural for human beings (*qua* human beings) can be modified by habituation and training – strikingly distinguishing this from physical laws of external nature (EN1103a14-b25) – only one form of constitution (politeía) is natural everywhere, namely, the best (hê aristê). In the *Politics*, he indicates that only under this primary and best constitution, providing the same kind of life (tòn autòn bíon) for individuals, city-states and human beings generally (Pol1325b31-32), will the goodness of a human being

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[26] See Eikeland (2008a) for how the concept of praxis fits into the scheme of primary (prôtê) politics in Aristotle.

stated absolutely (haplôs) (1276b30-36) and the goodness of a citizen relative to the current constitution be the same (Pol1277a12-14, 1278b1-5, 1293b3-7, 1333a11-16, cf. Pol1310a35). Under such conditions only will even the education of a good ruler, a good citizen, and a good human being be identical (Pol1288a38-b2, 1333a1-16). In general, an education for virtue makes the individual a good human being in an unmodified sense (haplôs) and simultaneously prepares individuals for serving the community (prós tò koinón) (EN1130b25-29).

Accordingly, Aristotle speaks explicitly about laws of virtues like courage, temperance, gentleness (EN1129b19-26, MM1193b4-6, Prot62a) and reminiscent of the natural, unwritten, and common laws (koinoi nomoi) alluded to in the *Rhetoric* (Eikeland 2008a:196–205, 316–324). Common laws are according to nature (katà phúsin) and make themselves felt even without communication or agreement about them. So do the virtues as practice internal standards and attractors of performance. Natural laws of virtue must be cultivated. Differently from laws of external and mindless nature, habituation and training can modify them, but they do not thwart natural impulses (hormais) like some arbitrary external command (EN1180a19-24, Prot64a). They spring as lógos from nous (mind, reflective thinking) and phrónêsis (considerate, practical wisdom). According to *Politics* (1287a11-b5, EN1134a35-b8), this kind of laws is like nous without passion and desire, securing – like virtue – that its regulations hit the middle (méson) (of the target). Hence, they are not scientific laws of external nature, nor do they represent uncivilised nature, nor are they "positive law" arbitrarily promulgated by some socially sovereign power. We develop them *through* habituation (ethismós, éthos, héxis) *by* our own efforts *into* virtuous character (êthos) *within* civilisation, indeed *as* cultivation (therapeía) and *as* civilisation, appropriately rendered into Modern Greek as politismós. Their development is the civilising process or *formation* (*Bildung*, paideía). To Aristotle (EN1152a30-34, Pr949a28-32, Rh1370a3-10), the nature of habit and virtue represents our *second* nature (deutera phúsis) or a *different kind* of nature (tis hetéra phúsis) (Prot.23b). Habits and virtues are cultivated and developed from *within* practices, in accordance with what distinguishes human nature, as an *Aufhebung* or advance on and suspension of precivilised, unhuman nature outside any kind of pólis.

Both Cynics and Stoics also defined a true city-state (pólis) as law abiding and urbane or "civilised" (asteíon) as opposed to being ágroikos or rustic and wild (AD 11k, cf. Pol1253a36, 1328a11). The Stoics counted "bad individuals" deprived of law *according to nature*, not only as fools and slaves but also as *exiles*, presumably from the cosmópolis (AD11j). Neither did the Cynic lifestyle romanticise life without pólis or civilisation. It showed that conventionality was irrelevant for virtue and happiness. Diogenes claimed it was impossible to live as citizens (politeúesthai) without law (khôris nomou), again, not conventional laws but laws of virtue (DL VI.72, AD11d).[27]

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[27] The internal connection between law and city is repeated and emphasised many places, e.g. by Cicero, *De Finibus* III.xix.64, III.xx.66–67, III.xxi.73; *De Natura Deorum* I.xli.116, II.xxxi.78–79, II.lix.148–149, II.lxiii.154, III.xv.38, III.xxxv.85; *De Re Publica* I.xxv.39–40, I.xxxii.49; and *De Legibus* I.v.17 ff., I.vii. 23, I.xv.42-xix.52, II.iv.8–10.

The sources do not contain or suggest elaborate Cynic or Stoic political theory as in Aristotle, however. Still, we often find Stoic statements about the universally communal and political nature of man (DL VII.121–123, AD 6, 11b, 11m, Cicero, *De Legibus* I.x.28–30, I.xii.33–xiii.35, Epictetus, II.ix.3–5). Marcus Aurelius (5.16) writes:

> Community (<u>koinônía</u>) is the good of a reasoning being. For it was proven long ago that we are born for community.

> Epictetus (II.v.26) asks what is a human being and answers:

> A part of a <u>pólis</u>; first of the one which is made up of gods and men, and then of that which is said to be very close to the other, the <u>pólis</u> that is a small copy of the universal.

Clearly, the Stoics somehow looked at the cosmos as an elevated <u>pólis</u> (Cicero, *De Finibus* IV.iii.7). The exact meaning of this is not equally clear, however. Why is the cosmópolis more truly a <u>pólis</u>? What did the Stoics mean by "<u>kósmos</u>" and "<u>pólis</u>"?

Diogenes Laertius writes (VII.137–138) that the Stoic term "<u>kósmos</u>" meant either (1) God himself, (2) the orderly arrangement (<u>hê diakosmêsis</u>) of the heavenly bodies or (3) the combination of both the system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. Since reason pervades every part of the cosmos, as the soul does in us, the cosmos is alive, rational and intelligent (DL VII.142), almost identical to God (DL VII.135, 147), and administered by reason and providence (VII.138). Although the system of gods and men alludes to it, Diogenes Laertius (VII.137–157) does not mention a cosmópolis.

Which properties of the cosmos could make it into a <u>pólis</u>? Arius Didymus (fl. 30 BC) writes in *Epitome of Stoic Ethics* (11j) that the Stoics used "<u>pólis</u>" in three ways:

> With regard to the dwelling place (<u>oikêtêrion</u>), with regard to the composite made of men (<u>tò sústêma tôn anthrôpôn</u>), and thirdly with regard to both of these.

The *first* meaning seems to indicate the urban physical localities, further emphasised by Cleanthes (AD 11j) as "*an arrangement for* dwelling in a place". These were aspects *excluded* by Aristotle from the definition of a <u>pólis</u>. The *second* emphasises a system of human beings (<u>anthrôpôn</u>), without privileging the wise or even citizens only as members. Although only the cosmópolis was a true city for the Stoics, with only wise individuals as citizens, this is not mentioned. Elsewhere, however (LS 67L, from Eusebius, Praep.Ev 15.15.3–5), Arius says more. After repeating the two meanings,

> one as a habitation (<u>oikêtêrion</u>) and two as a structure of its inhabitants along with its citizens (<u>ek tôn enoikoúntôn sún tois polítais sústema</u>),

he *compares* the cosmos to a city, claiming that it is *as if* (<u>hoiónei</u>) it is a city of gods and men,

> so the world is *like a city* (<u>ho kósmos hoiónei pólis estìn</u>) consisting of gods and men with the gods as rulers and men as their subjects.

Finally, he provides a justification:

> (Gods and men) are members of a community because of their participation in reason, which is natural law.

Both here and in Cicero (*De Finibus* III.xix.64, III.xx.66–67, *De Natura Deorum* I.xxv.71–xxvi.74, *De Legibus*, I.xxiii.61), the kósmos is said to *resemble* a city (*quasi*/hoiónei). Schofield (1999:59–63) uses Dio Chrysostom's (40–120 AD) explanation in his *Borysthenitic Discourse 36* (18–32) as a decisive reliable source for Stoic thinking about the pólis. Even Dio (36:29–31) writes that the Stoics talk about the cosmos as pólis *metaphorically* (pólei proseikázousi), in order to harmonise human beings with the divine and to

> embrace in a single term everything endowed with reason, finding in reason the only sure and indissoluble foundation for fellowship and justice.

The Cynic intermediates are not only indifferent and insufficient but diverse and relative. Dio claims, however, the universe cannot *literally* be a city. That would contradict both it being an organisation of human beings (sústêma anthrôpôn) and the universe as a living being. The metaphor is still appropriate because the universe is *also* – as the pólis – an ordered multitude orderly administered. Marcus Aurelius (4.4) provides an inference that further illuminates similarities between pólis and kósmos according to the Stoics:

> If mind is common to us (ei tò noeròn hêmin koinón), so also is reason (ho lógos) in virtue of which we are rational (logikós). If that is so, the reason, which prescribes what is and what is not to be done (ho prostaktikós lógos), is also common. If that is so, law (ho nómos) is also common. If that is so, we are citizens (politaí esmen). If that is so, we partake in a kind of political system (politeúmatós tínos). If that is so, the universe is as it were (hôsaneì) a city. For what other common political system (koinou politeúmatos) will anyone say the whole race of men partakes in? From where else then, than from this same common city-state, come thinking itself, reasoning, and lawfulness?

Without interpreting or going meticulously into its presuppositions or internal validity, the inference confirms, *first* of all, that it is *as if* (hôsaneì) the universe is a pólis or *kind of* political system. The cosmos is not *really* a pólis. It may be a metaphor for the Stoics but still provides the standard for evaluating imperfect cities, however. Dio (36:18) claims that most people use words without knowing their real meaning. Everybody uses words, as "man", but only the educated know their real meaning and the thing itself (tò pragma). The same goes for a word like pólis, which Dio defines to be a number of human beings, dwelling in the same place, governed by law. His emphasis (36:20) is again on reason and law:

> For just as that person is not even a man who does not also possess the attribute of reason, so that community is not even a city which lacks obedience to law. And it could never be obedient to law (nómimos) if it is foolish and disorderly (áphrôn kaì ákosmos ousa).

In spite of Schofield's (1999:109) self-declared inability to find "any subsequent use of kósmos in the sense of an ordering of society", Dio (36:13, 20) clearly measures local cities as being either orderly or disorderly using the terms kósmos and ákosmos to characterise them. A small city orderly governed (katà kósmon oikousa) is

better than a disorderly and lawless big one (<u>megálê akósmôs kaì anómôs oikêtai</u>).[28] Apparently, even a small city has to be well ordered (<u>kosmios</u>) in order to count as a true city, mirroring the big one.

According to the inference above, true law, defining what it is to be a true <u>pólis</u>, springs from reason (<u>lógos</u>) and rationality (<u>tò logikón</u>), which springs from the mind (<u>tò noerón</u>) which pervades the universe as common to all human beings. The universal <u>lógos</u> with its laws pervades and rules everyone and everything. Among humans, the <u>pólis</u> institution is the most law abiding. Since the cosmos is even more law abiding, however, it becomes *as if* the cosmos is the truest city. Nonconventional law according to nature *is* correct reasoning (AD 11d). Only the wise reason correctly. Only by becoming wise, then, will human beings be able to attune themselves to the cosmos and thereby become citizens of the laws that make the cosmos into a kind of political system (<u>politeumatos tinos</u>). The wise individual was no less perfect than Zeus himself, according to Chrysippus (DL VII.119, AD 11g, Nickel 2008, 628). However, no living individual was fully and really wise.

2.7 Preliminary Conclusions

As already stated, the discussion does not end here. Both Aristotle and the Stoics thought of the <u>pólis</u> and political relations as by definition lawlike. Human beings living outside a <u>pólis</u> were considered <u>ágroikos</u> and uncivilised. The Stoics had a tendency to conflate ethico-political laws with laws of external nature, however, and to reduce the political merely to the law abiding. The political was much more complex and relational for Aristotle. With the Stoics, Aristotle's distinctions between external laws of nature, habituated second nature, and laws expressing the nature of different virtues seem to have disappeared. Laws of external nature, laws of reason, and laws of virtue seem conflated (DL VII.87–89). In addition, the laws of the Stoics regulate everything deterministically, apart from the evaluation of impressions. Although both Aristotle and the Stoics emphasised how the participation of human beings in <u>lógos</u> separates them from other animals, their concepts of <u>lógos</u> differed. Certainly, this tentative comparison requires detail and further development. Yet, the discussion suggests that the Stoics were metaphysical monists (DL VII.61), deductive and deterministic (apart from a certain inner freedom), with laws regulating everything. Their idea of political unity or solidarity, whether for the wise alone or universally, is substantial and "mechanical" in Durkheimian terms (1933), making Plutarch's summary of Zeno plausible. The heuristic indicates Aristotle's <u>koinópolis</u> common to all <u>lógos</u> users, as a non-local alternative to the Stoic

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[28] With a different emphasis, Aristotle writes in *Politics* (1326a8-b26, cf. 1286b20-23) that the greatest <u>pólis</u> is not the one covering the largest area, the wealthiest, the one containing the most people, the one having the strongest military or anything of the sort. A <u>pólis</u> has a function (<u>érgon</u>) to perform: living well (<u>eu zên</u>) and doing it good, promoting virtue. The greatest state, or condition, is the one who performs this function best.

cosmopolis and as an "inner" or "submerged" figure in his thinking. It remains to make it more explicit and drive the argument home, in a different context, however.

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Chapter 3
Individuals and Peoples Are Not Each Other's Enemies: Gunnar Landtman's Sociological Foundations for Cosmopolitanism

Jouni Ahmajarvi

3.1 Introduction

Much has been written about the theories of the integration of European nations and the history of the ideas behind this currently more or less ongoing process, which has relatively directly led to the formation of the EU.[1] However, the discussion is often drawn toward economic and political reasons surrounding integration, and this tends to narrow our views on the history of theories of cosmopolitanism, which contains more diverse dimensions. This chapter draws attention to one of those dimensions and examines Finnish sociologist and anthropologist Gunnar Landtman's (1878–1940) ideas on cosmopolitanism and a United States of Europe based on his evolutionary sociology. It focuses on Landtman's reasoning regarding the potential of rational cosmopolitan cooperation. It explains how Landtman put biologically orientated evolutionary sociology and ideas on human nature into action and how as an academic public intellectual he put forward these views in Finnish public debate, offering solid foundations for cosmopolitanism.

Between 1923 and 1939, Landtman wrote numerous articles, essays, and appeals in which he deployed his ideas. His works on cosmopolitanism can be divided into three main areas. First are his responses to events such as the rising nationalism and different pacts between states. Second are his formulations of solid rational cosmopolitanism, the United States of Europe being one example. Third are his papers

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[1] There are many studies on the history of theories on European integration. I am in great depth to many. See, for example, Andersson (2009), Bugge (1995), Judt (2011), Stirk (1989), and Mikkeli (1998). The reader should recall that even though nowadays one can unblushingly think of joining Europe, which in many popular views is a synonym for the EU, things were certainly not like that in the mid-war Europe.

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written to lend scientific weight and importance to his responses to those events and formulations of the possibilities of uniting peoples and individuals. Reading his journalism and science together gives a rewarding picture of a forgotten[2] mid-war internationalist who is neither fashionably Marxian nor Freudian but an intellectual who builds on social and natural sciences. I begin by focusing on the basic assumptions and epistemology of his sociology. Then, I briefly introduce him as an academic public intellectual.

3.2 Access to Human Essentials: Landtman and the Epistemology of His Sociology

Landtman wrote his sociological studies during the first decades of the twentieth century. He was a student and a friend of sociologist and anthropologist Edward Westermarck (1863–1939) who was a professor in both Helsinki and London and a major figure in British intellectual life (Sanderson 2007: 94–99). This relationship shapes Landtman's sociology and depicts his place in the field of social sciences. He has been placed in the early British social sciences as a follower of Westermarck (Allardt 1997: 101–104).[3] His research interests revolved around social inequality and social classes. He published in total four monographs on that topic, of which three were published in English and one in his native Swedish.[4] Landtman was the first professor of sociology at the University of Helsinki starting at 1927. During his tenure, sociology became one of the most popular subjects at the Faculty of Philosophy in which it was located (Ahmajärvi 2012: 140–145).

Since 1850, the social sciences were dominated by evolutionary theories of human social life. Well-known figures like Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), E.B. Tylor (1832–1917), William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), and Westermarck wrote studies in which elaborate evolutionary schemes were supported by extensive compilations of data (Allardt 1997: 94–100; Sanderson 2007: 10). Göran Therborn has explained well the basic assumptions of early sociology. To him, sociology's social cosmology was evolution, its social direction was progress, and its mode of cognition was science, biology being the most influential model (Therborn 2000: 39–40, 44). Many early classical evolutionists wrote about the basic characteristics of social evolution and formulated "laws" to explain it. In many cases, social evolution was described as a development of different hierarchical stages of evolution, usually

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[2] My forthcoming monograph on Landtman's sociology and ways of using sociological knowledge as a public intellectual is the first study on his sociology, let alone on his role as a public intellectual.

[3] Landtman is seldom mentioned outside Finland, and if he is mentioned, he is placed in the history of British Anthropology. See, for example, Lawrence (2010), Langham (1981), Barth (2010), and Stocking (1979).

[4] See Landtman (1905, 1909, 1916, 1938).

from a more primitive stage progressing toward civilization (Sanderson 2007: 10; Stocking 2001: 109–110).

The fundamental assumptions of classical sociology were given different meanings and were expressed with different accents. They shared basic assumptions, but otherwise were often radically different (Therborn 2000: 38–39). One cannot really find, in Landtman's sociology, a systematic attempt to explain why societies have passed from one stage of evolution to another. Landtman was influenced by the classical evolutionary ideas and concepts, but already his teacher Westermarck had developed doubts about the methods of earlier evolutionists and was more interested in a Darwinian approach to human nature and its reflection in social arrangements (Sanderson 2007: 94; Kuper 2005: 103; Ihanus 1990: 34–35; Therborn 2000: 38–39; Stocking 1996: 152–153). Westermarck and his Finnish students like Landtman used social evolutionary concepts, but focused on the origin and development of one particular social phenomenon, not the development of culture as a whole starting from primitive societies and progressing toward civilized culture.[5] Landtman had not followed the evolution of social classes higher than it was theoretically significant or necessary, until the *semi-civilized stage* until he saw that the phenomena under study had fully developed. In his view, this enabled him to lay down the realities of his subject and *to throw light upon the course and conditions of evolution* (Landtman 1938: 3).

In his sociology, Landtman was not particularly interested in the societies of his own time. For him modern societies presented comparatively little theoretical interest. Seeking the theoretical significance of primitive societies (e.g. Landtman 1932b) was not a form of exoticism, although there may have been an element of sociological botany of herbarium. Evolutionary sociology which looked for the *origins* of social phenomena from the so-called primitive societies had, as Göran Therborn has put it, *privileged entry to essentials of humanity* (Therborn 2000: 39). This is what Landtman was also looking for in order to understand, for example, how society comes into existence or social classes have developed.

Many early sociologists, like Landtman, were almost obsessed with finding the "origin" of a social phenomenon. The origin was thought to lay among the uncivilized peoples of the world. Landtman thought that he was able to *move backwards in the course of evolution and direct our attention to the earliest known organizations of society* (Landtman 1938: 3). In Landtman's view, the contemporary primitive peoples of the time were like "open-air" museums for sociologists to make observations about early societies. Landtman also used his opportunity to work among one such society, which provided access to human essentials. He carried out anthropological field studies in the Kiwai Island of New Papua Guinea (1910–1912). For him the Kiwai people represented a theoretically significant early society. Many of his conclusions about the early societies and human behavior were based on his empirical observations made during the expedition (Landtman 1918: 4; Allardt 1997: 103; Lawrence 2010).

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[5] See, for example, Hirn (1900), Karsten (1905), Holsti (1913), and Numelin (1945).

Following the general practice of the social science of his time, which can prove, inter alia, to be important material for critical, contemporary readings of the European scientific gaze and developmentalist notions of the early twentieth century, Landtman made extensive use of comparative method and compared the customs of early stages of social evolution in order to understand the evolution of a social phenomenon. His sociology was based on an idea of relative uniformity of humans around the world, i.e., human nature (Landtman 1920: 5–8). The Darwinian understanding of human nature played a crucial role for the Westermarckians. Anyway, despite the numerous similarities with Westermarck, Landtman does not make references to Darwin. Notwithstanding, one can see that Darwin-based biological conclusions that Westermarck further developed also underpin Landtman's sociology. To Landtman, what Darwin and Westermarck were alluding was that there is human nature, the biological substrate that determines our basic needs; and society is a manifestation of human nature that greatly influences our day to day wants and preferences including moral inclinations. Westermarck had concluded at the time that social customs should be studied in their connection with biological conditions (Stocking 1996: 152).

However, Westermarckians should not be confused with the so-called social Darwinists. One could describe the popular notion of a Darwinist social scientist as a proponent of a simple social philosophy: the idea of individuals or societies in a war against one another (West 2005: 254–255, 261). Instead, the Westermarckians were interested in social arrangements as manifestations of human nature (Sanderson 2007: 94; Westermarck 2014/1889: 158). Their sociology was close to what we would now call evolutionary psychology. As I will explain later, Landtman considered ideas that we can today call "social Darwinist" old-fashioned misunderstandings and labeled them "cultural zoology." For him the importance of Darwin's theory was not in the survival of the fittest but in its power to explain human sociality.

Landtman's sociological work aimed to explain the origin of society. As already explained, the basic assumption of Landtman's sociology was that the "origin" was the location of theoretical significance. His epistemological premises included the idea of human nature, the human ability to feel sympathy, and the potential of expanding sympathy to a wider circle than that of the "near and dear." To Landtman, the earliest forms of social bonds between individuals were families. This connection between two individuals is based on reproduction and parenting. What binds individuals together is the feeling of sympathy. In his words, people in an early society *are kept together by social instinct and mutual interest*, *not by any kind of coercion* (Landtman 1938: 320).

The notion that individuals need help and protection by their kin and depend on cooperation is theoretically significant for Landtman's cosmopolitanism. He explained the origin of society and communal life as a process where even the most stubborn individual understood the benefits of cooperation and social life and that, from then on, there are no limits to the extension of sympathy and common interests

beyond the borders of one's own family, society, or even a state. According to him, humans have a natural tendency toward cosmopolitanism and the potential of broadening and extending the circle of sympathy. Cooperation which brings individuals together and leads to interaction was, for Landtman, as we will see later, a main factor of social evolution (Landtman 1920: 37–51, 1930: 21, 1938: 231). According to Darwin, grasping the benefits of wider cooperation required developed reason (Darwin 2004/1879: 147); as I argue later, the development of reason was one of Landtman's motives for writing about international cooperation which would lead to cosmopolitanism.

According to Therborn, evolutionism lost its appeal in the trenches of World War I. The new focus of social sciences was the structure of the social rather than its evolution (Therborn 2000: 40). However, Landtman held on to his basic assumptions. During the 1930s, some other scholars also began to turn to evolutionism seriously again (Sanderson 2007: 2, 105–131). Landtman's evolutionism was not out of fashion and particularly not in Finland, where he and other Westermarckians still held high academic positions (Ahmajärvi 2012; Lagerspetz and Suolinna 2014: 67–95).

3.3 Utilizing Sociological Knowledge: Landtman as an Academic Public Intellectual

Outside the university, Landtman was a quite well-known academic public intellectual using the tools of a civil society in mid-war Finland.[6] He forged his intellectual career in opposition to Finnish nationalism and conservative forces. One obituary clearly reveals his reputation and gives us a picture of his role in the debates. Even though Landtman had difficulties, especially during the 1930s, as society became more authoritarian, he had the courage to keep up humanism, to oppose dictatorships and violence, and to defend democracy and civil rights. His contemporaries also admired his enthusiasm and ambitious trust in science (*Rauhaa kohti* 10–11/1940).

As Eliason and Kallberg point out (2008: 1), an academic public intellectual is a person who communicates his specialized knowledge in an understandable and relevant way for the public outside his specialty. This does not only mean popularizing their research. The main purpose is to employ the specific knowledge, in Landtman's case his understanding of human nature and factors of social evolution, for a better future. For intellectuals, involvement is vital. For a scholar like Landtman, the facts were crucial, and as a public writer, he had to know how to use the facts. As Kolakowski puts it, intellectuals *derive the rules how the facts of the existing world*

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[6] He was, for example, a proponent of freedom of speech and democracy, founder of the Society for Human Rights and an opponent of death penalty. He was also a member of the Parliament and the Foreign Affairs Committee.

must be interpreted. They produce the meaning of facts (Kolakowski 1990: 36). As a modernist sociologist, Landtman had his facts, and as an academic public intellectual, he used these facts as tools in creating a worldview, in this case cosmopolitanism.

For many classical evolutionists, progress was not necessarily an inevitable process of steady improvement. There was space for involvement. One of the major tasks of sociology was to align itself with progress and contribute to it (Therborn 2000: 39; Sanderson 2007: 30). Especially in Landtman's evolutionism, there was no uncompromising illusion of historical determinism. Auguste Comte (1798–1857) saying *savoir pour prévoir*, *prévoir pour pouvoir* (Weiler 2008: 66) captures also much of Landtman's outlook. Sociologists, in many cases, understood their role as active individuals who possessed a kind of positivistic understanding and who had to take action for the future. In 1902, Victor Branford (1863–1930), an influential figure in British sociology and one of the organizers of the Sociological Society in Britain (Renwick 2014: 80–82), writing about purposes of sociology, divided sociology into two aspects: first the speculative, the purpose of which was to understand and interpret the process of social evolution, and, second, the practical aspect whose purpose is the utilization of knowledge, gathered and unified from its manifold sources, *for directing*, *as far as possible*, *and in part controlling*, *of this evolutionary progress* (Branford 1903: 154).

Landtman also saw that, as there was no *ars gratia artis*, social science could claim its justification from its potential for serving humanity (Landtman 1935: 261). He strictly followed this "pure" form of science, but, in mid-war Europe, he also wanted to start directing and maybe even controlling the evolutionary progress using his scientific knowledge. His motives and understanding of human nature and social evolution come close to J.B.S. Haldane's (1892–1964) who meanwhile asked the social question as a biologist. According to Haldane, "To biologists, the social problem is not 'How can we get these men and women fit into a society?'" but "how can we make a society into which these men and women will fit" (Haldane 1933: 262). Landtman's substantial question was formulated well by William Beveridge (1879–1963), another of Landtman's contemporaries: *under what conditions it is possible for men as a whole to live* (Judt 2011b: 176).

3.4 Statesmen Are Under the Influence of Cultural Zoology: Responding to Current Affairs

Landtman raised cosmopolitanism first at a presentation during the annual meeting of the Society of Swedish Literature in Finland[7] in early 1923. Most likely, there he felt that he had a responsive audience which was not keen about the growing Finnish

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[7] Svenska Litteratursällskapet I Finland (The Society of Swedish Literature in Finland) is a scholarly organization that preserves, promotes, develops and mediates Swedish Cultural Heritage in Finland. See www.sls.fi.

nationalism in the country (Kirby 1989: 117–118). Landtman had evidently chosen a safe place for testing his ideas. One should not forget that the era was not particularly helpful to internationalist ideas; for example, in 1922, Walther Rathenau (1867–1922), a German cabinet minister and proponent of the unification of European states, had been murdered by German nationalists (Judt 2011a: 8).[8]

In Landtman's presentation, we trace many elements and forms of argumentation that he developed further later. He argued that individuals or peoples were not each other's enemies. He also, shortly, mentioned the sociological facts that he later used more emphatically. Sympathy was a human feeling produced in the interaction between individuals. He also mentioned another important conclusion: morality may be influenced by suggestion, meaning that the moral sense of individuals could be molded. Thus, the concept of morality denoted shared values born in that precise society. But, as Landtman implied, nationalism was not a solid basis for shared values. He understood this suggestion as a requirement, hand in hand with science, to prevent facile and pernicious ideas from taking the lead in building a popular worldview.

At the time, he saw the rivalry between states as the true enemy to social progress. It was not individuals or peoples of recently established states who were organizing wars. They were not each other's enemies but, in Landtman's view, the states themselves were. In his opinion, if people had a chance to decide, the future would belong to a form of natural, rational, and wholesome cosmopolitanism. Landtman saw strong nation states as opponents of international interaction, welfare, and interaction between peoples (Landtman 1923a: 150–151).

Landtman realized that the states had, even after the World War, not stopped competing against each other. There were no convincing signs of any growing rational cosmopolitan cooperation. To Landtman, there was then a winners' and losers' arrangement. Landtman could not see this as a fruitful basis for the future and felt that international cooperation was needed. He did not assume that his sociological facts meant that human nature was peaceful. He was offering frames and terms of reference for social life, which would lead to peaceful social evolution. Cosmopolitanism and international cooperation and integration were, for him, better solutions than nationalism (Landtman 1923a: 148–155). It is important to understand that, then, industrialization and other developments were in many cases bound up with nation building and competition. For example, in Hungary, state ownership was used in order to compete in economic rivalries, especially with Germany (Judt 2011a: 63). This kind of world order meant competition, which Landtman considered a disabling basis for the future.

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[8] It is worth mentioning that Finland also experienced a politically motivated murder in that year when a right wing activist murdered Minister Heikki Ritavuori. I am not suggesting that Landtman was in any true danger, but still it is good to keep in mind the political climate and the strength of nationalism during the mid-war years.

Later, in 1923, Landtman published an essay titled "Immanuel Kant and the Question of Peace."[9] The timing of the publication suggests that he, as a public intellectual, was reacting on the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. As I have shown, Landtman had already been presenting his cosmopolitan ideas to a limited audience, but this time he wanted publicity. He wrote this essay in Finnish which was not his native language, but it was the language of the majority in Finland.[10] It seems obvious that he wanted more readers and rise the level effectiveness of his words. Choosing Finnish indicates the weight he gave to this topic. He had been an active proponent of the Swedish language in Finland, and his decision to use Finnish must have been difficult but important to him.

Landtman introduced Kant as one who believed in rationality, justice, and humanity, and he saw Kant's study *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795) as a philosopher's testament to human kind. For Landtman, Kant provided sound arguments to react strongly to the Ruhr occupation. Kant had written, according Landtman, that one should not make peace treaties which could provide excuses for further war. This was clearly pointed out against the Treaty of Versailles, which was made in many ways to punish Germany. More important was that Kant had also said that people will say no to war so long as it is possible to do so (Landtman 1923b: 239–241). In a way, Kant had already introduced Landtman's favorite phrase *individuals and peoples are not each other's enemies*.

Nevertheless, he added sociological facts to the Kantian argument. Landtman wrote that, generally though unfortunately, in the sociology of the times, the old idea of human nature and the processes of social evolution were still popular. In his view, such ideas declared nations in a state of eternal war against each other likening them to animal species in the natural world. Within that framework, the fittest will survive, and a nation defeating another is the fittest and deserves to rule the less fit. Each nation assumes itself to be the fittest and the only existing solidarity appeared on a national level. For Landtman, this general framework was false, not based on facts. Landtman called this false idea, which was still a reality in international relations at the time, "cultural zoology" (Landtman 1923b: 242).

Cultural zoology had not, according to Landtman, been able to solve problems in 1914 and neither could it do so now. In his view any potential cooperative effort made to bring states closer together was useless because those believing in cultural zoology were not able to admit the facts. These being the existing dimensions of international reliance and peaceful interaction, individuals, peoples, nations, and states, existed in interaction, and this was a fact, but those under the influence of cultural zoology refused to admit it (Landtman 1923b: 243–243).

According to Landtman, there were visible proofs of dimensions of international reliance and peaceful interaction. The products moved daily around the globe, and such phenomena as the stock exchange, capital, diplomacy, labor movement, science,

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[9] I have translated the titles of Landtman's works into English. The original Swedish and Finnish titles can be seen in the bibliography.

[10] Some of his essays were published in both Swedish and Finnish, but some only in Finnish, clearly with a wider audience in mind.

and art were all international. The world had evolved to a new stage. His conclusion was that the goal must be a new world order, which included all civilized nations and made the rational division of labor between different peoples and cooperation possible. After all, they were already possible in one state. What happened inside the borders of states could and should also happen internationally. The world was already international, and states were in trouble because they did not cooperate. He reminded his audience that most of the social problems in any state were actually caused by international factors. The biggest problem was the competition between the states. For example, the states were seeking a better competitiveness. In this race, states made structural changes but only inside their borders, often causing more social problems. The main reason for the competition between states was their enthusiasm to attract investors. This had, for example, created serious tax competition between the states in Europe. The capital was able to invite the states to bid. These problems could be solved by rational cooperation (Landtman 1923b: 243). He was already in 1923 worried of the diminishing power of democratic institutions which operated at the national level; some years after that paper, Landtman proposed world parliament as a solution.

According to Landtman's cosmopolitanism, it is dangerous to think another state as an enemy, since social evolution was based on understanding common interests and utility. Cooperation was the force of social evolution toward progress. Nationalism had in the war taken on such disastrous forms that there was now an urgent need for organizing international relations. Cosmopolitanism was needed to prevent another war and to ensure peaceful social evolution, which had already experienced a huge standstill, the war. War was only in the interests of the financial world, but definitely not in the interest of the people. In Landtman's view, nationalism should be directed toward international cooperation (Landtman 1923b: 243–244).

Later, in 1929, Landtman published another response, a trenchant essay titled "Do Not Believe the Statesmen." By this time, Landtman had become a professor of sociology at the University of Helsinki, and his views and concepts of sociology were prominent in that essay. Landtman had obviously become what Stefan Collini has called "an individual of cultural authority" (Collini 2006: 54).

Landtman was repeating his main arguments but only in stronger terms. Sociology teaches that society and social evolution are based on human sociality, sympathy, and common interests. Just as in early societies, also in modern societies, individuals rely on one another, require interaction, and should cooperate. Landtman, as a writer who believed in cooperation in international relations, was very dissatisfied with the then state of affairs. He deemed confounding that politicians and statesmen were the only social domain that had not understood this basic principle proven in his view by sociology (Landtman 1929: 37–38).

The winners of the Great War leading the continent were still working under the influence of old diplomacy, which Landtman previously had called cultural zoology. States like France, England, and Italy were merely hiding behind a curtain of

peaceful pacts[11] and common interests, but this was only the surface. Reality still reflected the war of one nation state against another. Behind each other's backs, states were still arming themselves. Secret negotiations were common practice, and this took responsibility away from the politicians in democratic countries: hence it was against the will of people. This was, according to Landtman, also the convention in The League of Nations. In his view, the statesmen had forgotten what has always been the main factor of social evolution – cooperation and understanding of common interest. To prove his diagnosis, Landtman was suggesting a European wide referendum. He believed that individuals and peoples did not want war against each other; only statesmen did (Landtman 1929: 38–39). He felt the sphere of common interest and utility was now international and individuals were ready for cosmopolitanism.

3.5   Current Situation Observed, Conclusions Made: United States of Europe

In addition to his responses and sociological articles, Landtman also wrote two essays published in 1927 and 1932 (Landtman 1927, 1932a) and focused on a United States of Europe. In his way, he participated in the discussion on pan-Europeanism. His ideas on a United States of Europe can be seen as his rational cosmopolitanism's practical solution to the problems of international relations. He was not entirely alone in the field of integration proposals and theories, but his ideas on integration were more inclusive than many. In many cases, a United States of Europe or pan-Europe meant regrouping financial and industrial aspects of Europe to assure France and Germany against the ever growing strength of non-European powers. And Coudenhove-Kalergi's project did not include Britain or Russia. Some proposals were limited to regions within geographic Europe. Josef Pildsuski in Poland included only Eastern and Central European nations in order to balance Russian and German powers, and, as another example, Ukrainian Dmytro Dontsov used a reminiscent idea of Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas (Wojnar 2014: 162–167). In many cases, the theorists for integration based their theories on economic competition against another power. In Landtman's eyes, those must have seemed like "cultural zoology" disguised as integration. His cosmopolitanism was in favor of uniting all the civilized cultures.[12]

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[11]Landtman must have referred to Kellogg-Briand pact (1928), General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an instrument of National Policy.

[12]As I have explained, Landtman used cultural evolutionary concepts. If willing, one can see Landtman's civilized countries referring to a certain stage of social evolution – starting from primitive and evolving toward civilization. In this case, the level of culture was his border. This can be related to his ideas on expanding the circle of sympathy. Certainly, Landtman's modernist conception of the civilized can critically be discussed from many postcolonial and postmodernist perspectives.

His argumentation clearly reflects his awareness of the need to be careful about what he said when writing against nationalism. He understood that any international division of labor and production would cause problems, for example, to Finnish agriculture, but eventually European cooperation would benefit all. One problem was, as Landtman wrote, that an ordinary man still sees the nation state as being significant concept, as object of identification, and also as the only sphere of solidarity. He started cautiously explaining that even such concepts as patriotism and fatherland were not eternal but more like steps of social evolution. Also, highly regarded concepts such as "nation" could lose their prestige if misused. He explained that this concept can be understood in many ways. A communist understands fatherland in a different way than a middle class man. He did not deny the power of patriotic sentiments, but his point was that such ideas as patriotism also needed to gain the approval of universal humanism. In Landtman's view, one needs to understand it from humanity's point of view. Again, sociology had something to contribute, especially from Landtman's account of the origin of society and sociality. In his view, sociology had shown that each individual must give up parts of his sovereignty for the sake of common utility. Even in early society, each individual needed to follow various regulations in the name of unity and common utility. This also works in modern societies at the national and the international level (Landtman 1932a: 106).

In the new world, the sense of solidarity could not be restricted to the borders of nation states. The world had become too small for exclusive and restricted units such as sovereign nation states. For the sake of comparison, he stated that, for example, Europe was no bigger than Germany was before the invention of railways. Landtman compared integrating European states to the unification of Germany in 1871 when separate smaller units with their own identities had become one nation. Uniting Europe would be as meaningful but, he admitted, a little more complicated (Landtman 1932a: 106). Anyhow, he was saying that Europe could become one such unity.

Landtman did not expect a united Europe to happen in 1 day. He understood that it had taken time even for existing states to develop. In his view, it would eventually happen, if the right decisions were made, because people are not each other's enemies. He concluded that, as soon as the will of people comes to the fore, integration is possible. He argued that, if there was a European wide referendum about rearmament, people would vote against. In keeping with Landtman, it was the people who naturally wanted a United States of Europe because they already lived in interaction with each other. It would need time, but after unification the future would be peaceful. One can see that Landtman had experienced the World War and was observing signs of the next one coming. A united Europe was a pacifist program for him. Integration and broader sympathy in his view guaranteed peace. He stated that one can no longer imagine a war between two towns in Finland. He felt that this sense of solidarity should be taken to the European level (Landtman 1932a: 111).

More concretely, Landtman suggested first economic union, which was the easiest to execute, and a European customs union. But it was not a growing economy that he was after. Economic union was for him a way to achieving a social Europe,

and it would also be one step toward a united Europe. It would also prevent a divisive resentment among European states. This would have positive effects, even though it meant huge revision of production structures, on economics and also social policy. If there was no competition in Europe but, rather, a rational form of cooperation, the negative consequences of competitiveness would also cease. The rational cooperation was in the common interest and also one of the factors of peaceful social evolution. The European states which were at the time living under economic turmoil were unfortunately, as stated by Landtman, directing their action against each other. The used keyword was lowering the production costs, and this was done by lowering wages and extending working hours. One popular answer was also to reduce levels of social security. Landtman disagreed and offered a cooperative united Europe as an answer to questions which each state tried to answer separately. To him economic problems were merely problems of distribution and organization. What was needed was international rationalization. In his vision, rationality meant organized production for European markets. This would preclude competition and add European wide solidarity. He understood the complexity of rational production: which country produces what? He did not offer precise answers but wanted to see free movement of labor, across the borders. Basically, his vision was close to the United States of America, which he also mentioned as approximating a rational system. For Landtman, economic unification was one step toward confederation (Landtman 1932a: 111). Later in his writings, he thought highly of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal (Landtman 1937: 284–285).

3.6   Landtman Explaining the Sociological Facts: Reasserting Sociological Arguments

Although Landtman's articles on ethics have not been highly regarded (Salmela 1998: 37, 99), reading them as part of his cosmopolitanism brings a new, rewarding perspective. This reappraisal gives them value and importance. In his articles on ethics, Landtman attempted to reassert the sociological arguments used in his journalism.

In 1930, Landtman published an article titled "The Essence of Morality and Utilitarianism" in the journal of the Finnish Philosophical Society. There he said more about the basic conclusions drawn and also about the history of sociology and sociological ethics. Landtman placed the roots of his sociological understanding in thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as David Hume and Adam Smith, the sentimentalists who associated human morality with human sentiments and human nature. As Landtman points out, his teacher Westermarck had developed these ideas further (Landtman 1930: 17–19, 1933a: 174–175).

According to Landtman, sociology has given pertinence to moral philosophy because sociology has been able to provide scientific explanations to questions of human morality. Referring to Westermarck's study *The Origin and Development of*

the Moral Ideas (1906–1908), Landtman argues that sociology has explained that morality arises from sympathetic emotions of human nature, which connect human individuals with each other (Landtman 1930: 19–20). According to Westermarck, in a small tribal community, "all the members of the community are united with one another by common interests and common feelings" (Pipatti). This was one of the sociological facts that Landtman forged for his argumentation in his essays on cosmopolitanism, which he placed in modern society. He repeated and underlined the importance of understanding the common interest and utility of cooperation for each individual and the society, applying the idea also on the international plane.

Following Westermarck and his Scottish predecessors, Landtman refers to sympathy as the human capability impartially to share in other people's feelings. Human beings are able to identify themselves with each other's feelings. Underneath much human interaction, you find sympathy and altruism. These were originally feelings within individuals who lived close, within visual range of each other. This means, according to Landtman, that society is the circle in which morality and the understanding of the benefits of cooperation in interaction with each other have evolved. There is no morality in nature but only when human beings interact with each other (Landtman 1930: 20, 1933a: 183).

How does this relate with cosmopolitanism? This is the question Landtman was actually answering in his scientific articles on ethics. According to Landtman, there is no doubt that the principle of common utility could be widened beyond the borders of states because international relations also work under the same principle (Landtman 1930: 24–25). In short this means that the feelings of sympathy, social instinct, altruism, and other characteristics of human nature, which he regarded as crucial factors of social evolution, could be widened beyond one's close community, society, or even state. All that was needed was interaction between peoples. Here Landtman again follows Westermarck's ideas: "People of different nationalities feel that in spite of all the dissimilarities between them there is much that they have in common," and the circle of sympathy expands (Westermarck 1908: 177; Pipatti). In Landtman's thinking, different peoples could be and on a certain level already were engaged in the needed interaction with each other, which would lead an expansion in the circle of sympathy. Wider cooperation was in the common interest, and this understanding in Landtman's view should not be demoralized by governments (Landtman 1933a: 179).

As I have clarified, Landtman's sociology was also influenced by Darwin. Landtman implicitly also used Darwin's theory on widening sympathy. According to Darwin, the idea of humanity was one of the noblest virtues with which man is endowed, and it is connected to the development of sympathy, i.e., sympathy becoming more widely diffused. Landtman's understanding of human sociality, cosmopolitanism, and ideas on international cooperation owe a great debt to Darwin's *The Descent of Man*. According to Darwin, "*As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities , the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to*

men of all nations and races" (Darwin 2004/1879: 147). Landtman was trying to convince his Finnish readers of the necessity of the "simplest reason." For him the "artificial barriers" were the old-fashioned statesmen of the era.

3.7 Cosmopolitanism and Cooperation as the Next Stage of Social Evolution: World Parliament Needed

At the end of 1933, Landtman published an article in Finnish titled "The International Contradictions in the Light of Sociology." This paper was a reaction to what Landtman termed the "politics of war," which he believed was imminently about to break out in a world conflagration. According to Landtman, no efforts were made toward mutual understanding or equality anymore in sight. As nobody had yet proposed any fruitful reforms, he argued that sociology could provide one (Landtman 1933b: 195). Again, timing suggests why he was writing. The paper was published after Adolf Hitler had become the chancellor of Germany and Germany had left the League of Nations. For Landtman, these events were even stronger signs of the wrong path being taken. Both the League of Nations and pan-Europeanism were losing their credibility.

In his article, Landtman repeated his main arguments and linked them to current affairs. One may think this was merely reiteration or a lack of ideas, but one must admit the impressive courage Landtman expressed in his continuous involvement. He was trying to communicate with nationalists and others who promoted the competition between states. Times were hard, according to Landtman, depression seemed to be eternal, and this he thought would usher along greater threats. The constitutions in many states had become unstable and temporary. Again, he rhetorically compared domestic policy and international relations. The tensions between states were just as strong and ever increasing as the tensions between political parties and ideas were in independent states (Landtman 1933b: 195).

Landtman argued that the nation states in the social evolutionary process as sovereign bodies had reached their peak. As the world had changed, he was proposing a new cosmopolitan social contract. The basic assumption of evolutionary sociology was progress. The ongoing social evolution demanded new organizations which were above the states. As I have argued, he saw many other dimensions of social life already internationally arranged. He was seeking for an international coalition of the states. The coalition would take part of the sovereignty of the states. This was part of his idea of the progress. As an evolutionist, he understood that untouchable sovereignty and competing states would not lead toward a peaceful tomorrow.

This higher organization, Landtman proposed, would keep the constitutions of the states. The coalition would connect the states just as sympathetic emotions and common interests had connected individuals in societies in the early stage of social evolution. There is a social instinct in human nature, which binds people together.

In his view, because human nature has not changed, the same principle mattered also in the higher stages of social evolution. After all, the circle of sympathy had widened before (Landtman 1933b: 195–196). By this he meant social evolution, since, at first, there were families and then they formed societies, which were kept together *by social instinct and mutual interest* (Landtman 1938: 320); then after a long process of social evolution society reached its *civilized stage*, with its nation states.

For Landtman, this sociological fact was not naivety or utopianism. Adaptability, a Darwinian idea, was one feature of human nature, and people were always under external influences. Earlier he had written about influencing by suggestion. He argued that influencing people's opinions was important because mass psychology plays a crucial role in societies (Landtman 1933b: 195–196). He was directing his arguments against nationalists and underlined the utility of the whole, this whole being the circle of human interaction. In his vision, the next step would be the utility of human kind. Humans are bound together because of the utility of cooperation, no matter whether it happened within the family, in a small-scale society, in a nation state, or finally at the level of international cosmopolitanism. Reciprocity and mutual benefits were essential for the origin of society. They are also crucial when cosmopolitanism evolves. Every piece of society must consider the common welfare, otherwise the solidarity will falter.

A coalition between states means that each state minds its own welfare but above all takes care of the international welfare. It only demands giving some of the states' sovereignty to a higher organization. In short, Landtman was outlining a new cosmopolitan social contract which was based on sociological facts, in which the world evolved and there were recognizable factors guiding the course. The next step was going to be, or was supposed to be, a natural and rational cosmopolitanism, which he had proposed already in 1923.

Again, Landtman was explaining that the preconditions of solidarity and mutual understanding were in the people – the people are not each other's enemies, but isolated states are. However, statesmen were suspicious and the League of Nations did not follow the will of people. In the League of Nations, the representatives were statesmen and diplomats, but in the future world parliament the representatives would come from the parliaments on the nation states. The world parliament would be democratic. However, nation states would also remain an important political configuration. Landtman understood the strength of patriotic sentiments, everybody has his or her fatherland, but there was nothing unpatriotic in international cooperation. All people had to do, according to Landtman, was to understand already existing international reliance and cooperation: every day products already travel around the globe and that even though people live basically in their small communities and states, people were also living through international interaction and mutual understanding with each other. The politics should follow to ensure cosmopolitanism (Landtman 1933b: 196). In short, cosmopolitanism was already a reality, but one simply had to admit the facts.

3.8 Conclusion

Landtman showed strong consistency in his writings between the world wars. His willingness to hold on to his sociological facts is reminiscent to those famous words usually connected to J.M. Keynes: "When the facts change I change my opinion, what do you do sir?" Landtman firmly believed that people have a natural ability to cosmopolitanism. The facts never changed and Landtman never had to change his opinion. His last writing on the topic was published in 1939. He was still trying to convince the Finns of the benefits of cooperation. By then, he had even more strongly striven for peace (Landtman 1939). It seems like his ideas fell on deaf ears. The world conflagration he had warned his readers about eventually occurred, and Europeans (who he wanted to unite) experienced unimaginable horrors.

As Tony Judt has stated, "we must revisit the ways in which our grandparents' handled comparable challenges and threats" (2011b: 221). We are still living in a world easily recognizable in Landtman's writings. The challenges he experienced are comparable to those of living generations. The facts that he promoted have not changed. Humans still have feelings of solidarity, and social beings are definitely not each other's enemies. In the terms and references he was offering for social life, there was something valuable for us too. As British political theorist John Dunn has observed, the past is somewhat better lit than the future: we see it more clearly (Judt 2011b: 221). We should not forget that not admitting the facts of Landtman's sociology in the 1930s leads to highly unfortunate consequences and not to a peaceful cosmopolitanism. Comparing the path taken with that which humanity failed to take may help us to choose anew or mend our ways.

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Chapter 4
Cosmopolitanism and Europe: An Original Encounter in the Thirties (1929–1939)

Tommaso Visone

« Le Dix-neuvième Siècle a été un siècle de doctrines. Le Dix-neuvième Siècle, siècle romantique, siècle qui commence en 1760, siècle de producteurs de grandes idéologies sentimentales: idéologie démocratique, idéologie légitimiste, idéologie capitaliste, idéologie neo-catholique, idéologie socialiste, idéologie nietzschéenne. Ces idéologies se sont étendues jusqu'à nous, pour mourir parmi nous. Le Vingtième Siècle les a tuées. Le Vingtième Siècle est un siècle de conscience planétaire. Il exige de politique de faire face à des difficultés venant des quatre coins de l'horizon. De là ce repliement de nations sur elles-mêmes, qui est peur et nécessité de concentrer ses forces devant tant de périls et de problèmes et qui est aussi veillée d'armes avant de se jeter à corps perdu dans des luttes globales. Dans de telles conditions, les idéologies conçues en Europe au siècle dernier deviennent insuffisantes, trop étroites. Il devient nécessaire de les mêler, de les marier, de leur faire engendrer des enfants plus complexes et plus souples. De fait, nous les voyons, ces idéologies, courir les unes après les autres, se frôler, se toucher, s'embrouiller dans une orgie qui prend des proportions cosmiques ». Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, *La fin des doctrines*. (1936)

The 1930s are commonly considered an age of nationalisms, fascisms, and totalitarianisms. During such a decay, it is apparently difficult to identify direct commitment in cosmopolitan ideas or in any kind of "Europeanism."[1] In spite of the climate

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[1] "Europeism" here means the second sense that is normally linked to the expression "idea of Europe." In fact inside the academic world, there are mainly two meanings linked to his expression: the former defines a consciousness, a "being" (also an existing tendency), a differentiation between what Europe is and what it is not, and a perception to be something of peculiar called Europe, whereas the latter indicates a project, a vision, a "should be," and something to realize or to desire that is not yet present that will be common to all Europe. Of course in historical praxis, there are a lot of connections between these two ways to think about Europe, but we can say that, even though they are not separated, they can be conceptualized as distinct (so it is possible to distinguish but not to disconnect about that). See Visone (2016). On the idea of Europe as a project, see Voyenne (1964), Duroselle (1965), Pistone (1975, 1993, pp. 700–709), Stirk (1989), Den Boer et al. (1995), Du Reau (2001), Pagden (2002), Telò (2004), Chabot (2005),

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of the period 1919–1929, which was signed by the League of Nations and characters such as Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi, the following could easily be described as a time in which not only cosmopolitanism but also "Europeanism" were out of the continental Europe *Zeitgeist*.[2] As I tried to show in other works, this impression is correct for "Europeanism" only if along with such concept, we only consider its "liberal" version as it was thought during the 1920s (1919–1929).[3] In fact, the specific context of the 1930s produced a group of new ideas of Europe – thought as a political whole – characterized by their metapolitical breath: in such a decay, it was clear that reordered Europe wasn't just choosing what the best institutional organization for Europe was inside a defined "ideology," but it was about choosing (and affirming in direct concurrence with others) a new model of civilization beyond the nineteenth century's one.[4] But is such a consideration still true as far as cosmopolitanism is concerned? Was it completely out of touch with the 1929 and 1939 reality in continental Europe? In order to give a partial answer to this wide question, it is interesting to define what "cosmopolitanism"[5] means here. By observing the debate of that period, cosmopolitanism can be considered as not only "the doctrine defending the insignificance of sociopolitical distinction among states and nations, giving to each individual the world's citizenship" but, more specifically, the idea that "each men is a citizen of a universal organism" that can be concretely defined "as a republic or as a universal monarchy" in which it is possible to keep a national distinction but only inside the universal community.[6] In fact, such an idea was shared by a group of intellectuals that were aware that in the 1930s the world entered a new era in which Europe was no longer the center of the world nor history's[7] locomotive. If an epoch of world interdependence was starting, it was necessary to rethink the world as a community starting from Europe that, during the 1930s, seemed to be on the brink of collapsing. Europe was seen as a strategic point to originate this transformation also because of the increasing challenge of fascism that in the same

Anderson (2009), and Colombo (2009). About Europe as a consciousness and a "being," see Morin (1988), Gadamer (1989), Geremeck (1991), Cacciari (1994), Fontana (1994), De Benoist (1996), Cardini (1997), Tielker (1998, 2003), Mikkeli (1999), Balibar (2001), Consarelli (2003), Todorov (2003), Bauman (2004), De Giovanni (2004), Pera and Ratzinger (2004), Scuccimarra (2004, pp. 61–75), Pellicani (2007), Rossi (2007), Garcia Picazo (2008), Habermas (2008), and Consarelli (2012). See also the idea of *conscience europeiste* in Brunetau (2014, p. 57).

[2] See George-Henri Soutou (2014, p. 9). Different from this context is the American and the English one characterized by the work of authors such as Clarence Streit, Barbara Wootton, Lord Lothian, and Lionel Robbins. On this debate see Bosco (2009) and Castelli (2002).

[3] See Visone (2012a, b), pp. 137–151.

[4] See Visone (2012a, 2015).

[5] About the history of the concept, see Scuccimarra (2006).

[6] See Mori (1992, p. 495). In fact the etymology of the Greek word cosmopolitanism implies a tension between universe (kosmos) and city (polis). Any kind of cosmopolitan thought has lived this tension trying to subordinate local aspirations to global values and perspectives. See Bresciani (2014, p. 170).

[7] See, as example, the reflections of Paul Valery (1931) and the considerations of Moritz Bonn that invented the word "decolonization" in 1932 to describe such a context. See Reinhardt (2002, p. 288).

period tried to impose a new European order, in direct contrast with the idea of a democratic Europe open to a cosmopolitan world system.[8] In order to better clarify this debate, it is now interesting to examine the encounter between cosmopolitanism and "Europeism" and to analyze a few particular positions that came up such context marked by the 1929 crisis:

1. It is now important to start by saying that from 1929 to 1939, intellectuals were commonly engaged in a radical ideological struggle. In fact, as many coeval observers and historian noticed, the 1930s were characterized by an authentic "clash of ideologies," by a radical conflict on the different collective directions to follow. The ideological battle was fought – as Enzo Traverso notes – by intellectuals who were completely engaged in it.[9] In such a context, the study of European "projects" and "visions" elaborated by intellectuals takes on a particular interest not only to grasp the idea of Europe but also to better understand the 1929–1939 decay. In fact, in that epoch the "lines of loyalty… ran not between but across countries" and imagining new orders and new political identities beyond the nation-state was more common than we can actually suppose nowadays.[10] In such a scenario, it is important to stress how a cosmopolitan feeling was, asymmetrically, shared inside different ideological families that, for their contemporary struggle against fascisms, were directly hit by several persecutions.[11] Many socialists, anarchists, republicans and liberals were forced to exile and thus to live out of their countries.[12] This condition was fundamental to produce, in some cases, a true identification between the idea of a new European order and the prospect of a cosmopolitan system that would guarantee peaceful relations among the different civilizations. But, for an important part of these intellectuals, such a result was in any case impossible to pursue adopting the old instruments of the League of the Nations and using the problematic logic of "international pacifism."[13] In fact it was clear that – especially with the challenge of fascism – it was not possible to evoke any kind of stable peaceful solution among sovereign nations, founded on shared values (as it was on the nineteenth century). Thus the new order would have been the result of a creation that would

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[8] About this debate see Visone (2014, pp. 113–142).

[9] See Traverso (2007, pp. 191–219).

[10] See Hobsbawm (2003, p. 102).

[11] For example, José Ortega y Gasset considered Europe the only possible civilization potentially capable to take "mando" (rule) over the globe in such a scenario. He recognized the dignity of others civilization without considering them able to give to his contemporary world a common direction. According to him only a new united Europe would have been able to do it. All this view put him out of the kind of cosmopolitanism that we are talking about here. See Ortega y Gasset (2007).

[12] See on this the considerations developed by Jundt (2009, pp. 13–16).

[13] Different, of course, is – just to give an example – the position of the cosmopolitan and federalist Scelle (1932/1934).

have been victorious only if it had been able to answer better than fascism to the issues opened by the fall of the liberal XIX Europe.[14]

2. As we have seen, it is possible to consider among these intellectuals who, in such harsh times, fought this struggle for a new cosmopolitan order in Europe and in the world. In this "group" some names are more interesting than others for the quality of their commitment. Among them it is impossible to exclude two figures frequently underestimated as Anna Siemsen and Andrea Caffi. These two intellectuals where strongly engaged in criticizing the nationalist order of their times and in finding alternatives to the fascist way toward a new European order (with all its implication for the entire globe). Who were they? Being a pupil of Joseph Bloch, Anna Siemsen was a socialist pedagogue and an intellectual who escaped to Switzerland after the collapse of German socialism. According to Francesca Lacaita, she is one of the most interesting characters of the German emigration during the 1930s because of her deep engagement and culture.[15] Remarkable writer she could be considered for her sensibility to international and pedagogic problems that gave her the ability to fully understand the global measure and radicalism of the fascist challenge.[16] Andrea Caffi was a socialist and libertarian intellectual that had an adventurous and unique life. He was born in Saint Petersburg and there he started to frequent a socialist and Menshevik environment. Then he had the opportunity to study with Georg Simmel in Germany and to sink into the Parisian intellectual context of World War I period. Then, after some experiences as a reporter and a diplomat, he became strongly engaged in the antifascist struggle. For that reason he was forced to exile in France where he continued the collaboration that had started during the 1920s, with Carlo Rosselli and with the group of "Giustizia e Libertà"[17] until 1935. He is considered one of the most original intellectuals of the 1930s and one of the most significant cosmopolitan characters of his times.[18] Starting from their thoughts, it may be possible to show a hidden aspect of the 1929–1939 debate and to examine if cosmopolitanism was completely out of touch inside that intellectual context.

3. Anna Siemsen's pondering over European order is well condensed in her work "*Dictaturen – Oder Europäische Demokratie*?" (1937) where she highlights the coincidence between social democracy and political democracy as aims of the socialist movements. This book was written during her exile in Switzerland. In fact the advent of Nazism in Germany (1933) represented a terrible threat for any

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[14] As Thomas Mann wrote in 1934, it was impossible to find an agreement with Hitler. Thus it was necessary a new organization of the "universalist forces" that had to be able to impose itself over the world. See Mann (1958, pp. 340–341).

[15] See Lacaita (2010, pp. 13–21). About the German exiles' debate concerning Europe, see Schilmar (2004).

[16] About Anna Siemsen's life, see Siemsen (1951) and Rogler (1995, pp. 7–53).

[17] See Saporetti (2004).

[18] About Caffi's life see Bianco (1977) and Bresciani (2009) and all the documents inside the Andrea Caffi page of "Biblioteca Gino Bianco" http://www.bibliotecaginobianco. it/?r=28&s=132&p=25&t=andrea-caffi.

political opponent. She actually lost her job as a pedagogy professor at Jena's University, and considering the new German political context, she decided to move to Switzerland. She had already engaged into the socialist debate as a critic of SPD and, since her rupture with the Socialist Workers Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei*), as a militant in the Swiss Socialist Party and feminist writer. Among the end of the 1920s and 1937, she reached the conviction that the battle for socialism and euro-federalism was the same. She wrote that capitalism and sovereign nation-state were strictly intertwined and that they have to be fought together.[19] In fact, in her view, it was impossible to effectively defend and pursue socialist goals with the coeval division of Europe among sovereign national states. She wrote:

If one lives in complete loneliness in the middle of savage nature it is then possible to let him and his family live in anyway they want,. They can set fire to their settlement, they can kill each other: at the very end it is their own business. It is possible to keep their sovereignty. But if one lives in close contact with others there is no other solution than to limit the sovereignty of a fire starter and of a murderer even inside their own house because, if they are allowed to keep it, it would be a danger for all their neighbors. Europe's people live in close contact among each other …What we call today in Europe State's Sovereignty… is nothing but a cosmetic camouflage of the current absence of international law in reason of which pacific states are exposed to aggression and the ones organized on liberal principles are exposed to barbarism and all the small and weak are exposed to the oppression of some dictatorial, aggressive and unscrupulous states. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 19–20, p. 18)

In her view that system founded on national sovereignty was also the cause of the success of dictatorships and of the incumbent war among Europeans, well represented by the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, that "sovereign disorder" restrained Europeans from creating a new world order based on peace and equality as opposed to the concrete possibility of a war among the European states and the colonies that started to claim their independence (India, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, etc.). She fully understood that "decolonization" had started and tried to speak to Europe about the new inedited situation:

Today the great English colonies of Australia, Canada and South-Africa are no longer dependent regions but autonomous members of a confederation of states. Japan has actually become a superpower that looks dangerous for Europeans. China, India, Egypt and Asiatic people fight fiercely for independence. And the Abyssinian war has an effect that goes in the same direction of the world war: also the least and more trivial African people is becoming convinced that European domination is not an unavoidable destiny that must be docilely accepted and that such a destiny has to be dominated and defeated. However, by following such a path, Europe is pushed back onto itself. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 25–26)

This European movement – with its political and economical consequences – would lead to a new world conflict. Against that threat – she was sure about the fact that another world conflict would destroy Europe more than other parts of the World – Anna Siemsen called for a European democratic federation founded by the European continental and democratic states (Spain, France, Belgium with

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[19] See Siemsen (1932, pp. 50–55).

USSR as external warrant) that would defeat fascist dictatorship to create the basis for a larger union:

Europe has to become an economic union if they don't want to suffocate inside their thirty-six tight boundaries. Europe has to establish an imperative common juridical order if they want to avoid suicidal civil wars of their States. Europe could preserve the multiplicity and the richness of their national cultures only if they protect themselves from external subjugation and from internal oppression through a free federal constitution. (Siemsen 1937, p. 18)

This federal "Europa-Union" would create a new kind of socialist and pacifist society, founded on "internal colonization" or on the redistribution of richness and work in the poorest areas of Europe. Of course these wouldn't be an aristocratic/meritocratic society – as hoped by some coeval liberals[20] – but an egalitarian one in social and political terms. Furthermore, that kind of federation of equals could be the pillar of a new multilateral world order, founded on cooperation and equality among the different parts of the globe. She affirmed:

We are probably at the beginning of a decisive era. In Europe the socialist movement is trying to radically transform the relations among men. Out of Europe the sense of their human rights is awakening in each people and they start to defend their independence against European masters and exploiters…The Union of the same Europe, the collaboration without constrictions with other freed continents are still possible today. And if such a thing could not assure overabundance of richness and power for a dominant class as it was in the past, it could differently (and it is better) procure to every workers freedom, security and a satisfied existence. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 25–27)

Siemsen's idea is to promote a new kind of cosmopolitanism in which the New Europe would not be the "ruler" but the crossroad of a cultural and economical exchange based on the equality of its participants. In order to accomplish such a condition, it would have been necessary to defeat any dictatorship in Europe and to create a new federal, democratic, and socialist order for the old continent. This would have hindered Europeans' last attempt to think themselves as the masters of the world due to the beginning of an unprecedented era of politically pacific collaboration. In this sense the European Union, as a new pan-European democracy, would have become a possible new source of peaceful relations among the world's peoples. In fact:

The more the European states arm themselves and weave one against the other, the stronger the awareness and the will of resistance awakes, and the wider the sense of revolution of Asian and African people spreads. In spite of some temporary success, in spite of our technical superiority, we won't be able to keep them subjugated and deprived of their rights for a long time. A democratic Federation of European States would still have a lot to give them; it could create peace on the basis of juridical equality, in economic cooperation and in cultural exchange. But such a Europe hasn't been born yet. It could be that the tribulations that we are experiencing are just the labor pain of such a new Europe. Whether they lead Europe to a happy birth or to its end, it depends on the will of all of us. (Siemsen 1937, p. 5)

4. Andrea Caffi was always very interested in such view that, by crossing anarchism and socialism, it tried to think against the idea of a modern e centralized

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[20] Such as José Ortega y Gasset (2007).

nation-state. Influenced by the thought of Proudhon and Herzen – and by the personal experience as Italian immigrant in Russia – Caffi developed strong criticism toward national sovereignty as the pillar of international order.[21] After joining "Giustizia e Libertà" (1929), he tried to develop this criticism in close relation to the huge civilization crisis in which Europe was involved after the end of World War I (a crisis that became unavoidable for any intellectual after the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929).[22] He thought that the only way to react against nationalism and the risk of a new war inside the old continent was represented by the creation of a European Confederation that would aim to start a path toward the end of national sovereignties. In fact, in a 1932 essay Caffi affirmed:

The Union of the European States in a legally defined superior political body, provided with organs and tools to effectively govern, suddenly makes the nightmare of a bad war disappear and the same questions that today are source of hurricanes would immediately (or since the first phase – very far from the transformation in true United State – and when the notorious sovereignty of the Confederation single members will be barely undermine) be abolished. (Onofrio 1970, p. 61)

Impressed by the debate that followed the Briand declaration and by the idea of an "Antieuropa" that was thought to be the fascist answer to liberal, cosmopolitan, and democratic "Paneuropa,"[23] he insisted on the necessity of a European political unification that had to be realized to grant, through federalism, individual and collective freedom in the face of the threat represented by a possible hierarchical Europe created by the fascist regime. According to him the time had come for European democracies to realize such a union:

If democracies don't know how to implement it – the political Union – in time (and this failure would seal their condemnation to a total eclipse) it is not absurd that triumphant dictatorial regimes will try it; but the Confederation wanted by the democrats would be organized through peaceful ways and would respect each nations' equal rights, whereas the fascist Mitteleuropa will not be strengthened if not by iron and fire, and inside of it, close to other oppressive hierarchies, there shall be a division among one or two dominant peoples and several other slave one. (Onofrio 1970, p. 62)

The proposal of a kind of European federalism – that he considers the final result of a political joint effort aimed to European unity – was, thus, fostered by a concern to liberty and autonomy that, linked to his intellectual formation, was also stimulated by the works of Georges Gurvitch and Wladimir Woytinsky.[24] The former developed – with *L'idée du droit sociale* (1932) – an idea of juridical pluralism founded on the social right (*droit sociale*) that emanates directly to

[21] See Bresciani (2014, p. 175).

[22] During the 1920s Andrea Caffi was engaged in studying and criticizing the ideas of Oswald Spengler and Hugo von Hofmannstahal about the crisis of European civilization and culture. See Visone (2012a, p. 154). Also during the 1930s, he continued to study the right-wing culture and the fascist ideology as it appears clear in Caffi (1932, pp. 55–72).

[23] See Visone (2014).

[24] See Bresciani (2014, p. 176).

each community without any relationship to the sovereignty of the state. The latter was convinced that the crisis of 1929 and the fascist rise needed a unitary European answer that could be achieved only through a federal model, as he wrote in *Tatsachen un Zahlen Europas* (1930).[25] According to Caffi, without such an answer not only Europe would have risked a fascist reunification – with all its consequences – but there would have been a new terrible war because of its sovereign state system that creates deadly divisions among men. In 1935 he firmly and provocatively tackled the problem:

Until there are States, sacred egoism is the supreme law…and – thanks to God – today it is no longer possible to be mislead about using this selfishness for general interest; these are chimeras to be abandoned to the non innocent games of liberal historiography. What is forcing Europe to war is not fascism itself but the very order of Europe divided into sovereign states. Territorial divisions, corridors, national minorities and the economic ruin created by custom barriers were not invented or created by fascism. Can these questions be solved step by step without starting war? And what has been done about that in seventeen years time? It is no longer about sovereign states' European policy but more about overcoming them altogether. (Caffi 1935)

Thus, European federalism, according to him, will be structured onto the ceasing of the sovereignty of nation-states. This would have created the premises for a redemption that, carried out at a European level, could include also other civilizations creating something new but inspired by "universal" western culture line. Caffi was aware of the fact that his cosmopolitanism was coping here – with its identification of western "humanism" with "universalism" – its true limit. As he wrote to Carlo Rosselli in 1929:

Maybe the word "to save Europe" is still too defensive (keeping it simply for the rivals at the apogee – Maybe we have to synthesise: Europe – America – East – China (?) naturally (here is my limit *ultra quem non possum*) I don't want and I don't think to a civilization in which our traditional line isn't dominant: Plato – St. Sofia – Leonardo – Galileo – Voltaire – humanitarian socialism. (Caffi 1929)

Thus the problem for Caffi was not simply unifying Europe but changing the world in a socialist sense, a way that for him required the end of nation-state sovereignty and the beginning of a new European federal system oriented to answering to the new needs of human coexistence in the world. His aim was realizing, against fascism and beyond the modern sovereignty, "a society in which only spontaneous bonds exist, where right is created, rediscovered, carried out newly in any instant, where man and citizen are no longer distinct categories."[26] But this post-national spontaneity, thought through European tradition of thought, was in potential contradiction with the spontaneous independence of other extra-European civilizations to choose other potential traditions to think about their new society. In this sense it is well comprehensible why he focused on Europe as the continent in which to realize his cosmopolitan experiment and

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[25] In 1930 he published also, for Paneuropa Verlag, a French translation of his former work *Die Vereingten Staaten von Europa* (1926).

[26] Andrea (1970, p. 206).

why he was doubtful toward a potential political subject able to go beyond Europe itself. In this sense, according to Marco Bresciani, his cosmopolitanism lived in the irreducible tension and in the potential conflict between his universalist attitude and his awareness of the persistence of any particular identity and culture.[27]

5. As we have seen, these intellectuals were both "socialists" and "cosmopolitans." According to them, the new historical reality forced men to think and to organize themselves out of the nation-state boundaries and logics. In this sense, following their discourse, if one wanted to realize "socialism" in such a scenario, it was necessary to think to a new organization of Europe, able to put an end to the old logic of hierarchical control and competition founded on the nation-state sovereignty. This logic in fact created all the premises of war and, with and together to war, the whole of condition that legitimized and produced the exploitation of man by man.[28] In this sense the rupture with the nation-state system was the way to discover new solidarities and to create a new kind of transnational equality among individuals and communities that would be founded on a new federal European system. In this sense their "cosmopolitanism" – which was political and founded of federalism as tool of a new coexistence out of the old state-system[29] – marries their "socialism" as an answer to the new scenario of their epoch. A time in which not only the economical order was a world one but in which for the first time the world was felt as composed by others civilization able to fight (and to win) with Europe in a historical scenario that lost its only protagonist: the old continent. Thus rethinking Europe as a federation was for them a way to rethink the human coexistence on the world and to try to give a new direction to the same history. In this sense – also if their ideas were, of course, in the minority also inside the socialist world – we can say that they react to their *Zeitgeist* being also deep observers and critics of it. If they were out of touch with the mainstream national/international solution adopted by socialist parties during the 1930s, they were also sharp interpreters of the new problems of such a decay. Cosmopolitanisms, apparently useless in a time signed by fascisms, become a political resource to such a thinker to adapt socialism to a new intertwined and polycentric world and to challenge fascism on the field of the creation of a new civilization able to substitute the nineteenth century one. The same criticism to the idea of national sovereignty was thought to be a radical rupture with an "old world" that they considered responsible for the dramatic

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[27] Bresciani (2014, p. 187).

[28] Also if Caffi and Siemsen's ideas were not accessible to Spinelli and Rossi, it is very interesting to find some similar analysis (about the "reactionary" role of nation-state and about the socialist necessity to substitute it with a federal state) inside the "Manifesto of Ventotene" written in 1941/1942.

[29] Of course there are differences between the two thoughts analyzed here. For example, the "federalism" of Caffi is closer to the Proudhonian one – with a strong influence of Gurvitch – while the model of Anna Siemsen is constituted by Swiss system. In any case they were both interested, as final aim, in transform the European society in the interest of the "person" more than in simply putting some states together.

developments of their time. There is also another element of originality in this relation among cosmopolitanism and a new idea of Europe created under the sign of socialism. In the eighteenth century, the idea of a culturally (and sometimes politically) united Europe was often thought as a fundamental aspect of *philosopher*'s cosmopolitanism. In such a context, Europe was considered the land of the "progress" and of the "knowledge," the true center of the world, and the first civilization inside of it.[30] In the 1930s, some authors – such as the two that we consider here – started to wonder not only whether Europe could keep on being the center of the world (and as we saw Anna Siemsen clearly answers no) but if it is right to Europe to continue to impose not only its power but its culture over the rest of the world.[31] And this – in the context that produced the concept of "decolonization" – is an element that, in spite of being embryonic, suggests to continue to deepen the debate of such a controversial decay.

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[30] This superiority was affirmed in spite of all the criticism that authors such as Montesquieu and Voltaire claimed against their society and in spite of their positive consideration of other civilizations (such as China). See the classic study Chabod (2003, pp. 106–121). This conviction was just partially modified by the affirmation of the USA after the independence's war (1783). See Chabod (2010, pp. 122–127).

[31] Also in Caffi the impossibility to renounce to "European tradition" in a hypothetical new world order becomes a conscious "limit."

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Part II
Patriotic Commitment and Cosmopolitan Obligation

Chapter 5
Which Love of Country? Tensions, Questions, and Contexts for Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Education

Claudia Schumann

> *Talking about love may be too easy, or rather too difficult. How can we avoid simply praising it or falling into sentimental platitudes? One way of finding a way between these two extremes may be to take as our guide an attempt to think about the dialectic between love and justice.*
>
> Paul Ricoeur, "Love and Justice," p. 23

5.1 Introduction

As I am thinking and writing about the possible meanings of patriotism in education, German newspapers comment on the victory of the German football team against Argentina in the World Cup Final with titles such as "Wir sind wieder … wer?" (*Der Spiegel 29* July 2014, title page). While asserting that "we are someone" again, they at the same time raise the question of who it is that we are or have become again. The images below the title offer in a "close-up of the nation"[1] a soccer player to the left of the page, chancellor Merkel in the middle, and a woman wearing a veil to the right of the page. While the breadth of who seems to make up Germany as a nation in these days is symbolized through the iconic depiction of soccer shoes, Merkel's trademark hand folding, and the Muslim veil, the unity of all these differences is symbolized by the German flag that covers and camouflages all three of them. And the new-found national pride is further supported by outside perspectives on the success, as foreign newspaper titles read: "World Cup victory confirms Germany supremacy on almost every measure" (Taylor 2014). At the same time, the media report on commemoration services with politicians warning of the fanaticism and extensive nationalism in Europe leading to the beginning of World

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[1] Subtitle of the same article (*Der Spiegel 29* July 2014).

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War I; other reports follow on the crisis in the Ukraine, its struggle for national integrity and independence from Russia, on the war between Israel and the Hamas in Gaza counting more than 1000 civilian deaths to date, and on the hoisting of the black flags of the ISIS, signposts of thousands of brutally violent killings in the name of the erection of an Islamic state in Iraq and Syria.

These headlines, for me, are indicative of why patriotism needs to be discussed in relation to cosmopolitanism. The urgency and need for clarifying our conceptions of each respectively and critically reflecting on their possible compatibility is stressed not only by the fact that these headlines make apparent that, also in our present day, for many the notion of country remains much more than an empty signifier, but also because they illustrate the wide range of promises as well as the dangers connected to the notion of love for country. The paper starts out by considering the reasons which Martha Nussbaum gives in more recent publications for departing from her earlier cosmopolitan position, which has been prominently and widely discussed in educational and political theory, in favor of now promoting "a globally sensitive patriotism" (2008, p. 78). Beyond aiming at drawing attention to an as yet only scarcely discussed shift in Nussbaum's thought, her reasons for endorsing patriotism will be shown as exemplary for related argumentations by other authors, especially insofar as love of country as a motivating force for civic duty is understood as in tension or even as incompatible with cosmopolitan aspirations. In the next part, the motivation for turning to patriotism as articulated by Nussbaum and others will be questioned and demonstrated to rely on mistaken understandings of love of country as a possessive emotion. It will be argued that moral judgment with regard to the *patria* as well as from a cosmopolitan stance is equally tied to our sensitivities and equally requires their education. Furthermore, we will look at Axel Honneth's notion of solidarity as a form of love inflected by justice as a possible alternative for conceptualizing patriotic attachment. The final section of the paper will put forth an argument for the compatibility of a critical cosmopolitanism with a critical patriotism. In particular, a critical patriotism needs to transgress the inward-directed focus of much writing on patriotism and take into account an outward perspective, as suggested by Papastephanou (2012, 2013), including how a country is seen by noncitizens, the historical relationships to other countries, and the sort of obligations that arise in terms of historical justice in relation to other countries. If we take patriotism in this outward-looking perspective seriously, we also come to understand why it would be a mistake to skip patriotism altogether as some critics have suggested (e.g., Kateb 2000). Rather than constructing cosmopolitanism and patriotism as mutually exclusive opposites, critical cosmopolitanism and critical patriotism can be shown to have different but complementary and mutually corrective functions.

5.2 Martha Nussbaum's Shift from Cosmopolitanism to Patriotism

The discussion on patriotism is notoriously polarizing. On one side of the spectrum, we find scholars such as George Kateb who consider patriotism "a mistake twice over" and find it "surprising and deplorable […] that the mistake of patriotism is elaborated theoretically and promoted by people who should know better" (Kateb 2000, p. 901). On the other hand, we find scholars arguing that abandoning patriotism would imply "necessarily to give up on building a *democratic* national community" (Callan 2009, p. 66). The worry about the loss of "a shared sense of nationhood" destroying the "fragile bond of belonging" which then can no longer serve as "an instrument for political change towards justice" (Callan 2009, p. 66) is commonly voiced by scholars from secular Western democracies. Other important criticisms of a "general incrimination of the politics of any national affect" (Papastephanou 2012, p. 187) have been raised by postcolonial theorists arguing that critics of (nationalist) patriotisms "sidestepped the fact that it was precisely decolonization that, unconsciously or not, they were also attacking" (Brennan 1989, p. 1). Interestingly and not much noticed, Martha Nussbaum has moved from one end of this spectrum to the other. In 1996 she argued in the widely discussed *For Love of Country*? that "the worthy goals of patriotism" would indeed be better served by "the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings" (Nussbaum 1996, p. 4). However, in later years, and much less recognized in the academic discussion in education as well as in political theory, Nussbaum went on to change her mind and discards cosmopolitanism in order to now argue for "teaching patriotism" (Nussbaum 2012, p. 213; cf. also Nussbaum 2008). How radical a departure she has made is shown in the following quote:

> I do not […] even endorse cosmopolitanism as a correct comprehensive doctrine. Further thought about Stoic cosmopolitanism, and particularly the strict form of it developed by Marcus Aurelius, persuaded me that the denial of particular attachments leaves life empty of meaning for most of us. (Nussbaum 2008, p. 80)

We will consider later in which way her more recent outright rejection of cosmopolitanism and the whole-hearted embrace of patriotism might be connected to a certain narrowness of her own outlook on cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, in a closer analysis of her arguments for this change of mind, we will find that Nussbaum's "notion of a globally sensitive patriotism is not the easy target that many critics of patriotic attachment and concomitant education set for themselves" (Papastephanou 2013, p. 169). Nonetheless, we will also find that the underlying conception of patriotism and the hopes connected to it are constructed in a way that creates an artificial tension and ultimate incompatibility with cosmopolitan aspirations and furthermore seems to not serve well what Nussbaum considers the "worthy goals of patriotism" to begin with.

So which reasons does Nussbaum give for her shift to patriotism in education? First of all, she stresses the "importance of particularistic forms of love and

attachment" as providing "the foundation of political principles" (Nussbaum 2008, p. 80). Secondly, she says that cosmopolitanism implies "the denial of particular attachments [which] leaves life empty of meaning for most of us" and that "the solution to problems of particular attachments ought not to be this total uprooting, so destructive of the human personality" (ibid.). This brings to mind an argument which Alasdair MacIntyre developed already in 1984 that "the moral standpoint and the patriotic standpoint are systematically incompatible" (MacIntyre 1984, p. 5) since the partiality of the patriot stands in blatant contradiction with the widespread understanding of liberal morality holding that moral judgment and action requires us "to judge as any rational person would judge, independently of his or her interests, affections and social position" (ibid.).

It is quite apparent that Nussbaum in her later writings seems to align the stance of the cosmopolitan with this understanding of morality and that she seems to agree with MacIntyre that the strongest argument for patriotism being a virtue lies in the following rationale:

> *If* first of all it is the case that I can only apprehend the rules of morality in the version in which they are incarnated in some specific community; and *if* secondly it is the case that the justification of morality must be in terms of particular goods enjoyed within the life of particular communities; and *if* thirdly it is the case that I am characteristically brought into being and maintained as a moral agent only through the particular kinds of moral sustenance afforded by my community, then it is clear that deprived of this community, I am unlikely to flourish as a moral agent. [...] Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards of judgment. (MacIntyre 1984, p. 10f.)

In her arguments for patriotism, Nussbaum appears convinced that cosmopolitanism in a similar sense that MacIntyre puts forth for liberal morality would require us to be an "impartial actor, and one who in his impartiality is doomed to rootlessness, to be a citizen of nowhere" (MacIntyre 1984, p. 12). Also in philosophy of education, it has been argued that "national sentiment can provide this bonding" (White 1996, p. 331) which is needed to transcend immediate self-interest and that the love of country is an important means to underpin the civic friendship which is required to animate citizens for projects such as the fair redistribution of goods (cf. e.g., White 1996, p. 331f.; also White 2001).

In my prior work on cosmopolitanism (Schumann 2012; Schumann and Adami 2013), I have already contested the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a form of identity which stands in opposition to local and particular forms of being bound. In line with other proponents of rooted cosmopolitanism, I have stressed the importance of the critical dimension of Diogenes' claim to being a citizen of the world, arguing that the real conflict line does not lie between a stylized universalism and particularism, but that the "distinction which should matter is that between a badly understood cosmopolitanism which means nothing but the economically inspired extension of reification on a global scale, and between a critical cosmopolitanism which provides an analytical-descriptive as well as a normative resource for theorizing the withstanding, untangling and going beyond such reifications on a global scale" (Schumann 2012, p. 229). As Marianna Papastephanou carefully works out in her article on Nussbaum's turn to patriotism, it is precisely the narrow fixation on

the late Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism which "traps her political thought in either/ors" and the "oppositional connection of cosmopolitanism and patriotism as attachments that operate at cross-purposes [which] effaces the possibility of conceptualizing them as a set and a subset whose synergy has mutually corrective and directive effects" (Papastephanou 2013, p. 168). However, before looking more closely into the ways in which I think it can and should be argued that a critical cosmopolitanism is actually compatible with a critically understood patriotism much in the way as suggested by Papastephanou, I think it is worthwhile to look at the way in which the understanding of moral judgment as abstraction from all particular attachment and sentiment is inherently mistaken which puts into question the main argument given for their conception of patriotism by both MacIntyre and Nussbaum.

5.3 Questioning the Motivation for Teaching Patriotism

We have seen in the previous discussion that one of the main incentives for Nussbaum to encourage patriotism and dismiss cosmopolitanism is due to her conviction that cosmopolitanism requires the denial of particular attachments, thus undermining the very basis on which we first develop into moral actors. In the following I would now like to take a look at the intricate argument which Alice Crary has put forth in *Beyond Moral Judgment* (2007) regarding the question of the impartiality requirement for moral judgment. Her line of reasoning is of great interest here because it pinpoints the internal confusion I find with Nussbaum's conception of cosmopolitanism and the conclusions that follow for her endorsement of patriotism. Following the later works of Wittgenstein, Crary has developed a thoroughgoing criticism of what she names the "abstraction requirement" which is widely spread in many varieties of contemporary moral theory and which she argues is "internally confused" (Crary 2007, p. 26). Crary draws an "image of a natural language as a non-neutral, intrinsically moral acquisition" (2007, p. 41) and argues that "learning to speak is inseparable from the adoption of a practical orientation toward the world – specifically, one that bears the imprint of the speaker's individuality" (2007, p. 43). When we learn how to use a concept correctly, we do not make reference to a "fixed linguistic competence" (2007, p. 41), but we know intrapersonal differences (e.g., through age-dependent cognitive differences) as well as interpersonal differences (e.g., in relation to the understanding symbolic meanings), which we take into consideration when we judge the correctness of the use of a particular concept. In this way, learning a language we also acquire different intra- and interpersonal practical orientations which "encode a view of what matters most in life or how best to live" (2007, p. 43), so that "learning to speak is inseparable from the development of an – individual – moral outlook" (ibid.). Hence, she demonstrates that if it is not "possible to get our minds around how things are independently of the possession of any sensitivities, we […] make room for an alternative conception on which the exercise of rationality necessarily presupposes the possession of

certain sensitivities" (Crary 2007, p. 118f.). Crary recognizes that a certain form of impartiality might be required for moral judgment, but she also emphasizes that in ordinary situations what we mean by impartiality is merely "an abstraction from those routes of feeling that threaten to distort moral judgment" (2007, p. 203) and that this should not be confused with the philosophical question "whether every affective propensity we have as such represents a potential threat to such judgment" (2007, p. 204). In her account of moral judgment, which is grounded in the idea that there is a moral dimension to all of language, there is room for cases in which an ascription of subjective properties "figures in the best, objectively most accurate account of how things are and, further, that the person who lacks the subjective endowments that would allow her to recognize them is simply missing something" (2007, p. 28). If Crary's analyses are correct, then moral judgment with regard to our *patria* just as much as in a cosmopolitan stance with regard to global issues is deeply tied to our sensitivities and requires abstraction from some of these sensitivities only in so far as these might preclude sound judgment. More importantly, it requires a thoroughgoing education of these sensitivities in order to be able to arrive at an objective and rational assessment of how things actually stand and what course of action is the right one to take.

The idea that a genuine affective dimension plays an important role also for cosmopolitanism and that cosmopolitanism should not be reduced to merely legalistic, negative duty, "based on some relationship of reciprocity of benefits" (MacIntyre 1984, p. 5),was recognized by Nussbaum in her reply to the critics of her early prominent writings on cosmopolitanism. She then defended that children, "long before they encounter patriotism," "they know hunger and loneliness, they have probably encountered death […], they know something of humanity" (Nussbaum 1996, p. 143) and that by not letting themselves "become encrusted by the demands of local ideology, they were able to respond to a human face and form" (ibid., p. 144). While the patriotic stance here became strongly equated with ideological nationalism, the cosmopolitan stance, the response to human face and form, was clearly identified with more than a narrowly rationalistic, principled dutifulness. What seems to have changed her opinions in the following years is the idea that educating national sentiment, since directed at a "circle" that is closer to the self than the whole world or humanity as such, is able to engender stronger "sentiments of love and support" (Nussbaum 2008, p. 81) than educating for cosmopolitanism ever could.

Papastephanou has developed a convincing critique of Nussbaum's model of concentric circles and has suggested an eccentric model of cosmopolitanism instead (Papastephanou 2012; especially chapter 2). Indeed, in her discussion of Aristotle's argument against Plato, Nussbaum betrays most overtly her model of love as one that not only starts from the self and leads outside and back to the self but as a model of love of country which is thoroughly emotivist and possessive. In apparent agreement with her reconstructed Aristotle, she summarizes his insights claiming that "to make someone love something requires making them to see it as 'their own,' and, preferably also, as 'the only one they have'" (Nussbaum 2012, p. 232). There is a lot that could be said about this conception of love. Thinking about even closer circles

than the nation, we could wonder if we would consider it a genuine form of love if our partner, parent, or child would really primarily love us because they consider us their own or the only one they have. But leaving these broader questions aside, it seems doubtful that a love so conceived could actually do the kind of work that Nussbaum wants for the worthy goals of patriotism, namely, the de-centering of the self. Would such a possessive emotion not really just lead to an extended self-centeredness, an extended sense of self-importance and egotism, a form of self-aggrandizement much in the way as Kateb claims that patriotism is "only disguised self-worship" (Kateb 2000, p. 923)? Such a conception would then contribute to the opposite of what Nussbaum hopes patriotism to do; it would certainly not lead to "the sacrifice of self-interest" in "the struggle for justice" (Nussbaum 2012, p. 250).

I would like to suggest that if we are looking for a form of love or emotional-affective attachment to others which can play "the role of the 'cement' of society" (Papastephanou 2012, p. 188), we do not need to drag up such loaded words as "sacrifice" reminiscent of religious martyrdom but might be better off looking in a place such as what Axel Honneth has demarcated in his *Struggle for Recognition* (1992/1995) in terms of social esteem or solidarity. As is well known, Honneth distinguishes between three different forms of recognition that he considers essential for identity formation: love, moral respect, and social esteem (solidarity). While love describes the forms of unconditional and highly partial personal recognition one receives from primary caretakers and in romantic relationships, moral respect should be accorded equally to everyone regardless of their personal traits or features. However, his interpretation of Mead and Hegel leads Honneth to stipulate that these two forms of recognition in themselves are not sufficient. Rather, in order for a society to not succumb to a merely legalistic structure based on negative freedom and constraints, we require a third form of recognition, a form of social esteem which is accorded to each individual of a society qua individual, which means an appreciation of the specific values and contributions a concrete person brings to the community and which implies our active and positive interest in the projects that another person pursues. Its demands go not as far as the demands and commitments of personal love, but solidarity is affective sentiment inflected by the logic of justice – in a similar vein as Ricoeur argues that while the logic of love, the logic of superabundance, is distinct from the logic of justice, the logic of equivalence, they need to be dialectically related to each other (cf. Ricoeur 1996, 37).

5.4 Reconciling Critical Cosmopolitanism with Critical Patriotism: The Importance of Context

But where do these reflections on love and solidarity leave us with regard to the question of the meaning of patriotism for education and its relation to a cosmopolitan education? As we have learned from Crary, good moral judgment requires the education of (practical) sensitivities just as much for the patriot as it does for the

cosmopolitan. As we can learn from Honneth and Ricoeur, it is just as undesirable to teach patriotism as it is undesirable to teach cosmopolitanism purely driven by the logic of equivalence. Surely, we can and should aim to foster solidarity in a local just as much as in a global context. But what is the place then for patriotism in education? In which way does it retain a distinctive sense from cosmopolitanism? Much of what I have said so far could be read as suggesting a form of civic or even constitutional patriotism as suggested most prominently by Habermas, and it could be argued to be served well by underpinning it with national sentiment within appropriate constraints as suggested by John White (see above). In my prior work on cosmopolitanism, I have argued that the main critical impetus of a cosmopolitan stance is to commit ourselves to "non-reifying forms of boundedness" (Schumann 2012, p. 230) and to "taking responsibility for making the situational and historical contexts of our own claims and demands visible" (ibid.) as well as gaining an understanding for the contexts in which others might raise claims and demands toward us. This context sensitivity leads to an understanding of patriotism which I would like to spell out in terms of two main aspects which Papastephanou has importantly drawn attention to in her reconceptualization of a critical patriotism.

Papastephanou points out that much of the recent literature on patriotism has focused on what she terms an "internal patriotism" (2012, p. 191), stressing the importance of patriotic bounds and the "obligations to compatriots" (ibid.) whose enacting is assisted through patriotic affect and sentiment. Looking at recent publications on patriotism in philosophy of education, this inward-looking perspective appears indeed prominent. When Michael Hand discusses the benefits of patriotism as "a spur to civic duty" (Hand 2011, p. 25) and as "a source of pleasure" (ibid., p. 27), he considers patriotism only in terms of its relevance for the patriots of this *patria* but not in terms of its relationship to its outsiders. Only when discussing the negative effect of patriotism as an "impediment to civic judgment" (ibid., p. 29), the external perspective becomes indirectly activated in the example of the "immoral imperial excess [which] has been part of America's presence in the world" (Miller; quoted in Hand 2011, p. 30).

Papastephanou in contrast argues for the necessity of emphasizing an outward-looking perspective for a critical patriotism (2013, p. 174) which "raises legitimate demands and protects the rights of a particular people without nationalist claims to superiority and expects its people to be fair to others" (2012, p. 191). While the focus of external patriotism lies "on debates about how one's patria is or should be" (ibid., p. 190), in contrast to the cosmopolitan concern with the whole world, it is nevertheless compatible with a broader and critical cosmopolitanism and does not stand in contradiction to it. Eamonn Callan's definition of patriotism as "a project of collective self-rule in which the achievement of domestic justice is combined with due regard for the rights and interests of others with whom the world is shared" (Callan 2006, p. 546) only superficially includes the external perspective. The external perspective on patriotism which Papastephanou claims runs deeper. It calls attention to the fact that our picture of our own *patria* also has to take into critical account outsiders' points of view on it. Thus, critically reflecting on relations with national others becomes a visible demand and an integral part of patriotism

(compatible with a critical cosmopolitanism, nevertheless having a distinct character and function). It allows clarifying the political obligations that arise for the patriot because of her country's implication in the history of its outside, and it helps to make sense of the way in which patriotism can become politically activated, as in the wave of decolonization which started in the second part of the last century. Civic and constitutional patriotisms run the danger of underestimating "that national distinctiveness has had a specifically empowering role in people's resisting domination" (ibid., p. 195), and they do this through a depoliticized understanding of culture. Therefore, in addition to stressing and demonstrating the legitimacy of this outward dimension of patriotism, Papastephanou furthermore proposes to shift the focus of patriotism from the nation back to the ethnos (2013, p. 193ff.). "Nation" is not only easily conflated with the nation-state and carries negative associations to the historically predominant exclusivist and arrogant stance of nationalisms, but it also relates back etymologically to the Roman goddess of birth and origin (cf. ibid., p. 196). "Ethnos" in contrast can be shown to carry connotations which "bring together the stability of the common abode (home) with the mobility of flow and of a common navigation, the collective passage (homelessness) through a half-remembered, half-forgotten past and an unknown and uncertain future" (Papastephanou 2013, p. 197). In the idea of *ethnos* as "a group of people (or animals) cohabiting a specific land and having a specific way of living" (Ibid.), the notions of birth and hereditary lineage remain secondary. While Papastephanou remains wary of the pitfalls of ethnos as well, she argues that patriotism could "better betheorized by the term 'ethnic' rather than 'national' because the word *ethnos* comprises as yet unexplored counterfactual possibilities" (ibid., p. 198).

As I am writing this paper, I am myself in the process of relocating from Germany to Sweden for the next years to come. What might distinguish the love that I might find or grow toward my new country of residence, possibly becoming another *patria* for me, from the love that countless other Germans not living there nevertheless feel deeply toward Sweden? This German romance with Sweden is a love based on projective images not originating in but fostered through highly popular TV crime shows and romantic family dramas set in Sweden and produced for the sentimental desires of the German audience. The most blatant difference, as I see it, will not lie primarily in the inward, emotivist dimension of patriotism but in what Papastephanou characterizes as the outward dimension. Insofar as I am enjoying immediate benefits and profits from being a Swedish resident, I might have to consider other obligations to and claims by those countries with which Sweden has been historically entangled. And insofar as I come to enjoy and maybe love aspects of the specific way of living in this country, my transformed cultural identity might become politically activated in case of perceived threat to that which I might have come to cherish in ways that the German TV audience might not.

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Chapter 6
Cosmopolitan Patriotism Educated Through Kant and Walt Whitman

Pradeep A. Dhillon

In her essay "Anything but Argument?" Cora Diamond seeks to establish that when we, as philosophers, insist upon argumentation as the only legitimate instrument for cultivating moral thinking, we impoverish moral capacities.[1] Regardless of how well an argument for a particular moral stance is constructed, Diamond maintains that the argument convinces only those who are either predisposed to agree or trained to evaluate reasoning and rhetoric. For Diamond, sound argumentation certainly is capable of sharpening our moral thinking and expanding our moral imagination, but these faculties develop just as well, if not better, through engagement with the world as expressed in literature—and, I might add, in the arts in general.[2] I follow Diamond in holding that the arts can expand the moral imagination of those for whom argument is ineffective, either due to an indisposition to agree or an insufficiency in rhetorical training.

Diamond's argument rests on the assumption that those who are not already inclined in a certain moral direction often have limited access to the educational opportunities that would extend and exercise their moral imagination. This would be quite troubling if we took argumentation to be the sole epistemic tool in the service of moral judgment. If that were the case, then only philosophers trained in engaging with and evaluating such arguments could be moral! Clearly this is not an outcome that moral educators would affirm. Rather, we can recognize this spurious epistemic claim, which is based on drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and the arts, as having a long, but not unchallenged, tradition within Western

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[1] Cora Diamond, "Anything but Argument?" in *Philosophical Investigations*, 5 (1):23–41 (1982).

[2] See, for example, Pradeep A. Dhillon, "Examples of Moral Perfectionism from a Global Perspective," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 48, No.3, (2014), pp. 41–57.

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philosophy and considerably less traction in non-Western philosophy.[3] As Diamond notes with concern, when we insist on a sharp philosophy–art distinction, we run the risk of not only limiting moral thought to moral philosophers but also suggesting that philosophy itself is incapable of expanding and exercising our moral imagination. This second corollary would also sit uncomfortably with most philosophers.

The impetus for Diamond's argument is the insistence by philosopher Onora O'Neill that, in the context of moral reasoning, rational argumentation is the primary weapon in the arsenal, and literature and the arts have no place. O'Neill made this point as part of an argument for the moral worthiness of animals, in which she claimed that "if the appeal on behalf of animals is to convince those whose hearts do not already so incline them, it must, like appeals on behalf of dependent human beings, reach beyond assertion to argument."[4] In other words, for O'Neill, people who are already inclined to accept the moral value of animals, or other moral stances, can be swayed by mere assertions, while those of differing moral commitments can be swayed by argumentation. For Diamond, though, the single tool of argumentation is not enough. She takes as an example Charles Dickens's *David Copperfield*, a novel that she sees as, among other things, an appeal on behalf of those who are locked up as madmen like Mr. Dick. Diamond notes that Betsey Trotwood does not need to be so swayed; it is others, not only within the novel but also the readers without, whose moral imaginations Dickens seeks to enlarge. In her words, "Was it [the novel] not meant to show them, and show them with imaginative force, a way of looking at the Mr. Dicks of the world?"[5] She goes on to say that, when hearts are not so inclined, it is because moral imagination has not been directed toward a certain issue. As a more recent example, we could think of Clint Eastwood's film *Million Dollar Baby*, which provides an aesthetic exercise in the expansion of our moral imagination by compelling us to look more closely, and with greater compassion, at the moral complexity of the question of euthanasia.

Diamond goes on to wonder why it is the arts, and not philosophy, that are enjoined in this task of moral education: "Is an attempt to widen the imagination something which it is all right for novelists to do," she asks, "but not alright for philosophers?" In other words, O'Neill's demand for argumentation in the service of moral judgment rests on the division between the head and the heart and on the assumption that philosophy alone is the bearer of serious thought: "But this *must* [sic] be a mistake," she says. "Dickens aims at the heart, and there is serious thought in what he does; he aims to convince and not simply to bring it about that the heart goes from bad state 1 to good state 2."[6] Thinking of the diversity of styles in moral thinking while refusing an absolute distinction between philosophy and literature in expanding and exercising our moral imaginations, Diamond goes on to say:

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[3] See, for example, Pradeep A. Dhillon, "Literary Form and Philosophical Argument in PreModern texts," in *Dialogue and Universalism*, No. 11–12, 1998. pp. 131–141.

[4] Cited in Diamond "Anything but argument?" p. 23.

[5] Diamond, "Anything but argument?" p. 26.

[6] Ibid.

Admittedly, the ways we can, as philosophers, judge some
philosophical work which is directed at enlarging our imaginations
will not be the same as the ways in which we
judge sheer arguments; but the problems of exercising philosophical
judgment of such works need not incline us to regard them as
not—as such—philosophical works at all.[7]

In this essay, I draw out the implications of Diamond's thinking on moral education by applying it to a single concept found in philosophy and poetry: cosmopolitan patriotism. First, drawing on recent Kantian research, I show how in Kant's thought, cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not at odds but interdependent. Contrary to much of the discourse on cosmopolitanism, Kant's suggestion that we bear duties toward distant strangers (cosmopolitanism) does not arise from an indifference to the care, concern, and responsibilities we bear toward those with whom we share more immediate bonds (patriotism). For Kant, cosmopolitanism and patriotism are mutually interdependent normative values. After this discussion of Kant, I turn to the poetry of Walt Whitman, arguing that in his "Passage to India," serious moral thinking—in this case the idea of a cosmopolitan patriotism—is not out of the realm of a poetic expression.[8] Furthermore, I draw on Kant himself in order to demonstrate that moral philosophy often depends on imagination in order to develop a moral argument and proceed toward moral education. The exercising and expansion of the moral imagination, particularly as it relates to an education that fosters cosmopolitan patriotic education, is much needed as we struggle to settle into a global, democratic, twenty-first century in which we are called to simultaneously strengthen our bonds with distant others and with our compatriots.

6.1   Bringing Kant into the Global Twenty-First Century

Pauline Kleingeld, in her recent exploration of Kant's cosmopolitan patriotism, clears some of the misunderstandings that stand in the way of demonstrating Kant's relevance for this global democratic moment in human history.[9] She persuasively argues that by the 1790s, Kant had completely stepped away from his earlier hierarchical views on race and had come to be deeply critical of slavery and colonialism. Before this period in the development of his critical philosophy, Kant demonstrably held the most appalling of views on racial hierarchy. In his "Determination of the Concept of a Human Race" (1785) and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788), he explicitly places northern European races at the pinnacle of

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[7] Diamond, "Anything but argument?" p. 27.

[8] See Jurgen Habermas's response to Mary L. Pratt's claim that philosophy is just another form of writing in "Excursus on Leveling the Distinction between Philosophy and Literature," in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1991), pp. 185–210.

[9] Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*: *The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

human development. Invoking differences of climate and environment, he also argues against the migration of peoples to different parts of the world on the grounds that each group is best suited to live within its own original context. Kant's views on the peoples of India, Africa, and the Americas, based on his biased readings of travelogues, denied them agency and rendered them incapable of the cognitive development necessary for the creation of culture, autonomy, and morality. These people were best suited, in his early view, for servitude and slavery. Kant's position is completely at odds with the universalistic moral theory for which he is so well known, a view predicated on universal rational capacities.

Kantian scholarship has taken one of two positions on Kant's views of race, which have so bedeviled Kant's normative philosophy. The first, developed by Charles Mills among others, argues that Kant's universalism is meant to affirm only the equality of whites. In this view, Kantian thought is shot through with white supremacist attitudes. The other position, offered by Kant's apologists, is that he was a man of his times and we must separate the philosophical thought from the historical inhabitant of eighteenth-century Konigsberg. Kleingeld finds the first position erroneous and the second unacceptable. Through a careful reading of the Kantian corpus and by locating the texts within their original intellectual contexts, Kleingeld follows the arc of Kant's development as a philosopher. She argues that by the 1790s, as Kant matured, he came to reject these early views in line with the moral theory of autonomy and freedom, universally held, that he was now proposing. Thus, for example, Kant says in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, "All human beings are born free (lines 30–31), and any slavery contract is self-contradictory and therefore null and void (lines 16–20)."[10] Along similar lines, Kleingeld also argues that Kant denies the possibility, in accordance with principles of right, for one human being to own another (MdS 6:370), and he states that there is no place in a theory of right for "beings who have merely duties and no rights (serfs, slaves) (MdeS 6:241)."[11]

As further evidence of Kant's change of mind, Kleingeld points out that in his notes for *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1794–1795), Kant strenuously criticizes the slavery of non-Europeans as a grave violation of cosmopolitan right. He censures the slave trade, not as an excessive form of an otherwise acceptable institution but as a clear violation of the cosmopolitan right of blacks. Having criticized European behavior in Africa, America, and Asia, he concludes:

> The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right.[12]

He also offers the one of the most severe indictment of colonialism to be found anywhere in the philosophical literature:

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[10] Cited in Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," in *The Philosophical Quarterly* (2007), Volume 57, Issue 229, p. 586.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Cited in Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*: *The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, pp. 112–113.

> If one compares with this (viz. the idea of cosmopolitan right) the *inhospitable* behavior of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when *visiting* foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as *conquering* those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying proportions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their "discovery" lands that they regarded as belonging to no one. For the native inhabitants counted as nothing to them. In East India (Hindustan), under the pretense of establishing economic undertakings, they brought in foreign soldiers and used them to oppress the natives, excited widespread wars among the various states, spread famine, rebellion, perfidy, and the whole litany of evils which afflict mankind.[13]

With regard to migration, Kant gave up his earlier view that different races were physiologically best suited for specific environments and came to hold that all environments were suitable for human adaptation. That is, in direct contradiction of his early views on migration, Kant came to support the movement of peoples in search of better and more fulfilling lives.

Thus, by the second half of the 1790s, Kant no longer attributed any special role to racial differentiation (let alone to a hierarchy of capacities) for the purpose of global migration. He now simply held that nature had organized the earth in such a way that humans could live everywhere and that they would eventually use the surface of the earth for interacting peacefully. The new category of cosmopolitan right first introduced in the third article of his 1795 essay, *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, was based on the increasing and continuing movement and interaction across borders. There was no indication in these later writings that migration would be easier in some directions than in others as he had earlier held. Kant concluded his exposition of cosmopolitan right by expressing the hope that

> Uninhabitable parts of the earth—the sea and the deserts—divide this community of all men, but the ship and the camel (the desert ship) enable them to approach each other across these unruled regions and to establish communication by using the common right to the face of the earth, which belongs to human beings generally.[14]

Through travel and communication, he continues:

> distant parts of the world can come into peaceable relations with each other, and these are finally publicly established by law. Thus the human race can gradually be brought closer and closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship.[15]

Hence, following Kleingeld, we see that Kant held neither to an "inconsistent universalism" nor to a "consistent inegalitarianism"[16] but rather afforded universal rationality and hence equality. Unfortunately, he never did change his personal views on the hierarchy between men and women. Recently, however, we have seen

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[13] Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)," in Kant: Political Writings, edited by H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 106.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Kleingeld, 2007, p. 582.

some excellent extension of his moral and political philosophy to give women the equality they hold, in Kantian terms, as human beings.[17]

Having established Kant's cosmopolitan credentials around specific issues like slavery, colonialism, and migration, Kleingeld turns to his reconciliation of two sets of duties: those we bear to distant strangers and those we bear to our fellow citizens. That is, she argues for the compatibility between cosmopolitanism and patriotism in Kant's moral and political philosophy. In the secondary literature, that which upholds, refutes, or seeks to refine Kant's thinking on cosmopolitanism, there is very little that has been written on Kant's ideas of patriotism. We owe Pauline Kleingeld a great debt for drawing out Kant's conceptualization of patriotism and for bringing the relation between cosmopolitanism and patriotism that he proposes to the fore. For Kleingeld, both cosmopolitanism and patriotism turn on a moral republicanism that enjoins individuals with a love for their fellow citizens as well as loving the State within which they live since its values inform their relationship with other nations around the world and their citizens. Kleingeld's study on the topic of cosmopolitan patriotism is rooted in historical specificity. She not only carefully traces changes in Kant's thought, but she also points out that patriotism, as understood during the nationalist period of the nineteenth century, was quite different from the idea of patriotism as understood in the eighteenth century. It is this turn to reading Kant in light of the democratizing eighteenth century, I suggest, that points to the great relevance of his thought in the global twenty-first century. Kleingeld's philosophical excavations of Kantian thought can help lay the foundation of a theory of global justice that would include economic in addition to political and cultural justice.[18]

To illustrate, consider the case of the global recruitment of teachers in relation to Kant's conception of cosmopolitan right and patriotic duty. By focusing on the global recruitment of professionals, including teachers, we can easily see the increasing relevance of Kant's cosmopolitan law in the globalization of education conducted within a commitment to global justice. Particularly, I would argue that his thought has a place in the growing recruitment of international teachers by US school districts to positions that local teachers are either not able to or willing to fill. The phenomenon of increasing recruitment of teachers from overseas, many of them women, enables us to better understand the demand that Kant's cosmopolitan law places on host institutions. This law comes into play especially when international and constitutional legal requirements are met, and yet the conditions that might serve to promote perpetual peace remain unsatisfied. That is, I will not point to the many egregious and illegal examples of the exploitation of female teachers (including sexual trafficking under the guise of offering teaching contracts) by some private companies. Rather, I want to focus on the overlooked aspects of the legal recruitment and placement processes and the theoretical and practical challenges they present. This focus should have implications not only for philosophy of education but also for educational policy.

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[17] See, for example, Helga Varden and Susan Shell among others.

[18] See Kleingeld's "Patriotism, Peace, and Poverty: Reply to Bernstein and Varden," for an incipient theory of global justice in *Kantian Review*, Vol. 19, 2014, pp. 267–284.

6.2 Kant's Cosmopolitan Law

Cosmopolitan law is intended to support the first two articles of Kant's proposal for establishing perpetual peace among nations. Rejecting the idea of a world government, Kant argues for an international system that is held together by a system of global governance based on republican values, what we today would call democratic values. This would be an international federation of democratic, constitutional nations. Taking peace as not merely being the absence or cessation of war, Kant's purpose here is to think of the institutions that could create the conditions for peaceful coexistence between sovereign states. Kant lays out three definitive articles of a perpetual peace in the second part of his "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." The first states, "The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican"; the second, "The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States"; and the third, "Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality."[19] The first two articles define the relationship between states and individual citizens, and the second seeks to establish a moral relationship between republican states. The third article, cosmopolitan right, which serves as a complement to political and international right, speaks to the relationship between individuals and states of which they are not citizens. This third right, often seen as being weak and even necessary, is growing in importance as globalization requires the increasing need for legal frameworks that articulate international and constitutional laws ensuring just and equal treatment of all those living and working in transnational contexts. This would be true of businesses but also individuals.

Having established in earlier writings the right to movement within and beyond the boundaries of the state, Kant limits that right by upholding the value of sovereignty. To this end, he draws a distinction between the hospitality owed by a guest and that established by cosmopolitan law. He tells us that the right to hospitality is the "right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives in someone else's territory."[20]

That said, he does not ask for absolute hospitality but rather limits this right. The traveler, he says, "can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in." It is important to note that Kantian cosmopolitanism is not unmindful of the particularity of political affiliations, nor is it a cover for imperialism. What he considers are the claims that a peaceful noncitizen can make on the citizens of the state within which he or she is traveling. On Kant's view, travel is considered peaceful when undertaken for the purposes of commerce and exchange of ideas but never when the intention is that of appropriating the lands and goods of the inhabitants of the nations they are visiting. He explicitly states his abhorrence of the practice of colonialism undertaken with such vigor by the

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[19] I. Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)," in *Kant*: *Political Writings*, edited by H.S. Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93–130.
[20] Kant, *Political Writings*, p. 108.

Europeans of his day and, for those very reasons, understands too the limits placed on imperialist travel by eighteenth-century China and Japan. Thus, for him, while the traveler has the right to attempt to enter into discourse with the citizens of the host nation, he or she cannot demand it. The citizens of the host country retain the right to refuse such interaction and even turn her away, albeit without being hostile and definitely not if the turning away would result in physical annihilation. This last stipulation rests on a distinction between voluntary and involuntary travel. As an aside, it is worth mentioning that Kantian thought has played a very important role in the writing of laws regarding refugee status. Involuntary travel that reached a crescendo in Europe in the twentieth century provided the impetus for drawing up refugee laws.

In developing his proposal for perpetual peace, Kant drew on his experience with the primary motivations for travel in the late eighteenth century: the Grand Tour without which no gentleman's education could be complete, mercantile travel as international trade intensified, and forced travels of people like the French aristocrats fleeing from Jacobin excesses. What Kant did not anticipate was *transnational* travel, where social and economic boundaries would grow more porous even as legal and political institutions remained strongly in place. In other words, the worker as traveler resides in the host country, maintaining ties with fellow citizens in the home country through the use of new technologies and occasionally traveling for vacations.

Kant's discussion of travel plays out the modernist narrative of individuals belonging to individual states and traveling as individuals. Furthermore, most of these travelers were men. This remains largely true today in the transnational movement of labor. Women are often left behind with the husband's family according to cultural laws where many of them suffer hardships and indignities in the absence of their husbands. This is a story about women and globalization that remains largely untold except perhaps in novels and films, such as the Indian film *Dor*. The dominant discourse around women in globalization remains largely tied to those who are sexual victims, both at home as sex tourism increases and as a result of movement tied to trafficking. The suffering of women tied to the globalization of unskilled and semiskilled labor remains in the shadows.

Kant did not fully anticipate transnational travel being tied to an increasingly well-articulated global economy. Such travel is no doubt driven by unskilled and semiskilled labor seeking to sustain families in the states of which they are citizens. However, increasingly, we find travel undertaken by participants in the knowledge economy. These participants include computer scientists and medical practitioners but also teachers. Constitutional and international legal systems are being put in place such that these traveler–workers can work in the host nations, providing services the host nation needs. Host countries, however, reserve the right to limit the conditions of such work. Thus, for example, within the knowledge economy families can, and often do, travel with the individual offered a well-paid job. They are, however, subject to several restrictions; among them is the ban on spouses seeking employment within the host country, regardless of the spouse's education level and professional status. At many levels, the era of globalization creates a sense of free

lateral movement and economic well-being while in reality severely limiting meaningful participation in a culture within which such work is undertaken.

6.3   Hospitality and Cosmopolitan Law

Let us turn to the specific case of teacher recruitment in the global knowledge economy to obtain a deeper sense of the importance of Kant for this global twenty-first century. Margaret Fitzgerald's case study of the Caribbean teachers recruited to teach in New York City's public school system speaks of the many difficulties and hardships experienced by these teachers.[21] For one, they experience a sense of cultural isolation even as they prepare to teach and live in some of the more challenging schools and neighborhoods. Many of these teachers are women, since this was often the only avenue for higher education in their home countries. Furthermore, Fitzgerald tells us, most of the teachers recruited from the Caribbean are highly trained and often held positions of great respect and influence within their home countries. Many of them were educated in and trained as teachers within a British educational system. On taking on their responsibilities in the USA, they are all too often offered no cultural and institutional support by their American counterparts or by the principals and other members of the administration. They are left to figure it all out for themselves. In addition, they are often held to vaguely articulated and shifting standards that are probably higher than those demanded of the teachers, whose position they are recruited to fill.

Fitzgerald sheds light on the many overt and subtle forms of discrimination that make the already difficult task of these teachers nearly impossible as they undertake the discharge of their new professional duties. In one instance, for example, when the teacher asked for a sample syllabus, she was refused on the grounds of promoting academic freedom. The Fitzgerald study reports many instances of the refusal of hospitality that was necessary not only to their well-being but also to the effective dispensation of the duties for which they were recruited. Not surprisingly, many of them are declared ineffective in the classroom. In Fitzgerald's words,

> I argue that international teacher recruitment, and in particular the U.S. public school recruitment of highly trained teachers from "developing" countries, has become an illusory panacea for alleged teacher shortages, a short-term strategy for staffing classrooms instead of a longer-term and much more difficult and costly set of strategies for really prioritizing education as a necessary core value of a just and sustainable knowledge economy. Focusing on the case of New York City's Caribbean teachers and privileging their testimony about their responses to such recruitment elucidates many of the personal contours of this emerging strategy of the neo-liberalized global governance of teacher labor.[22]

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[21] Margaret Fitzpatrick, *Globalizing Teacher Labor for the Knowledge Economy*: *The Case of New York City's Caribbean Teachers*, unpublished dissertation, University of Illinois, 2014.

[22] Fitzgerald, *Globalizing Teacher Labor for the Knowledge Economy*, p. ii.

Reflecting on some of the violations of the cosmopolitan rights of hospitality, Kant presciently cautions us: "what happens here happens everywhere." New media have made this truer today than ever before.

The failed and failing situation that Fitzgerald describes reflects a working environment where no legal violations actually took place. The teachers were recruited according to the laws of the nation states of which they were citizens. Their contracts complied fully with the federal and state labor laws of the USA. And yet, listening to their testimonies, we are left with a clear sense that a very important aspect of the conditions that would enable the full and rich implementation of the contractual agreements has been ignored. This avoidance could either be prompted by an unawareness of the needs of those not familiar with the culture they are moving into or through a deliberate exercise of some misplaced sense of superiority. The result is a community whose trust in and dependence on the system has been violated, a classroom full of students who continue to be shortchanged by the public school system, and individuals who are left to flounder in an institution that is the cornerstone of a democratic society even as they are subjected to undemocratic practices.

Thus, we return to the importance of the third cosmopolitan right of hospitality that Kant saw as being a necessary complement to the political and international rights articulated in the first two definitive articles of his proposal for perpetual peace. While the first two rights can be, and have been, tied to various laws within constitutions and internationally through treaties, covenants, and agreements, the third is vital in realizing not merely the shell of international commerce and engagement but its substance. For Kant, the upholding of the cosmopolitan rights of others is not a matter of "philanthropy." It is a right that can be claimed by the teacher and that the principal and her colleagues must uphold if they are to honor the first two articles for the fostering of peace as well as truly complying with both constitutional and international law. Within the host school context, this would require the training of all academic and administrative personnel as well as the student body to facilitate the effective integration of the much-needed teachers into the professional environment of their institution. It would also mean educating the recruited teachers of their rights within the contexts where they are to work.

Kant insists that the upholding of the cosmopolitan right to hospitality is not to be taken as an act of kindness. Rather, as in the case of the recruitment of teachers, it is to be recognized as an essential foundation of the creation of a fully functioning, sustainable, and flourishing public school system. The cosmopolitan law is no doubt unwritten and thus difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, cosmopolitan right is required for the proper implementation and use of international and constitutional laws. In Kant's words,

> The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under such conditions can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace.[23]

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[23] Kant, *Political Writings*, p. 108.

It is commonplace among philosophers in general, and philosophers of education in particular, to argue that Kant's moral cosmopolitanism leaves no theoretical room for duties to one's State. This remains the case despite Kant's many comments on the importance of cosmopolitans acting patriotically. Critical of notions of national exceptionalism—the idea that one's nation is superior to all others—Kant "claims that such a view should be 'eradicated' and replaced by 'patriotism and cosmopolitanism.'"[24] Patriotism for Kant represents a republic—what we would today call a representative democracy—which follows the rule of law that flows from the general will. Citizens are not only recipients of State benefits but also bear a duty to engage with it in order for it to continue functioning as a political community of free and equal members. This sets up a two-way normative relationship between the State and its citizens. The State bears a responsibility to treat all its citizens equally and fairly, for it has to create the conditions where citizens can exercise their democratic duties and express their general will. Kant's 1784 essay "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" details the relationship between individual citizens and the State, particularly through the institutions of scholarship and the press.[25] That is, citizens cannot withdraw from the business of the State to pursue their own private concerns. His injunction to "argue as much as we like, but obey," is not only a mandate for rule of law but also for literacy. Furthermore, when citizens and the State accept the mandate for free and equal participation, they make a contract with each other and the State to promote justice and thus create a just State. Such enlightened citizens would, on Kant's view, go so far as to refuse to promote a just State if it meant that they would do so by all and any means. In others words, against the charge that Kant overlooks the special obligations we bear toward the State of which we are citizens, we find that he repeatedly endorses these obligations which flow from his theory of political self-legislation that is in accordance with his principles of morality and right. This, Kant acknowledges, does follow some calculation—as is often supposed—but requires also the balancing of diverse moral demands, which is something that we have to gain experience in through education. In other words, in order to fully exercise our freedom and hence claim our own humanity, we need to acknowledge and create the conditions, both nationally and globally, for others to do the same.

This way of thinking has two important implications for education. First, we are called on to educate for the awareness that we bear responsibility toward our State and fellow citizens not simply because they are "ours" but because they are free and equal legislators within the community of which we are a part. Second, since local loyalties develop early on in children, we need to slowly expand those feelings and understandings to go beyond the family, our face-to-face interactions, and even the imagined communities we share through print and other media, to encompass the community of all human beings. In sum, to refer again to Kleingeld, Kant considers

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[24] Kleingeld, p. 26.

[25] Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?' (1784)" *Kant: Political Writings*, edited by H.S. Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 54–60.

it our duty to "promot[e] the well-being of others," which we should do not "in accordance with one's own view of the good," but with "respect [for] others as moral agents in their own right." This means letting "oneself be guided by *their* ends, provided these ends are morally defensible, and … tak[ing] care that one not help others in a way that is humiliating or paternalistic."[26]

6.4   Poetic Cosmopolitan Patriotism: Walt Whitman

To explore a specific instance of Cora Diamond's insight that literature and the arts can serve to broaden our moral landscape through a turn to imagination, we turn now to the poetry of Walt Whitman. The cosmopolitan patriotic demand, as articulated by Kant, can be found in many places in Whitman's poetry, but I want to draw it out specifically through his verses in the "Passage to India," written on the occasion of the opening of the Suez Canal, which considerably shortened the distance between the USA, Europe, and the East, particularly India.[27] Furthermore, I want to point to the role that Kant's theory of the imagination could be said to play in Whitman's poetic realization of cosmopolitan patriotism.

For Kant, imagination, in keeping with Western classical thinking on the topic, plays an intermediate role between sensibility and understanding. This view is first articulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* but underlies the subsequent *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. Having established that sensibility and understanding stand in a mutual relationship, Kant divides sensibility between sense and imagination. The former "comprising the 'faculty of intuition in the presence of an object' and the latter 'intuition without the presence of an object' (A%15)."[28] Furthermore, imagination itself is further divided between memory (the recollection of objects that have been experienced) and productive or poetic imagination. What is important for our discussion of Whitman is that Kant takes productive imagination to be indispensable in creating the conditions of experience that are neither willful nor accidental. Thus when Whitman writes,

> O you fables, spurning the known, eluding the hold of the known, mounting to heaven!
> You lofty and dazzling towers, pinnacled, red as roses, burnish'd with gold!

he is not speaking of fantastical structures. Rather, he uses poetry to extend the imagination of his American countrymen to experience real structures: the Golden Temple of Amritsar, India, and the Madurai temple with its ascending sculptural depiction of the religious myths of India. Whitman had not directly experienced these structures, but he would no doubt have known about them from the ample

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[26] Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, p. 19.

[27] Walt Whitman, "Passage to India," reproduced in *Walt Whitman*: *Selected Poems*, *1855–1892*, edited by Gary Schmidgall (New York: St. Martin's/Stonewall Inn Publications, 2000), pp. 315–322.

[28] Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 246.

descriptions of "the wonders" of India available by the end of the nineteenth century. It is important to note, though, that for Whitman as for Kant, these structures are not fantasy but rather products of human, materially grounded imagination—or in his words, they are "mortal dreams." Whitman brings the accomplishments of distant others into focus for his countrymen through the use of a distinct aspect of the faculty of imagination that Kant calls "imagination plastic," the ability to present a pictorial representation across distance. In addition, by emphasizing the mortality of the builders of these structures, Whitman transforms the architects from distant others to members of a shared global community. In Kantian terms, as a poet, Whitman uses the occasion of the opening of the Suez Canal to give expression to the responsibility he bears to his fellow Americans—a patriotic duty—to bring to their awareness the cosmopolitanism that must be part of their understanding of themselves as citizens of America and of what it means to be an American citizen.

In line with Kant's thinking, Whitman's poem denounces the kind of patriotism that would hold its own accomplishments superior to those of other nations:

> Not you alone, proud truths of the world!
> Nor you alone, ye facts of modern science!
> But myths and fables of eld—Asia's, Africa's fables!

Whitman remains proud of the accomplishments of his country, celebrating the recently completed transcontinental railroad and the laying of telegraph wires under the ocean: "The New by its mighty railroad spann'd, The Seas inlaid with eloquent gentle wires." But in this glow of rightful pride in American accomplishments, he warns against forgetting the past out of which this new civilization was forged;

> The Past! the dark, unfathom'd retrospect!
> The teeming gulf! the sleepers and the shadows!
> The past! the infinite greatness of the past!
> For what is the present, after all, but a growth out of the past?

This past, for Whitman, includes the scholarship, "the bibles and legends" of Asia and Africa. Cosmopolitanism is, for Whitman, inherent in patriotism. Even as he sings his own country, he speaks of the learning and wisdom of Asia and Africa: "You too I welcome, and fully, the same as the rest; You too with joy I sing." A sense of equality in appreciating and lauding human accomplishment is a crucial element of his cosmopolitanism as expressed in this poem, which he writes for the America that he envisions. In other words, the poem serves the pedagogical purpose of promoting cosmopolitan patriotism.

The premise that grounds Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right is the idea that before any particular acquisition of property, the earth is a common possession of all. Kant does not mean that the land is jointly owned but rather that it constitutes the material possibility of the interaction among peoples, as through migration. Its very shape, its roundness, creates the condition of such an original community. Even though various parts of the earth might be owned by different peoples, they remain part of the whole, which for Kant constitutes the "original community." Since these parts are "locked in," they stand in a community of possible physical

interaction that must be regulated in accordance with principles of cosmopolitan right. Whitman articulates this very idea when he urges his fellow citizens to recognize these possibilities:

> Passage to India!
> Lo, soul! Seest thou not God's purpose from the first?
> The earth to be spann'd, connected by net-work.

He urges other Americans to see that they are part of this wider community, a community not of remote and disengaged strangers but of close, even familial, relationships:

> The people to become brothers and sisters,
> The races, neighbors, to marry and be given in marriage,
> The oceans to be cross'd, the distant brought near,
> The lands to be welded together.

Whitman thus encourages his countrymen to imagine a peaceful world where the other can be considered as another.[29] Here Whitman echoes Kant's reflection on migration and the diversity of races. Since humans can adapt to living in any environment—which, as I have already mentioned, is a reversal of Kant's earlier thinking on this topic—and since they belong to the "original community of the land," they have the cosmopolitan right to migration when their own habitats cannot provide the conditions necessary for their well-being. These migrations, with the possibilities of multiplying diversity, are to be valued. In his words, such migrations should foster diversity instead of uniformity, since nature itself favors "multiplying endlessly the bodily and mental characteristics in the same tribe and even family."[30]

Through this discussion of Whitman and cosmopolitan patriotism, I have sought to uphold Diamond's claim that literature and the arts can be bearers of serious thought and serve an important function in expanding the moral imagination of those who are not in a position to evaluate and judge philosophical arguments. In other words, Whitman's poetry gives epistemic access to the concept of cosmopolitan patriotism to those who lack either the training or the inclination to read Kant's philosophical texts. Thus, Diamond seeks to rescue philosophers from making the indefensible claim that only philosophers, with their training in evaluating moral arguments, can be effective moral agents. Conversely, she also seeks to redress the possibility that philosophy cannot expand and exercise moral imagination. I conclude by examining the ways in which Kant's discussion of cosmopolitan patriotism does just that.

In the essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784), Kant conceives of history as a progressive development of moral reasoning, toward the goal of transforming the global society into a "*moral* whole." This cosmopolitan ideal for historical progress is tied to our particular attachments and responsibilities. Speaking of the burden of history that we bear toward our descendants, he wonders

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[29] See, for example, Pradeep A. Dhillon, "Examples of Moral Perfectionism from a Global Perspective," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 48, No. 3, (2014), pp. 41–57.

[30] Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 116.

how our remote descendants will manage to cope with the burden of history which we shall bequeath to them a few centuries from now. No doubt they will value the history of the oldest times, of which the original documents would long have vanished, only from the point of view of what interests them, i.e. the positive and negative achievements of nations and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal…and this may provide us with another small motive for attempting a philosophical history of this kind.[31]

In theorizing the normative ideal, Kant uses productive imagination—the tool of poetic expression—to render for us a world that we should strive to achieve. He does this not by providing us with a romantic fantasy but rather by taking us as we are, selfish beings with narrow attachments, "the crooked timber of humanity," and carefully laying out what we can and should accomplish, provided we can first imagine such a possibility.

The use of productive imagination in building philosophical theories provides us with moral guidance as we develop as individuals, States, and species, not in one fell swoop but slowly through a moral education that links where we are to the ideal moral state we wish to achieve. Thus, Kant relies in his theory of cosmopolitan patriotism on the imagination, the ability to render what is not present. Drawing on productive imagination, he teaches us that just because we have not accomplished such a state of cosmopolitan properly in the past does not mean that given the freedom granted us by our very humanity, we cannot imagine such a possibility and strive towards it. Kant shows us with imaginative force the moral perfections we are capable of realizing, just as Whitman, through his poetry, teaches us of the intimate links between American patriotism and cosmopolitan commitments. In Cora Diamond's words,

Is an attempt to widen the imagination something which it is all right for novelists to do, but not all right for philosophers? Dickens aims at the heart, and there is serious thought in what he does. If the idea is that that is all right for novelists (and poets) but not for philosophers, what is there to be said for it?[32]

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[31] Immanuel Kant, *Kant*: *Political Writings*, pp. 41–53.
[32] Cora Diamond, "Anything but argument?" p. 27.

Chapter 7
Cosmopolitan Idea of Global Distributive Justice

Zdenko Kodelja

Although there are different interpretations of cosmopolitanism and different conceptions of cosmopolitan justice,[1] it seems justifiable to assume that the idea of cosmopolitan distributive justice – which some philosophers identify with economic justice – is based on some common characteristics of cosmopolitanism. According to Sebastiano Maffettone, there are mainly three such characteristics: individualism, universalism, and egalitarianism. Cosmopolitanism in its pure form is, firstly, "typically individualist, because it sees the relations between persons on the planet as the very starting point of every inquiry and practice," and for this reason, "all the relevant relations are so inter-individual ones."[2] Secondly, it "is also universalist in the Kantian meaning of the term," since "its ethical and political norms are valid for all persons … in the same way."[3] And thirdly, cosmopolitanism is "egalitarian, even if often in a sophisticated way."[4] Maffettone stresses that it is egalitarian because "it maintains that all people must be treated equally, like universalism itself requires. It does not maintain however that all people have a right to the same amount of resources. Some inequalities, for example, can be justified within pure cosmopolitanism in the light of a plausible incentive system. To keep the egalitarian assumption, it is here sufficient that these inequalities have effects that can be considered beneficial for everybody."[5]

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[1] These differences can be seen, for instance, if we take into consideration three different "cosmopolitan approaches to the problem of global poverty": utilitarian (Singer), rights-based (Shue), and a duty-based (O'Neill) approach (Tan 2004), 40–53.

[2] Maffettone 2007.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

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These characteristics of cosmopolitanism and particularly its impartial egalitarianism are essential to the great majority of conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice as well. On the other hand, precisely these characteristics are the main reason that the cosmopolitan idea of distributive justice is constantly accused of neglecting "the special ties and commitments that … are associated with nationalism and patriotism."[6] Another reason why this idea is a target of severe criticism is the fact that at least some cosmopolitan conceptions of global justice are based on the assumption that some principles of distributive justice "apply between individuals *across* societies and not just within a single society."[7]

However, the problem of how justice is to be considered at the global level has provoked one of the most controversial discussions in contemporary political and moral philosophy. The main aim of these polemics has been, as Philippe Van Parijs stresses, to find an adequate answer to the question of whether global distributive justice should be understood as social justice in the sense that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should be extended to all mankind or, just the opposite, if global justice should be understood as an international justice, which requires the development of the principles that would enable fair interactions between nations and countries, which should be quite different from those principles that allow interindividual equity within nations or nation states.[8]

Looking from the cosmopolitan point of view, principles of global distributive justice should apply equally and impartially to all human beings regardless of their nationality and citizenship.[9] Among the philosophers who are convinced that the principles of justice accepted at the national level should also be applied to the world as a whole are Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. They both argue that such a principle is also the famous John Rawls's difference principle of justice, which requires social institutions to be arranged in such a way that social and economic inequalities "are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society."[10] However, some other political philosophers, for instance, Nagel and, what is indicative, Rawls himself, unequivocally reject such interpretations. Moreover, they claim that global distributive justice is – in the world as it is now – impossible. In their opinion, it is impossible because there is no global justice without either a global people, or global democracy, or a global state, or a global basic

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[6] Tan, *Justice without Borders*, IX.

[7] *Ibid.*, 56.

[8] Vandevelde and Van Parijs 2005–2006).

[9] Tan, *Justice without Borders*, 4.

[10] Rawls and Kelly 2001), 42–43.

structure.[11] Some among these opponents of global distributive justice think that only humanitarian duties are needed on global level.[12]

If they are right, then those who think that we need also duties of global distributive justice[13] are wrong and vice versa. Suppose now that we have only humanitarian duties. In this case, the question arises as to whether there are any moral or legal obligations of justice to diminish or, if possible, to abolish injustice at the global level. The answer is affirmative. There are both legal and moral obligations. Legal obligations are usually understood as obligations of the nation states, while moral obligations are duties of individuals and institutions.[14] In the case of extreme inequality and poverty in the world – which are two distinctive sorts of such injustice – the moral obligations toward the poor of the globe, as Maffettone emphasizes, do not "depend directly on the existence of a controversial global basic structure"[15] or, we can add, on a global people, a global democracy, or a global state. He argues that there is universal duty of justice, according to which "we have a duty to protect human dignity in all its forms, regardless of the presence of a real global basic structure."[16] This duty requires us to "help whoever is in extreme difficulty" regardless of whether or not "we are personally or collectively responsible for his or her hopeless situation."[17] Understood in such a way, a universal duty of justice – which is a form of positive duty to help – differs considerably from the negative duties not to harm the global poor, advocated by Pogge.[18] Although Pogge does not deny the existence and importance of positive duties of assistance, he argues that negative

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[11] Critical analysis of this dispute is in Van Parijs (2007, 642–649).

[12] Ibid., 641. They obviously agree with Rawls, who argues that the duty of assistance is sufficient for securing human rights and meeting basic needs in burdened societies. However, "if we accept that rich countries have *only* a duty of humanity to poorer countries, we are also accepting," says Kok-Chor Tan, "that the *existing* baseline resource and wealth distribution is a just one" (Tan, *Justice without Borders*, 66).

[13] The difference between duties of global distributive justice and duties of humanity is important: "while duties of humanity aim to redistribute wealth, duties of justice aim to identify what counts as a just distribution in the first place" (ibid., 67).

[14] Cosmopolitans believe that individuals are "the ultimate unit of moral concern" (Tan, *Justice without Borders*, 1), while the so-called statists – such as Nagel and Rawls – think just the opposite, namely, that the fundamental moral units are institutions simply because "the principles of justice apply to institutions and not directly to individuals" (Sebastiano Maffettone, *Un mondo migliore*: *Giustizia globale tra Leviatano e Cosmopoli* (Roma: Luiss University Press, 2013), 107.

[15] Sebastiano Maffettone, *Un mondo migliore*: *Giustizia globale tra Leviatano e Cosmopoli*, 116.

[16] *Ibid*. This universal duty – and the correspondent basic socioeconomic right to subsistence – "rest on the characteristic of human vulnerability. They are imposed by the fact that our weakness as human beings requires a necessary support that cannot be deferred" (*ibid*., 119).

[17] *Ibid*., 94, 117.

[18] According to Pogge, the notion of "harming the poor" should be "understood as making them worse off than they *should* have been, i.e. how well off they would have been had the international economic order been just. To know what 'harming' is, one therefore needs to know what justice requires," and "not the other way round" (Van Parijs, International Distributive Justice, 649).

"moral duties are more stringent than positive ones."[19] His intention is to show two things: first, that "existing world poverty manifests a violation of our *negative* duties," that is, "our duties not to harm,"[20] and, second, that citizens of rich countries, who "benefit from a system that foreseeably and avoidably causes widespread misery," are in fact "violating negative duties not to harm the global poor."[21] In consequence, they have not only a duty not to harm but also "to compensate for any harm" that they "do cause"[22]and "to avert harms that one's own past conduct may cause in the future."[23] These duties are, in his opinion, "of a very different nature from a duty to assist."[24] The so-called intermediate duties are different from positive ones because they presuppose that rich countries – and at least indirectly their citizens as well – are responsible for severe global poverty. According to Pogge, they are responsible for harming the global poor by shaping and imposing on poor countries the new unjust global economic order, that is, "the social institutions that produce these deprivations."[25] However, although he is persuaded that negative and intermediate duties are more stringent than positive duties, he does not think that they should replace positive duties. What he claims is that it is not sufficient to appeal only to positive duties if we want to diminish global poverty.

On the other hand, positive duties to assistance do not presuppose that we have such duties because of our direct or indirect responsibility for global poverty. We have already mentioned that, according to Maffettone, we have to take up our universal duty of justice regardless of whether or not we are personally or collectively

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[19] Pogge (2005), 34. The argument that he uses in order to give proof for this assertion is the following: "the duty not to assault people is more stringent than the duty to prevent such assaults by others" (*ibid.*). However, this does not mean that he believes – as some critics have attributed to him – "that *any* negative duty, including the duty to refrain from doing some small harm, is more stringent that *every* positive duty, including the duty to rescue thousands of children" (*ibid.*, 34–35).

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Pogge (2008), 531.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," 34.

[24] Pogge (2008), 531. These duties "do not fit well into the conventional dichotomy of positive and negative duties" because they are at the same time both negative and positive. "They are positive insofar as they require the agent to do something and also negative insofar as this requirement is continuous with the duty to avoid causing harm to others" (Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," 34).

[25] Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," 33, 36. However, this does not mean that the existing global economic and institutional order is the only cause of world poverty. He admits that bad national policies, bad social institutions, and corrupt and incompetent leaders are in poor countries causal factors as well. But despite this, the global institutional order is one which "powerfully *shapes* the national regimes especially in poor countries as well as the composition, incentives, and opportunities of their ruling elites. For example, corrupt rule in poor countries is made much more likely by the fact that our global order accords such rulers" (ibid., 49). Another example of the impact of the global institutional order on poor countries: "In the WTO negotiations, the affluent countries insisted on continued and asymmetrical protections of their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export credits, and subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export opportunities of even the very poorest countries" (ibid., 50).

responsible for extreme global poverty. Peter Singer in his famous article "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" – which can be seen as a paradigmatic example of the utilitarian cosmopolitan approach to global justice and inequality – also argues that the well-off people in rich countries have a moral duty to help poor people in poor countries. He interprets this duty as a logical conclusion that follows from the following two premises:

1. "Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad."[26]
2. "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."[27]

The conclusion which follows – if we accept both premises and assume that people in rich countries can prevent the "suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care" in poor countries – therefore, is people in rich countries have a moral obligation to help those in poor countries.

What is important to stress here is that, according to Singer, the application of the second premise does not imply that the moral obligation of rich people depends either on the physical proximity or distance between rich and poor or on the fact that there are many rich people who can help.[28]

On the one hand, he argues that mere distance in space is in itself irrelevant to the determination of what one ought to do. "If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever," says Singer, "we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us."[29] This is, in fact, his answer to the following frequently used objection to help poor countries: "suffering outside one's country just is not something one has a duty to help alleviate, because those suffering belong to a different society, and hence a different moral community. Duties arise between members of single communities, bound by ties of mutual co-operation and reciprocity."[30]

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[26] Singer (2008), 3. However, his argument is also "deliberately vague, since he wants his conclusions to follow logically from a variety of ethical positions—from his own consequentialism, on which we would have a duty to transfer our own resources to the point where marginal utility could not be increased, to a comparatively weaker position which would only entail that we give up wealth until something "of moral importance" needs be sacrificed" (Blake 2013).

[27] Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 3. By saying that "without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" Singer means "without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent" (*ibid.*, 3). Singer gives an explanation on how to understand the second premise in the following way: "If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing" (*ibid.*, 3).

[28] *Ibid.*, 4–5.

[29] *Ibid.*, 4.

[30] This objection is presented and critically discussed in Dower (2000, 279).

On the other hand, he refuses the view that numbers diminish moral obligation. In his opinion, "it does not matter morally to the question, what you ought to do, how many people could help the situation."[31] In addition, it seems that he also thinks – like Maffettone, but opposite to Pogge – "that the causes of poverty are irrelevant to our moral obligations to the world's poor."[32] This obligation to help those in poor countries is understood as a strict moral duty. This means that such help should not be considered as an act of charity or what "philosophers and theologians have called 'supererogatory' – an act that it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do."[33] Charity is not an obligation. It is "something that we are free to do or to omit."[34] As such, charity is not a satisfactory solution of the problem of global poverty.[35] The claim that we have a duty to help others is therefore much more demanding than our moral obligations are usually understood. The usual interpretation of one's strict duty is not to harm others. But helping others is morally optional.[36] Such an interpretation of our duties is – as we have already seen – acceptable neither for Pogge nor for Maffettone. Although it is true that Pogge prefers

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[31] Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 5.

[32] Miller (2007), 237, n. 8. David Miller argues that Singer's drowning child example is "a very bad analogy for thinking about responsibility for global poverty" since he "asks no questions about outcome responsibility for global poverty: he does not ask why so many are poor, whether responsibility lies with rich nations, with the governments of poor nations, etc. – he treats poverty as if it were a natural phenomenon like earthquake" (*ibid*., 234–237). But even if this critic is correct, it is at the same time irrelevant to such conceptions of positive duty to help as are conceived and defended by Singer and Maffettone. These duties require us to help whoever is suffering from extreme poverty, regardless of who is responsible for global poverty.

[33] Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 7. "Supererogation" is a term which means "paying out more than is due (*super-erogare*)," and it is used as a name "of actions that go beyond the call of duty."

[34] Onora O'Neill, "Rights, Obligations, and World Hunger," in Pogge, Horton, *Global Ethics*, 148. Charity lies beyond one's duty. It is not required by justice: giving what is owed to one as his right. For this reason, it is not the fulfillment of a duty for others' rights.

[35] According to Thomas Nagel, charity – which is still the mechanism that is the most frequently used in order to help those who are in extreme difficulty – is not enough "because of limits on what it can achieve." In addition, charity is for him problematic in the context of global poverty "because of what it presupposes" as a condition of its successful functioning: "it is not threatening for those asked to give." There are two reasons for this. "First, it is left to them to determine when the sacrifice they are making for others has reached a point at which any further sacrifice would be supererogatory. Second, it does not question their basic entitlement to what they are asked to donate. The legitimacy of their ownership, and of the processes by which it came about, is not challenged. It is merely urgent that, because of the severe need of others, those who are well off should voluntarily part with some of the wealth to which they are morally quite entitled. For this reason people are especially happy to donate help to the victims" of natural catastrophes (Nagel 2008), 52–53). Looking from this perspective, we can see that the difference between charity and intermediate duties, defended by Pogge, is not only in the fact that charity is voluntary while intermediate duties are obligatory for rich states and their citizens but rather in that what they presuppose. Charity presupposes that the rich states and their citizens are simply generous and, of course, innocent regarding global poverty, while intermediate duties presuppose just the opposite, namely, that they are both directly and indirectly responsible for severe global poverty.

[36] Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 6–9.

negative and intermediate duties, he does not claim that positive duties to help are morally optional. Maffettone is in this regard even much more unambiguous. His universal duty of justice is a strict positive duty. It is a duty to protect everybody's human dignity in all its forms. In order to protect it, we must make sure that a few fundamental basic rights – such as socioeconomic human rights to subsistence, health, and a minimum education – are guaranteed.[37]

Therefore, in addition to this moral duty of individuals, there is, as we have already mentioned, the legal obligation of nation states as well. This obligation corresponds to the right to an adequate standard of living, which is recognized as a human right in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and in the *International Covenant on Economic*, *Social*, *and Cultural Rights*[38] and also as "a fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger."[39] In addition, nation states have the same legal obligations also concerning the right to education,[40] protected by the same (and some other) international documents of human rights. This means that all national states must be organized so that all of their citizens can fulfill this right. If they do not organize themselves in such a way, then they violate not only the right of their citizens but also the previously mentioned "negative duty of justice, namely, the duty not to impose unjust social institutions on its members."[41]

However, in many poor countries, their citizens cannot enjoy even a few basic human rights, including the right to elementary education,[42] although these states have the legal obligations to guarantee these human rights. Since they are universal rights, every human being has them. Despite this, many people – especially in very poor countries – have no opportunity at all for fulfilling them. The problem is that human rights, as Habermas emphasizes, have at the same time moral content and "the form of legal rights. Like moral norms, they refer to every" human being, "but as legal norms they protect individual persons only insofar as the latter belong to a particular legal community – normally the citizens of a nation state. Thus, a peculiar tension arises between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realizations: they should have unlimited validity for all persons,"[43] but

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[37] Sebastiano Maffettone, *Un mondo migliore*: *Giustizia globale tra Leviatano e Cosmopoli*, 116.

[38] Article 25 of the UNDHR states: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services …." In Article 11.1 of the ICESCR, it is stated: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent."

[39] ICESCR, Article 11.2.

[40] I have discussed some problems regarding the fulfillment of the universal right to education in a similar context elsewhere (Kodelja (2013), 15–23).

[41] Pogge (2001), 187.

[42] It seems that poverty and absence of education are caught in a vicious circle: poverty causes lack of education, and in turn, lack of education causes poverty.

[43] Habermas (2001), 118.

until now, this ideal has not yet been achieved. At the moment it is still so that nobody can attain the "effective enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen," because an "actually institutionalized cosmopolitan legal order" has not yet been established, although "Article 28 of the United Nations *Declaration of Human Rights* refers to a global order 'in which the rights and freedoms set in this Declaration can be fully realized'."[44]

Therefore, at the international or global level, there are no appropriate mechanisms in place to enable effective action in cases where countries do not fulfill their duties and thus violate this important human right. In such cases, according to Onora O'Neill, the role of the state should be assumed or at least supplemented by international institutions, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations.[45] Nevertheless, even in this case, we are not absolved from the previously discussed negative and positive duties, that is, from our moral obligation not to harm others and to help them.

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[44] *Ibid*., 118–119.

[45] O'Neill (2001), 180–195.

Part III
Cosmopolitan Educational Challenges and Responses

Chapter 8
The Philosopher and the Teaching of Philosophy in the Age of Cosmopolitanism

Denise Egéa

With the development of global processes, especially global communications and social media, the notion of cosmopolitanism has become more widespread and somewhat of a "buzzword." However, cosmopolitanism is nothing new. It has been traced back to Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412 B.C.), founding father of the Cynic movement in Ancient Greece. It is said that "Asked where he came from, he answered: 'I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitês*)'."[1] In an interview with Bennington, in 1997, Jacques Derrida explained:

> There is a tradition of cosmopolitanism … which comes to us from, on the one hand, Greek thought with the Stoics, who have a concept of the "citizen of the world." You also have St. Paul in the Christian tradition, also a certain call for a citizen of the world as, precisely, a brother. St. Paul says that we are all brothers, that is sons of God, so we are not foreigners, we belong to the world as citizens of the world; and this is this tradition that we could follow up until Kant for instance, in whose concept of cosmopolitanism we find the conditions of hospitality.[2]

The discussion which follows is developed in the context of the past several months of sociopolitical events, against the backdrop of acute pressure from the aftermath of terrorist acts, conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and a mounting rhetoric of military action and war. In this paper, I draw on Derrida's texts to reach

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[1] Diogenes Laertius (1972) [1925]. "Διογένης (Diogenes)." *Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων* [*Lives of eminent philosophers*]. Volume 6, passage 63. Translated by Robert Drew Hicks (Loeb Classical Library ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

[2] Jacques Derrida (1997) in Bennington, *Politics and Friendship*: *A Discussion with Jacques Derrida*, Centre for Modern French Thought, University of Sussex, 1 December 1997. Last accessed June 8, 2015. http://www.livingphilosophy.org/Derrida-politics-friendship.htm.

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a better understanding of cosmopolitanism in terms of the responsibilities it entails for the philosopher and the teaching of philosophy.

8.1   Cosmopolitanism

Robert Fine believes that "Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right is widely viewed as the philosophical origin of modern cosmopolitan thought."[3] Going back to Kant (1724–1804), his relatively recent concept of cosmopolitanism took shape in an era when states and borders were being outlined and played a major role in defining citizenship – a time of "nation-building." His goal, or rather his hope, was "to end all wars for good,"[4] proposing the creation of a Federation of Free States which would not constitute an international state in order "to avoid a totalitarian regime on the global level."[5] In this context, Kant saw it as a right for people to live in a peaceful international community and based his cosmopolitanism on a conception of individual and international right. However, we would have to wait a few more years and two World Wars for the conceptualization of international law and for the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Lubo Mitev writes that "Now, in the beginning of the 21st Century, we have a system of civil and international law that can be integrated far better than in Kant's time, to constitutionalize and institutionalize cosmopolitanism."[6]

Jacques Derrida saw Kant's concept of cosmopolitanism, with its conditions of hospitality, as very limited, because it is essentially restricted "to the political, to the state, to the authority of the state, to citizenship, and to strict control of residency and period of stay."[7] He wished for something more than political, "more than cosmopolitical, more than citizenship."[8] In *Specters of Marx*,[9] he wrote about a "New International" which would go "beyond this concept of the cosmopolitical strictly speaking."[10] This led him, in his "Discussion" with Bennington, to call for a new

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[3] Robert Fine (2003) "Kant's Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel's Critique," *Philosophy and Social Criticism 29*(6): 609–630.

[4] Immanuel Kant (1970) "Perpetual Peace." In *Kant's Political Writings* (p. 93–130). Cambridge: University Press. p. 104.

[5] Lubo Mitev (2010) "Kant's Conception of Cosmopolitanism and its Limitations," Last accessed June 8, 2015. https://lubomitev.wordpress.com/2010/08/16/kants-conception-of-cosmopolitanism-and-its-limitations/#_ftn2.

[6] Mitev, "Kant's Conception of Cosmopolitanism".

[7] Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida (1997) "Politics and Friendship: A Discussion with Jacques Derrida." Centre for Modern French Thought, University of Sussex. Transcribed by Benjamin Noys. Hydra Design: Peter Krapp. p. 7. Last accessed June 8, 2015. http://www.livingphilosophy.org/Derrida-politics-friendship.htm.

[8] Derrida, "Discussion," p. 7.

[9] Jacques Derrida *Specters of Marx*: *The State of the Debt*, *the Work of Mourning*, & *the New International*, trans. Paggy Kamuf, New York and London: Routledge.

[10] Derrida, "Discussion," p. 7.

concept of democracy – and one must read "democracy to come" about which he wrote widely – which would reshape the political landscape, going beyond the nation-state but also, and most importantly, "beyond the cosmopolitical itself."[11] This rethinking, reconceptualization of cosmopolitanism, international law, and human rights must go through a philosophical thinking.

8.2   The Necessity of Philosophy[12]

In a 2002 interview aired on the French channel France 3, following up on the deep concern abundantly expressed in the media as to the ability of politicians to analyze and respond to the major recent sociopolitical developments (widespread corporate corruption and, more tragic still, the then US President Bush's pressure to go to war against Iraq), Charles Pépin asked Derrida a most relevant question, i.e., whether "the mighty of this world, heads of states and corporations" should be given access to the teaching of philosophy. Derrida declared not to entertain too many "illusions as to the organized, institutional, pedagogic form," such a teaching of philosophy could take. But he recognized that "corporate executives, policy makers, and especially politicians" would benefit from it, in particular since "all the decisions … so-called ethical, theo-ethical, which must be taken today, questions of sovereignty, questions of international law, have been the objects of philosophical research for a very long time, and in a renewed fashion now."[13] In "Imprévisible liberté," the same questions were raised concerning scientists. While making a distinction between "scientism"[14] and "science," Derrida noted that no matter how competent they may be in their own areas of expertise (while "competent" and "areas of expertise" would need further scrutiny), "sometimes, the 'scientists' will proffer any nonsense when they dabble in philosophy or ethics."[15]

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[11] Derrida, "Discussion," p. 7.

[12] This discussion was developed in part in a previous publication: Egéa-Kuehne, D. (2004) "The Teaching of Philosophy: Renewed rights and responsibilities." In P.P. Trifonas and M. Peters (Eds) *Derrida*, *Deconstruction and Education*: *Ethics of Pedagogy and Research*. London: Blackwell Publishing. p. 17–30.

[13] Jacques Derrida (2002) "Culture et dépendances," Special Jacques Derrida. Presented by Franz-Olivier Giesbert, with the participation of Elizabeth Levy, Charles Pépin, Daniel Schick, and Séverine Werba. France 3 Television (May 2002). npn.

[14] Term generalized after 1911, referring to the belief that science (i.e., all sciences) could explain, resolve, and control all human phenomena. It became "a discourse on science which claims to abolish philosophy while deploying the very discourse of science" in Dominique Lecourt (ed.), *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences*, Paris: Presses Universitaires Françaises (1999), p. 852

[15] Jacques Derrida et Elizabeth Roudinesco (2001) De quoi demain... Dialogue. Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard et Editions Galilee. p. 84. Jacques Derrida and Elizabeth Roudinesco (2004) For What Tomorrow...: A Dialogue (Cultural Memory in the Present), trans. Jeff Fort. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

In the aftermath of the most recent events and escalation in terrorist attacks in several countries on several continents in a matter of days,[16] Derrida's words have a renewed impact:

> Never as much as today have I thought that philosophy was indispensable to respond to the most urgent questions of society…. Never have we had such a need for the philosophical memory.[17]

In 1999, Derrida was invited to speak at a UNESCO[18] conference on the general theme of "The New World Contract" drawn up by Federico Mayor, then director general of the institution. In his address, Derrida discussed "the task of the philosopher here, such as [he saw] it assigned and implied by the new 'world contract'."[19] Derrida understood this task as also being "that of whoever tends to assume political and legal responsibilities in this matter."[20] He gave as examples four of the tightly linked themes around which had revolved his lectures, seminars, conferences, publications, and interviews (including several interventions before UNESCO): work, forgiveness, hospitality, peace, and the death penalty.[21]

Later on, in his 2002 interview with France 3, Derrida insisted – and it is nowadays most relevant – that philosophy is more necessary than ever to respond to the most urgent questions raised by today's sociopolitical context, questions of politics, ethics, and especially rights and law.[22] These issues concern international institutions, including "the UN, the Security Council, the role of certain sovereign states in their relation of respect or non-respect toward these international institutions,"

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[16] Recall terrorist attacks in Paris last January 15, 2015 (on *Charlie Hebdo* newspaper and the Hyper Casher supermarket), and the chain reaction that ensued both manifestations in support of "Charlie" and terrorist attacks in retaliation.

[17] Derrida, "Culture et dépendances," npn.

[18] United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

[19] Jacques Derrida (1999) "La mondialisation et la paix cosmopolitique," first delivered at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris on November 6, as part of the "Discussions of the Twenty-first Century." Transcribed and published in *Regards* 54 (February 2000, 16–19). Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg as "Globalization, Peace, and Cosmopolitanism," in *Negotiations*: *Interventions and Interviews*, *1971–2001*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002, 371–86. p. 376.

[20] Derrida (1999) "La mondialisation et la paix cosmopolitique," p. 376.

[21] UNESCO has deemed it necessary to establish for itself a department of philosophy, which is why, in a previous address before UNESCO in 1991, Derrida declared that "UNESCO may in fact be this privileged place . . . perhaps the only possible place in which to truly deploy the question" of the right to philosophy. He continued: "As if, in a word, UNESCO and, within UNESCO in a way that was privileged, its department of philosophy, were, if I can say this, the singular *emanation* of something like *philosophy* as 'a right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view'." (Derrida's emphasis, *Negotiations*, p. 330).

[22] Derrida, "Culture et dépendances." Npn.

all having to do with international law.[23] Derrida stressed that, if international law is to be modified, "it can be done only on the grounds of a philosophical reflection."[24]

Another point Derrida makes, referring to Kant's 1784 text *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*,[25] is that these institutions as well as international law, most of which appeared after the Second World War,

> are already *philosophemes*. They are philosophical acts and archives, philosophical productions and products not only because the concepts that legitimate them have an ascribable *philosophical history* and thus a philosophical history that finds itself inscribed in the charter of UNESCO; rather because, at the same time, and for this reason, such institutions imply the sharing of a culture and a philosophical language, committing themselves consequently to making possible, and first through education [*et d'abord par l'éducation*], the access to this language and to this culture. [Derrida's emphasis][26]

When signing the charter of such an institution, a state and its people make a commitment to uphold the culture and the philosophical heritage thus inscribed in its chapter.[27] Derrida pointed out that some may see in it an "infinite opening," while others might object that "it is limiting to an apparently essentially European heritage."[28] And then some may lose sight of this implicit commitment altogether, which stresses all the more that this commitment entails an education to culture and to philosophy, which is of paramount importance for an understanding of what is at stake, and which is "indispensable to the understanding and the implementation of these commitments to these international institutions, which are … philosophical in essence."[29]

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[23] See also Jacques Derrida (2001) *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, London and New York: Routledge.

[24] Derrida, "Culture et dépendances." npn.

[25] *Idea* [in view of] *of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*.

[26] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 331. Translation modified: in the French text, "first of all" relates to "education" (thus emphasizing the importance of education) and not to "access" to language and culture, as translated in the current English text. Jacques Derrida (1997) *Le droit à la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolitique*, éditions UNESCO. p. 13.

[27] Following an 18 years absence from UNESCO, on September 12, 2002, speaking before the UN General Assembly in an effort to gain support to go to war against Iraq, President Bush announced the return of the United States of America to UNESCO (188 Member States; as a founding member, the United States helped shape the 1945 Constitution). UNESCO Press Release # 2002-64, Paris, September 12, 2002. Last accessed June 8, 2015. http://www.unesco.org.

[28] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 331 (also p. 371–86). They may overlook the fact that this is no simple heritage and "combines and accumulates powerful traditions within it" (*On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, p. 31). See also, for example, Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco (2001) *De quoi demain… Dialogue*, Paris : Fayard Galilée; and Jacques Derrida (2001) *Foi et Savoir suivi de Le Siècle et le Pardon*, Paris : Éditions du Seuil.

[29] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 331. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 15–16.

8.3   The Philosopher Responsibility

In light of the recent events, the rise in violence and terrorist activities in too many countries too often, Derrida's questions (although asked 18 years ago) sound most urgent:

> What are the concrete stakes of this situation today? Why must the important questions concerning philosophical teaching and research, why must the imperative of the right to philosophy be deployed in their international dimension today more than ever? Why are the responsibilities which need to be taken no longer, and even less today in the twenty-first century, simply national? What do "national," "cosmopolitan," "universal" mean here for, and with regard to, philosophy, philosophical research, philosophical education or training, or even for a philosophical question or practice that would not be essentially linked to research or education?[30]

In this context – Derrida had already pointed out – the right to philosophy and to the teaching of philosophy, as well as the responsibilities at stake, must be considered beyond national borders, on a cosmopolitan and universal level. This position raises new questions, already discussed by Kant who stated that "a philosophical approach to universal history is inseparable from a kind of plan of nature that aims for a total, perfect political unification of the human species."[31] Since then, such institutions as the UNESCO, the UN, and the Security Council have moved the creation of "institutions ruled by international – and thus philosophical – law" out of the realm of "fiction" into that of actual existence[32]; whether they – that is their members who signed the charters – uphold the commitment thus made is precisely what is at issue.[33]

Is not one of the responsibilities of today's philosopher, in the context of globalization and cosmopolitanism, the necessity to move beyond the opposition Eurocentrism vs. anti-Eurocentrism? While upholding the memory of a philosophical heritage essentially Euro-Christian (Greek, Roman, Jewish, Christian and Islamic, or Mediterranean/Central European, Greco-Roman-Arab/Germanic), it is necessary to both recognize its origins and go beyond its limits. It is also essential to be aware that the philosophical has been and is being transformed and appropriated by non-European languages and cultures. According to Derrida, this is what a close, "long and slow" study of the historical roots and development of philosophy one, which he never had a chance to complete, should reveal. He believed that

> [w]hat is happening today, and has been for some time … philosophical formations that will not let themselves be contained in this dialectic, which is basically cultural, colonial and neo-colonial, of appropriation and alienation. There are other ways (*voies*) of philosophy

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[30] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 332. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 20.

[31] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 333. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 20.

[32] Derrida, *Negotiations*, p. 333. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 20.

[33] In fact, after much preparation, President Bush opted to go to war against Iraq regardless of the NU's and other Member States' respective positions, not to mention the United States Congress's own opposition.

> …. [Moreover, n]ot only are there other ways of philosophy, but philosophy, if there is such a thing, is the other way (*l'autre voie*).[34]

Derrida also believed that letting philosophy, even under the label of cosmopolitanism, be determined by the opposition Eurocentrism vs. non-Eurocentrism would be limiting the right to philosophy and to the teaching of philosophy. In order to follow up and understand "what is happening and can still happen under the name of philosophy," Derrida suggested three fields of reflection, under three "titles." According to him, they "could be the concrete conditions for respect and the extension of the right to philosophy."[35]

1. *First title*. Whoever thinks that the right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view must be respected, granted, extended will have to take into account the competition that exists and has always existed between several models, styles, philosophical traditions.
2. *Second title*. The respect and extension of the right to philosophy to all people also presupposes … the appropriation but also the overflowing of what are said to be … the founding or originary languages of philosophy – the Greek, Latin, Germanic or Arabic languages.
3. *Third title*. Although philosophy does not simply amount to its institutional or pedagogical moments, nonetheless the many differences of tradition, style, language, and philosophical nationality are translated or embodied in the institutional or pedagogical models, at times even produced by those structures.[36]

8.4 Conclusion

After the shock of the latest wave of terrorist attacks, several governments agreed that education is the key and started planning new reforms. It is a sound step, but going one step further, in the current context of globalization, cosmopolitanism, sociopolitical conflicts, terrorist threats, and war, with Derrida, I would stress that, especially within higher education, the rights to philosophy and the teaching of philosophy take a new dimension and urgency and present new challenges. Declaring philosophy to be cosmopolitan is not sufficient to make it universal. One must recognize the role played by appropriation and transformation of the philosophical and of the institutional and pedagogical models in non-European languages and cultures. In addition, today, while threatened by budget cuts leading to closing programs and a major emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs, access and rights to philosophy and the teaching of philosophy are ever more necessary, for they are indispensable to understand our renewed responsibilities in a broader world and to make responsible decisions from a cosmopolitan point of view.

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[34] Derrida, *Negotiations*, 337. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 32–33.

[35] Derrida, *Negotiations*, 337–40. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 32–44.

[36] Derrida, *Negotiations*, 340. *Le droit à la philosophie*, p. 43.

Chapter 9
Education and Three Imaginaries of Global Citizenship

Niclas Rönnström

9.1   Introduction

Some people think that global citizenship is an abstract, well-intended but mis-guided idea since citizenship is exclusively thought of as a legal relationship between a nation state and its members. This view, however, need to be reconsid-ered in the global era since states are increasingly uncoupled from their nations and their members. Today, global interconnectivity is increasing in its scope, intensity, speed, and impact, and since citizenship also includes aspects of democratic partici-pation, belongingness, loyalties, and identity formation, our national imaginaries and boundaries of citizenship are definitely challenged (Osler and Starkey 2005; Schattle 2012; Papastephanou 2013). The story of Terry Jones, a pastor of a tiny congregation in Gainesville, Florida, reminds us that people anywhere can affect people everywhere and that globalization is highly relevant for our conceptions and practices of citizenship (Schattle 2012, 23f). In July 2010, a group on Facebook suggested that it would be a good idea to burn the Koran in memory of 9/11, and they asked their followers to send in photos of how they planned to burn the sacred text. Terry Jones announced that his church would arrange an "International Burn the Koran Day," and later he posited a clip on YouTube in which he claimed that the Koran was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The mayor of Gainesville com-mented on Jones's plans, saying that he and his followers were embarrassments to the community and not really to be taken seriously. However, fans and critics around the world debated the event, which soon took on global proportions. Religious lead-ers begged Jones to cancel his stunt, demonstrations occurred worldwide, American flags were burned, and demonstrators chanted Death to America and Long Live Islam. David Petreus, the US military commander in Afghanistan, warned in a

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written statement that Jones's plan could cause problems in Afghanistan but also endanger US troops worldwide. Jones, in turn, claimed via CNN that the general should rather point his finger at Islam and actually tell the bad religious guys and not him, the good guy, to stop their activities and to shut up. On September 9, President Obama called Jones's plan a recruitment bonanza for Al Qaeda and warned that the burning of the Koran might cause suicide bombings around the globe. Jones finally canceled his memorial plans for 9/11, but several months later, he, the author of *Islam Is of the Devil*, went ahead and, together with 30 of his followers, burnt a copy of the Koran. The event barely received any attention in the USA, but a video was shown on TV in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This resulted in massive protests by thousands of people; it also claimed the lives of at least 20 people, including 7 United Nations workers.

Our global interconnectivity and the story of Terry Jones raise questions about moral obligations to strangers or those who do not think and act like our neighbors and fellow citizens and questions not only about our loyalties and sense of belongingness but also about the character of democratic participation within and beyond the nation. The story also raises questions about the understanding of distant others and their cultures, which in turn raises questions about the roles and responsibilities of educators and education in the global era. In this chapter I will discuss three imaginaries of global citizenship in relation to education against the background of modern social imaginaries capturing forms of human interconnectivity in modern society. Social imaginaries are important in this context since globalization challenges not only the borders or boundaries of interconnectivity but also the ways in which we imagine ourselves to be linked together in society. The importance of education in matters of global citizenship is mainly that educational institutions can be seen as vital agents for helping us to imagine human interconnectedness and citizenship anew. *First*, I outline the relevant modern social imaginaries for the purpose of this chapter. *Second*, I discuss problems connected with the *globalization of modern citizenship* since it places the productive capacities of humans mainly in the private sphere and shields them from democratization, but also since it seems to accelerate global risks and inequalities. *Third*, I discuss a *globalist imaginary* that shapes educational realities today. In this imaginary, education is primarily seen as a promoter of human capital and a nation's ability to stand up to global competition, and it reduces or translates the collective agencies of democracy and the public sphere into economic worldviews and consumer behavior. *Finally*, I discuss the *imaginary of a rooted cosmopolitanism* which I think is a promising candidate for thinking interconnectivity and citizenship anew in the global era since it departs from the view that local and national identities that bind people together can also mobilize moral commitment to global others, expand epistemic capacities and outlooks, and promote active democratic participation locally, nationally, and globally.

9.2 Modern Social Imaginaries, Global Interconnectivity, and De-territorialization

A social imaginary, according to Charles Taylor (2004, 2007), is the way ordinary people imagine their social reality and its relationships, order, and identities. It makes possible and legitimizes social practices, and it can start out as a theory and later transform into a social imaginary more or less lived out among members of society as a deep-seated, background horizon of meaning. A social imaginary can offer a view and explanations of how people are linked together in society, and what one person can expect of the other, which means that it works as a normative background to actions and practices (Taylor 2004, 23–26). Social imaginaries cannot be vaccinated against flaws, faults, and risks because they can misconstruct human interconnectedness, and they also evolve with the development of new practices or modified versions of old practices. The fact that social imaginaries are often taken for granted does not mean that they are trivial; rather, they heighten an awareness of how we humans live under descriptions that have (conventional) consequences for our lives and actions (Searle 1969). We can think of a social imaginary in the same sense as Benedict Anderson (1991) thought of the nation as an imagined political community. To be a member of a nation state presupposes the capacity of citizens to understand human interconnectedness beyond their immediate context. When we think of human relationships on a larger scale or on a societal level, we have to imagine (because we cannot really experience) such an interlinking, but in ways that permeate our everyday lives.

Taylor (2004) claims that there are three basic social imaginaries essential to modern society and its forms of interconnectedness, and I believe that they are also important for recent developments in education, and, in this particular context, citizenship education (Peters et al. 2008). The reason why they are important for education is that modern education and its institutions are defined, formed, and legitimated in accordance with our social imaginaries. We might say, simply, that the primary function of modern education is to pass on to children and young people the knowledge, values, capacities, and attitudes we think they need to link into a social realty defined by social imaginaries or into practices that make sense against the background of social imaginaries (Rönnström 2015). Taylor (2004) believes that our modern social imaginaries are all developments of an original imaginary of the modern moral order in which the members of society are viewed as free and equal rational beings meant to collaborate in peace for their mutual benefit and that this order has its starting point in individuals and conceives of society as established for and instrumental to the rights, strivings, and needs of those individuals. The modern moral order later transformed into an imaginary based on individual agency largely connected to national interests, *the economy*, and two other imaginaries based on more collective forms of agencies traditionally tied to a nation state, that is, the *public sphere* and the *democratic self-rule of a sovereign people*. In the global era, however, it is crucial to understand how not only the nation-centeredness of social imaginaries but also the view of the modern moral order has been challenged

because the states, economy, democracy, and public sphere have been separated from their national territory.

The economic imaginary contains a view of human interconnectedness designed to produce mutual benefit among members of society under the beneficial influence of an invisible hand (Taylor 2004, 70). Members of society, it is assumed, can coexist peacefully because they are involved in an ongoing exchange of advantages in which their different goals mesh. This is one reason why the economic imaginary involves an affirmation of ordinary life. It is supposed to enable members of society to serve their common good at the same time as they serve their own individual good just by leading their everyday, productive lives. The view of agency that is implied in the economic imaginary does not differ substantially from the view that was developed by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century. It builds on an instrumental theory of practical rationality that involves taking any given goal (desire) for an outcome and then using one's beliefs to determine which actions will be effective in bringing about this outcome (Heath 2011). This theory is derived from nonsocial contexts that do not essentially depend on norms, meaning, and linguistic communication, and since human goals are not bounded by rationality, it is the trial-and-error mechanisms of markets that are supposed to challenge the productiveness of our strivings. This view of social order is derived from the idea of a self-regulating market and is nothing other than a consequence of individuals acting in "a system of incentives that seamlessly integrates the interests of instrumentally rational individuals in such a way as to produce mutually beneficial outcomes" (Heath 2011, 43). The economic imaginary assumes an objectifying account of society, that is, as a nexus of norm-independent processes making social events look like any other event in nature (Taylor 2007, 176).

In the global era, the economy has evolved into a highly influential globalist imaginary (Rönnström 2015; Steger 2005). Members of society are imagined to be linked together in a global economy designed to produce mutual benefit on a global scale under the influence of an invisible hand. Globalization is mainly conceived of as the liberation and integration of markets imagined to promote rationality, efficiency, social cohesion, and prosperity, but it is also assumed that this can only be achieved by cultivating consumerist or entrepreneurial identities among the members of society (Steger 2005, 32). Globalization is thought of as a natural phenomenon, but it is also imagined to be necessary, good, and beneficial for all (Beck 2005, 5). The nation state is conceived of as a competition state because the global integration of markets puts nations and national economies at risk. The transformation of nation states into competition states is expressed in attempts to discipline the state and its citizens in line with the perceived demands of a global economy (Beck 2005, 261). This has the consequence that we no longer see the mutual cooperation but rather the competitive edge of agents at the heart of the economic imaginary. Moreover, this evolution also has the consequence that states are increasingly uncoupled from nations, gradually evolving into major agents for spreading global capitalism and the free interplay of markets. The globalist imaginary has become powerful in recent years, and, perhaps, so widespread that other ways in which we imagine ourselves as interlinked in society might be neglected.

According to Taylor ([2004](#)), two modern social imaginaries involve an understanding of members of society as being linked together in more horizontal modes of communicative, norm-regulated but also collective actions, that is, *the public sphere* and the *democratic rule of a sovereign people*. In agreement with Habermas's ([1991](#)) work, Taylor thinks of the public sphere as a common space in which members of society can meet each other through different media in order to discuss matters of common concern. These communicative encounters are assumed to shape the attitudes of the participants and enable the formation of wills and mind-sets. The public sphere is imagined to be open for everyone and quite independent of political power, but it also serves as a benchmark for political legitimacy and governance (Taylor [2004](#), 99). Since the public sphere is held to be enlightened and the people are thought of as sovereign, the government should take them seriously on the basis of cognitive and moral reasons. The public sphere is therefore not only imagined to be an aggregate of voices but is also conceived to be a collective agent or a creator of collective agencies. The people are imagined to form a specific collective agency: the democratic self-rule of a sovereign people building their own nation as a norm-dependent society conceived as their common concern (Taylor [2007](#), p. 185–196). As a consequence, human interconnectedness and aspirations can not only be handed over to market mechanisms. The democratic and public collective agencies are imagined to balance the free play of markets because society is also and ultimately imagined to be the common norm-dependent concern of the actors who are subjected to it.

It is easy to perceive the nation state as a natural kind for self-identification, societal demarcation, and moral obligation. However, James Tully reminds us how nation states came into being in terms of two kinds of struggle for recognition: "the equality of independent, self-governing nation states and the equality of individual citizens" (Tully [1995](#), 15). Nation states in Europe developed in opposition to the outside force of imperia and the feudal society within the evolving nations, even if they continued the imperial tradition in the non-Western world. However, they also developed through a kind of domestic imperialism toward groups poorly attuned to the political majority culture within the nation. Will Kymlicka ([2003](#)) discusses how this domestic imperialism ignored, excluded, or silenced all those who did not match the characteristics of an image of the citizen, typically based on the attributes of the able-bodied, heterosexual, white male. However, soon the national tuning process met resistance from groups within nations. Various groups in different nation states reacted against domestic imperialism, claiming their right to cultural recognition and the right to a life of their own choice and tradition not necessarily attuned to the majority culture. This evolution can also be traced in the history of citizenship education, according to Dave Mathews ([1996](#)). First, citizenship education was domestic imperialistic mainly aiming at instilling essential values and practices in the (future) citizens. During the seventies the consensus view of the nation was challenged, and conflicts within nations were recognized without any given solutions. By the end of the last century, understanding, respect, and tolerance in relation to differences and plurality became important values to strive for in national citizenship education even if educators experienced difficulties in actually

walking the pluralist talk (Ladson Billings 2004). At present, the importance of cosmopolitan education is increasingly debated because of the obligations we owe not only to fellow citizens but also to strangers.

Nation states and nationalist imaginaries are challenged in the era of globalization, and, according to sociologist Ulrich Beck, cosmopolitan imaginaries have ceased to be merely ideas deliberated in academic ivory towers; they have now entered our social reality (Beck 2011). Imaginaries of national sovereignty and independence are running out of steam because the neat correspondence between nation, state, territory, society, the economy, democracy, and culture seems to be missing in reality. Globalization, mobility, and migration have meant increased diversification in many nation states, and conditions for identity formation have altered due to the de-territorialization of culture and meaning (Beck 2006). Ingrid Volker (2014) claims that research on the public sphere still assumes strong territorial ties to nation states, even if the public sphere is actually and increasingly becoming globalized and a new intensive calibration of "polis" and "demos" is going on whereby identities are renegotiated between new global alliances and national loyalties. Political theorist David Held (2010, 185) argues that processes of globalization lead to the political paradox of our times, that is, that the collective issues we must grapple with are increasingly global, while the means for addressing them are national and local. Globalization has meant that the imaginaries of public and self-determining collective agencies can no longer be exclusively identified with a nation state and that our imaginaries of nation-centered collective agencies are running dry even if we often still take them for granted.

Gerard Delanty (2009, 123) suggests that globalization has led to a bifurcation of nation states because modern states are increasingly uncoupled from their nations. They are increasingly being appropriated for the perceived demands of a global economy, thereby making their independence impossible. For the nation state, the only thing worse than foreign investors breaking national economies apart is their choice to engage in business with others. However, this situation has also created conditions for populist-nationalist movements aiming at the protection of the nation because many domestic groups feel that they have been abandoned by the state. I think this reclaiming of nationalism expresses a new dynamic in the struggle for recognition within nation states. Cultural recognition used to mean that groups poorly attuned to the majority culture were striving for recognition, but now groups who claim to represent the majority culture or an ethnic nationalism think of themselves as having been left out in the cold by their own states, which, in turn, seem to fear being left out by important economic actors. As a consequence, imaginaries of national identities and citizenship are hardening at present. Many governments are cracking down on immigration and minority groups as a means for reassuring anxious citizens that they have control over the borders they recently opened up in the name of economic growth and free flow of capital (Schattle 2012, 5).

The recent rise of nationalism, xenophobia, and the workings of the globalist imaginary making economic competitiveness the goal of many states have together fueled debates on citizenship, democracy, and the public sphere. In the present situation, where traditional nation-centered imaginaries are running dry and

globalization has meant opportunities but also risks and challenges that show no respect for national borders, philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006, xiii) has stressed the importance of our forming new "ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become." Kymlicka and Walker (2012) and many others argue that globalization has made some version of cosmopolitanism inevitable, but at the same time that the typical imaginaries of cosmopolitanism that have evolved in the modern era are both utopian and dystopian. They are utopian because they envision a political world order modeled on the nation state applied globally, and they are dystopian because they tend to suppress diversity and open doors to imperialism (Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 3). It is in this context that education is held to be important – not as a static replicator of a nation-centered past in the global present but as an agent for change that helps us to imagine human interconnectedness and citizenship anew. In what follows, I will discuss three imaginaries of global citizenship in relation to education against the background of modern social imaginaries reminding us of the ways in which we have imagined ourselves as being linked together as free and equal members of society and to what extent they qualify as promising candidates to think anew in the global era.

9.3 The Globalization of Modern Citizenship and Its Low-Key Democratic Participation

Citizenship and citizenship education are hard to define because they both depend on three aspects subject to a number of interpretations. Citizenship can first be defined in relation to the rule of law, specifying what it means to be a bearer of rights and duties, but also in relation to a view of democracy explicating the scope and character of democratic participation. If citizens are merely decision takers subject to rules and governance imposed on them, they may be seen as bearers of rights and duties, but they cannot be seen as active democratic participants or decision-makers. The interpretation of democratic participation varies between democratic traditions. In liberal or realistic traditions, the citizen is thought of as wise in not interfering too much with politics except to exercise the right to influence and vote for representatives or, if they choose, to become political representatives. In the republican tradition, however, citizens are generally thought of as politically responsible, willing, and competent to seek out the public good through reasoned discussion and debate in the public sphere. Democratic traditions, therefore, allow for both low-key and active participation. The third aspect is that citizenship involves relations of belongingness and loyalty, but also questions of identity traditionally connected to a nation state (Schattle 2012; Skrbis and Woodward 2013, 29–40). Anthony Giddens (1994) insisted that the relationship between the citizen and the state involves more than a formal legal tie and that the nation state could be seen as a power container with a totalizing, homogenizing, and formally equalizing

effect. In this context, I think of all these three aspects as essential to citizenship and citizenship education.

Citizenship has been framed most commonly as a reciprocal relationship of rights and corresponding duties that exist between individuals and nation states, but how can we understand this relationship in times where states are uncoupled from nations and increasingly becoming agents for economic globalization? Contemporary understandings of rights include civil and political rights, but also social and economic rights that in welfare states often include the right to education, health care, basic living wages, fair and safe working conditions, unemployment insurance, and retirement pensions. In recent years, cultural rights have been proposed and debated frequently, and in the global era human rights are also part of our citizenship-rights vocabulary, both exemplifying an increasing denationalization of citizenship. However, Hans Schattle (2012) claims that if citizenship is understood chiefly as a legal relationship between the individual and the state, globalization would not be particularly relevant to citizenship. In fact, global or cosmopolitan citizenship would become merely an abstraction since the world has never been the locus of citizenship, and educators should not teach our children utopian abstractions, no matter how well intended they are. In the case of the scope, character, and effectiveness of democratic participation and in relation to questions of belongingness, loyalty, and identity, globalization seems to be crucial and highly relevant due to the uncoupling of meaning, identity, and culture from particular territories. The former problem complex finds expression in contemporary debates on the asymmetric relationship between global capitalism and the traditionally national but steadily growing transnational character of politics. The latter is most clearly expressed in debates on the relationship between cosmopolitanism, patriotism, and nationalism and in discussions on the need for a cosmopolitan education that Martha Nussbaum (1996) started in the 1990s with her essay *Patriotism and cosmopolitanism*.

There has been renewed interest in citizenship education in the global era. Cosmopolitan education in Nussbaum's (1996) terms includes the recognition of differences and similarities between people; the recognition of increasing global interdependencies and interconnectivity; the acceptance of moral obligations to neighbors, fellow citizen, and distant strangers; and the fostering of capacities and a willingness to think beyond national boundaries and learn the culture of dialogue. Osler and Starkey (2006) have discussed several reasons for this renewed and often globally focused recontextualization of citizenship education, increasing global injustices and inequalities, mobility and migration, changed and low civic/political engagement, antisocial behavior and violence in schools, and the rise of ultranationalist movements hostile to strangers. Osler and Starkey (2005) think that we need a cosmopolitan education, and like many authors today, they also believe that cosmopolitan and national views of citizenship are not necessarily at odds with each other. Walter Humes (2008, 51) also welcomes the introduction of global citizenship in education even if it seems to militate against the nation-building character of educational institutions because "however interpreted, [it] deals with the big issues of our time: wealth and poverty; equality and justice; access and exclusion; rights and democracy; freedom and authority." However, I think that there is an important

connection between our understandings of citizenship rights and globalization but also the "big issues of our time." We should not underestimate the role citizenship rights can play in the global context, and we have reasons to be cautious in welcoming global citizenship in education as something good under any description. I will address this issue as raised in the recent work of James Tully (2014) on global citizenship.

Tully (2014, 8) thinks that a standard imaginary of modern democracy and citizenship has evolved which is increasingly legitimated, defended, and lived around the world. Modern citizenship is deeply rooted in processes of modernization in terms of representative democracy, international law, the globalization of the public sphere, and politics, but also in the processes of postcolonial nation building in the non-West. Tully thinks that modern citizenship is defined in relation to constitutional law and representative government and that a special status is given to civil rights, which he thinks of as *the* right among citizenship rights. Civil rights include freedom of assembly, speech, thought, and religion, but also the right to own property and enter into contracts. Tully (2014, 13) argues that the freedom to participate in the private or economic sphere and not to be interfered with while doing so is essential to modern citizenship. This leaves us with a paradox because the first right of citizenship is freedom to participate in the capitalist economy and the private realm and to be protected from interference from citizens and their representatives when doing so. Political rights are interpreted or defined in relation to representative government, but these rights seem to be circumscribed by civil rights. Political participation is optional, and to make participation a requirement for citizenship would violate people's civil rights not be interfered with. Moreover, the primary use of rights in the modern tradition has been to protect private interests from too much interference from citizens and their representatives. The third group of rights, social and economic rights, can be seen as the hard-won basic goods that citizens of different nations have achieved by challenging the authority of civil and political rights. The third group has evolved as a response to the inequalities that go along with the unrestrained formal equality of civil rights and the restricted democratic participation of voters (Tully 2014, 16). However, if we leave the national outlook and examine modern citizenship rights in a global context, the problems of modern citizenship take on dramatic proportions, and global citizenship is given a not so friendly face.

Tully (2014, 19) claims that modern citizenship has been globalized in two forms: first, through the replication of modern nation states and their basic institutions around the world and, second, through a form of cosmopolitan hospitality or duty that works as a carrier of modern citizenship and opens up host countries to free commerce. Cosmopolitan hospitality can be seen as a precursor to the duties built into transnational trade law agreements today, and Tully (2014, 22) claims that: "We can see that this cosmopolitan right is a right of the citizen of the civilized imperial states to exercise the first right of modern citizenship and a version of the second right beyond their nation state and to be protected from interference in doing so." The rights of citizenship are advertised as a gift to the presumably less-developed host country, but its two-faced nature also converts them into a Trojan

horse of Western imperialism. Tully admits that the language of the need to civilize half-baked barbarians has dropped out of the imperial repertoire, but he claims that it has been replaced by the more rationalistic language of modernization, marketization, democratization, and globalization. Moreover, in this context of globalization, the invisible hand of the economic imaginary is all too often backed up by the not so invisible fist of military forces (Tully 2014, 28). The promises of a modern order based on freedom, equality, and democracy that legitimizes the globalization of modern citizenship have a less pleasant side that invites informal imperialism, inequality, and exploitation.

The globalization of modern citizenship actualizes a structural problem built into our citizenship rights or at least in common interpretations of those rights. The passive or low-key view of democratic participation assumed in modern citizenship seems to prevent democratic activism and the possibilities of a people within a nation to exercise their right of self-determination. The globalization of modern citizenship can, therefore, mean that the state is never really rooted in the demos, and the public sphere of a "host country." Tully (2014, 29) claims that opposition too often results in repression from domestic elites or intervention from foreign powers protecting their globalized civil rights, that is, the right to participate in capitalist economy in a host country without interference from its passive citizens when doing so. From the perspective of citizenship education, Alia A. Abdi (2008) argues that many African countries in the postcolonial era have aligned themselves with modern citizenship, but in such a way that they have become not liberal but illiberal democracies. There has been, in Abdi's view, little or no altering of the basic traits of colonial education, and in the few cases where citizenship education programs have been offered, they have been formulated mainly to make the people loyal to military rulers, foreign interests, or dictatorships.

If Tully is right in his critique and analysis of the globalization of modern citizenship, the problem complex seems to be that big issues such as global inequalities, poverty, environmental threats, militarization of conflicts, and unjust forms of recognition or exclusion have brought about renewed interest in citizenship and citizenship education. These global issues are not isolated phenomena; they are linked together (Tully 2014, 85). Modernization, Western expansion, and economic globalization have caused dramatically increasing inequalities and poverty as well as planetary threats in the world. Military forces are primarily protecting powerful actors essential to economic globalization and their right to participation in global capitalism without interference from citizens when doing so. Not surprisingly, much of the unjust recognition of persons and people is connected with their not being willing to adapt to the roles they are supposed to play in the globalization of the modern citizenship scenario. In other words, Tully thinks that modern citizenship is not only too narrow or too ineffective to deal with the big issues of the time; it more or less causes them by placing the productive capacities of humans mainly in the private sphere and shields them from democratization by means of the primary status of civil citizenship rights. The globalization of modern citizenship seems to promote a primacy of the economy at the expense of the collective agencies we have imagined as essential to modern society, and it seems to accelerate the

problem complex that has enabled citizenship educators to welcome the concept of global citizenship. Therefore, modern citizenship as discussed by Tully seems to be a poor candidate for helping us imagining citizenship and human interconnectedness anew against the background of the promises of the modern moral order.

9.4 From Globalist to Rooted Cosmopolitan Imaginaries of Citizenship

There is another view of citizenship linked to the globalist imaginary and the uncoupling of states from their nations that seems to shape the realities of education globally today (Rönnström 2012). This view is also connected with the idea that participation in the economy is mandatory and political participation optional. According to the globalist view, the big issues of our time are conceived of as economic growth and the competitive edge of nations competing on global markets. Nick Stevenson (2011, 251) claims that the globalist view is spread across political parties, including social democrats. This is confirmed on the Swedish party website: education is primarily linked to visions of economic growth and the nation's ability to stand up to international competition and the creation of a human capital that can fill difficult recruitment gaps on the labor market (Socialdemokraterna 2015). The globalist imaginary is also reflected in research in the field of comparative education (Dale 2005). A *globally structured agenda of education* is held to be promoted by transnational actors such as the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF, and neoliberal regimes. This GSAE thesis reflects a strong relationship between imaginaries of globalization, needs for economic growth, and the necessity of educational change. The citizenship dimension is remarkably narrow because of the primacy of economic concerns with regard to the aims of education, the norms governing it, and the quality standards for measuring success in it, as I have argued elsewhere (Rönnström 2012). Responding to globalization is not about transforming a national outlook into a cosmopolitan outlook in education because most or all aspects of education are linked to strengthening a nation's ability to stand up to global competition (Nussbaum 2010, 14). However, the globalist view affirms not only economic goals and visions as primary. It also seems to reduce or translate the collective agencies of democracy and the public sphere into the globalist economic imaginary.

In this widespread imaginary, school and society are essentially imagined as markets in which we are all interlinked in productive economic exchange. Teaching and learning are seen simply as acts of market integration in which all kinds of diversity can be managed (not recognized) as long as the participants primarily play their roles as economic agents. Questions of rights seem to boil down to civil rights; democratic participation is low key and conceptualized in terms of markets and consumers; belongingness and loyalties are connected to nations competing globally; and the identities of citizens are primarily understood in terms of consumers or entrepreneurs. Globalists assume that all that is important for citizenship can be

translated into economic worldviews, and they assume that market transactions can do the job that communicative engagement is supposed to do in the public sphere, as Michael Wohlgemuth (2005) argues. Communicative transactions in the public sphere are often claimed to be argumentative, inclusive, public, free from coercion, rationally motivated, and of equal interest for all. In the market, however, all this can be translated into the equal opportunity to advertise and buyers preferring new products; the inclusion of all buyers in markets; buying, selling, and competing as non-coercive acts; and rationality in terms of well-informed trial-and-error processes. Wohlgemuth shows that economic transactions may display qualities that are at best functionally analogous to communication in the public sphere and that we should not underestimate the functions that market mechanisms can have in citizenship issues. For example, political consumers can be seen as a counter power aiming at reducing excessive exploitation in the world. Consumers can act across borders, belong to any community, and refuse to buy at any time and place (Beck 2005, 7). However, the globalist reductionism or translation act is problematic because essential aspects of the ways in which we imagine ourselves to be interconnected in modern society seem to be lost in translation rather than reappropriated for global citizenship.

Individual instrumental agency cannot replace the collective communicative agencies that are essential to the public sphere and democratic governance. The logic of communication in the public sphere is qualitatively different from the aggregative logic of economic individualism, and the instrumental view of action and practical reason cannot account for the communicative view of action and reason that is essential to meaningful exchange, perspective taking, cooperative engagement, and will formation in the public sphere. This shortcoming is particularly relevant to education since we have to learn how to become citizens. The view of society as a nexus of norm-independent processes entails a view that escapes the influence of democratic citizens, and this aspect undermines the productive, interactive and balancing relationship between the public and the private spheres that were held to be important for our modern social imaginaries. Moreover, the invisible hand that is supposed to provide general welfare on a global scale, even if this goal is not affirmed in the attitudes of actors, seems to belong to the rich and not to the poor in an increasingly unequal world society (Baumann 2013, 32–48). Questions of justice, equality, and moral obligation cannot, so it seems, be handed over to invisible-hand factors; therefore, consumer behavior cannot be equated with citizenship action since the reflections over justice and moral deliberation need to be affirmed in the attitude of the actor in the citizen but not in the consumer. Moreover, the pressing questions of a hardened nationalism and increasing xenophobia seem to be bypassed or worsened rather than dealt with in schools and society striving for competitive edge. The globalization of the public sphere and the eroding of the imaginary of democratic governance in terms of a sovereign people within a nation in the light of risks, challenges, and common concerns that show no respect for national borders call for a reappropriated view of global citizenship and education. The globalization of modern citizenship and the economic reductionism of the

globalist imaginary are not viable options since they can be seen more as parts of the global problems discussed than as promising responses to them.

Globalization has made some form of cosmopolitanism inevitable, or so it seems (Kymlicka and Walker 2012; Held 2010). However, a defensible cosmopolitan imaginary must avoid the informal imperialism and the risk of abstractionism discussed earlier. A cosmopolitan imaginary cannot be derived merely from abstract categories such as "humanity" and "the world." It must resonate with particular cultures, identities and persons, and it must inspire states to refrain from homogenous tuning or nation-building processes, whether in the form of domestic imperialist views of normal citizens or in the reductionist views of competitive citizens. A cosmopolitan nation state must accept and be responsible to a diverse demos, and it should not abandon its own nation in the name of economic globalization by increasing the scope of market forces, political noninvolvement, competition, and capitalist agencies; by decreasing nonmarket social factors, democratic participation and cooperation; and by cutting back the third group rights and hard-won services which have offered protection to the most vulnerable and the least powerful in society both within and outside the borders of the nation. If we take the modern moral order seriously in a global context, we must reappropriate institutions, habits, and actions in education and elsewhere so that society and its institutions become instrumental not only to the interests of a few but also to the needs of all members of the world society. We can no longer defend uninterrupted economic agency and globalization with imaginaries that seem to misconstruct human interconnectivity in terms of how everyday market transactions link into a global economy that is beneficial to all as long as we only protect it from citizens and their democratic involvement.

It is in this context that the imaginary of a rooted cosmopolitanism has evolved (Kymlicka and Walker 2012; Weinstock 2012). It expresses the moral claim of equal worth of and moral obligations to all people, not as an abstract category but as individuals and sometimes groups. It does not mean a demand for a world state or a world culture, nor does it exclude the possibility of strong identification with a particular nation or a particular group; in fact, the case is quite the opposite. The imaginary of rooted cosmopolitanism builds on the view that the very same local and national identities that bind people together can mobilize moral commitment to global others. Moreover, it involves the view that rooted attachments can bring about extended moral commitment to distant others because it can actually be the case that one's local or national attachment motivates extensive commitments since that is what is required from such attachments (Tan 2012). Rooted attachments can, therefore, be seen as functionally necessary to achieve cosmopolitan goals and aspirations, and education can take on at least four important roles as a promoter of a rooted cosmopolitan view of citizenship (see Weinstock 2012).

First, we need to distinguish between accidental and reflective or educative cosmopolitization. It may be thought that increased mobility, migration, and communication networks and the de-territorialization of culture and meaning result in contexts for identity formation that automatically globalize all or most of us into cosmopolitans. Of course, socialization and everyday narrative identity formation can and do develop cosmopolitan traits in people, but since empathic, inclusive,

communicative, cooperative, reflective, and critical capacities and attitudes are essential to cosmopolitan outlooks, collective agencies, and identities, we cannot simply trust that they will develop naturally as a response to globalization and in educational institutions where globalist imaginaries prevail. This is why educational institutions matters, because we cannot solely outsource cosmopolitan education to individuals. *Second*, education is essential as an agent for widening our outlooks and epistemic rootedness. There are limits to what we can know, given the contexts that we live in, and our social imaginaries place demands on our capacities to think beyond our immediate contexts and experiences. Moreover, we might be epistemically rooted in worldviews and concepts that could reduce, distort, or simply make it difficult to grasp the fabric of the globalized world and its relations of dependencies and interdependencies. Education has an important epistemic function to widen our outlooks, to reappropriate our concepts, to make openness and perspective taking possible, and to make critical appropriation of worldviews a habit. *Third*, education must be able to widen and deepen our motivational rootedness but also place reasonable demands on it. Since living up to our moral obligations requires that we actually are motivated to do so, education can and must shape our moral motivation. It is important not to demand more of us than is reasonable – for instance, in vain attempts to inculcate an extreme cosmopolitan position, entailing that our obligation to humanity should always override any particular attachment. It is also important not to demand too little from us so that our obligations to strangers are never deliberated and unreflectively bypassed by our moral habits or not affirmed in our attitudes because we leave questions of equal and just distribution to invisible-hand factors. *Fourth*, education must be able to strengthen and reactivate our political rootedness in relation to the collective agencies we have imagined as essential to modern interconnectivity and the modern moral order. A view of global citizenship education that builds on low-key democratic participation or that reduces democratic influence or agency to consumer behavior or power seems to be inadequate as long as we still think that our modern social imaginaries capture essential ways in which we are interlinked in an increasingly interconnected world society. Education should take on the role as a promoter not only of rights including human rights but also as a promoter of an active citizenship in which people can experience themselves as both takers and makers of decisions and discussions in local, national, and global contexts and not limit their democratic participation to influencing representatives and voting.

Rooted cosmopolitan citizenship education involves, in short, educating citizens: (a) whose moral responsibilities and obligations transcend their local or national contexts and attachments to include all individuals and groups of human beings in the world society and who make the use of their rooted capacities their global orientation; (b) who can communicate with, take the perspective of, and learn from others, near or far, and recognize others as the same in some aspects and different in many aspects but equal in moral aspects; (c) who can understand themselves and others as citizens belonging to nations and an interconnected but not always mutual world society; (d) who acknowledge the plural source of their cultural heritage and their increasing and crucial interdependence in a world where its members, however

different, share future and who can make themselves aware of problematic aspects of nation-centered and nation-biased social concepts, habits, and institutions; and (e) who can critically and dialogically evaluate cultures, identities, and actions and, through reflective and cooperative action, transform and transcend their actual contexts to form alternative imaginaries and habits of coexistence. Cosmopolitan education should not be understood as a tourist approach to the global other or simply an act of intercultural communication or multicultural encounter; rather, it is based on understanding people and persons living near and far away, but it also involves the historicity, relationality, and action coordination crucial for our living together in a world society (Papastephanou 2002, 85). In cosmopolitan citizenship education, the nation cannot be the sole center of gravity, the market cannot be the sole game in town, and there is no place for ignoring the consequences of uninterrupted global capitalism, thereby running the risk of worsening the big issues of the time that seem to be important not only to citizenship educators but to people with different pasts who now share futures.

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Chapter 10
Reimagining European Citizenship: Europe's Future Viewed from a Cosmopolitan Prism

Eli Vinokur

10.1   Introduction

Often, policy makers overlook the potential that education offers as a basis for social, political, or financial change. In this paper I will demonstrate that the absence of a cosmopolitan educational process, in its broadest meaning, throughout the creation of the EU created a fragmented entity that is united monetarily, but whose citizens feel very little commitment toward their fellow Europeans, let alone across European borders. I will claim that although the idea of a European Union is cosmopolitan in nature, its current condition, especially as manifested in the Eurozone crisis, is only instrumentally cosmopolitan. In fact, the EU is moving away from cosmopolitan theory and practice.

But not everything is lost. The contradiction between the social fragmentation and the interdependence within the EU leaves it with two choices: collapse as a union and face social and economic threats, or seek survival together. I maintain that this political and financial reality enables a renewed attempt at the EU project, this time by fostering an educational deliberative process that could unite European citizens into an open, culturally sensitive, reflective, critical, and diverse cosmopolitan community which is capable of transcending egotistical interests.

The article is divided into four parts. First, I reflect on the motives behind the inception of the EU. This leads to a critical account of the EU's contemporary situation. After highlighting the drawbacks of the EU's integration strategy, I advocate "integrated cosmopolitanism" as a pathway to inner border crossing, thus allowing for an alternative vision for the EU in the form of a diverse, reflective, and open

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cosmopolitan-oriented community. Finally, I briefly discuss the educational process that could foster a European Union more worthy of its name.

10.2   Kantian Peace via Economic Integration

The EU was a project of Kantian peace – an attempt at adhesion of European states that shared a common desire to say "no more" to their violent, barbaric history and create a "federation of Europe" (Held and McNally 2014). This political aim was to be actualized by the economic integration of European productive capacities (Fligstein 2014). The declaration of the first European entity – the European Coal and Steel Community – states that unity on the basis of common financial interests is the "first step in the federation of Europe" (Schuman 1950). Thus the foundation of European Unity was built predominantly on financial bricks.

The dream of the founding fathers of the European project for a shared sense of belonging among citizens of a growing European Empire was cultivated by the establishment of the European Economic Community or the Common Market in 1957, the European Community, and finally the European Union.

The extension of the EU has brought about the most robust form of the European vision – "an integrated Europe with a single market subject to common rules and a shared framework of human rights and justice" (Held and McNally 2014).

Although several scholars claim that the desire of countries such as Spain and Greece to join the EU was seen "as a way of confirming their status as open, modern, democratic and pluralistic states after many years of being closed and authoritarian societies" (Kymlicka 1999, 118), I maintain that behind the inspiringly articulated speeches and policy papers about a sublime European or a national vision, the primary motivation for a country to join the EU was narrow ended, namely, a matter of economic gain. To convince citizens to join the union, politicians usually made the case for the comfortable life, mainly financially. Thus the aspiration toward an ethico-political cosmopolitan ideal of shared civic commitment and responsibility across national borders was swapped for a seductive promise of potential personal profit. And indeed for a decade and a half it seemed that the architects of the European Union largely kept their promise.

Free trade and the removal of non-tariff barriers lowered prices for consumers. Increased trade to the EU created jobs and higher incomes, and trade within the EU rose by 30 %. Between 1993 and 2003, the single market boosted the EU's GDP by 877 billion euros (5700 euros per household). Investment from outside the EU grew from 23 billion euros in 1992 to 159 billion euros in 2005 (Economics 2014). Research conducted by Campos et al. found that membership in the EU had a positive effect on average incomes in all but one of its member countries (Campos et al. 2014).

10.3   When Financial Interdependence Encounters Social Fragmentation

On paper, everything concerning the European economic plan seemed to work, but the European political project of creating Europeans has more or less stalled. In the words of Sophie Duchesne, "European integration was expected to form citizens who identify themselves as European; these citizens were expected to share resources and subsidize poorer citizens. These self-identified Europeans would also support European institutions and policies" (Duchesne 2014); yet Eurobarometer surveys over the past 20 years show that despite the financial success of the European project, only about 10–12.7 % of the citizens in Europe (mostly managers and white-collar workers) think of themselves as Europeans (European Commission 1995; The European Parliament 2013). Moreover, when pragmatically tested during the Eurozone crisis, European citizens were reluctant to help remote strangers. A poll conducted by the German Emnid Institute in 2012 found that 62 % of Germans opposed a proposed 130 billion euro rescue package to help Greece's ailing economy (Kirschbaum 2012). On the institutional level, the way the EU institutions and its largest economies treated the crisis sharpened the democratic and equality crisis, as they subordinated the will of the people to financial interests (Peters 2012; Habermas 2012). Germany even threatened to expel Greece from the EU if it conducted a referendum on the single currency (Chapman 2011).

Reflecting on a meeting between Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy held on 22 July 2011, Habermas (2012) noted that the compromise they have crafted between German economic liberalism and French etatism indicated that both leaders

> want to expand the executive federalism implicit in the Lisbon Treaty into a form of inter-governmental rule by the European Council. Such a regime of central steering by the European Council would enable them to transfer the imperatives of the markets to the national budgets. This would involve using threats of sanctions and pressure on the disempowered national parliaments to enforce non-transparent and informal agreements. In this way, the heads of government would invert the European project into its opposite. The first transnational democracy would be transformed into an arrangement for exercising a kind of post-democratic, bureaucratic rule. (pp. 52)

The contradiction between financial integration and social alienation erupted, not only in the form of a Eurozone crisis and a political crisis, but also in the shattering of the European solidarity dream. Once Europe became "too interconnected financially to fail," the egotistical glue that banded Europeans together became a double-edged sword.

During the Eurozone crisis, even the greatest beneficiaries of European financial and political integration – the elites and the upper classes – have revealed that being interconnected means not only gaining mutual profit, but also being dependent upon other people, as unpleasant and troubling as it may be. Although most of them were able to survive the financial crisis, a vast majority of their employees didn't.

The Eurozone crisis was followed by a steep recession in most EU member states (for an elaborative account, see Williams et al. 2012). The austerity measures

implemented in response to the financial crisis are considered to be one of the main reasons that unemployment in the EU 28 stands at 25.67 million, with 26.7 % unemployment in Greece (49.80 % among youth) and 25.3 % unemployment in Spain (57.7 % among youth) (Krugman 2013; Eurostat 2014a).

Austerity is detrimental to social equality. An Oxfam study concluded that 10 % of the EU's population controls 24 % of the EU's wealth (Corbalan 2013). At the same time, 24.5 % of the EU population (122.6 million people) is living at risk of poverty or social exclusion (Eurostat 2014b). According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), social inequality primarily accounts for social unrest within the EU, which is now the highest in the world. The ILO predicts social inequality will widen (International Labor Organization 2013).

The Eurozone crisis has also opened an identity Pandora box that heavily undermined the "European identity dream." Firstly, it caused a spike in xenophobia. A poll conducted by Pew Research found that 86 % of Greeks, 80 % of Italians, 57 % of the French, and 55 % of the British wanted less immigration (Pew Research Center 2014). Additionally, according to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey,

> every fourth person from a minority group said that they had been a victim of crime at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey. More 'visible' minority groups – that is, those who look visibly different to the majority population – report, on average, higher levels of victimization (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2012).

Secondly, another survey conducted by Pew Research found that the favorability of the EU in the eyes of its inhabitants had fallen from a median of 60 % in 2012 to 45 % in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013).

The biggest blow to the vision of Europe has happened in recent election campaigns in the EU, as far-right parties gained unprecedented popularity. Marine Le Pen's National Front party recorded 26 % of the vote in the last French election, while the UK Independence Party recorded 27.49 % of the vote in the European elections and Jobbik attained approximately 20 % of the national vote in Hungary (Wilshere 2012; The BBC 2014; Paterson 2014).

But despite this grim reality, the European project can still rise from the dead. Surprising as it may sound, I assert that the EU's current condition calls for another attempt at the European project, only this time via an integrated cosmopolitan approach.

10.4 Integrated Cosmopolitanism as a Pathway to Integration

During the last couple of decades, cosmopolitanism has become a matter of great academic interest across the humanities, social sciences, and education. Extensive literature on cosmopolitanism has imbued the concept with new meanings, but

simultaneously created a discourse that is divided internally into dozens of competing and sometimes fuzzy discourses (Papastephanou 2012).

Many of cosmopolitanism's advocates tend to reduce it to only one prism, be it political, cultural, financial, ethical, sociological or anthropological, etc. I maintain that the connections between the challenges Europe faces today obligate us to formulate a cosmopolitan orientation that creates a combination of prisms without nullifying any of them, forming a kaleidoscope of varying perspectives. In previous work, I referred to this as an integrated conception of cosmopolitanism (Vinokur and Alexander 2013).

It is important to note that my attempt to forge a cosmopolitan response to contemporary challenges does not entail a search for a fixed notion of cosmopolitanism. In fact, I am not sure whether such an attempt could or should be successful at all. Having that said, my intent is to propose one central feature of a still to be aspired toward integrated cosmopolitan orientation, which may allow for further deliberation among scholars. An analysis of existing literature allowed me to identify the essential thread running through the cosmopolitan discourse as an orientation, an attitude to the other. This disposition toward the other can range from mere openness to the encounter to inner readiness to change as a result of it. I defined it in broad strokes as "being concerned for the other as I am concerned for myself" (Vinokur and Alexander 2013, 6). In other words, to openly encounter the other, to include the other and care for her interests, one has to be able to free some space within oneself from oneself.

In the same previous work, I have also suggested extending the concept of the other from referring mostly to members of minority groups or representatives of foreign cultures to anything (a human being as well as any element in nature) other than oneself, other than one's natural concern for one's own interest (*Ibid*).

In a nutshell, "integrated cosmopolitanism" suggests that the main challenge of contemporary reality is overcoming the alienation that often stems from one to the other, be it a distant or a close other. This account builds on the presupposition that any encounter which involves human beings contains an element of remoteness, an "I-It" element a la Buber (1970). Thus the feeling of "otherness" can manifest toward the foreigner, the stranger, and the different but also toward the family and the close community, as well as toward any other dweller in the cosmos – the inanimate, vegetative, or animate.

Relying on this conception of otherness, I maintain that European integration primarily demands the crossing of "internal borders," i.e. the internal psychological and relational borders that are constructed within citizens in the process of their acculturation and socialization. Thus, education – which is one of the main vehicles for acculturation and socialization – has a key role in comprising a truly cosmopolitan European Union. In the following section, I will provide a brief overview of the educational policy of the EU throughout the years. My goal will be to show that it did not differ that much from EU's economically oriented agenda. Then I will suggest an alternative, cosmopolitan educational vision to be implemented in various educational settings, based on the main principles of integrated cosmopolitanism.

10.5 Reinventing European Education

According to Etzioni (2013), until the 1970s the issue of integrating educational programs under one unified European core was a taboo in the EU. Member states wanted to protect their cultural and political identity and thus refused to even think about reform of the national education systems. To win support over the opposition, educational reformists decided to place education under the umbrella of vocational training, thus following the same utilitarian strategy they used to integrate Europe from the outset (Etzioni 2013, p. 317).

An overview of the Bologna Declaration of the joint European Ministers of Education, as well as the preceding declarations of Lisbon and of Paris, implies an attempt to replicate the European political integration project in the realm of higher education, placing future financial success at the core of the integration of European academic institutions (Lorenz 2006, 123).

The European officials' desire to promote a profit-oriented educational agenda is clearly reflected in the words of the Lisbon Council, which pledged to make Europe "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" (cited in Etzioni 2013, p. 318; Lisbon European Council 2000). Needless to say, these goals do little to build bonds of affinity and the only shared values they foster are utilitarian. Moreover, when realistically examined, this utilitarian educational agenda was very thin and focused mainly on teacher and student mobility.

But even this agenda was underfunded and frequently met with political oppression (Etzioni 2013). Apart from the Erasmus program, which allowed European students to study across Europe outside of their country of origin and became a success story, it is difficult to name another educational endeavor which seriously brought the EU closer to the implementation of the "European identity" dream.[1] Actually, even the positive impact of the Erasmus program and the likes "is confined to mostly an elite cohort of socio-economically privileged students" (According to Etzioni 2013, 319).

Just like in the case of European integration, the Europeanization of education was promoted primarily on economic grounds, ignoring cultural, social, and political aspects. As a result, it moved the EU even further apart from a cosmopolitan vision of social sustainability. Before it is too late, European officials have to learn their lesson. And here, the current state of affairs could play a key role in turning this profit-oriented approach around. The Eurozone crisis should serve as a wakeup call which will allow for the installation of a "cosmopolitan content dimension" into school and university curricula.

From childhood, the young individual has to feel and understand that self-centered orientation to reality will not lead to happiness. One practical way of doing this is to transform classes into a microcosm, a mini-society, and a small public sphere where cooperation, mutual respect, and mutual care are appreciated. In such

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[1] A list of such educational endeavors and further references to additional literature that rated their success can be found in Etzioni (2013).

a class, lessons would be organized in circles where children would have a vivid discussion regarding their subject matter, as well as regarding their mutual life as future citizens at eye level. In such a process, the teacher would gently guide the process of deliberation and help them reach a mutual understanding a la Paulo Freire's problem posing (Freire 1993). At the end of such discussion, children would reflectively react on their ability to enter a dialogue, to listen to the opinions of others, and to even change their own opinion as a result of a meaningful interaction, instead of trying to constantly defend their own agenda.

Such interactions could also involve role-playing, where children first learn about various social roles, meet their representatives in person, and then try to "enter the shoes of the other" and protect their opinions in a real dispute about civic rights and duties during class. Such experiences, when done on regular basis, could contribute greatly to the development of their social imagery. Having the need to protect the rights of different groups in class throughout their years in school could give rise to one of the most important civic virtues - the ability to imagine the situation of the other and thus be flexible and self-reflective in the face of social conflicts.

The main focus of the proposed exercises of deliberation should be on the cultivation of interpersonal relations of caring, respect, and human dignity, but also on the recognition of the difficulties that lie before the individual who aims to generate such an attitude toward the other.

Apart from the fact that this kind of cosmopolitan citizenship education does not detract from the local or the national community but adds another level of commitment to the European community of citizens, it also recognizes the very human aspect of our difficulty in doing so. As Sharon Todd (2009) rightly reminds us, the process of cultivating our humanity, or in our case solidarity among strangers, be it within a certain country, across Europe, or across cultural differences, should not disregard the simple fact that the "inhuman" is also a part of our humanity. Acknowledging that self-centeredness, egotism, violence, envy, lust, pride, and fear of the other are all parts of the human experience is a very important educational milestone on the way toward the implementation of the aforementioned cosmopolitan vision. The next step would be to not disregard nor try to strangle these feelings and emotions, but rather learn to "master the beast." The art of mastering the beast that is within entails the ability to spot when the media, politicians, or any other groups with their own agenda try to take advantage of our primordial emotions and tendencies to divide and conquer. But it also entails attentiveness to the difficulties of overcoming the otherness that is seen in the other and the ability to turn to the close community and culture for support in facing this challenge. Acquiring the art of "mastering the beast" and eventually using it for the benefit of society should become a major civic virtue.

Students would also leave the class once in a while to experience the world they are learning about "on the outside." A special day could be organized on a regular basis where children would learn about the European Union and visit its institutions. Additionally, they would encounter different social venues to better prepare for their adult lives as active citizens. Such visits may include factories, courts,

governmental institutions, banks, theatres, community houses, shelters, hospitals, and more. The tour would be combined with explanations, and later a critical discussion would be held about what they saw.

There surely are many more examples that could fit here, but what is important is the principle that should lead the way when thinking about the role of the schools and teachers. Instead of places for social reproduction and spoon-feeding of knowledge, schools should become venues for social change, and teachers should become facilitators of social processes between children. Children who grow in an environment of caring for the other will not only blossom, but will also emerge into their lives with a feeling of agency, a sense of mission to build a similar society in the world outside their educational framework.

10.6   Toward a Cosmopolitan Vision of Europe

As noted by Alexander, human actions and attitudes stem from their "vision of the good," – the lofty goals toward which they strive – and education has a key role in its formation (Alexander 2006). But education, the way I conceive it, is more than schooling or academization. It is even more than theoretical learning about the need to accept the other. Education is the result of the influence of an amalgam of forces that form and reform our perceptions regarding the meaning of life, right and wrong, just and unjust, morality and amorality, etc. Education is the story about life we tell ourselves and are being told by various agents in our society – from media to politicians to schools to grandma's lullabies. And today, there is an acute need for a new story, a cosmopolitan story.

The cultivation of such a story calls for an in-depth counter educational process, which should include curricular reform in schools and universities, but should also relate to the political, cultural, and financial aspects.

On the political level, in addition to constitutional and architectural reforms, there is a need to articulate a public sphere, where all parts of society will be represented and the most pressing issues will be discussed openly, but also respectfully, out of a sincere desire to form a truly sustainable society (Habermas 1991, 2012).

The success of far-right parties in recent elections was partly attributed to their leaders taking pressing issues and addressing them in a populist manner, whereas more moderate representatives in the EU largely ignored public concerns and used slogans like: "we need to celebrate diversity." Populists filled the vacuum created by the ignorance, alienation, and remoteness of the current representative democracy in the EU and advocated a much easier to grasp vision of limited immigration and national protectionism. A vivid public sphere could counteract the populist rhetoric by filling the democratic void.

On the cultural level, although the European commission has invested more than 45 million euros in research on European identity since 2005 (Duchesne 2014), there is a need to recognize that the EU is very diverse – for now, there is no such thing as a European identity; rather, there are different identities intermingling in

the European sphere, being constantly shaped and reshaped, some in a more open manner and some in a much more closed and extreme self-centered manner. In such a reality, it is not always possible to reach a consensus on a shared identity. In some cases, grounds for a mutually respectful discussion which ends in a modus vivendi is the best we can hope for. There is also a need to understand that some cosmopolitan orientations already exist, and thus they are worthy of being recognized, even if they are not European.

Finally, there is a need to reform the financial system not only at the institutional regulative level but also at the core human level. It is imperative to articulate an educational move that will create another and much more efficient regulatory mechanism – an inner moral mechanism within a person, allowing him to self-regulate. At the same time, it is important to not forget that no educational endeavour can be successful if the weak and the poor are not protected from the rapidly progressing globalization. In the words of Habermas (2012, 52),

> A Europe-wide civic solidarity cannot develop if social inequalities between the member states become permanent structural features, and hence reinforce the fault lines separating rich and poor nations. The Union must guarantee what the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic calls the 'uniformity of living standards' (Art. 106, para. 3). This 'uniformity' refers only to a range of variation in social living conditions which is still acceptable from the perspective of distributive justice, not to the levelling of cultural differences.

10.7   Conclusion

Today the European Union is facing the danger of collapsing like a large house of cards. In such a state of affairs, neither utilitarian (in the financial sense) nor legislative attempts alone are enough to keep the dream of unified Europe alive, let alone the cosmopolitan project of unity in diversity. To change the current unpromising trends and make a step toward the realization of a socially sustainable Europe, there is a need to cultivate a feeling of commitment to the other from bottom up. As I have tried to show in this paper, this can be done via education, in its broadest sense.

The revival of the European project can begin by creating the conditions for deliberation among European citizens, as a result of which they could mold a cosmopolitan-ethical prism. If people will receive the opportunity to meaningfully encounter their society, reflect on it, and act to change it for the better, we will immediately witness a change of affairs. Once people begin to develop a cosmopolitan disposition, they will naturally form better and more humane enterprises, corporations, international institutions, NGOs, policies, financial systems, and their likes.

A Europe worthy of its name can thrive only if nationalistic, Eurocentric, or any other self-centered ambitions will be overshadowed by a cosmopolitan vision, a vision which can be defined as "being concerned for the other as I am concerned for myself" (Vinokur and Alexander 2013, 6), or in the words of Beck, an ambition of European citizens to "take up the cause of others as their own" (Beck 2007, 50).

This vision can be cultivated in the large European arena alongside its cultivation in the particular national settings, as well as on the basis of particular cultural and historical heritage, as I have exemplified in my work about rooted cosmopolitanism (Vinokur 2015).

Ironically, from the most egoistic perspective, contemporary reality calls for the application of such a cosmopolitan vision. European society is facing the crossroads of the double meaning with which Kant began his "perpetual peace" – the graveyard vis-à-vis the peaceful society. Acknowledging the tragic, some would say even prophetic note of this paper, I still cannot betray my deep gut feeling that history will judge us – parents, politicians, policy makers, scientists, media producers, and finally educators – according to the path we will choose.

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Chapter 11
Europe and the Post Colony: Possibilities for Cosmopolitanism

Penny Enslin

11.1 The Limits of Cosmopolitanism? An Educational Example

Cosmopolitanism offers a vision that transcends parochialism and nationalism, embracing all of humanity. It seems to promise a compelling way to frame relationships between citizens of states that are geographically distant but increasingly connected by global flows of goods, communication and people. Yet when reflecting on relationships between Europeans and citizens of developing countries, cosmopolitanism is also vulnerable to the criticism that it is Eurocentric so that it tends, in spite of its declared aims, to an unreflexive universalism that favours European assumptions and interests. In a globalised world system, such dangers are especially relevant to now-popular educational associations between Europeans and the people of former European colonies. If such concerns about cosmopolitanism are well founded, then postcolonial perspectives may offer alternative framings of interactions between Europe and the rest that better serve such educational projects. I propose to explore the relative merits of cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism by discussing the example of educational partnerships between schools in Scotland, a country once active in building and benefitting from the opportunities and wealth afforded by the British Empire by being part of the United Kingdom, and in Malawi, a former British colony.

Schools in Scotland and Malawi are linked together in a network of partnerships and projects, under the aegis of the Scotland Malawi Partnership, an umbrella organisation comprising an alliance of civil society organisations in both countries that was formalised in the Co-operation Agreement of 2005 between the governments

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of Malawi and Scotland (Scottish Government 2005). Alongside initiatives in government, health and sustainable development, educational partnerships have aimed to contribute expertise and skills in the two countries to combat poverty and to support development in Malawi, based on principles of equal respect and mutual benefit. Educational partnerships take the form of letter writing by pupils in twinned schools, teacher exchanges and development initiatives and the inclusion of elements in the curriculum about each others' countries and cultures as well as common projects on themes like the environment. Partner activities can also involve building and repairing classrooms, school feeding schemes and the collection of learning materials for use in Malawian schools. The Partnership describes and encourages school partnerships as primarily an opportunity to learn, '…an ideal way to enhance the global curriculum, by offering pupils an interactive dimension to their study of global issues. By partnership with a Malawian school you will continue to build the historic, cultural, social and political ties between the two countries' (Scotland Malawi Partnership 2009: p. 2).

Cast in these terms, such partnerships are committed to an approach to education that matches some features that Nussbaum (1994) attributes to cosmopolitan education: that global perspectives make international cooperation in solving common problems possible; that cosmopolitan education encourages those in wealthier countries to acknowledge their moral obligations beyond national boundaries; and that learning about others helps us to know more about our own context. The Partnership's Guidance to participating schools in Scotland emphasises benefits to both nations, stressing too the importance of local leadership and civil society's role in defining needs. It is also careful to emphasise the principle of partnership, based on the values of equality, mutuality and reciprocity. 'Partnership is not about simply providing material aid to another school. It is about creating a relationship between schools which enables pupils in both schools to develop a more critical understanding of the lives of their partner pupils' (Scotland Malawi Partnership 2009: p. 6).

But can a cosmopolitan framework for viewing partnerships between Scottish pupils and their Malawian counterparts – descendants of a former colonial power and of the previously colonised – do enough to acknowledge and address their unevenly shared history of colonialism and the postcolonial condition that still prevails? Postcolonialism demands acknowledgement of the history of European conquest, dispossession, exploitation, the 'othering' of indigenous culture and the imposition of schooling practices that denigrated local knowledge and practices. A postcolonial perspective is also a critical response to the lingering effects of colonial conquest after political decolonisation and the achievement of independence for former colonies. Education has been a prominent theme in postcolonial theory, in its critical analyses of education (e.g. Said 1993) as a defining feature of the colonial regimes that marginalised indigenous educational practices and denigrated local knowledge and values, imposing an alienating curriculum poorly matched to local knowledge, values and needs. Schools were instruments of colonial subjugation – even if they also unintentionally produced native leaders in independence struggles – intended largely to school native populations to provide a supply of minor officials and of cheap, docile labour. Since independence the problem of

Europe continues to loom large in the form of continuing European and Western political, economic and cultural domination. Scotland and Malawi are still tied to neocolonial economies in a world system geared to favour the rich countries of the West, including Europe. Disparities between the two countries in wealth, development and education are enormous. In 2012 the United Kingdom was ranked 14th on the Human Development Index, with a population enjoying 12.3 mean years of schooling, while Malawi was ranked 174th on the Human Development Index and recorded 4.2 mean years of schooling for its people (UNDP 2014).

So on asking what is at stake in weighing up a cosmopolitan reading of partnerships between schools in former colonies and those of their former European colonial masters against the potentially more apposite insights of postcolonialism, it is necessary to consider whether cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism are easy or difficult bedfellows. Is it possible to resolve tensions between them, some of which will be described below, both as theories as such and in reflecting on their usefulness in considering aims and practices in education?

In asking whether cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism could be complementary ideals, at first glance both 'isms' might look like useful if not essential means of understanding and of breaking out of Eurocentrism. Yet cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism differ in several key respects. Firstly, their genealogies are different. Cosmopolitanism is an ancient idea, traceable in its early versions to antiquity, even if it has been contested and refined since its renewed post-Enlightenment expressions. Postcolonial theory, as a more recent 'ism', can be dated mainly to the upsurge of work in comparative literary theory since the 1970s, though its earlier impulses lie in the post-World War II movements for liberation from colonial rule in Asia and Africa. Secondly, cosmopolitanism tends to be a perspective from within the metropolis looking out, and its universalism may sit uneasily beside the particularity and defence of difference and the local that are necessary to the postcolonial stance. On the other hand, while the postcolonial condition pertains across much of the globe in that almost all countries now grapple with migration and domestic diversity as well as an integrated world system, postcolonialism's most urgent expression talks to the experiences and perspectives of those in former colonies and other developing contexts on the receiving end of a global order that favours the rich West, including Europe (I treat the West and Europe as largely interchangeable). Ironically, though, given postcolonialism's critique of imperialism, it too is a theory developed and consumed largely in the Western academy. Thirdly, they are different kinds of theoretical practices, cosmopolitanism being mainly located in philosophy, as a theory about relationships with distant others, ethical obligations beyond the nation state and identity. Postcolonialism has a sharper critical edge, directing justified moral outrage at histories of colonial and neocolonial exploitation and marginalisation, its main impetus being literary theory and cultural studies, but with influences from psychology and forays into historiography. Yet while the discussion that follows does not compare like with like, both theories are contestable and flexible to an extent.

Taking the school partnerships between Scotland in Malawi as an illustrative case, I aim to show how cosmopolitanism can and should be recast in response to

criticisms of its key weaknesses and as already indicated will look to postcolonialism for some direction in doing so. I will begin in Sect. 2 by examining the history of colonialism that forms the backdrop to the Scotland Malawi Partnership, drawing out the symbiotic relationship between colonialism and nationalism. Section 3 examines recent critical perspectives on cosmopolitanism with reference to possibilities for a post-European future. Section 4 takes up the problem of nationalism in postcolonial theory, and Sect. 5 concludes by reflecting on implications for education of the idea of a postcolonial cosmopolitanism.

For the purposes of this discussion, since the terms of postcolonialism are so contested, I deploy the term 'postcolonialism', without suggesting a clear break between colonial history and the subsequent period in which colonialism and its effects have persisted after former colonies achieved independence, to ask what the post colony might be like, as an imagined space in which the legacy of colonialism could be overcome. I treat both Malawi and Scotland as postcolonial contexts, Malawi more obviously so because it is a former colony struggling to overcome its colonial legacy and Scotland because although previously prominent in the British Empire it is consciously trying to address the passing of Empire and its post-imperial, post-industrial economic decline as well as its relationship with its small but diverse immigrant population. Some might wish to regard Scotland itself as having been colonised by England, but this is not a plausible claim. I view educational partnerships like this one as attempts to address postcoloniality, not in the sense of setting the past aside, but of working creatively with the postcolonial condition across space and time. The temporal dimension is as necessary as the more obvious spatial one, as understanding the postcolonial condition requires a historical perspective, to which I now turn. I write about an educational project that in its most reflective expressions and impact is admirable and inspiring, but I do so from within Scotland, whose gains from empire and colonialism prompt closer critical scrutiny of its role as a partner. I do not set out to evaluate the partnership here, but to refer to it in order to test competing ways of framing its intentions and reflecting on their implications, as well as testing the limits of cosmopolitanism.

11.2 Scotland and Malawi's Colonial History

Scotland and Malawi's partnership commits both countries to a shared future, but their shared past is a particularly complex one, tied up in the ambiguities of imperial history, some elements of which are much debated by historians, though they agree that Scotland played a significant role in building the British Empire, even if not all go as far Thomson's claim that:

> Of all the people in the United Kingdom, it is the Scots' contribution that stands out as disproportionate. They were the first peoples of the British Isles to take on an imperial mentality, and possibly the longest to sustain one. In the spheres of education, engineering, exploration, medicine, commerce, and shipping, the Scots earned a particularly strong reputation for empire building. (Thomson 2008: p. 51, quoted in MacKenzie and Devine 2011: p. 19)

To these contributions to empire building must be added the roles of Scottish settlers, colonial administrators and, most importantly for the present purposes, the missionaries of the Scottish churches, primarily the Scottish Presbyterian Church. In references to Malawi, the shared history is standardly described as having begun with David Livingstone's missionary work in Malawi, which is sometimes depicted in heroic terms that border on the mythological. A more critical view holds that this relationship can be traced to David Livingstone's role in appropriating Central Africa for the Empire (MacKenzie 1988). Yet while Scottish missionaries' part in bringing the people of what became known as Nyasaland and later Malawi into the British Empire must be acknowledged, so must their role in resisting the worst effects of colonisation, despite early tendencies to paternalism and campaigns against local cultural practices that took the form of cultural imperialism (Breitenbach 2011). As time passed the missionaries stood against the settlers' economic interests and often racist ideology, taking the side of the African population on land, tax and labour issues (Ross 2015) and in opposing federation with Rhodesia in the 1950s. The missionaries who followed Livingstone were frequently at odds with the colonial authorities and with the interests of settlers. Scots missionaries were also prominent in supporting independence for what became the state of Malawi in 1964. Following independence the missionaries were also to oppose the authoritarian rule of Hastings Banda, prior to the end of one-party rule with the restoration of multiparty democracy in the 1990s. Although the missions and their churches were instrumental in the imperial project, it is fair to say that their actions were also egalitarian and humanitarian (Breitenbach 2011).

The network of schools established by the missionary movement, including those of the Scottish Presbyterian missions in Malawi, was their primary legacy (Ross 2015: p. 11). As elsewhere in the Empire, the mission schools facilitated the growth of national consciousness and produced graduates who became leaders of the struggle for independence. Breitenbach (2011) presses this relationship between mission education and decolonisation further by observing that through the provision of Western education, the missionaries created for colonised populations a way of adapting to the changes that took place because of imperialism and colonial rule.

Yet the most intriguing aspect of the imperial and the missionary legacies was their impact at home, in developing Scottish national identity. Missionary figures were well-known to the Scottish public, a source of national pride, initially understood as part of the Scots' 'civilising role' in the Empire, but one that also remained integral to Presbyterian life until well into the decolonisation era. 'The missionary enterprise [and religious life] provided a prism through which Scots at home perceived the empire, colonial territories, and peoples, while at the same time it fostered national pride in the Scots role in Empire' (Breitenbach 2011: p. 223).

Pride in the Empire was to endure until its end, but with the loss of empire this sense of national identity was to change, and its role in the recent flourishing of Scottish nationalism is hotly debated by historians and political analysts. Describing contemporary Scottish nationalism as 'post-imperial nationalism', Glass (2014) argues that as long as it lasted, the Empire both laid the groundwork for the emergence of Scottish nationalism, by encouraging the sense of Scottish national identity

derived from pride in a unique role in building it, and also prevented nationalism's emergence until after the loss of Empire, which no longer provides the benefits of opportunity and wealth. '…[M]any Scots have turned to nationalism in an attempt to seize independence, which could increase Scotland's chances of playing a greater role on the European, if not the global, stage while giving them total control over purely Scottish concerns' (2014: p. 2). For Glass, many Scots viewed nationalism as a means to independence and control over their own affairs and as a way to enhance their role in Europe and globally.

I draw attention to the role of both empire and of Scotland's complex part in the history of Malawi as factors in the shaping of Scottish identity not to conclude that the presence of nationalism could preclude cosmopolitan commitments and actions, but to indicate the ironies that lie in the historical background to today's school partnerships. It would not be far-fetched to interpret the Scots' project of fostering a partnership with Malawi as an element of a strategy to define a distinct geopolitical identity in which its commitments to its geographically distant African partner also complement a post-imperial distance from its proximate English neighbour. But in view of Scotland's imperial past, and also the upsurge of Scottish civic nationalism that has elected a nationalist devolved government in Edinburgh and an overwhelmingly nationalist contingent of Members of Parliament to Westminster, I need to take up the problem of the viability of framing school partnerships like this one as *cosmopolitan*. Is the very idea of a cosmopolitan partnership with a former colony not vulnerable to standard criticisms of cosmopolitanism as inherently European? Might postcolonial theory be a better alternative? Both questions invite further reflection on nationalism, a theme I bear in mind as I now address these questions.

11.3   A Post-European Cosmopolitanism?

A likely objection to my reading of partnerships between schools in Scotland and Malawi as reflecting cosmopolitan assumptions and commitments would hold that cosmopolitanism's appreciation of diversity is easier to sustain from within the confidently hegemonic cultural and material location of the West, including of course the Europe in which it originated. More damningly, criticisms of cosmopolitanism can depict it as a consumer and lifestyle choice, a superficial fascination with difference that fails to extend to inclusion.

Such a critical stance is strongly articulated by Calhoun (2012), who warns that cosmopolitanism is typically based in certain kinds of contexts, like academia and multilateral organisations and businesses that might be cast as neutral and global but which bring with them their own forms of exclusion and inequality. He observes, scathingly: 'As the class-consciousness of frequent travellers, cosmopolitanism provides elites with a self-understanding shaped not so much by a consciousness of privilege as by the illusions of having escaped the biases of particular locations…' (2012: p. 106). Yet while one has to concede that some forms of cosmopolitanism

do exhibit such tendencies, they are not true of all expressions of cosmopolitanism. The Scotland Malawi Partnership is an example, in my view, of a project implicitly rooted in cosmopolitanism and also self-consciously determined to enact principles of equality, mutuality and reciprocity in an inclusive and non-hegemonic fashion.

Contrary to the case example under consideration in this chapter, to his association of cosmopolitanism with elitism, Calhoun adds the observation that cosmopolitanism has a tendency to distrust nationalism and local loyalties. And although cosmopolitanism is about relating sympathetically to strangers, and transcending group interests and local communities, such a cosmopolitan outlook 'is not likely to be an adequate substitute for the more specific solidarities and structures of inclusion' (p. 122). Again, the Scotland Malawi Partnership does appear to offer a counterexample, in two senses. First, there is no evidence in this case of any wish to sweep aside local solidarities in either partner country; it sets out to build local structures of inclusion through small-scale projects that work with local civic structures. Secondly, the Partnership is flourishing in a Scottish context in which nationalism is clearly also thriving. Having said that, however, cosmopolitan theory *is* generally critical of nationalism. Breckenridge et al.'s exploration of *cosmopolitanisms* (2002) regards nationalism as a retrograde ideology and a force for evil, albeit Janus-faced.

By contrast with Calhoun (2012), Delanty (2009) resists depictions of cosmopolitanism as Western or universalist, preferring to put forward a version of cosmopolitanism that is post-universalistic, post-Western, non-Eurocentric, open-ended, reflexive and self-problematising, arguing that it does not only have to pertain to elites. Nor is it exclusively Western, as shown by Breckenridge et al. (2012, also cited by Delanty 2009: p. 5) who look to diverse examples from outside European history that range from Sanskrit literature in precolonial Asia to the diverse architectures of pre-war Shanghai. In detaching cosmopolitanism from its European roots, Delanty proposes a post-Western 'critical cosmopolitanism'. The 'cosmopolitan imagination', Delanty argues, is transformative, able both to recognise difference as a positive ideal and to offer a way of reinventing political community based on a global ethic.

It is apparent that Calhoun and Delanty are doing dissimilar things with cosmopolitan theory, working with this 'ism' to different purposes. Calhoun describes cosmopolitanism's less creditable expressions, while Delanty in his turn sets about the process of conceptual alteration, reconstructing cosmopolitan theory and taking it in a new direction with prominent educational possibilities. This critical cosmopolitanism Delanty casts as offering 'analysis of cultural modes of mediation by which the social world is shaped and where the emphasis is on moments of world openness created out of the encounter of the local with the global'. Cast thus, cosmopolitanism becomes 'a form of world disclosure that arises out of the immanent possibilities of the social world for transformation' (2009: p. 53).

In terms that look likely to appeal to those who express the ethical bases of the Scotland Malawi Partnership (e.g. Ross 2015; Scotland Malawi Partnership 2009), Delanty's rearticulated cosmopolitanism is advanced as a new mode of imagining the world, of being open to strangers, exercising the cosmopolitan imagination by

opening up new ways in which the self develops relations with the other and the wider world. When societies come into contact with one another in such a spirit of openness, their self-understanding is transformed. This kind of learning is a necessary condition of cosmopolitanism and it can reinvigorate cultures and identities.

> The power to name, create meaning, construct personal biographies and narratives by gaining control over the flow of information, goods and cultural processes is an important dimension of citizenship as an active process. In this regard what needs to be stressed is the learning dimension of citizenship as a constructive process. (Delanty 2009: p. 128)

Some proponents of both cosmopolitanism and postcolonial theory might respond that Delanty goes too far. Imagine such situations, moments of cosmopolitan citizenship where participants are encouraged to relativise and evaluate their own culture and identity. These, while intended to create Delanty's 'shared normative culture' (p. 112), are likely to leave participants from former colonies more vulnerable to damage than their European partners (I will return to this point in the next section). Delanty's observation that postcolonial theory is rarely more than a critique of Western modernity (p. 181), while holding that cosmopolitanism makes generative interaction between different perspectives more central, does not entirely reassure on this point. Yet his observation that postcolonial theory has offered significant insights that help to dislodge strictly Western assumptions from cosmopolitanism is also significant. Tempering cosmopolitanism with insights from postcolonial theory appears to offer a solution to criticisms of its tendency to reflect or potentially favour a European consciousness and interests. Yet postcolonialism presents some problems of its own, and these now need to be considered, again taking up the theme of nationalism.

11.4   A Postcolonialism Without Nationalism?

While education enjoys a prominent place in cosmopolitan theory, as noted above with reference to both Nussbaum and Delanty, this is also true of postcolonial theory. Delanty's emphasis on the cosmopolitan imagination as occasioning learning looks not that different from Gandhi's claim that a task of postcolonial theory is a 'political obligation to assist the subjects of postcoloniality to live with the gaps and fissures of their condition, and thereby learn to proceed with self-understanding' (1998: p. 8). In the context of this chapter, I interpret this learning of self-understanding to include subjects of postcoloniality located in both the former colonies and in former colonising countries. And I have already noted in Sect. 1 the additional layer to postcolonialism's interest in education in the form of its powerful critique of the role of education in the history of colonialism. To these can be added a third, the need for critique of the ongoing neocolonialism inherent in global educational policies and systems (Altbach 2006).

Postcolonial education has much work to do in countering historical European hegemony and the uses of education in its service. But what form and what strategies

might postcolonial education adopt? To what extent does it need to be a retrieval of precolonial traditions and practices by independent nation states? As with cosmopolitanism, this raises the underlying issue of postcolonialism's relationship with nationalism, albeit it a different way. Earlier, I noted the symbiotic and ironic relationship between Scotland's colonial and imperial history and the development of Scottish national identity. While imperialism and colonialism are standardly read as drivers and effects of European nationalisms, decolonisation frequently involved creation of independent 'nations' with artificially created borders contrived by the departing colonial powers. An added irony is lent by the observation that the *nationalisms* of the independence struggles and subsequent state building were inventions borrowed from the colonial masters that left a legacy of underdevelopment and instability. So while at first glance a distinguishing feature of cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism might be assumed to be their contrasting orientations to nationalism, a not dissimilar symbiosis is evident in postcolonialism.

In her subtle analysis of the multifaceted and painful symbiosis between colonialism and nationalism, Gandhi considers the idea that there may be 'some grounds for a postcolonial defence of the anti-colonial nation' (1998: p. 102). Gandhi sides plausibly with the view that, in spite of its role in decolonisation, nationalism's crucial place in the archive of the colonial era should be a transitional stage in decolonisation. But in the context of this chapter, and even in association with a defence of cosmopolitanism, for all the limited space that theory can make for nationalism, I find it ultimately difficult to set nationalism's occasionally more progressive impulses aside completely. Just as a place could be made for a form of civic Scottish nationalism that accommodates and even complements cosmopolitan projects like the Scotland Malawi Partnership, so too under conditions of inequality between partner countries and their schools and communities, some form of nationalist defence of the local may be required. I suggest this in relation to my earlier concerns about the possible full scale implementation of cosmopolitanism as described by Delanty.

The extent to which postcolonial education could and ought to retrieve traditional indigenous knowledge and educational practices, returning to precolonial ways of being and modes of education, requires further investigation. And even if postcolonialism is able to divest itself of forms of nationalism likely to undermine possibilities for cosmopolitan education, a postcolonial impulse in education to retreat from modernity and to reach for a retrieval of tradition may be neither feasible nor in the interests of learners in postcolonial countries. But my critical concern about such possibilities is ultimately less about the dangers of nationalism as such than about the wider problem of such strategies being too centred on culture and not enough on critique of the kind that is needed to explain the neocolonial context in which both Scottish and Malawian economies are materially co-located in a global economy that continues to favour the former. It comes as no surprise that postcolonialism's predominant expressions through literature and cultural critique have led to a preoccupation with cultural dispossession and domination, at the expense of making a necessary place for an analysis of global capitalism (see, e.g. Lazarus 2011). Looking beyond culturalist expressions of postcolonialism recognises

the shared predicament of Scots and Malawians as subject to the hegemony of global capital in undermining democracy and limiting opportunity in both countries, albeit in different ways. Neither cosmopolitanism nor postcolonialism yet offers a necessary analysis of the worst effects of neoliberal imperatives on education as a new version of empire, less visible, more globally dispersed and no longer the preserve of Europe or the West. But cosmopolitanism has more to offer than postcolonialism in its recent turn to theories of cosmopolitan justice that argue for obligations of justice beyond the boundaries of the nation state (e.g. Moellendorf 2002) and for a cosmopolitan justification for redistribution of educational goods from rich to poor countries (Enslin and Tjiattas 2004). This could include the distribution of resources, however modest, from schools and organisations involved in educational partnerships between countries like Scotland and Malawi.

11.5   Conclusion: A Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism

Are cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism difficult bedfellows or complementary ideals? My reflection on the Scotland Malawi Partnership as creating a space in which the post colony might be imagined through education suggests that while some tensions remain, they can complement each other. While invoking neither theory explicitly, to achieve its evident cosmopolitan ambitions, the Partnership needs a postcolonial analysis of the historical roots of the relationship between a former colony and a former coloniser. A cosmopolitan educational practice will clearly benefit from postcolonial awareness.

Both theories have been shown to be vulnerable to telling criticisms of their worst tendencies. At its worst, cosmopolitanism can be an indulgence of the prosperous West, though this objection is addressed by Delanty's revised account of a critical post-European cosmopolitanism, and his notion of a mediating cosmopolitan imagination rearticulates cosmopolitanism as an educational project in itself. My example of the Scotland Malawi Partnership has been presented as an expression of cosmopolitanism that matches Delanty's account and could accommodate a benign expression of nationalism. In its turn postcolonialism's own ironic historical association with nationalism could be transitional, but it is limited by its preoccupation with culture at the expense of the material dimensions of colonialism and coloniality.

While both theories might be vulnerable to the criticism that they have been developed and contested mainly in the rich Western countries that are the object of postcolonial critique, this ought not to be a fatal criticism, and they do tend to act as correctives to each others' more problematic tendencies. Like all theories, each has potential for facile expressions and applications, and neither can be expected to stand on its own and do all the work. To imagine otherwise would be to assume that theoretical reflection about education demands the selection of a single doctrine, a disciplinary 'ism' that excludes all others. Nor does it help when weighing up the apparently competing claims of rival isms to rigidly mark one off from the other as

competing and mutually exclusive doctrines, creeds to defend against all others, which could undermine creative and principled educational practice. Instead it is more productive to ask how both theories might best be enacted, in their most critically defensible expressions. Furthermore, such reflection is not merely a matter of selecting the most theoretically viable stance and applying philosophy to education. Analysing educational practices like the example discussed in this chapter is also iterative, in the sense that examples test theories. The Scotland Malawi Partnership is a case that demonstrates the potential of conceptual alteration, even if counter-intuitively in the form of reconciling cosmopolitanism with some more benign expressions of nationalism.

In making these observations, I am not suggesting that this is a debate to be carried further by pupils involved in educational partnerships. But the issues discussed here should be of concern to teacher educators and curriculum developers as well as those engaged in planning and defending partnerships. All need to be alert to the questions raised by this kind of discussion for the ethos that underlies international educational partnerships. This discussion of the competing merits of cosmopolitanism and postcolonialism prompts some obvious conclusions about the curriculum in the post colony, as a space imagined and inhabited in both partner countries. A curriculum that is both cosmopolitan and postcolonial would clearly make a central place for developing understanding of self and other. Elements like colonial and world history as well as indigenous and cosmopolitan languages and literatures look like obvious candidates. But wide discrepancies between the two societies in access to a structured curriculum in adequately funded schooling systems look neither cosmopolitan nor postcolonial.

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Part IV
The Many Faces of the Philosophical Tasks Confronting Cosmopolitanism

Chapter 12
Alain Badiou on Political Education

Torill Strand

> *'…the only education is an education by truths'* (Badiou 2005a,
> p. 14)

12.1 Introduction

In this chapter I perform a critical reading of Alain Badiou's hypertranslation of
Plato's *Republic* (Badiou 2012) in order to outline his idea on 'an education by
truths'. In doing so, I do not interpret Badiou's turn to Plato as an analytic exercise
in definition, neither as a hermeneutical search for meaning or an immanent or tran-
scendental critique of Plato's assumptions against other ontological or epistemolog-
ical stances. My ambition is rather to read Badiou's way of reading Plato against his
own philosophy in order to throw some lights on Badiou's idea of education.

Why does Badiou turn to Plato? What does he seem to gain from Plato's dia-
logues? And in what ways may his way of reading Plato relate to education?

In exploring these questions, I start by portraying Badiou's way of reimagining
and renewing Plato's classical text. To do so, I take Badiou's hypertranslation of the
allegory of the cave as an exemplary illustration of 'an education by truths'. The
allegory, but also Socrates, Amantha and Glaucon's discussion, demonstrates
thoughts in motion. Badiou models such thoughts as dialogical, productive subjects.
But to be beneficial, they must be directed towards truths. So, when Badiou states
that 'the only education is an education by truths', it is exactly this notion of educa-
tion he illustrates by his hypertranslation of Plato's *Republic*.

I here read the way Badiou rewrites Plato's allegory of the cave at three analyti-
cal levels. My first reading points to how this allegory pictures education as a move
away from *illusio*, beyond *doxa* and towards *noesis*. My second reading shows how
the allegory illustrates a generic truth procedure that not only troubles Socrates,
Amantha and Glaucon's conventional beliefs of education but also the very

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foundation of their beliefs. My third reading, however, focuses on the very ways in which Badiou's hypertranslation rewrites, discusses and amplifies generic truth procedures. Badiou's hypertranslation may thus be taken to illustrate how the work of philosophy may give new impetus to the potential powers of generic truths. Truths are generic in the sense of truth-procedures that reveal or unfold something entirely new, something that cannot be grasped or apprehended by the already established categories of the discourse, and thus goes beyond the situation: 'Created in one world, it is in fact valid for other worlds and virtually to all.' In other words, Badiou's hypertranslation of the *Republic* cannot unilaterally be read as an actualization of Plato's classic text (Bartlett 2006, 2012; Reinhard 2012). It should also be read as a renewal and strengthening of the truths that originated with Plato and still characterises the Western world's master discourse on education. It is also a comment to this discourse's blind spots. We – the readers – are therefore invited to participate in the movable thinking that originated with Plato and which is here represented and reconceived by Badiou. So let us take a closer look at how Badiou 'translates' the allegory of the cave.

12.2   From the Cave to the Cinema

Overall, Plato's *Republic* treats the topics of morality and justice, but also many other issues, such as education, politics and images of the good. Throughout the *Republic*, Plato offers elusive imageries of the importance of goodness, in which the allegory of the cave is the most famous. It seems that Plato wants to tell us that morality can never be understood, and justice not achieved, without an understanding of goodness (Altman 2013; Waterfield 1993). But how do we come to such understanding of goodness?

In Chap. 9 of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates portrays 'a situation which you can use as an analogy for the human condition – for our education or lack of it' (514a).[1] The allegory tells a story of imprisoners chained to the wall of a cave since early childhood. Their legs and necks are fixed, so that they are forced to look in one direction only. They gaze at the empty wall in front of them, unable to look around, not even at themselves or at each other. But there is a fire behind their backs which throws shadows on the wall in front from people, puppets, objects or animals passing by. The prisoners have never experienced life outside the cave, not even realised that they are inside a cave, so to them these shadows constitute reality.

In his hypertranslation of *Republic*, Badiou transforms the allegory of the cave to a fable of a movie theatre: 'I'll try to paint you a picture, with shadow and light intermingled', Socrates says (Badiou 2012, p. 212). The fable tells a story of a gigantic movie theatre, a full house of 'tens of thousands of spectators' chained to their seats and with rigid headphones covering their ears, holding their heads in

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[1] All quotes from Plato's *Republic* are cited from Robin Waterfield's translation (Oxford University Press, 1993).

place. The audience gazes at an enormous screen in front, which goes all the way up to the ceiling. At their back there are huge projectors throwing a white light and also shadows of 'a chaotic parade' on the screen. The colourful parade consists of a myriad of characters, such as puppets, robots, animals, soldiers, gangs of youths, cultural consultants, turtledoves and scythe bearers that shout, sing, dance, play or just move silently along a wooden walkway in front of the projectors.

> My God! *Amantha bursts out*. That's one weird show and an even weirder audience!
> They're just like us. Can they see anything of themselves, of the people sitting next to them, of the movie theater, and of the bizarre scenes on the walkway other than the shadows projected onto the screen by the lights? Can they hear anything other than what their headset deliver to them?
> Not a thing, for sure, *exclaimed Glaucon*, if their heads have always been prevented from looking anywhere but at the screen and their ears have been blocked by the headphones.
> And that *is* the case […]
> Not to mention, *added Amantha*, that the object on the walkway, whether it is a robot or a puppet, is already a copy of itself. We could say that all they see is a shadow of a shadow.
> And that all they hear, *Glaucon completed*, is the digital copy of a physical copy of human voices. (Badiou 2012, pp. 212–213)

Next, we are invited to imagine that a member of the audience is forced to stand up, turn his head and look at the light. The sight hurts his eyes, so his impulse is to turn back to his seat. But he is again violently forced, 'by a bunch of tough guys in our pay', to leave the movie theatre, enter a small side door that leads through a muddy tunnel and climb up into the open air. 'At first he is blinded by the glare of everything and can see nothing of all the things about which we routinely say: "This exists, this is really here." He's hardly someone who, like Hegel standing in front of the Jungfrau, could say, with total disdain, "*das ist*," it just is' (Badiou 2012, p. 214).

After being used to the light, he enjoys the reflection of flowers and trees in the water, before he eventually finds pleasure in the flowers themselves. As the night falls, he lifts his head to the sky and sees the moon and the stars. 'Finally, one morning, he sees the sun, not in the ever-changing waters, or in its purely external reflection, but the sun itself, in and for itself, in its own place' (Badiou 2012, p. 214). Plato suggests that the freed prisoner 'feel happy about his own altered circumstances' (516c) and Badiou that 'he is glad to have been forced to leave' (Badiou 2012, p. 215).

So how does this allegory portray the human condition and the way in which we come to understand goodness?

12.3   First Reading: Education as a Move Towards *Noesis*

Plato is easy to read but more difficult to understand. There is a lot more going on than one can directly grasp, and the reader is often left with unanswered questions or a sense of partial comprehension. The reason is that the dialogues are written as dramatic plays, in which Plato let the figures debate, discuss, contest and argue. Sometimes it seems that they debate unimportant topics, other times that they

underplay vital philosophical issues. This also goes for Badiou's hypertranslation of Plato's *Republic*.

Nevertheless, a first reading of the allegory reveals a picture of a move towards insight, wisdom or knowledge of the good. We may label this process *paideia* (Jaeger 1973), *Bildung* (Humboldt 2000) or simply *education*. The allegory carries three dimensions that together portray this educational process: the situation, the event and the subject.

The situation is the movie theatre or 'the cave of illusion', in which the artificial images and the shadows of the simulacra are taken to signify the world. The event is the unexpected turning of the head, the unpredictable and violent enforced escape, the surprising ascension into the open air and the experience of the sun and the beauty of the objects of the world outside. This event generates a radical rupture, since it brings to pass instituted knowledge and world views. Drawing on set theory, Badiou holds that an event does not make sense to the rules of the 'situation'. An event 'is not'; it is 'an ultra-one relative to the situation' (Badiou 2005b, p. 507). Consequently, the event is both situated and something additional to the situation: On the one hand, the event is conditioned by a situated void. On the other hand, it carries a radical novelty, a deep-seated change that implies that it is impossible to continue to perceive the situation in the same way as earlier.

The subject is an operation that might or might not appear as a result of the situated event. Badiou defines the subject as 'the local status of a procedure, a configuration that exceeds the situation' (Badiou 2009c, p. 27). The subject is, on the one hand, a product of the material set of conditions. On the other hand, it exceeds the situation: The subject is an operation emerging from the situation and which may produce something new. In other words, a subject is a process that gradually unfolds the imports of the event. The subject addresses the whole situation and unfolds the infinity of the truth exposed by the event. Thus, the subject is larger than the human being, as it is related to the truths and educative processes that may or may not emerge as a result from the event.

In short, Badiou's hypertranslation of the allegory of the cave seems to imply that education is a process that may or may not emerge from a situated event. However, the text itself – and also Badiou's way of translating it – clearly demonstrates thoughts in motion.

12.4 Thoughts in Motion

In a preface to his translation of Plato's *Republic*, Badiou says that it took him 6 years to translate the book. He started by rereading his 54 years old and already well-read copy of the Greek text[2] in order to understand it in its own language: Armed with dictionaries, grammars, three already available French translations and his previous readings of many passages, he set out to diligently read the text without

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[2] Émile Chambry's bilingual Budé collection published in 1949.

taking notes. 'I simply wanted the text to speak to me and not keep any sly secret hidden in its recesses' (Badiou 2012, p. xxxii).

Next, he translated the text – not word by word but rather by putting his understanding of the thoughts and sentences into his own words – on the right-hand side of a sketch book. To translate the whole *Republic*, he used 57 such large sketchbooks. Then, usually the next day, he revised the first attempt and transcribed this revision on the left-hand page of the book (opposite of the first draft). The handwritten version was next transcribed and converted into a computer file. After receiving comments and re-considering his own critical reading, Badiou revised the computer file into a third version.

Badiou states that this process was 'almost never a "translation" in the usual sense of the term' (Badiou 2012, p. xxxii). Although Badiou holds that Plato was ever-present, he did not translate a single sentence exactly as it appeared in the original. Moreover, he divided the book into 16 chapters, not ten, which he meant better suited the work's rhythm. However, this formal restructuration is just one example of his somewhat creative technique of treating the text.

First of all, he introduces a female character: Plato's brother, Adeimantus, becomes his sister, Amantha. This is the same Amantha that comments on 'the weird show' at the movie. Next, Badiou freely chose references, as in the fable of the movie theatre, in which he referred to Hegel and quoted Becket whilst assuming that Hegel and Becket were known to Socrates. Moreover, Badiou replaced Plato's historic examples of the wars, revolutions and tyrannical regimes of the Greek world, claiming that World War I, the Paris Commune and Stalin are more convincing examples. Plato's images were also updated, as with the allegory of the cave: 'it only takes describing that movie theater and having Plato's prisoners become spectator-prisoners of the contemporary sphere of media for it to be the same thing, only better' (Badiou 2012, p. xxxiii).

Also, Badiou tells that he deliberately 'interrupted' Socrates endless stream of fake questions by the listeners' interruptions. Instead of having them repeat 'yes', 'of course' and 'naturally', Badiou let the young listener hold the ground, saying that she disagreed, and from beginning to end that she is unconvinced. In doing so, Badiou continuously maintained a heavily dramatic dialogue in order to restore the inner split that poetry introduces into philosophy. As he says, this is 'a split that Plato already had a hunch about' (Badiou 2012, p. xxxiv).

Consequently, Badiou let his own thinking – and also the contemporary philosophical context – permeate his treatment of Plato's *Republic*. He therefore changed some fundamental concepts. First and foremost, he changed Plato's 'Idea of the Good' into the 'Idea of the True' or simply 'Truth'. He also changed 'soul' to 'Subject'. In Badiou's version of Plato's *Republic*, they therefore speak of 'a Subject's incorporation into a truth' (Badiou 2012, p. 219) instead of 'the soul's ascension towards the Good'.

So let us again take a look at the fable of the movie theatre: We have seen that Badiou's hypertranslation of the allegory of the cave seems to portray education as a process that may or may not emerge from a situated event. But how does Badiou portray the 'Subject's incorporation into a truth' or – to put it differently – the condition for 'an education by truths' to take place?

12.5   Second Reading: Education by Truths

Badiou's fable of the movie theatre and also Socrates, Amantha and Glaucon's discussion of the fable demonstrate thoughts in motion. Thought, to Badiou, 'is the name of the subject of a truth procedure' (Badiou 2005c, p. 141). Such thoughts are here modelled as dialogical, productive subjects. However, to be beneficial, they must be directed towards truths. But how does Badiou portray the 'Subject's incorporation into a truth'?

After a short break in the discussion between Amantha, Glaucon and Socrates' conversation, Socrates takes a sip from a glass of water. He then states that 'education isn't what some people claim it is' (Badiou 2012, p. 218). Education is not a question of a lack of the capacity of sight. It is neither about a lack of the capacity of knowledge. Every Subject has such capacities. Education is rather about turning the Subject into the right direction. 'So education isn't a matter of imposing, but rather of orienting: It is a technique of conversion…' (Badiou 2012, p. 218).

So education is here portrayed as a 'technique of conversion', a 'reorientation' and 'incorporation into a truth'. Thought has its own power, which it can never loose. But whether thought is useful or useless, constructive or destructive, valuable or damaging depends on the direction in which that power is turned towards truths. But what is here meant by 'truths'?

Badiou holds that truths are the real of philosophy, the object of thought. Truths – or 'truth-in-worlds' or 'truth-procedures' – emerge from a situation and are generated by an event. In his 'Logics of Worlds' (2009a), Badiou attempts to describe in detail the appearing and disappearing of truth-in-worlds. He here holds that a world (situation) cannot be understood simply as a multiple (a set) but should rather be conceived both in its *being* and *appearing*. 'I insist, since this is the very problem that this book is concerned with: truths not only are, they *appear*' (Badiou 2009a, p. 9).

> There is no doubt whatsoever concerning the existence of truths, which are not bodies, languages or combinations of the two. And this evidence is materialist, since it does not require any splitting of worlds, any intelligible place, any 'height'. In our worlds, such as they are, truths advance. These truths are incorporeal bodies, languages devoid of meaning, generic infinities, unconditioned supplements. They become and maintain suspended, like the poet's conscience, between the void and the pure event. (Badiou 2009b, p. 4)

In other words, truths are generic in the sense of truth-procedures that reveal or unfold something entirely new, something that cannot be grasped or apprehended by the already established categories of the discourse and thus goes beyond the situation. In a short essay – 'The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself' – Badiou states:

> An attentive examination of Plato … results in the following theses …: Before philosophy – that is, in a "before" that is non-temporal – there are truths. These truths are heterogeneous and occur in the real independently of philosophy … Philosophy is a construction of thinking where … it is proclaimed that there are truths. But this central proclamation presupposes a specifically philosophical category, which is that of the Truth. (Badiou 2008, p. 10–11)

Badiou here speaks of two types of truth: On the one hand, 'truths' (in plural) as the conditions of philosophy; on the other hand, 'Truth' (singular) as the premise for the philosophical identification, articulation and affirmation of such truths. Truths, or truth-procedures, are truths-in-worlds that emerge, appear and disappear dependent on the conditions they are part of. But do such truths-in-worlds carry the potential to open up towards universal truths?

Plato's problem – which is still ours – is how our experience of a particular world (that which we are given to know, the 'knowable') can open up access to eternal, universal and, in this sense, transmundane truths. For this to come about, according to Plato, this experience must be set out 'in truth', with this immanence being understood in the strict sense that only inasmuch as it is set out in the element of truth can a particular object of the world of our experience be said to be known, not only in its particularity but in its very being (Badiou 2011, p. 106).

In this perspective, Badiou's rereading of Plato illustrates acts of thinking, the productions of new subjective dispositions, which, on the one hand, are generated and shaped by tangible truths-in-worlds and, on the other hand, based on the possibility of eternal and universal Truth.

12.6   Third Reading: The Work of Philosophy

Philosophy is the thinking of truth. And such thinking always emerges in response to certain forms of demands exterior to thinking, exterior to philosophy, exterior to the work of philosophy. To Badiou, philosophy is always already committed to the completely inconsistent relationship between the rules of philosophy and the incommensurable logics of everyday life (Strand 2014). This is what Badiou, as a philosopher, demonstrates in his diligent translation, rewriting and actualization of Plato's allegory of the cave.

When Amantha, Glaucon and Socrates discuss the individual's return to the movie theatre, Socrates implies that 'the prisoners that escaped from the movie theater, the ones who made it to the top of the mountain and contemplated the sun from there, will have no desire what so ever to be involved in messy human affairs. As they've been incorporated into a Subject-of-truth, their only desire will be to remain up there forever' (Badiou 2012, p. 217). In case he will return, he may be 'forced to defend himself in law courts or other state institutions, places where, as far as justice is concerned, what's at stake is only its shadows, or, at best, fake objects projected by an artificial light onto the screen of the world'.

Next, Socrates offers a few comments on blindness: It seems obvious that – when we move from darkness to the bright sunlight – we can be blinded by the intense light. But it is also possible to be blinded by the dark. 'Sight can be disturbed in two different ways, by two different causes, dependent on whether one's going from the light to the dark or from the dark to the light' […] 'and these remarks about sight apply equally well to the Subject' (Badiou 2012, p. 217).

In other words, the Subject – which is just another word for thinking – may be blinded either by the sunlight or by the darkness. Consequently, it will ease our vision if shadow and light, darkness and sunlight interact: Thus, when introducing the fable of the movie theatre, Badiou 'translates' Socrates introduction to read: 'I'll try to paint you a picture, with shadow and light intermingled' (Badiou 2012, p. 212). Badiou's fable does not tell a story that aims at a clear distinction between darkness and light, blindness and insight. Contrary, the fable explores the possibility of 'an education by truths'.

Badiou's hypertranslation of Plato's *Republic* thus demonstrates philosophy as the thinking – or rethinking – of truth. In doing so, philosophy always – as also in this text – relies on crucial discourses that exceed philosophy itself. In general, Badiou holds that political, scientific, artistic and amorous discourses, or praxes, precede and orient philosophy. But philosophy should never be fused with its conditions (Badiou 1992, 2006, 2008, 2011).

So to Badiou philosophy is always conditioned. Philosophy cannot think for itself. There are no such things as philosophical truths; truths are produced and continue to emerge in other, nonphilosophical spheres of life: in love, art, politics and science. Here, 'truths not only are, they appear' (Badiou 2001). The task of philosophy is to think these emergences and creations of truths-in-worlds. Philosophy thus deals with the appearance of truths, 'at least if philosophy is to count for something in life, to be something other than an academic discipline' (Badiou 2009b, p. 12).

Badiou's hypertranslation of Plato's *Republic* can thus be read as his demonstration of the task of philosophy, which is to read and compare the truths emerging and to point out the educational potentials of these truth procedures. Philosophy must think that which is impossible to think within the given categories of the discourses. That happens through a thorough reading of the situation (the world), by appreciating the unusual and by asking new questions. Badiou holds that 'understood in this way only, and only in this way, philosophy really is that which helps existence to be changed' (Badiou 2009b, p. 13). Because true life is in the choice, in distance and in the event: "The most profound philosophical concept tells us something like this: 'If you want your life to have some meaning, you must accept the event, you must remain at a distance from power, and you must be firm in your decision'. This is the story that philosophy is always telling us, under many different guises: to be in the exception, in the sense of the event, to keep one's distance from power, and to accept the consequences of a decision, however remote and difficult they may prove" (Badiou 2009b, p. 13).

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Chapter 13
Education in and for Cosmopolitics: A Speculative Vital Materialist Approach to Cosmopolitanism

Sevket Benhur Oral

13.1 Introduction

CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research) in Geneva, Switzerland—the underground mecca of high-energy physics, where beams of protons are smashed together at close to the speed of light in the epic Large Hadron Collider (LHC) with its four massive particle detectors, ATLAS, CMS, ALICE, and LHCb—is a quintessential cosmopolitan community not only because it sits on the Franco-Swiss border and hosts scientists from over 113 countries (CERN) but because it is constituted first and foremost as a vital materialist confederation of human and nonhuman[1] *actors* that form "a public as a set of bodies affected by a common problem generated by a pulsing swarm of activities" (Bennett 2010, p. 101). In other words, CERN is "a unified politico-scientific system" (Watson 2014, p. 92): a *cosmopolitics* of actants[2] that are enlisted in constantly evolving, dynamic, and conflict-ridden alliances formed around common problems, the solutions to which emerge through the hard labor of tracing concatenations of mediators which act in the absence of any guarantee of a universal transcendent arbiter that would be expected to settle all disputes once and for all.

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[1] Nonhumans can refer to many different things: animals such as scallops, natural phenomena such as reefs, tools and technical artifacts such as mass spectrometers, material structures such as sewerage networks, transportation devices such as planes, texts such as scientific accounts, economic goods such as commodities, and so on (Sayes 2014, p. 136).

[2] Bruno Latour's term, borrowed from semiotics and elaborated in the context of actor-network theory (ANT), to refer to both human and nonhuman actors (Latour 1999, p. 303). The terms "thing," "materiality," "material singularity," "actor," and "actant" are used interchangeably in this article.

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In this article, I will argue, based on Jane Bennett's conceptualization of vital materialism and drawing upon Bruno Latour's notion of action (or agency) and of "'cosmopolitics,' the term of Isabelle Stengers that Latour loves so well" (Harman 2014, p. 71), for a trans-panhuman (or posthuman) articulation of cosmopolitanism that self-consciously takes into account the interinvolvements between human and nonhuman materialities that constitute a community which binds us together, the human and nonhuman things alike, without these two groups being relegated into two separate and irreconcilable domains: "society" (or "mind," "language," "culture") on the one hand, and "nature," on the other. In other words, the cosmos of cosmopolitanism is populated *once again* with both human and nonhuman things: a true *cosmos* of things.

In Graham Harman's interpretation, Bruno Latour, in his very intriguing and witty book, *We Have Never Been Modern*, claims that:

> modernity tries to *purify* the world by dissecting it into two utterly opposed realms. On one side we have the human sphere, composed of transparent freedom and ruled by arbitrary and incommensurable perspectives. On the other side we have nature or the external world, made up of hard matters of fact and acting with objective, mechanical precision. … We are told that nature is one, but that humans have numerous diverse perspectives on it. Not surprisingly, Latour rejects this modernist notion. (Harman 2009, p. 57, emphasis original)

Latour disputes this "modernist settlement" (1999) as he terms it, whereby a huge and unnecessary gap between words and world is introduced and the solitary scientist is tasked with the discovery of the world as it is, purified of any contamination by language, politics, values, and passions. Instead, Latour laboriously describes the formation of scientific networks and how human and nonhuman actants in them work together through a chain of traceable mediations in the fabrication of facts:

> In the sciences, the degree of objectivity and certainty is directly proportional to the extent of artificiality, layering, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and complexity of mediations. The assertion sounds radical but is merely obvious: in a laboratory, no naked access to truth is thinkable. Is a microbe visible without the mediation of a microscope? Are microscopes found in nature or are they human fabrications? When one scientist questions another, it is not to ask whether new data (new facts) have been fabricated or not. The question is, "How have you proven that *x* is so?"—and the emphasis is on *how*, by what *means* or mediation. (Latour 2004, p. 459, emphasis original)

Latour's project is not so much a new attempt at reconciliation between nature and society as a complete and radical denial of their separation in the first place. The hard scientific fact and the world of human power games have never been split into two (Harman 2009, p. 59). The mobilization of myriad number of actants in trials of strength with each other and the mediations and translations that obtain among them in variously shifting networks make sure of that. In short, there is no "radical schism between humans and things" (Harman 2009, p. 61). They both are equally historical and entangled entities participating "in heterogeneous assemblages in which agency has no single locus, no mastermind, but is distributed across a swarm of various and variegated vibrant materialities" (Bennett 2010, p. 96).

In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not primarily conceived as a social, economic, political, or moral phenomenon (in its Euro-universalistic or posthuman varieties).

More importantly, it is principally a material phenomenon. The account of cosmopolitanism I will espouse here takes vital material singularities and their not fully predictable encounters and interlinkages as its main referent.

The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider, for instance, is a vital material singularity—an actant—the CERN cosmopolitan community shapes itself around. The panhuman interconnection (Braidotti 2012) at CERN is engendered by the existence of this giant collider and its colossal and weird-looking detectors. It is inconceivable to imagine CERN without the latter. I am not merely referring to the concrete material infrastructure that makes it possible to carry out the physics experiments that aim to delve into the deep mysterious levels of the universe. More significantly, vital material singularities have their own generative power and autonomy that cannot be reduced to their prerequisite functional place in the interrelated system of scientific apparatuses that silently and obediently execute the tasks they were designed to do for the ultimate aim of unveiling the secrets of one nature in purified form. Instead, a new complex existent comes into being that has the ability to surprise. Here, materiality is used in the sense that, ontologically speaking, it is inconceivable to know what material things are once and for all. In other words, they are always in excess of what is attributed to them by human beings.

The ATLAS detector is an affective body, an agentic assemblage that affects and is affected by other similar assemblages in the collective life of CERN. It is a *thing*, and not an object, that is, a vivid entity "not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics" (Bennett 2010, p. 5).

As an existent that commands attention in its own right, the ATLAS detector is "in excess of [its] association with human meanings, habits, or projects" (Bennett 2010, p. 4) for it is endowed with what Bennett (2010) calls the *thing-power*: "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle" (Bennett 2010, p. 6).

A vital materialist approach to cosmopolitanism takes thing-power seriously for life always exceeds our knowledge and control (Bennett 2010, p. 14). This is not something to be lamented. Not being able to know reality once and for all does not preclude speculation regarding its nature. On the contrary, it leaves it wide open to dispute its character, which is not meant to be pinned down irrevocably since, as Quentin Meillassoux puts it, there is a difference between the eternity of the laws of becoming and the eternity of the becoming of laws (Watkin 2011, p. 143). Bennett's vital materialism is nothing but a bold attempt to speculate—with the help of Latour, Spinoza, Deleuze, Adorno, and others—on the nature of reality.

The thing-power in education reveals itself in the way both human and nonhuman actants exercise their capacity to bring something new into the communal educational space, which is a multilayered relational matrix (or field) of action replete with discordant elements, with innumerable actants, animate and inanimate, interacting in manifold ways composing, through numerous associations and mediations, a common world of education. This world is full of tensions and open to surprises and cannot be converted without remainder into a controlled zone where the possibility of something new coming into being is neutralized in the name of

creating a risk-free safe environment. Takaharu Tezuka, an architect from Japan, contends that "kids need a small dosage of danger" these days:

> My point is don't control them [kids], don't protect them too much, and they need to tumble sometimes. They need to get some injury. And that makes them learn how to live in this world. I think architecture is capable of changing this world, and people's lives. And this [kindergarten design] is one of the attempts to change the lives of children. (Tezuka 2015)

With this overall principle in mind, he imagines (and builds) a kindergarten in the form of an oval-shaped circle, the roof of which is a continuous free-flowing spacious area interrupted only with skylights providing natural light and trees popping through, where kids can run to their heart's content, climbing the trees, playing with and around them. There is no boundary between inside and outside. There is no classroom boundary and acoustic barrier either. There are different regions or sectors of the kindergarten for different activities to take place, but they are not walled off. They are completely porous, physically, aesthetically, and politically. There is no rigid compartmentalization. Compared to a conventional kindergarten design, this school might be considered to be full of dangers, physical and political, but that is the point. It is not designed to control every single aspect of children's actions throughout the school day. Rather, the design lets children engage in conjoint actions in collaboration with each other that help them understand and negotiate obstacles and dangers. This kindergarten is a cosmopolitical community creating a common space for education to unfold in ways that are open to novelty and surprises. It is nature and society de-separated, with animate and inanimate things interacting in ways that constitute a community that binds us all together. In such a community, any *thing* can be a teacher, not just the *human* things.

In *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, Biesta (2014) highlights the importance of conceiving the teacher as someone or something—not necessarily a human being but anything that can complicate a situation by inserting "what is new or other into a situation, a poem, a canyon, an insect, a piece of lumber or a computer" (Santoro and Rocha 2015)—that constitutes the "newness" in an educational community. For, as Biesta (2010) attests in *Good Education in an Age of Measurement*, only under conditions of plurality, i.e., within a multilayered relational matrix/field of action, can human subjectivity emerge as a new beginning. As Biesta (2010) argues (and I emphatically endorse), the question of human subjectivity is the educational question par excellence and revolves around what it means to be a unique human being in the midst of plurality and difference, which necessarily entail discord and conflict as much as order and harmony. The conditions of plurality, it will be argued, do not lie exclusively within the domain of culture. Rather, it is the matrix of action, or as Latour puts is, "the parliament of things," where the subjectification of the human thing takes place as a new beginning to reckon with.

The subjectivity of a human (its will, intentionality, consciousness, and so on) is clearly different from the vibrant material agency of nonhuman things (animate and inanimate). Nevertheless, there are enough affinities, resonances, and isomorphisms between human and nonhuman agency that "a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed

materialities that form confederations" (Bennett 2010, p. 99) emerging, crystallizing, and dissolving in response to common problems seems to be a better conceptual starting point to understand the process of the formation of human subjectivity and its vicissitudes.

The rest of the paper is divided into two main parts. Part I goes into the basic tenets of vital materialism in more detail with particular focus on Latour's methodological concept of action (or agency) (Sayes 2014). Part II discusses the pedagogical ramifications of the cosmopolitics of vital materialism.

13.2   Part I: Vital Materialism

For Jane Bennett (2010), matter is not a passive inert stuff lying over there waiting to be put to use in some practical project for humanity. Instead, she defines *vital materiality* as "the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own" (Bennett 2010, p. viii). Matter, when not reduced to "a resource, commodity, or instrumentality" (ibid.), can be understood in the way Bruno Latour uses the term *actant* to refer to both human and nonhuman things, by which he means any object that "stands by itself as a force to reckon with" (Harman 2009, p. 13).

> The world is a series of negotiations between a motley armada of forces, *humans among them*, and such a world cannot be divided cleanly between two pre-existent poles called 'nature' and 'society.' As Latour puts it: 'we do not know what forces there are, nor their balance. We do not want to reduce anything to anything else … What happens when nothing is reduced to anything else?' (Harman 2009, p. 14, emphasis added)

Well, put simply, an *irreductionist* ontology happens, whereby the idea "that some beings are intrinsically more real or consequential than others" (Watson 2014, p. 84) is jettisoned. For Latour—heavily involved in combat against the Cartesian bodiless observer (the mind/brain-in-a-vat), empiricists' *tabula rasa* "bombarded by a world reduced to meaningless stimuli" (Latour 1999, p. 5), Kant's universal a priori categories, Derrida's deconstruction, incommensurable cultural categories or language games, phenomenology's world-for-a-human-consciousness as well as scientific naturalism/reductionism in all its forms—what happens is that what he calls the modernist settlement, "the notion of a world 'out there' to which a mind-in-a-vat tries to get access by establishing some safe correspondence between words and states of affairs" (Latour 1999, p. 113), is dismantled. Instead, we become connected to a vibrant reality that has never been lost or kept outside. In other words, for Latour (1993), we have never been modern. That is, the world has never been outside and we were never gazing at it from the inside. The modern settlement—or "the modern Constitution," as he sometimes refers to it (1993)—has never taken place:

> There are not two mutually isolated zones called 'world' and 'human' that need to be bridged by some sort of magical leap. Instead, there are only actants, and in most cases it is

impossible to identify the precise sphere ('nature, or culture?') to which any given actant belongs. The division of the world into two zones is a pointless fiction, since we have never managed to purify the world. We have never been modern. (Harman 2009, p. 57)

The ATLAS detector at the LHC is an actant caught up in a cosmopolitics of associations of human and nonhuman things. It cannot be reduced to a mere technical/material object devoid of any of the entanglements of a human world of politics. It is not something we are completely in command of and have the ability to absolutely control. In other words, it is not inert. It has the ability to surprise. It is an agent with powers that form alliances with other bodies we are not completely in charge of. It has a life of its own not in isolation but in conjunction with the turbulent political life of human projects and aspirations as well as the universe of nonhuman actors such as black holes, neutrinos, quarks, the Higgs boson, dark matter, gravitational waves, strings, m-theory, and others.

For vital materialists, it is futile to relegate some aspects of the ATLAS detector into purely scientific or technical realm and others into purely political or economic realm. Instead, the detector is constituted by the mobilization of a whole spectrum of articulated linkages created by specific traceable laboratory practices and techniques that bring things together in ways that reveal corresponding forces and energies (Foster 2011).

In the collective of humans and nonhumans, there is no unmediated action. The detector is not a neutral conduit for human will and ingenuity used to access a pristine objective reality out there waiting for us to discover it, neither is it a mysterious object that no human can master. In other words, it does not have an essence. Rather, it has existence and existence is action (Latour 1999, p. 179). The detector and the human enter into a relationship and unleash their forces in such a way that the link/association between the two modifies/transforms both. The detection of the Higgs boson is not the result of the human actor perfecting the neutrality of the detector and purifying its contaminating influence. The result is achieved by the mobilization of the shared mediated action. Neither the detector nor the human on their own achieves the result. It is a common achievement; they do it together each being transformed in the process. As Latour (1999) puts it, "action is a property of associated entities" (p. 182).

> It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read "Man flies," "Woman goes into space." Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that includes airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not fly, the U.S. Air Force flies. Action is simply not a property of humans *but of an association of actants*. (Latour 1999, p. 182, emphasis original)

The description of another association of actants, this time between a human and a microorganism, is detailed in *Pandora's Hope*, where Latour (1999) walks us through his account of how Pasteur and his microorganisms *happened* to each other in the former's laboratory in Lille, France, in the middle of the nineteenth century. The human character, Pasteur himself, and the nonhuman character, yeast (or more fully, lactic acid fermentation yeast as opposed to brewer's yeast) are the main actors in this narrative. Interestingly, in the beginning of the story, the existence of the yeast is not even acknowledged. It emerges as a new entity as a result of an

extraordinary series of transformations in Pasteur's laboratory (Latour 1999, p. 118). These transformations take place through "a sturdy and thick layering of *transverse* paths" (Latour 1999, p. 113, emphasis original) whereby a vibrant *collective* constituted by the myriad associations of humans and nonhumans is formed. In this collective, both human and nonhuman actors initiate action. Action is not solely within the domain of human subjectivity. Rather, agency is *distributed* across a network of transverse paths crossed by vibrant actants testing each other in trials of strength (Bennett 2010):

> … Pasteur designs trials for the actor to show its mettle. Why is an actor defined through trials? Because there is no other way to define an actor but through its action, and there is no other way to define an action but by asking what other actors are modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character that is the focus of attention. (Latour 1999, p. 122)

Action, according to vital materialism, is not the privileged domain of human intentionality only. It is not limited to humans. Actants constitute a collective, "which refers to an ecology of human and nonhuman elements" (Bennett 2010, p. 103). In such an ecology, action is distributed, and nonhuman elements take as much initiative as the human actors. Latour (1999) revels in making statements like "laboratory scientists make autonomous facts" (p. 281) to demonstrate the distributed nature of mutual action:

> The scientist makes the fact, but whenever we make something *we* are not in command, we are slightly *overtaken* by the action. … That which slightly overtakes us is *also*, because of our agency, because of the *clinamen* of our action, slightly overtaken, modified. Am I simply restating the dialectic? No, there is no object, no subject, no contradiction, no *Aufhebung*, no mastery, no recapitulation, no spirit, no alienation. But there are *events*. (Latour 1999, p. 281, emphasis original)

In replacing the word "society" with "the notion of collective—defined as an exchange of human and nonhuman properties inside a corporate body" (Latour 1999, p. 193)—Latour points to the exploration of the historicity of not only humans but also nonhumans in the way they fold and unfold into/out of each other. For him, the mobilization of human and nonhuman actants in the collective can best be described as an event that leads to interesting things happening. Unlike the notion of causality put forward in the modernist settlement whereby "history has no other meaning than to activate a potentiality—that is, to turn into an effect what was already there, in the cause" (Latour 1999, p. 152)—events are marked by actants associating with each other through mediations as a result of which they are "modified, transformed, and perturbed."

13.3   Part II: Education in and for Cosmopolitics

Having established the failure of the modernist attempts to purify scientific practices—the attempts to conceive "nature as a supposedly transcendent, non-human, ontologically separate domain in the world" (Blok and Jensen 2011, p. 75)—and the

success of things that act in assemblages of the human and nonhuman, it becomes clear that:

> meaning is not separate from matter. Indeed an assumption is that rather than separation as foundational to enacting a purified human condition, entanglement is materially and practically fundamental to a hybridised post-human condition. Objects are not entirely separate entities, but are mixings, gatherings, things, what Latour (1993) refers to as 'quasi-objects' in his argument that we have never been modern i.e. purified. (Edwards 2010)

Education in and for cosmopolitics is not about purity, universal harmony, or impartial rationality of the human subject facing a world of matters of fact but about *vitality* experienced in human-nonhuman networks of associated action. At the most fundamental ontological level, there is a multilayered relational matrix (or field) of action replete with discordant elements, with innumerable actants, animate and inanimate, human and nonhuman, interacting in manifold ways composing and maintaining common worlds. This matrix is the parliament of things, where human and nonhuman things become connected in surprising new ways, wherein "nature-society hybrids [genetically modified foods, for instance] can be treated as one and the same collective, experimental and democratic process" (Blok and Jensen 2011, p. 78). In "the parliament of things":

> [t]hings are presented as "matters of concern." Matters of concern possess all of the qualities that "naturally given" facts *do not*. They are rich, complex, uncertain, surprising and artificially constructed. At the same time, this artificial fabrication serves only to make them more real—and, in this sense, more objective. Fundamentally, matters of concern, or hybrid quasi-objects, possess an open and uncertain character that makes them *inherently* political: As opposed to "naturally given" facts, their place in the future collective world is never completely settled. On the contrary, different points of view, different life-forms and different political practices will gather around the things in ever-changing ways, thus creating a string of occasional public forums where their future will be negotiated and influenced. (Blok and Jensen 2011, p. 86, emphasis original)

At its most elemental, educative experience is about formation of human subjectivity within the parliament of things, within the matrix of distributed conjoint activity. Such a matrix of activity is not necessarily harmonious. Rather, dramatic proximate encounters with things that act in assemblages of the human and nonhuman constitute the arena of matters of concern. The latter is not constituted by universal harmony and consensus where "the Kantian pillars of universal human rights and intercultural understanding" (Todd 2010, p. 215) underlie the liberal conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. The parliament of things is a material world of dissonance. Creating and maintaining any level of order and harmony requires a lot of work and effort and is based on countless mediations that need to be coordinated and articulated. Subjectification is the name we give to the process of engagement in such articulation.

Education in and for cosmopolitics then is about working on mediations that articulate the connections between human and nonhuman actants. The educational implications of a vital materialist conception of cosmopolitanism, therefore, point to conceiving education as engagement with a plurality of local cosmopolitics: negotiating plural vital materialist publics of human and nonhuman actants that

form into unified assembly of politico-scientific collectives affected by common problems.

The formation and transformation of human subjectivity cannot be conceived apart from the material entanglements and mediations within the parliament of things. Human subjectification is not a process of purification. Rather, it is a process of increasing complexification of our engagement with(in) the field of activity that constitutes myriad parliaments of things. The achievement of complexification is not governed by a rational, well-ordered, rule-governed, predictable process that aims to stamp out dissent and cleanup disorder to create harmonious unified wholes. Rather, it is the expression of vitality that underlies the field of activity within which we experience ourselves. Now and then, certain temporary formations of unified wholes are achieved, and they might even become institutionalized acquiring some level of durability. This, however, should not mislead us into imagining that a permanent state of conflict-free tranquility and resonance is possible.

To give a concrete example, imagine a parliament of things in the rainforests of Borneo: a conservation technologist trying to protect a gibbon reserve from illegal logging using what is already available in the *cosmopolitical* environment that he operates within. Some of the actants that constitute the cosmopolitical community here are the gibbons, the rangers who protect them, illegal loggers, myriad sounds in the forest, chainsaws, cell phone network, cell phones themselves, the sensors in them, laws against illegal logging, the challenge of climate change, the increasing rate of deforestation, the engineer equipped with knowledge of science and engineering, and recycled solar power parts. The problem the engineer is facing is the inability of the guards protecting the gibbon reserve to hear the sound of the chainsaws that are fired up at a distance in real time so that they can intervene before it is too late simply because the chainsaw sounds are completely drowned out by the other loud sounds of the forest. To tackle this problem, the engineer comes up with an ingenious solution whereby he establishes a new set of connections and translations between used cell phones with sound sensors in them, cell phone service, a device that picks up the sounds of the forest isolating the sound of a chainsaw and then sending an alert to the guards regarding the location of the chainsaw sounds by connecting to the cell phone network:

> The moment a sound of a chainsaw is heard in the forest, the device picks up the sound of the chainsaw, it sends an alert through the standard GSM network that's already there to a ranger in the field who can in fact show up in real time and stop the logging. It's no more about going out and finding a tree that's been cut. It's not about seeing a tree from a satellite in an area that's been clear cut, it's about real-time intervention. (White 2015)

The subjectification of the engineer—the way he experiences what it means to be a subject existing within a field of meaning that contracts and expands—is achieved through the distributed conjoint action of many actants brought together in novel ways to address a problem in a local cosmopolitics that engenders a new repertoire of action, the impact of which is not immediately calculable. The process of subjectification is dependent on such cosmopolitics and cannot be conceived apart from it.

13.4   Conclusion

In his polemical rejoinder to Beck's "robust and realist form of cosmopolitanism" (Latour 2004, p. 450) offered as an approach for peacemaking with universalist ambitions, Latour weighs heavily on the side of complexification of the parliament of things for he asserts that:

> It's impossible for us now to inherit the beautiful idea of cosmopolitanism since what we lack is just what our prestigious ancestors possessed: a cosmos. Hence we have to choose, in my view, between cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitics. (Latour 2004, p. 453)

Complicating the account of the confrontation between European Christians and South American Indian animists regarding the state of the latter's souls in the eyes of the Spanish conquistadors and the Catholic Church by incorporating the way things appear from the Amerindian perspective where the state of bodily presence of the Europeans is in dispute in the eyes of the Amerindians, Latour (2004) reiterates his career-long observation that "[t]here are more ways to be other, and vastly more others, than the most tolerant soul alive can conceive" (p. 453). We should not hastily assume that there is:

> the one cosmos whose existence and solid certainty could then prop up all efforts to build the world metropolis of which we are all too happy to be citizens. The problem we face now is that it's precisely this "one cosmos," what I call *mononaturalism*, that has disappeared. (Latour 2004, p. 453, emphasis original)

Human subjectivity does not involve *human* subjectivity alone. Rather, the distributed subjectivity of a parliament of things, a cosmos that can only be unified at the expense of the pluriverse that underlies it, is involved. Multiplicity comes first. Dispute follows it. Harmony and order are precarious projects. There is no universal arbiter that would oversee a rational dissolution of conflict. If this is the case, focus on vitality rather than rationality should be the primary preoccupation of our educational systems: how to let vitality take hold of the way we design and organize our educational endeavors. Being engaged with the local cosmopolitics of vital materialities constituting a parliament of things, that is, building a world together, provides the arena for educative experience we need to experience and construct our subjectivity in worlds that are not necessarily cosmo*polite*.

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Chapter 14
'We Refugees': Biopower, Cosmopolitanism and Hospitality, Between Camps and Encampments

Nick Peim

14.1 Introduction

The figure of the refugee continues to haunt the western imaginary disturbing apparent stabilities of political and social orders. The refugee occupies a double space of significance that is both metonymic and metaphoric, being historically specific and paradigmatic. 'Today' the refugee appears in a number of disconcerting guises: as awkward, needy intruder demanding hospitality and as reminder of the often very different existence, and interdependence, of the Other. As such, the refugee also signifies the Otherness of ourselves, our worlds. In the face of the refugee, everyone is estranged. The refugee is not at home and symbolises – as well as lives – unhomeliness. The presence of the refugee disturbs the meaning of home.

There are powerful suggestions in several strands of modern thought that the various resonances generated around this disturbing figure, the refugee, are not at all accidental. The refugee appears as the paradigmatic figure of the postcolonial, for example, as the product of various conflicts around national sovereignty, as signifying painfully real experiences as well as being a product of a specific political order. In its paradigm guise, the refugee is both symptom of the contemporary political order and a new kind of norm. The implications of this figure have yet to be fully thought through. This paper will explore some implications for a consideration of the figure of the ontology of the refugee in relation to contemporary discourses on education.

Although not mainly concerned with the condition of the refugee, Catherine Malabou's 'ontology of the accident' presents one powerful, recently developed antidote to stable accounts of identity that accords with this paradigm figure. In Malabou's account, the ontological accident may include personal change or

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catastrophe, bodily mutations and ageing, historical upheavals and transformations or traumas and catastrophes involving mass displacements, even genocides. The accident may be mundane or extraordinary and local or global in scale. Personal accidents may utterly transform the individual, forcing a complete break with established identity. The 'accidents' of history may generate inherited effects: generational identity crises, post-traumatic stress syndrome, guilt and the rumblings of 'liquid fear', disturbing ontological security (Bauman 2006). The fundamental condition of anxiety is exacerbated, given spectral form in memory that threatens to populate the future with uncertainty or disaster. All are at least implicitly troubled by what Walter Benjamin referred to as the ongoing condition of crisis. Malabou's account offers a sustained development of 'fundamental ontology' of the 'analytic of Dasein' to include such elements as may have been touched on by the stoics and others, but that seem peculiarly apt for the condition of 'liquid modernity' and that offer an expansion of Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* (Bauman 2001; Malabou 2012; Heidegger 1962).

In some significant lines of modern and contemporary political ontology, the accidental condition of the refugee has been cited as a paradigm case. To be precipitously dispossessed, to be classified as 'alien', to have to reinvent oneself, to be without access to or even simply without a mother tongue and, also, to have forge new modes of 'mitsein': these are elements of the condition of the refugee. For Giorgio Agamben, following Hannah Arendt, the refugee is *the* political figure of our time par excellence (Agamben 1995). The refugee signals the provisional, partial security and identity of the citizen: in doing so, the refugee problematises notions of 'flourishing' that rely on citizenship as its grounds. Panics about immigration can be understood according to this perspective in terms of fear of the refugee 'within'. This spectral 'presence' disturbs the mythic integrity of territory, people, language and the questionable accoutrements of national identity. The refugee signifies a problematic something that must be contained or expelled and protected against. Everywhere the safeguards of citizenship are problematised. Everywhere this autoimmune state of mind infects the political domain (Agamben 1998; Derrida 2005).

The TV programme *Deadwood* provides a useful possible metaphor for contemporary political realities in relation to the general condition of the refugee. Deadwood is a real place in South Dakota but was, in the late nineteenth century, a frontier town. In the TV version, it is represented as being fraught with the depredations of modernity. Deadwood at the same time enacts the spiritual, psychological uncertainties of postmodernity. In its diegesis, Deadwood refers to itself as a 'camp' signifying a pre-polis condition of temporary settlement. It is semi-lawless, dominated by the powerful, the scene of a scramble for wealth, tolerant of the abuse of women and racial minorities. In Deadwood inequalities abound with no dependable social welfare support for the vulnerable. Deadwood signifies a temporary encampment at times aspiring to civic status but frequently dominated by other imperatives and struggles.

In *cosmopolitanism*, Derrida considers the possibility of a new cosmopolitan city as a response to what is perceived as an excessive, paranoid policing of borders

against the threat of the foreign other in the form of the refugee. Derrida considers the aporetic condition of hospitality – making an infinite demand while being constrained by pragmatic limits in order to make itself possible – as an instance of the now familiar possible/impossible. Almost as a hope against hope, then, Derrida proposes support for the ideal of the new cosmopolitan city as though knowing full well that the conditions of 'urbanity' are closer to the image of the 'camp' in *Deadwood* than to the ideal Greek polis (Derrida 2001).

A related approach to questions concerning the refugee appears in *Monolingualism of the Other* where Derrida problematises the idea of linguistic identity in a partly autobiographical account. In language, there is essentially no home, no mother tongue. One is always subject to the other that is language and in a sense to its sovereign occupation of the self. Language is not homely. At the same time, Derrida speculates on the 'paradoxical opportunity' represented by certain North African Jews who have no direct or intimate relation to North African, French or Jewish culture. But what is the nature of this 'paradoxical opportunity' (of the refugee) and to what extent does it signify a possibility for the general condition of we refugees in modernity (Derrida 1998)? A big question attends the condition of cosmopolitanism. Could it simply be another empty liberal mantra (democracy, freedom, etc.) that refuses to recognise its own underlying conditions?

The figure of the refugee here and its ontological significance are deployed as a critique of modern discourses that see education as the necessary grounds of salvation from the depredations of modernity (Benjamin 1999; Harber 2004). The role of education is rarely expressed in these terms, partly because educational discourses, dedicated as they have been to an ethic of improvement and ultimately to a vision of redemption, have had to avoid political ontology. But the figure of the refugee, as real and as spectral presence, as actual experience and ghostly disturbance, is appropriate to express an ontological critique of education and of the pretentions of education to be a positive ontotheological force (Peim 2012). This figure interrogates hegemonic education discourses, including dominant discourses of educational critique, posing impossible questions: How can education as we know it, most extensive expression of biopower as it is, remain as it is frequently represented as the best hope of the possibility of redemption from the contemporary camp condition? Is education not something to think beyond as an (or the) essential component of that condition?

14.1.1   'We Refugees…'

Malabou's account of the ontology of the accident and its implications has resonances for a 'fundamental ontology' of the contemporary, including the refugee as paradigm for existential conditions in modernity and beyond. In this 'figuration', the refugee has a double semiotic function: it acts symbolically to express some essential features of being, while it also corresponds more directly to extensive actual lived experiences. Perhaps also a more generalised condition of exile is

figured in the idea of banishment from the ideal or dislocation from a primordial condition of oneness, as Jung might have it. It is also metonymic in that for significant numbers of people, the condition of the refugee is *their* condition. Refugeedom corresponds to an actual lived experience: displaced, of uncertain abode, mobile, malleable and essentially homeless but also forging, inventive and creative; the refugee-bricoleur remakes herself in liquid modernity (Malabou 2012).

This refugee condition is articulated in the work of Arendt and Agamben as a lived experience that symbolically problematises integrity and coherence of identity. This model may have implications for understanding contemporary conditions in general: it constitutes an ontology of identity that holds in tension the relations between the global, the national and the local. An ontology of the refugee as paradigm figure will here be proposed within a wider system that addresses the governmental apparatuses of education.

14.1.2   The Camp as 'Matrix and Nomos' of Our Time

Agamben's scandalous proposal that the 'camp' is in fact 'the hidden matrix and nomos' of our time presents a disturbance to comfortable accounts of the contemporary order of things. Agamben declares that the regime of governance we live within is essentially figured in the form and function of the camp. This is an analogical relation: Agamben is at pains to point out that his use of the figure of the camp, while crucial, does not relate to the actual *experience* of the camp. Agamben uses the camp to illustrate something essential about the political character of our times under biopower. Here I want to explore this peculiar – but persuasive – ontological figure in relation to a relatively recent TV series, *Deadwood*, which won significant critical acclaim for its portrayal of a frontier world designed as typical of the late nineteenth-century USA. This symbolically liminal site expresses a condition of being between the state of civilisation, the state of an assumed 'nature' and the acquisitive lawlessness associated with an aspect of American capitalism in its social and ecological dimensions.

The idea of both camp – drawn from Agamben – and encampment, drawn from TV programme, *Deadwood*, here provides a composite metaphor with powerful ontological resonances for our time, the time of 'we contemporaries'. Camp has many implications, some of them very dark, and the analogy needs very careful handling. For Agamben, the camp is essentially a space of *exception* where sovereign power can exert itself more or less without restraint within a more or less continuous 'state of emergency'. Encampment signifies more generally the temporary and uncertainty in our apparently settled way of life. This condition has demographic, economic, technological and many other dimensions.

The two terms – camp and encampment – here are used to return to some themes regarding the ontotheological role of education and its place as an essential apparatus of contemporary biopolitics. From this perspective, the faith both of everyday metaphysics and of dominant philosophy of education that education is

quintessentially a liberatory or salvationary force is misplaced. Claims that education might hold the key to healing the wounds of modernity's legacies of violence and difference are misguided. Rather, we need to understand differently what education is today and how education has become a kind of a dominant mytheme (Peim 2013). The powerful, messianic promise of education belies its central role in 'the great transformation' that has imposed a specific, if mobile, ordering onto the social order that is still gaining in reach and power. The regime of *bio*power that remains powerfully entrenched operates in parallel with 'the precariat' that is a dimension of ontology in modernity and beyond. Biopower in fact represents itself as the necessary antidote to the uncertainties of 'liquid modernity'.

The figure of the refugee – as paradigm figure for our times – provides a focus for some rethinking of the relations between biopower and the governmental functioning of education in our time.

14.1.3   Arendt's Refugee

Arendt implies the refugee (as she was herself) as the paradigm figure of identity in our time. In her account, the refugee is condemned to begin again, to remake herself in strange or at least different circumstances, prefiguring Malabou's recent assertion of the ontology of the accident. Arendt's account highlights the fundamental 'thrownness' of human existence in Heidegger's key term in its specifically modern form. In modernity, Arendt claims the accidental, uncertain and precarious quality of existence is exacerbated by instabilities in mobile global political conditions. 'Liquid modernity' accentuates the experience of refugee status, provoking the question: In what can we put our trust? For Arendt, the refugee experiences a loss of faith in collective experiences and forms of identity. For those who suffer such unhomely exile, trust can only be granted to what we have made ourselves. If so, we suffer existential loneliness, displaced and removed from the securities of localness; the refugee suffers existential crisis. For Arendt, the figure of the refugee prompts the realisation that the key political project is to understand how meaningful, dignified existence is possible under the particular conditions of the modern world.

An interesting element in Arendt's account is the reference to Chaplin's 'tramp' as a prototypical refugee. This quintessentially urban figure exemplifies contingent existence: dispossessed, marginal and not belonging; Chaplin's tramp relies on resourcefulness and creative bricolage – moving among the debris and discarded places – always a spectator to someone else's 'good life'. Chaplin's 'tramp' develops a practice of survival, depending on chance mutuality. At the same time, the tramp enjoys a kind of freedom that is always detached from, irreverent to and distrustful of the state order and the law. Chaplin's tramp frequently clashes with the law signifying the 'dangerous incompatibility of general laws with [his] individual misdeeds' (Arendt 1994). Chaplin's 'tramp/refugee' is now 100 years old. Could he still exist but now transformed into the paradigm figure of our time?

14.1.4 Agamben's Expansion

A powerful development of Arendt's sketch of the refugee as a paradigm figure is offered in Giorgio Agamben's ontological claim that the refugee can be seen as the ultimate 'biopolitical' subject: the subject *par excellence* who can be regulated and governed – at the level of population management – in a permanent 'state of exception'. Agamben presents the 'figure of the refugee' as exemplary, as *the* symbolic representation of social and political reality in relation to Foucault's account of the emergence and rise of biopower and 'the great transformation'.

The refugee problematises strongly embedded categories of contemporary politics. Firstly, the refugee exposes the 'fiction' of national sovereignty, national identity and all associated legal and political categories such as 'the people' and 'the citizen' and their attendant safeguards. Refugees within the polity are in some senses always already reduced to 'bare life': humans without (or with a suspended) political identity or status. Secondly, 'the refugee' can be represented as the paradigmatic site of modern techniques of what Michel Foucault called 'governmentality': the organised practices and techniques used to produce, care for and/or dominate individual subjects within normative regimes of disciplinary care. Thirdly, Agamben argues that refugees can be seen as the ultimate 'biopolitical' subjects: those who can be regulated and governed at the level of population in a permanent 'state of exception' outside the normal legal framework – the camp (Agamben 2005). In detention camps, refugees are effectively reduced to 'bare life' whose status and identity are suspended under the law. Finally, Agamben suggests that by fully comprehending the significance of refugees in the present political order, we may countenance new ways of political belonging and the limits and possibilities of political 'community' in the future. After the nation-state and its associated legal and political categories have been assigned to history, the refugee will remain as 'perhaps the only thinkable figure'.

In the first three of these ways, the refugee is also strongly related to the 'child' of education, the schoolchild. The child is often both legally and practically represented as a form of 'bare life', a way of being that precedes entry into culture and identity 'proper'. The child is its subjection to disciplinary care, particularly through the apparatuses of schooling, intensively governed in relation to modes of conduct and habits of thinking. The child exists in a state of exception, being a 'special' subject subjected to special provisions under the law. The child is a key example of the state of exception that is indicative of the dispersed form of sovereign power that characterises modernity and beyond. As if to offer a disturbing specular case of the child under the law in the state of exception, the child as refugee has a real face: in the UK, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are held in 'camps' ('detention centres') in a 'state of exception'.

According to Agamben's perspective, significantly developed from Foucault, the apparently rational (say, Kantian) instruments of the state are the very institutions that may facilitate an infinite expansion of disciplinary coercion and 'biopolitical' control. According to this perspective, merely updating and expanding the classical

discourse and reach of rights fails to grasp how power actually works with regimes of biopower. As history amply demonstrates, the reform of existing institutions – rather than develop freedoms and expanding the range of capacities – serves to entrench the worst aspects of sovereign power and the system of nation-states that produces refugees. According to Agamben, liberal and conventional realist theories do not provide sufficient analytical and normative understanding of the real and symbolic violence administered to refugees, including by liberal democracies. Rather, the figure of the refugee symbolises the nature of the political regimes we live within. The treatment of asylum-seeking children in the UK, for example – and other kinds of exceptional detainees – indicates the totalitarian potential of an apparently liberal political order, hence, Agamben's affirmation of the paradigm of the camp in modernity as essential to political-historical ontology. Agamben claims that 'the concentrationary universe' – in terms of experience a perhaps unparalleled extreme – signifies something essential about the juridical structure within which we live.

The camp constitutes an exceptional space that stands outside of or beyond the law, while at the same time, it is instituted by a constitutional action involving the legally sanctioned suspension of law. The camp constitutes a paradigm case: the camp (and camp in this sense may refer to a variety of exceptional, but legally sanctioned places, spaces such as Guantanamo bay, detention centres for asylum seekers and other social spaces, including, oddly perhaps, but decisively, spaces of protection) by virtue of its very existence problematises the status of the citizen within even the most liberal political order.

14.1.5   Education/Schooling

Key aspects of schooling can be understood in analogy with Agamben's metonymic interest in the camp. In the first place, consider the legal ontology of schooling. Across the world, legal compunction is generally the norm with alternatives such as home schooling variously permitted under strict conditions or simply banned. Recent cases have highlighted this juridical dimension of education in our time and ought to alert us to something crucial in the governmental role that schooling plays. This surely is a fundamental ontological point. At the same time, schooling and education's institutions, invested with enormous social power and authority, exist in some significant ways in a state of immunity from general law. Decisions that are made about identities, decisions that frequently have lifelong implications and judgements that are conferred regarding the very quality of subjects that may have far-reaching, credentialing effects that may significantly determine social destinies are beyond appeal and may not be legally challenged. They operate rather a regime of truth that organises populations for differentiated social futures.

That schools are concerned, at a fundamental level, with the shaping of subjectivity is beyond question – in an important double sense. The will to shape the substance of the subject of education, in the form of an inexplicit model of virtue, is ensconced

in myriad rituals of the institution. It is a concern that is separate from the acquisition of knowledge and from the development of knowledge-related skills, but becomes sometimes crudely and sometimes subtly entrammelled with them, and has become a taken for granted element of the school's function in the condition of education that dominates the social ecology of our time. Virtues promoted are not democratically defined and publicly shared. Anyone who has worked in a school knows the often scandalous positive and negative descriptions that are offered for the attributes of pupils as individuals and often as whole groups by practising teachers. While this dimension of education might be considered to have positive social effects of inculcating necessary virtues, the inexplicit dimension also has to be acknowledged. What's more, of course, as we have long known, judgements made about desirable characteristics in scholastic environments are heavily class biased. The apparatuses of education are sensitive to class differences and – in the name of scholastic dispositions – make negative judgements that are clearly class, not aptitude, based.

At the same time, an enormous amount of institutional energy is committed, as Foucault so meticulously recognised and demonstrated in his account of modern forms of discipline, to the promotion of bodily conduct and comportment (Foucault 1977). The intrusion of practices of person management into significant aspect of being, conduct, dress, language, the performance of specific acts and 'tableaux vivants', have a double function. In the first place, they seek to regulate the conduct of the age-stratified groups they address. In the second, they are also the grounds for 'differentiation' (for years, a keyword in educational practices). Discipline disciplines but also provides a set of norms to deploy in the dual process of producing hierarchies of attitude and attainment and imbuing the individual subject with a clear sense of one's place in the order of things.

The government of subjectivity that is a key dimension of the fundamental ontology of the school, and of education in our time, also relates to the social architecture of the apparatus. The institution of the school necessarily works in terms of confinement. In terms of time, space and association, the school determines the limits of the movement of its subjects. This generalised topography with its essential and consistent organisation of spaces effects a 'dislocating localisation'. The topographic distribution of the institution thus has powerful effects of normalising its distinctive – and surely – rather strange and possibly disturbing features. When the National Curriculum was installed from 1988 in the UK context, such a norm-dominated version of what is proper to knowledge met with little resistance. The promotion of curriculum-based national cohesion was accompanied by a strict hierarchy of attainment tied to norms of development that were also the ground for judging the essential qualities of the school's subject. This fundamentally eugenicist project has never been questioned for what it is, a hierarchisation of social trajectories based on cultural biases that negatively and positively interpret certain kinds of social comportment, hence, the casual ascription of essential qualities to subjects of schooling that is evident in the commonplace language of school reports and is more extremely evident in casual staffroom talk.

Of course it would be wrong to minimise positive effects of the nineteenth century's reinvention of childhood especially relating to certain safeguards children came to enjoy, eventually, under the law, against violence and abuse. Schooling signals a gradual end to the appalling depredations of mass child labour in western nation-states. At the same time, it is important to recall that, in the UK context, at least, protective legislation postdated the drive towards establishing a schooled society. In 1870 the priorities were for the production of a well-managed, organised population that could be subjected systematically to certain kinds of training and imbued with certain values. The new nationally sanctioned elementary schools were not in their inception – nor for long after – envisaged as vehicles of nurture and were certainly never conceived of as vehicles for social justice.

The school as we know it, like the camp, is a specifically European invention, although now thoroughly globalised. The world dominance of the institution continues to carry through a rapidly accelerating process that we don't yet understand. Prestigious, traditional fee-paying English schools, for example, now replicate themselves in China with the connivance of the Chinese government. Non-western nation-states throughout the world seek to emulate – from a subordinate position, of course – the form and function of western education systems, even down to the minutiae of curriculum specifications. In doing so, they partake a globalised system that is not merely dispersed throughout the world but that divides the world into centres of privilege. The global university system is rabidly hierarchical with each institution aware of its status in the world's league table of prestige.

Both the dispersed school and the proliferating university are in themselves antidemocratic, in spite of protestations of reformers and redeemers (including 'critical' educationists). With its insistently hierarchical distribution of differentiated statuses – for subjects, for institutions and for nation-state system – contemporary education looks more like a new global feudalism than a triumph of the democratic spirit of education (Foucault 2007). What's more in its intensifying bureaucracy and the ordering of subjects that goes along with it, education looks like the key instrument of Heidegger's 'technological enframing', applied to the human world (Heidegger 1977). This practical restriction of being is accompanied by the confinement of knowledge in rationalised curricula that inhibit possibilities. The celebration of education as a total way of life seems misplaced.

Many hold to the idea that while the current order of things in education may have been beset by the depredations of neo-liberalism, education and its key instruments can be redeemed from those dark forces. These positions and their rhetorics hold onto the notion that there is something essential and positive about education itself. They assume that pedagogical relations in their ideal form are nurturing, necessarily productive and essential to any idea of the meaning of being that is concerned with self-improvement and with the improvement of the species. The dark logic of Agamben's 'state of exception' challenges such liberal faith in reform. Within biopower that is the present order of the day and that is most exemplified, in my account, in the school and in education in general, 'bios' – belonging to the culture, the 'national' group – is granted but can be withdrawn. The state of exception that the liberal state holds as necessary to its functioning institutes totalitarian

powers under the law. Some of these, even though rarely foregrounded, and rarely explicitly deployed, are frighteningly extensive. For Agamben, the liberal state is as good as totalitarian insofar as the power to become a totalitarian state makes the state totalitarian. This state of affairs echoes with Benjamin's assertion of the continuing state of crisis and with the more recent articulation of the provenance of 'mitsein' as posing as an ontological and ethical problem by Jean-Luc Nancy (2004).

Our world is dominated by a politics that relies on a mythology of education as redeeming power (Agamben 2000). The redemption of education accompanies the commitment to education as redemption in this ontotheological myth. The sovereign idea of education though is seriously challenged by what we might call the aporetic thinking of contemporary cosmopolitanism that problematises a rationally programmed or reprogrammed 'future' and proposes, alternatively, a more open expectation of 'l'avenir' (Derrida 1994).

14.1.6   Derrida: Cosmopolitanism and Monolingualism of the Other

Derrida's work includes several excursions into the terrain of 'Mitsein', including an explicit address to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism in Derrida, although represented as a positive condition, when thought alongside hospitality, is also represented essentially as a challenge: an impossible if indispensable idea. In *Cosmopolitanism*, Derrida considers the possibility of a 'new cosmopolitan city' as a response to an excessive, paranoid policing of borders against the threat of the foreign other in the form of the refugee who appears in this guise, interestingly, as a figure of fear. Hospitality, though, turns out not to be a clearly embraceable opposite of autoimmune paranoia but an aporetic condition that makes infinite demand on the host while being constrained by pragmatic limits in order to make itself even possible. Hospitality appears then as an instance of the now familiar 'possible/impossible', almost as a hope against hope. And while Derrida proposes support for the ideal of the new cosmopolitan city, the real point, perhaps, is that within the juridical structure described by Agamben's awkward reminder of the provenance of the camp – a version of biopower – hospitality is both strictly delimited and unpredictable.

Hospitality belongs with the discourse of the refugee and the possibility of being 'at home' elsewhere. In a further twist, though, Derrida's work, rather like Lacan's in this respect, problematises the very idea of being at home in language. Published at more or less the same time as *Cosmopolitanism*, *Monolingualism of the Other* addresses linguistic identity in a partly autobiographical account. Derrida claims to have only ever had one language, but that language, at the same time, was never 'his'. In language, there is essentially no home, no mother tongue. One is always subject to the other that is language and to its sovereign occupation of the self.

Language is not homely. Identity in this sense can never be the expression of some proper unity with an interior being of the self nor with a unified way of life, a mode of being proper to a determinate group held together by common language that expresses a consistent unity.

As Nancy suggests, 'Mitsein' is always paradoxically fundamental and accidental, the grounds for identity *and* expressive of 'thrownness'. The accoutrements of belonging and of identity are inessential and borrowed. While we may embrace them as fundamental expressions of what we are, in fact, we acquire them retrospectively once that decision of belonging has been made on our behalf. Inessentiality then is primary and fundamental. Its shadow remains as a possibility as exemplified in the potential condition of being a refugee.

14.1.7   *Paradoxical Opportunity*

Derrida's rumination on language and identity speculates on the 'paradoxical opportunity' represented by certain North African Jews who have no direct or intimate relation to North African, French or Jewish culture. Such a 'figuration' suggests Arendt's refugee as positive bricoleur of identity. What is the nature of this 'paradoxical opportunity' (of the refugee) and to what extent does it signify a possibility for the general condition of 'we refugees' (the condition of subjectivity itself) in modernity? A big question attends the condition of cosmopolitanism. Could it simply be another empty liberal mantra ('democracy', 'freedom') that refuses to recognise its own underlying conditions under the ubiquitous regime of biopower? Could its emergence out of various catastrophes of modernity paradoxically signify and force recognition of another way of being together as Agamben ('inessential community') and Nancy ('inoperative community') have begun to suggest?

The TV programme *Deadwood* provides a useful possible metaphor for contemporary political realities in relation to the general condition of the refugee. Deadwood is a real place in South Dakota but was, in the late nineteenth century, a frontier town. In the TV version, it is this proto-civic space that is represented as being fraught with the depredations of modernity and with the spiritual, psychological uncertainties of postmodernity. In the TV programme, Deadwood refers to itself as a 'camp' signifying a pre-polis condition of temporary settlement. It is semi-lawless, dominated by the powerful, the scene of a scramble for wealth, tolerant of the abuse of women and of the subjugation of racial minorities. Law emerges to protect incipient citizens but also to act in frequent states of emergency to impose a more or less arbitrarily conducted authority and order. Its manoeuvres are more or less arbitrary. In Deadwood, inequalities abound with no dependable social welfare support for the vulnerable. One group, the Chinese, enjoy the status of permanent outsiders, outside of even the uncertain, capricious protections of the law. Their presence signifies a social space of exception where the unconscionable can happen. In general, Deadwood signifies a temporary encampment at times aspiring to civic status

but frequently dominated by other imperatives and struggles. It is both an account of emergence of modernity but also at the same time a radically critical depiction of contemporaneity. As the 'civilising' forces in Deadwood emerge, the school occupies a central ideological and instrumental function in the transformation of the frontier environment. As the civilising process (in the Elias sense) gains momentum, the 'other' lawless manifestations of sovereign power do not disappear but become less visible (Elias 1991).

14.1.8   Finally

Education today operates as the essential instrument of biopower as briefly indicated above. Derrida's aporetic thinking of cosmopolitanism, configured around the ontology of the accident and centred on the paradigm figure of the refugee, problematises the rationally programmed 'future' of education, as opposed to a more open 'avenir' that may only be anticipated without schedule, but also disturbs the claim of education to be on the side of either liberation or critique. The TV programme *Deadwood* serves as a dramatic fictional reminder that the order of the established encampment is founded over the rough and ready condition of the 'camp' initially signifying a temporary, not yet civilised social space. It is a paradoxical and disturbing realisation that the civilising process of the 'camp' is caught up with a new form of invasive power that seeks to work upon the substance or 'soul' of the subject. This is the political ontology that Agamben's articulation of 'homo sacer' and 'bare life' and 'the state of emergency' invites us to consider. In this light, the redemption of education from its present inequalities and from its entrapment in impersonal bureaucratic processes looks remote, to say the least, founded as it is on a critical misreading of the order of things.

Within the order of modernity appears the disturbing figure of the refugee, now as much as ever a troubling, spectral presence. Arendt's account of the figure of the refugee is not entirely negative, however, rather like Derrida's account of cultural ontology of language difference and sameness. As Agamben notes, Arendt turns the position of the refugee into 'the paradigm of a new of historical consciousness'. This figure, as described above, promises at least the possibility of rethinking the 'mitsein' of any future that is not founded in the narrow forms of disciplined identity that are promoted by the apparatuses of education in the era of biopower.

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Chapter 15
Laclau's Ontological Rhetoric, Universality, and Collective Identity: A Lesson for Cosmopolitan Education

Tomasz Szkudlarek

Ernesto Laclau's theory is one of the most complete achievements in political philosophy in recent decades. One of its assets is how Laclau understands universality, and in this chapter his contribution to this field is used to propose an argument in the debate on the (im)possibility of cosmopolitan education. The chapter starts with a brief recapitulation of the basic tenets of Laclau's theory. Next, I present four instances of the universal which can be distinguished in his work. The first is a uniform sequence of events in the process of identity construction (from scattered demands to identity built around empty signifiers). The second is the universal, ontological impossibility of attaining social totality. The third is the ethical dimension of the process of identity formation. The fourth are theological contexts and connotations of the notion of identity (totality), especially in its relation to emptiness. From this reconstruction, I proceed to the often expressed claim that cosmopolitanism is impossible, arguing that Laclau's theory sheds new light on this issue, and, further, to my suggestions concerning some points of departure for a possible theory of cosmopolitan education.

15.1 Laclau: An Outline

This section presents a highly condensed and simplified reconstruction of the basic structure of Ernesto Laclau's theory of identity and undeniably ignores numerous important features. Some of its elements will be repeated in the following sections, but an understanding of the richness of Laclau's theory will not be possible on the basis of this reconstruction alone. Because of the limits of the chapter, I can only suggest that for a full account, one should refer to the original texts, especially to the most extensive presentation of Laclau's theory of populism (Laclau 2005) and to his earlier texts on social ontology (e.g. Laclau 1996, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

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Laclau's theory is praised for its unique explanatory power, even by its critics (Žižek 2008). It presents an attempt at redefining universalism in a way that aims to resolve the 'postmodern crisis' without abandoning the diagnosis of social heterogeneity. Laclau is radically critical towards claims to universalism, if these are understood in terms of historical logic and determination or as unitary normative foundations of the social. His critique undercuts all ideological positions, right or left, the aim of which is to propose uniform political imaginaries based on a belief in historical necessity, rational objectivity, economical determination or any other deterministic presumption. He challenges the idea of politics as a rational system which permits inferences as to objectively grounded political actions, which can thus be claimed to be 'necessary'. This includes a critique of the Hegelian and Marxist tradition, in which – as he notes – conceptual coherence can only be gained at the expense of exclusions, i.e. of eliminating, from theoretical models, those elements of the social which do not follow the logic of the conceptual system. For instance, Hegel's political logic does not encompass 'peoples without history', and Marx's binary conflict between labour and capital can only be theorised when social heterogeneity is excluded and denigrated under the label of the *lumpenproletariat*. The problem is not one of Laclau's being 'against exclusion'; on the contrary, Laclau criticises Hegel and Marx for their failure to make exclusion a significant part of their theoretical models, because – as he claims – no identity can be striven for without exclusion, and one of the main tasks of the theory is to explain such a relation.

A very important distinction that Laclau makes to secure the universal dimension of his theory is that between *the ontic* and *the ontological*. It is explained in detail in his book on populism (Laclau 2005). Laclau observes that even though populism has been given extensive attention in political debates, there is no agreement as to the nature of this phenomenon. The reason of this failure is that all previous attempts were based on the search for a specific (ontic) *content* of populist ideologies (right-wing orientation, blaming the elites for the misfortunes of common people, etc.). Instead, Laclau defines populism in ontological terms and speaks of its fundamental role in the political construction of societies. What is ontological here is that no society has a stable or predefined identity and, thus, that society needs to establish itself in course of political action; that, in turn, is impossible without populist mobilisation. On the ontic level, populism is always 'about something' (e.g. foreign capital or immigration). On the ontological one, such particular demands are but representations of the ongoing and never-ending struggle of those who are deprived of the right to fully participate in social life (*plebs*) and who articulate their diverse demands into a political front, which attempts to represent the whole of society (*populus*). In sum, the ultimate political demand is that of fullness, identity or totality (synonyms in Laclau) of a 'fully reconciled society' (Laclau 2005). However, it is impossible to achieve such totality.

The whole structure of Laclau's theoretical argument can be summed up in the following sequence:

1. The objectivity of the social is of a discursive nature. The notion of discourse is understood here as structure preceding the formation of elements. This allows Laclau to claim that the identity of the social is construed by means of rhetoric.

2. The basic elements of which social discourse is composed are *demands* related to particular *lacks* or faults of social structures. Demands are prior to the existence of social groups whose identities are built around them. No social group can exist without being related to unfulfilled demands. The ultimate demand that 'shines through' particular ones is that of fullness or the 'true existence' of a 'fully reconciled society'. Laclau puts it radically: such society is ontologically impossible, but politically necessary – we can never establish ourselves, but we cannot stop trying either.

3. Demands which start the process of identification are addressed to a particular location which must be opposed to their articulation, to 'the other' (e.g. the government). The first step in the construction of social identity is thus *exclusion* of a given element of the social which becomes the 'constitutive outside' for the identity to come. Referring to the same example, the present government may be excluded from the attempts at creating a new political identity. Claiming that all identities are set against something, Laclau continues and at the same time counters, Hegel, for whom identity is built in a *logical* relation to difference. This is why it is possible, according to Hegel, to absorb difference back in the gesture of synthesis, which restores totality. In Laclau's thinking, *no totality is ontologically possible*, and the social always remains heterogeneous. Therefore, Hegel's notion of logical difference is replaced by that of exclusion. The excluded element is part of the heterogeneous social, but it does *not* take part in the identity to come; it is its constitutive outside. Consequently, identity will never become totality – society will never be reconciled.

4. Unfulfilled demands are diverse and heterogeneous (e.g. demands for higher social benefits, lower taxes, a ban on abortion and freedom of speech may be expressed simultaneously in the same populist movement), and there is no conceptual framework in which they can be united. However, once a populist movement begins, it gains a somewhat universal feature – all such movements are defined *against the excluded* (e.g. the government, the rich, etc.). This means that their demands are *equivalent* in relation to one another, as long as they all oppose the same excluded element. The 'chain of equivalence' of such demands becomes the first element of the coming identity.

5. Each element of the chain has a double status. It is particular (it represents a given demand, like a ban on immigration, or for freedom of speech) and universal (it is equivalent to other demands and represents a desire for fullness).

6. As there is no logical or conceptual framework through which such equivalent articulation can achieve positive identity, this task has to be completed *rhetorically*. One of the elements of the chain has to be given the role of representing the whole (*synecdoche*). It still remains a particular demand, but it is *invested* with the meaning of the whole (Laclau borrows the term *cathexis* from psychoanalysis here). It is thus 'elevated to the dignity of the thing', in Freudian terms. This kind of representation of totality by the particular is called by Laclau, following Gramsci, *hegemony*.

7. In rhetorical terms, hegemony (particularity invested with the meaning of totality) is a *catachresis*: an articulation of heterogeneous elements which cannot be represented by a literal term. To perform this function, the hegemonic element

must become an *empty signifier*: it has no ontic referent, and it represents what cannot be represented – the impossible totality (identity) of the society.

8. Once so created and elevated, the empty signifier works backwards on the whole chain of equivalence, so that all its elements become united 'in the name' of that signifier. Social identity is, thus, temporarily established. In one of the examples given by Laclau, the demand for creating free trade unions started to represent all demands (economic, political, related to the conditions of labour, etc.) in the Polish revolution against the Communist government in 1980, and the name of the union thus created (*Solidarność*) became the signifier uniting the whole political movement (Laclau 2005).

15.2   Dimensions of the Universal

What is universal here? As I have mentioned, Laclau denies universality to the forces identified in the 'grand theories' of modernity, like those of Hegel and Marx (Butler et al. 2000; Laclau 2005, 2014). There is no universal historical logic that determines how societies proceed from one political form to another or how they construe themselves. As Laclau and Chantal Mouffe say in their classic work (1985), societies are ultimately heterogeneous, and if they are made unitary, this is done through power relations, the traces of which will always keep them in a state of antagonism. However, there are dimensions of the universal in Laclau's theory, and I want to point four of them: a uniform sequence of events leading to identity, the ontological impossibility of social totality and the representation of such failed totality by empty signifiers, the ethical dimension of the struggle for totality, and a monotheistic theology tacitly implied, and sometimes overtly discussed, in Laclau's work. I will briefly refer to these issues now.

First, the sequence of events in the process of identity construction repeats itself in the diverse histories of populist mobilisation and revolutions analysed by Laclau. It starts with scattered demands reflecting various 'lacks' in a social structure. The demands are articulated as equivalent against an excluded element of the structure (the government, the rich, the foreign, etc.). One of such particular demands is invested with the meaning of the desired whole (a 'fully reconciled society' in which the underdog element will find its place) and represents – both politically and semiotically – the whole chain of equivalent demands. Such demands do not have any *logical* connections; they are just *articulated* as equivalent and need, therefore, rhetorical instruments to be united into a uniform social movement. Consequently, the hegemonic signifier of the demand 'elevated' to represent all demands needs to erase its particularity, and, thus, it becomes an empty signifier: it is empty not only in terms of ceasing to represent a particular demand but also as pointing to the 'absent fullness' of society. As such, this signifier works retroactively to give common meaning to the so far disparate demands and struggles which are now articulated 'in the name' of that hegemonic demand. This sequence is universal: it repeats itself in various struggles and social upheavals *regardless their ideological orienta-*

tion, and in different historical and geographical settings, which Laclau extensively documents in his book on populism (2005).

Second, there is a universal, *ontological impossibility* of attaining such desired wholeness. The sequence mentioned above leads to precarious identities, which will start to disintegrate with the very moment of their closure, i.e. when a social movement gains hegemony and establishes a new identity. Laclau links this moment of disintegration to the need for diversifying demands into separate logics reflecting their content: when the revolution is over, the issues of unemployment, health provisions, or tax reductions for the poor return to the competence of specific offices and departments, which destroys their equivalence and, in consequence, also the identity acquired through their common representation. The moment of 'the political' (populist mobilisation, equivalence, cathectic investment of the desire for unity into a particular demand) gives way to democratic institutions and the lack or incompleteness of the social returns as a daily experience. In sum, it is precisely this always-returning impossibility of the fullness of society that is universal in Laclau's theory, and – also in a universal manner – this ontological lack needs to be represented by empty signifiers created on the basis of particular demands. To quote Laclau, '… [T]here is a series of terms whose semantic consists in pointing to an absent fullness, to an absolutely empty space deprived of any formal determination. It is in that sense that I have spoken of the "universal" not as an ultimate content that all things share, but as something that necessarily eludes all of them' (2004, 286).

Third, this absent fullness is where Laclau grounds the instance of *the ethical*. 'This experience of fullness as that which is essentially lacking … is the root of the ethical' (2004, 286). Laclau discusses the notion of the ethical in response to Simon Critchley's critique of the 'normative deficit' of his theory (Critchley 2004). The critique results from what otherwise is the strongest asset of the theory, i.e. its ontological character. For Critchley, the deficit concerns the lack of normative claims and political programmes derivable from Laclau's ontological models. From my point of view, the fact that Laclau is able to explain the dynamics of identity regardless of the ontic content of social movements and their ideologies leads to the question as to how one can prevent this theory from being used as a technology of staged revolutions guided by undemocratic ideologies. For instance, if political identity is dependant on *empty* signifiers, how do we know that a given, current mobilisation will lead to the establishment of a democratic rather than a fascist regime? Can we classify and judge diverse signifiers of emptiness in normative terms (Szkudlarek 2007, 2011)? The most important aspect of Laclau's dealing with such a critique is the distinction between *the ethical* and *the normative*, which reflects that between *the ontological* and *the onti*c described above. The ethical relates to the very need to overcome particularity and to establish social totality. The normative speaks to particularities in which the ethical (with its ontological impossibility) has to be invested and which present normative limits to its possible incarnations:

> … [T]he moment of the ethical is the moment of the universality of the community, the moment in which, beyond any particularism, the universal speaks by itself. The other side of it, however, is that society consists only of particularities, and that in this sense, universality will have to be incarnated in something that is utterly incommensurable with it. This

point is crucial: there is no logical transition from an unavoidable ethical moment, in which the fullness of the society manifests itself as an empty symbol, to any particular normative order. There is an ethical *investment* in particular normative orders, but no normative order which is, in and for itself, ethical. (2000, 81)

In this respect, particular normative orders existing in given, historical societies present limits to the possible investments of the ethical:

[T]he radical investment looks, on the one side, like a pure decision, on the other it has to be collectively accepted. … The subject who takes the decision is only partially a subject, he is also a background of sedimented practices organising a normative framework which operates as a limitation on the horizon of options. (2000, 82–83)

To sum up, what is universal here is the justified struggle of every society to establish itself as totality, which is the ethical justification of political decisions. However, this can only work whilst being invested in particular normative orders expressed in social practices of particular communities.

Fourth, one can speak of a theological instance of universality in Laclau's thinking. There are indirect and direct references to theology in Laclau's writings, for instance, when he occasionally quotes Levinas or Meister Eckhart, or in a chapter in his last book (Laclau 2014) fully devoted to theological rhetorics, called 'On the names of God'. The main topic of these references is the semantic emptiness of representations of totality. This semiotic structure has been contemplated for ages in the discourse of theology, e.g. in the mystical tradition of Christianity (hence, quotations from Eckhart), as well as in other religions, some of which are occasionally mentioned by Laclau. In brief, 'God' is an empty signifier: 'Since He is God the ineffable, we could use whatever name we want to refer to Him, as long as that name is not granted any determinate content' (2014, 44). However, because there is always some equivalence of the particular behind an empty signifier, *any* name given to God, including the word 'God' itself, bears the risk of contamination. Hence, as Laclau notes, some mystical schools, e.g. in Buddhism, express themselves in the language of atheism.

'On the Names of God' links the rhetorics of theology and political theory, which leads both to structural homologies and to the question of difference between these discursive practices. I will focus on the ethical aspect of these analyses. In one excerpt, where Laclau discusses the connection between particularity (finitude) and naming, he says:

This can be seen most clearly in the argument about God showing Himself in everything existing. If the argument is admitted in all its implications, we should conclude that actions we would call immoral express God as much as all the others. This is a conclusion that was accepted by some extreme mystical sects: as far as I live in God, I am beyond all moral limitations. But in most cases the mystic accepts conventional religious morality. It is clear, however, that the latter is not dictated by mystical experience, but by the positive religion to which the mystic belongs. (2014, 47)

The structure of this argument is identical with that pertaining to the ethical and the normative of which I have spoken before, and it positions God in the same structural location where the absent fullness of society and the ethical also reside. The

limits of possible incarnations of the ethical, like the limits of actions performed in the name of God, are conventional and cannot be derived either from God or from the elusive fullness of the 'fully reconciled society'. On the other hand, however, the conventional or the particular cannot provide grounds for moral engagement by themselves. Referring to Eckhart, Laclau says: 'It is only insofar as I experience my contact with the Divinity as an absolute, beyond all particularised content, that I can give to my particular courses of action their moral seriousness. … [I]t is only if I experience the absolute as an utterly empty place that I can project into contingent courses of action a moral depth that, left to themselves, they lack' (2014, 50).

The critical question of the ethical/normative relation, of the limits of the incarnation of the universal, remains open in Laclau's thought. He says:

> Even if we grant that this gap between the experience of the absolute as an empty place and the engagement with the particular contents that are going to incarnate it becomes a permanent one, does this not leave us entirely guideless as to what are the *right* incarnating contents? Certainly, it does. … If the experience of what I have referred to in terms of the dual movement 'materialization of God' / 'deification of the concrete' is going to live up to its two sides, neither the absolute nor the particular can find a final peace with the other. This means that the construction of an ethical life will depend on keeping open the two sides of this paradox: an absolute that can only be articulated by being something less than itself, and a particularity whose only destiny is to be the incarnation of a 'sublimity' transcending its own body. (2014, 51)

15.3   On the Impossibility of Cosmopolitan Society

The interest in cosmopolitanism nowadays is largely influenced by the process of economic globalisation (which sometimes is seen as 'economic cosmopolitanism', e.g. Kleingeld and Brown 2014), often understood not only as a chance for global betterment but as global exploitation as well. The new types of global wars on terror and the dramatic radicalisation of some fractions of Islam may be seen, in this context, as fuelled by the greed for global markets on the one hand and as an uncompleted struggle for decolonisation on the other. The global economy definitely creates infrastructures for the creation of global communities; on the other hand, however, it is held responsible for the destruction of numerous communities globally (Bauman 2000). It is tempting, therefore, to think of economic globalisation as a challenge, as the situation in which 'something' needs to be done in order to prevent the final catastrophe of unlimited exploitation and a total global war. Zygmunt Bauman (2001), who describes economic globalisation as the escape of capital from the control of nation-states, sees the remedy in inventing global institutions capable of limiting the flow of deterritorialised capital, and he is perfectly aware that this is beyond contemporary imagination.

The world order has to be reinvented, and the Western perspective obviously implies *peaceful* reinvention. It is in this context that the current return of the idea of cosmopolitanism can be seen. The feature of political solutions to the global crisis being 'beyond imagination' is one of the most frequent critiques of

cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld and Brown 2014). The formation of a global state, or an efficient organisation of a global federation of states, is often claimed impossible. Even the gesture of implementation of the Kantian concept of how to provide for perpetual peace (Kant 1903 [1795]) after the First World War, the establishment of the League of the Nations, was incomplete: it never encompassed an attempt to abolish standing armies, for instance. However, as Kleingold and Brown say (ibidem), the 'impossibility' argument has to be, in this context, made milder: *some* supranational organisations and federations (like the UN, USA or EU) do exist. 'So in order to be taken seriously, the objection must instead be that it is impossible to form a *good* state or federation of that magnitude, i.e. that it is impossible to realize or even approximate the cosmopolitan ideal in a way that makes it worth pursuing and that does not carry prohibitive risks' (online, no page numbering).

Why I think Laclau's perspective on universality is telling here is not because it gives an easy solution to the impossibility of a 'good', global political organisation. What Laclau tells us is in a way the opposite: *no* society can be established as good, as complete and not carrying 'prohibitive risks'. Society is *ontologically impossible* – but it is *politically necessary* at the same time. To the critics who say that it is impossible to arrive at the politically necessary state of global control over the flow of capital, Bauman says: 'I'm asked questions like these very often, and I usually reply with an Irish joke: a driver pulls over and asks a passer-by about the way to Dublin and the man replies, "Dear sir, if I wanted to go to Dublin this is not where I'd start!"' (in Wiśniewski 2011, 6).

The 'good news' for the proponents of cosmopolitanism is therefore paradoxical and twofold. First, *no good society is possible.* Laclau is very clear that the demand of 'totality' of a fully functional and reconciled society will never be met. And yet there is no doubt that local and national societies *do* exist – as failed totalities, as incomplete and always conflictual *perpetual projects*, which occasionally reinvent themselves and, through populist mobilisation, gain energy to act until the next crisis. Second, the fact that we see the current global situation as making cosmopolitan projects unthinkable should be countered by, perhaps, two counterstatements. The first is this: So what? We *must* find the way. Second, the current state of economic globalisation and the active role of undoubtedly effective transnational bodies like GATT or G7 show that cosmopolitan ideas are not utterly utopian in all their aspects; if it is possible in the domain of corporate economy, why can't it be possible in the political field?

15.4   From Laclau to Educational Theory

In the context of Laclau's theory, education appears to be an important instance of the *identity rhetorics* through which societies construe themselves (Szkudlarek 2007, 2011, 2013). There are several dimensions to how this connection operates. One of them is that in schools, words often operate in a decontextualised space

where they relate one to another rather than to their referents (Bruner 1973), which creates conditions for their abstraction and the construction of complex conceptual domains. However, some words never attain a purely conceptual status: they are constantly talked about and their ultimate meaning is never agreed on. School essays and classroom disputes have always been filled with 'pedagogically productive' topics. What is friendship? Is public good superior to personal happiness? What is patriotism nowadays? What is true love? What is justice? Has the restoration of the sciences and arts contributed to the purification of morals?[1] The never-ending circulation around such words makes students master their rhetorical skills, and at the same time it contributes to the creation of a particular, pedagogical genre of 'postulational rhetoric' (Szkudlarek 2014), where that which exists as part of everyday experience is confronted with its elevated, ideal version: 'being in love' with 'love', and 'I like it here' with 'patriotism'. This Platonic gesture of transcending the daily *doxa* towards true ideas has two effects: it invalidates the daily experience as the designate of elevated concepts (that infatuation was not true love, my feelings are not really patriotic), and thus it deprives these very concepts of experiential referents. The postulational rhetoric, working through 'thou shall'/'you ought to' operators typical of religion and education, is a powerful tool for the *production of empty signifiers.* Laclau's analysis of the names of God can have numerous equivalents in the analysis of the language of education.

My comment on Laclau's theory in this respect is that empty signifiers do not emerge in a 'natural' way in the process of identity construction, at least it is not always so. Elsewhere (Szkudlarek 2011), I have tried to show how the signifier of solidarity (*Solidarność*) in the 1980 revolution in Poland was artfully crafted in a way which made it a perfect representation of the ongoing political struggle and how its specific construction not only contributed to the creation of a hegemonic totality but also foretold some of the investments and exclusions needed in order to sustain it. In this context, I see educational rhetorics as one of the most important fields of the construction of empty signifiers to be utilised in the political construction of societies: both in their current hegemonic operations and in oppositional populist mobilizations. 'To be utilised' means here, in the first case, to be invested in particular normative orders congruent with current politics (e.g. the utilisation of the notion of patriotism in post-9/11 politics in the USA seen in calling the regulations limiting civil rights the PATRIOT Act) and, in the second case, to question such orders by reclaiming the ethical, 'empty and impossible' dimension of such signifiers ('we want *true* democracy' in almost every electoral campaign) or by investing the desire for fullness into a new particular demand (the case of *Solidarność*).

Education is a specific field of such constructions; probably the only one where one may experiment, in a relatively secure way, both with the creation of emptiness and with its investment in particular normative orders. This is because such orders in schools do not have to be fully congruent with those outside its walls. School can

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[1] The last example is the topic of essay competition announced by the Academy in Dijon in 1749, won by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

be a fictitious community, an artificial society, where some rules are made deliberately different from those operating outside. In the context of the discussion on the impossibility of cosmopolitanism, this means that such impossibility can be, in a way, ignored in schools and that one can *invent* elsewhere non-existent particular orders in which the demands of fullness (of the ethical, cosmopolitan community, of perpetual peace, of universal human rights) can be invested. In other words, school is not entirely about socialisation to existing norms; it has a disruptive, utterly political dimension which may contribute to social change and emancipation (Biesta 2010). In short, in schools one *can* create normative orders organising the process of learning, such that they can be invested with cosmopolitan ideas. Just as with other ideas, for that matter.

A very important issue concerns exclusions. According to Laclau, identity is not possible without exclusion. Linking disparate elements of the social is only possible when they appear equivalent *against* something or somebody. The idea of cosmopolitanism seems to be at odds with this theoretical statement. Is cosmopolitanism not the contrary – the idea of global inclusiveness where every person is treated as the bearer of universal human rights? Writing about nineteenth- and twentieth-century cosmopolitanism, Kleingeld and Brown mention this interesting phenomenon:

> Most past cosmopolitan authors did not fully live up to the literal interpretation of their cosmopolitan theories, and one can find misogynist, racist, nationalist, religious, or class-based biases and inconsistencies in their accounts. These shortcomings have often been used as arguments against cosmopolitanism, but they are not as easily used for that purpose as it may seem. Because the universalist potential in the discourse of 'world citizenship' can itself be used as a basis for exposing these shortcomings as problematic, one should say that they stem from too little, rather too much, cosmopolitanism. (Kleingeld and Brown 2014, online)

How can we interpret this passage? The fact that cosmopolitan discourse is not different from other political ideas is not surprising. What one can also see in this passage is the contrast between 'failed' cosmopolitanism in its particular manifestations and its 'universalist potential', which renders the shortcomings insignificant and calls for 'more cosmopolitanism'. In Laclau's terms, one may interpret this relation as that between the hegemonic demand represented by the empty signifier and its investment in particular demands. It is on the level of the particular, in course of being invested in concrete, context-dependant demands (political or educational projects), where the universal recedes and where exclusions need to be made in order to create chains of equivalence or to win particular games of power.

The problem with both education and politics, in their relation to the universal, is that they always have to be performed on the ontic level, within *particular* normative contexts, by *particular* people and through *particular* content. To put it simply, when cosmopolitan ideas are employed to frame educational experiences, through which positive attitudes to otherness or competencies imagined as necessary for world citizenship are to be created, they will inevitably create exclusions. They will appear conflictual, for instance, to some aspects of national or religious education, to some versions of immigration policy and to some elements of cultural heritage.

In other words, on the universal (ontological) level, the ethical of the cosmopolitan idea is as much all inclusive as it is inconclusive: it cannot be directly translated into concrete norms or codes of behaviour. To gain a degree of conclusiveness, it must be *invested* in particular, context-dependant normative orders and political demands, in the specific content of classroom curricula or communal struggles. And on that level, it cannot escape exclusion. To make cosmopolitan education operational, it seems inevitable that its normative structure be somewhat selective, *exclusive* against these elements of the social and cultural milieu which call for modes of behaviour hostile to the cosmopolitan imaginary.

In this respect, cosmopolitan education would not seem much different from national or democratic education, for instance. They all speak to *ontologically impossible* 'fully reconciled' communities, and they have to invent their ways of influencing human minds by *selection* and organisation of curricular content and learning experiences. If there is a difference between these three varieties of education for identity, it probably is in the 'politically necessary' part of Laclau's statement. In spite of all three kinds of communities being 'ontologically impossible', in the case of the nation and democracy, there were sufficiently strong convictions as to their political necessity. So far, the cosmopolitan demand seems still too weak to successfully reorganise pedagogical imagination. Perhaps the question, therefore, would be whether we really *want* the world to be cosmopolitan rather than whether we *can* make it so.

For those who do want it so and do strive for it through education, one can propose the following conclusions stemming from Laclau's understanding of universality, particularity, ethics and normativity.

First, cosmopolitan education will be on a collision course not only with most of what we know as national education but also with powerful political, economic and military forces which thrive in the *normative void* of interstate relations. As some 'realist' critics of cosmopolitanism maintain, the condition of perpetual war, rather than Kantian perpetual peace, is the 'natural' state of relations between nations, and 'moral consideration of others stops at the border of society' (Snuawert 2009, 12). Such space, devoid of normative and effective legal regulations, is the milieu of the operation of transnational capital. Bauman's Dublin anecdote reminds us that the fact that we do not know how to subject this space to normative (political) control does not free us from the necessity to do so. But one must be aware that this will not be a globally welcome intervention.

Second, cosmopolitan universalism must be *invested* in particular content which can work as the domain of subjective experience and engagement. When such investments concern education, one must bear in mind that schools are specific sites in the social space, where normative orders may, to some degree, differ from those outside their walls. This feature of schools is usually seen as their fault, an aspect of their 'artificial reality' responsible for educating young generations to non-existing worlds. But schools were created as such: as Gert Biesta (2010) or Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons (2013) remind us, one must differentiate education from socialisation. In the case of ethical ideas like cosmopolitanism, such relative isolation creates the opportunity to educate in spite of, or sometimes even against, the

existing normative orders. To sum up, the normative orders into which the universalist claims of cosmopolitanism are to be invested may themselves be *invented* for the sake of education.

Third, no normative order can operate without exclusions. In Laclau's ontology, they may be seen as operating on two levels, which I have called *deontic* and *deontological*, respectively (Szkudlarek 2013). On the deontic level, every norm implies what should and what should not be done. On the second, deontological one, however, such should–should not relations are only possible within a certain delimited field, which implies a more general exclusion of certain *ontological* elements. To give an example, in Marxism the struggle of workers for a just society is set against capital, and it must exclude bourgeois ideologies. On the second level, however, the antagonistic relation of labour vs. capital and workers vs. bourgeoisie, and granting this antagonism the power to change social structures, is only possible when the social field is conceptually cleared of elements not involved in the relations of capitalist production. To make his system complete and logical, Marx had to exclude the *lumpenproletariat* from the theory of social structure (Laclau 2005).

With regard to education, what this means is that one should be aware of the exclusions made, on the ontic/normative level, in the process of defining the content of learning activities, as well as of exclusions implied in the ontological construction of that 'ontic' domain of learning content and norms. Such exclusions set the desired educational outcomes against the current state of affairs or against the learning outcomes of other, competing educational ideologies and practices. In ontological terms, they refer to the desired and contested *forms of the social*, to the very construction of a 'good world' which inevitably has to be deprived of some of the currently existing elements.

In my opinion, these are fundamentally important ethical questions pertaining to the construction of education serving any form of collective identity. No world can be totally inclusive, as Laclau says; no 'complete' society is ontologically possible. Cosmopolitanism presents itself as amongst the most inclusive political and educational ideologies (if not *the* most inclusive singular ideology). To act responsibly by way of investing this idea into particular 'ontic content', one must also bear responsibility for what and who is excluded on the way to this version of a better world.

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Chapter 16
Concentric, Vernacular and Rhizomatic Cosmopolitanisms

Marianna Papastephanou

16.1 Introduction

Most cosmopolitan discourses employ self-descriptions or self-declarations of cosmopolitanism and rely on the problematic self-referential proclamation, 'I am cosmopolitan' or 'We, cosmopolitans'. This proclamation is problematic for various reasons, chief amongst them, because, as David Hansen argues, there is something awkward and amiss in rendering cosmopolitanism a badge (2008: 213) and in employing it self-indulgently. Within declarative and self-descriptive frameworks,[1] cosmopolitanism is assumed as an accomplished reality or trait and not as a regulative ideal. Also, such self-referentiality involves a risk of exclusion of those dwelling outside the homely space of 'We' or of those who are typically contrasted to the cosmopolitan 'I'.

This self-referentiality chimes, in my view, with the more general tendency of the relevant discourses to view cosmopolitanism monologically rather than relationally.[2] This is all the more astonishing if we recall that since the linguistic turn (in the analytic philosophical persuasion), the relentless critique of modern individualism (in the poststructuralist camp) and the dialogic shift of perspective (in the broader continental framework), relational dimensions of being seem to have gained philosophical priority. For instance, Jürgen Habermas has repeatedly emphasized the dangers of monological approaches to ethics and politics. In his latest book, where

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[1] In Papastephanou (2013), I develop a more detailed critical discussion of the declarative self-description and its operations in the cosmopolitanisms of Diogenes, M. Nussbaum, J. Waldron and K. A. Appiah. The ground that is covered there is presupposed here; it is not repeated for reasons of space as well as for purposes of providing new, original material.

[2] An explanation of these terms follows in the next section.

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Habermas deploys his vision of a European political union, in a chapter discussing Martin Buber, he returns to the issue of the priority of 'dialogical mutuality' over the 'monological self-relation' (Habermas 2015: 129). Yet, in most other political-philosophical approaches, topics such as cosmopolitanism appear theoretically confined to the I-perspective.

This coda briefly illustrates how the 'concentric circles' metaphorization of cosmopolitanism reflects and serves a monological perspective. Yet, even polycentric alternatives often fail to capture the more relational challenges that cosmopolitanisms worthy of the name should meet. Thus, critical attention is necessary not only concerning the established concentric outlook on cosmopolitanism but also concerning those post-colonial and culturalist theories that voice criticisms of concentric circles. The discussion below unpacks this claim through reference to vernacular and rhizomatic cosmopolitanisms. The as yet non-theorized metaphor of eccentric circles is introduced as an option suitable to cover relational normative grounds of cosmopolitanism beyond concentric and polycentric ethico-political deficits.

16.2   Introducing the Eccentric

David Hollinger summarizes the task that 'new cosmopolitans' assign to cosmopolitanism as follows: 'cosmopolitanism urges each individual and collective unity to absorb as much varied experience as it can, while retaining its capacity to *achieve self-definition and to advance its own aims effectively*' (2001: 239; emph mine). In such contexts, cosmopolitanism emerges as cultural-cognitive enlargement or existential enrichment of the self through exposure to diversity and alterity. But, in my view, this trendy cosmopolitanism is still too individualistic to cover the normative requirements of a 'politics' of 'cosmos'. Even attractive and thoughtful engagements with cultural exchange, which are involved in the so-called culinary cosmopolitanism and in its multicultural 'vernacular foodways' (Jonas 2013: 119), are ultimately monological in reflecting back upon an enriched self whose other dealings with alterity may not be sensitized. After all, the cosmopolitan, no matter how hybrid and enriched with borrowed elements, sets her aims by herself and advances them effectively.[3] Within this context, the other is a mere source of self-enrichment and hardly emerges as a source of responsibilities or of relational demands that set limits to the 'cosmopolitan', self-referential goal setting.

Important as many 'new cosmopolitan' insights may be, they operate in a monological framework – where 'monological' means something that begins with the self and, ultimately, concerns or benefits primarily the self. When the monological framework becomes exaggerated to the point of constituting all that is supposedly needed for a person to declare herself a cosmopolitan, relational ethico-political preconditions of cosmopolitanism remain non- or under-theorized. The term

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[3] Notice here the modernist (and ultimately un-cosmopolitan) undertones of each term in the construction: 'to advance my own aims effectively'.

'relational', as meant here, denotes what primarily involves the other and presupposes a decentring of the self. Such decentring comes from reflection on how the collective 'we' has treated various human and natural 'others'; the diachronic entanglement of peoples and the ethico-political quandaries, pending debts, unresolved issues and prospects for a different future all this may open. Instead of granting the self the image and title of the 'cosmopolitan', the relational makes higher demands on the self, at least, higher than those made by the monological framework. It does not assume that all that it takes for one to be cosmopolitan is to cross external borders, to escape the 'order' of localized existence and to welcome the real, supposed or imagined 'disorder' that exposure to difference introduces to one's life.

After all, some borders are internal and require other kinds of transcendence in order to be crossed, not facile ones of rootlessness, mere displacement or hybrid post-coloniality. Ironically, a resilient Cartesian solipsism seems to operate underneath those (post-)modern conceptions of cosmopolitanism that continue to put the self centre stage despite their anti-Cartesian declarations; interestingly, the otherwise vehement postmodern critique of Cartesian subjectivity falls far short when the issue of cosmopolitanism is at stake. Hence, some valuable criticisms (e.g. by Hansen 2008) of discursive operations related to proclaiming oneself a cosmopolitan can be pushed further. It can be shown that such criticisms of established outlooks are better served by another conception of cosmopolitanism, one that is not reducible to the mere pollination of subjectivity and cannot be so easily considered attainable or accomplished.

Concentric cosmopolitanism typically demands on the self to negotiate her distance from others who inhabit the space that is demarcated by ever outer circles. In more culturalist versions of cosmopolitanism, this negotiation concerns what is cognitively, aesthetically, culturally and, more generally, existentially on offer in the outer circles. A successful negotiation of distance in such cases invokes a less parochial and rather rootless existence. In more legal-moral versions of cosmopolitanism, the crucially contested and negotiated space concerns moral obligations and/or provinces of legal action. A successful negotiation of distance in such cases invokes a less community-centred demarcation of duties and more 'learned' and responsive stances to the rights, needs and expectations of the groups that populate the outer circles or more legal interventionist stances to world injustices. Though such legal-moral cosmopolitanism is more relational than the culturalist, it may nevertheless share with it the monological point of departure. This happens when all begins from the self who is invited to shorten the distance that separates her from others with little reconsideration of, or critical reflection on, the self's standpoint. For instance, the neglect of ecological cosmopolitanism (or the adoption of ecological ethical concerns only when environmental destruction has an impact on the quality of human life and entails risks for the self) (Spector 2015) illustrates the centripetal tendencies of a cosmopolitanism that is otherwise more relational than the culturalist version.

To the dominant, concentric centrality of subjectivity, I argue, another geometrical metaphor might be an appropriate theoretical response: cosmopolitanism can be illustrated through the image of eccentric circles. The fact that eccentric circles are

not drawn around the same centre offers some new possibilities for illustrating the relation of cosmopolitanism with multiple identities. It accommodates, say, cases of multiple allegiances (all of them being subsets of the all-encompassing cosmopolitan allegiance), which become politically activated even when they do not have the self as their common centre. For instance, one does not have to be constructed as a 'woman' in order to endorse demands typically associated with feminism; and one does not need to defend the preservation of endangered species on grounds of that species 'utility' for human life or not. Eccentric circles as figures of particular allegiances (relatively stable or momentary) that do not necessarily emanate from egocentricity can also disrupt the harmonious and proportionate geometrical order that concentric circles evince. Thus, they better reflect the more complex character of real human attachments to particularities. They make room for the complexity of a political philosophy that does not take the self for granted, at least not in old ways that evoke solipsism, essentialism, purist authenticity and fixity.

The decentring of the subject through eccentricity neither effaces the self, nor does it discard the concentric circles. It aims to enrich the cosmopolitan perspective with ever-shifting circles where the centre is often the other. It invites us not quite to shrink our distance from otherness but rather to create a distance from what appears to be our own, from what pertains to our self or describes our self at a given time. In other words, true harkening to alterity sometimes requires us to reconsider and *de*-scribe our self. What comprises, for instance, our consolidated practices, perceptions, interpretations and actions that affect otherness constitutes a 'baggage' that constitutes the traveller who never travels light, much against the self-understanding of footloose élites. The baggage of our self being already constructed in ways that filter our responsiveness to otherness is usually carried along even when we literally cross borders or when we endorse moral prescriptions of global aid or assume the posture of the global benefactor.

Instead of replacing the concentric, the eccentric aims to complicate the cosmopolitan perspective and to displace it in an ethico-political (rather than merely existential) sense. Cosmopolitanism demands an eccentric distancing from identity, a distancing which is not quite the by now theoretically fashionable denial of identity but rather a more profound, complex and often unexpected dialectical development. To unpack this claim, let us rephrase its deeper stake by putting the issue in the form of a question.[4] 'Is there any paradox in persons recognizing the history of their own identity and the ways in which it *intrudes* upon and shapes their outlook'? My answer to this question is more or less like this: our identities are constructed in multiple, fluctuating and intricate modes; this admission makes it easier for us to recognize the history of our own self. So, at times, we take some critical distance from our identities (denaturalize them) and see ourselves as hosts of various conditioning experiences. Subconscious operations aside, we may even act as discerning hosts, preparing ourselves to receive certain influences, to invite 'home' new 'inscriptions' (i.e. to let ourselves be shaped by new experiences) or to negate some

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[4] It is a question that Michael Peters raised to me at an interview and which elicited an answer that I am adapting here; see Peters and Papastephanou (2013).

'visitations', etc. But all this self-malleability should not be exaggerated or considered given just by virtue of a mere encounter with otherness. Our very decisions on, and acts regarding, what to host reflect, to varying degrees of force, the way we have already been shaped. In this sense, the term 'intrude' used in the above question appropriately describes this operation of the already familiar (to an extent, familial). Paradoxically, contrary to what is usually believed, the 'intruder' is not quite the foreign and the new, but rather the already established. Historically (i.e. spatiotemporally) constructed, our own 'current' selves intervene (intrude) in our operations as hosts and make us hostages to our own 'currency'.

But, instead of leading us to 'bad faith' and to various determinist interpretations of subjectivity, I believe that this paradox enables freedom and responsibility if we conceptualize it eccentrically. Rather than taking our construction as inescapable and non-negotiable, awareness of this paradox makes room for recognizing a 'paradoxa' ('doxa' denotes 'opinion, view'), another (and others') opinion of ourselves, one that, given the rich meanings of the preposition 'para', is always side by side with, and possibly contrary to, our currently held view on ourselves. Hosting the opinion of the other, being prepared to revisit our operations as host in light of the other's challenge of them, frees us, even if temporarily, from the position of the hostage to ourselves. In taking up the other's challenge, we accept the invitation to respond, to be responsive and to be held responsible for acts or negations of hosting. In other words, this 'para-doxa' helps us become more eccentric *qua* decentred.

Yet, often because neither the other's confrontational words succeed in shaking us nor are they necessarily framed in an idiom that does justice to their own legitimate demands, we cannot relegate the task of our decentring to others and we should not overlook the infinitely complex dialectic of 'us' and 'them' alternating in roles of host and hostage. Nor should we overlook operations that destabilize the brittle structures of 'we' and 'they', for the very category of 'we' and 'they' should never be treated lightly and uniformly. Therefore, goodness and wisdom in their constructive precariousness as ever-receding preconditions of cosmopolitanism, as I have interpreted the Democritean dictum that emphasizes them (Papastephanou 2013), seem to me to help in the direction of reclaiming the relational in a global context that continues, consciously or not, to glorify the monological. As never claimable 'attributes' of the self, goodness and wisdom motivate an ever-shifting eccentricity of the self, a critical dissatisfaction with, and reflective distance from, established and shaped selfhood.

16.3   Polycentric Cosmopolitanism

Having offered a rough sketch of the operations of the geometric metaphor of eccentric circles, let me further illustrate this approach by differentiating it from related alternative approaches. It is interesting critically to focus not on 'targets' that make things easy, so to speak, but on those post-colonial and culturalist theories that also voice criticisms of concentric circles. I have selected (a) Homi Bhabha's vernacular

cosmopolitanism and (b) W. E. Connolly's rhizomatic critique of concentric cultures as such polycentric alternatives. However, this critical discussion will remain only indicative for reasons of space:

(a) To Bhabha, 'it is the "disorder" of our books that makes of us irredeemable "vernacular" cosmopolitans committed to what Walter Benjamin describes as "the renewal of existence"' (1995: 5). Attributing the adjective 'cosmopolitan' so easily to people committed to the renewal of existence, as attractive as this ideal may be, makes one feel that much of what is an ethico-political ideality of cosmopolitanism is too quickly reduced to just existential enrichment or reshuffling of the self. The term 'cosmopolitan' is too easily conceded to just any movement of the academic flâneur and thus raises objections regarding the un-cosmopolitan exclusivism implicit in singling out a specific cast as eligible to the badge of the 'cosmopolitan'. Consider in such light Bhabha's following claim: 'In subtle ways that disorder challenges the shelved order of the study [...] which persuades us that we are cosmopolitans of a more "universal", academic cast' (ibid). The disorder of the material that shapes us and renews our existence may indeed complicate a facile, concentric cosmopolitanization of the scholar. But it does not stave off the danger of such disorder effecting only more sophisticated and critique-immunized exaltations of the vernacular-cosmopolitan academic. Disorder as such does not lead the 'renewed', 'reinvented' self to eccentric reconsideration of his set aims and of his advancing them effectively.

Bhabha criticizes Martha Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and charges it with an ultimately exclusivist provincialism. These criticisms help us see how Bhabha's vernacular cosmopolitanism is framed in opposition to the concentric circles metaphor. 'In her attempt to avoid nationalist or patriotic sovereignty, Nussbaum embraces a "universalism" that is profoundly provincial, provincial in a specific historical sense'. To Bhabha, this is so because Nussbaum too readily assumes 'the "givenness" of a commonality that centres on the "self" – as the Satrap of a benign, belated liberal benevolence – as it genially generates its "cosmopolitan" concentric circles of equal measure and comparable worth. But who are our "fellow city dwellers" in the global sense?' (ibid: 6).[5]

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[5] My critique of Nussbaum on the point of unacknowledged historical (and often traumatic) positionality differs from Bhabha's critique. Let me indicate this in a skeletal way with the example of colonialism and with a very brief contrast of Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism with Frantz Fanon's insights (Papastephanou 2012). While Nussbaum takes the self as a given and unproblematic centre whose ethical gap from distant others should be narrowed, Fanon showed that resistance to colonialism was, amongst other things, a subjectivation process against the self-denying impact that colonialism had on the colonized. The identity of the colonized had to be redeemed from the confusions that colonialism had so methodically and ruthlessly cultivated (or "employed" in a less intentional sense of governmentality) in order to keep control over the colonies. In other words, instead of holding a uniform conception of the self of all cosmopolitans-to-be, Fanon exposed that the self of the dominated was not a given, a stable centre from which all else moved outward. It was an identity that had suffered attacks and damages and that, precisely because of this, had then to be 'healed', restored (*qua* de-traumatized) and reconstructed through national insurrection as a first, yet not final, stage and through an enlargement of consciousness as an end point (which would save the colonized from the risk of remaining a people trapped in a prolonged past and from

Critiquing Nussbaum's concentric circles, Bhabha turns to another source, Adrienne Rich's cosmopolitan subject and draws from there an alternative positionality of the self. He writes 'the boundaries and territories of the cosmopolitan "concentric" world are profoundly, and painfully, underscored and overdetermined'. In Rich's poetry, 'the "I" is iteratively, interrogatively staged; poised at the point at which, in recounting historical trauma, the incommensurable "localities" of experience and memory each time put the "I" in a different place' (ibid: 7). Though this may indeed point to a polycentric, even eccentric, cosmopolitanization of the subject, Bhabha's selection of examples reflects the sensibilities of the footloose global intellectual. It does so, in my view, in a rather un-cosmopolitan, localized and ultimately 'provincial' way. Bhabha's selection of examples marks an almost imperceptible (though political extremely important) passage from the above-quoted recounting of historical trauma to currently fashionable modalities of noticing and theorizing trauma worthy of cosmopolitan attention. It thus reflects an unquestioned privileging of synchronically crossing spaces and borders over considering diachronic ethico-political debts and performing genealogies that challenge the 'I' more radically. In this way, Bhabha's examples operate at the synchronic level, singling out instances (compatible with polycentric cosmopolitanism) that have already passed the stage of becoming safe Western metonymies of cosmopolitan challenge.

Let me clarify this. To the question about who Nussbaum's fellow city dwellers might be, Bhabha answers by continuing to ask rhetorical questions that exemplify his objections: 'The eighteen or nineteen million refugees who lead their unhomely lives in borrowed and barricaded dwellings? The hundred million migrants, of whom over half are fleeing poverty and gender persecution world-wide? The twenty million who have fled health and ecological disasters?' (ibid: 6–70). Important as these examples are (and certainly overlooked by Nussbaum), they all involve the moving subject. In fact, they mainly concern the subject who moves westwardly and, in so doing, the subject who manages to move the West. For, the Western self, valuing mobility as he does and considering himself constantly on the move, finds it much easier to identify and sympathize with the mobile subject than, say, with any rooted self. The latter may not require the West's cosmopolitan attention by coming ashore (and thus by problematizing Western comfort zones of citizenship). But she may nevertheless complicate facile assumptions of both concentric and polycentric understandings of cosmopolitan challenge[6] by making demands on the West based on pending ethico-political debts. For instance, the Ovaherero Namibian tribes (and their compensation claims against Germany for the genocide that they suffered

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chauvinistically consolidating identity). The image of eccentric circles can do more justice to this possible road to cosmopolitanism, I believe, than that of concentric circles.

[6] As a case in point, consider here also the people of Chagos who, instead of asking citizenship rights in exile, they demand their right of return to their islands from which they were expelled by US and UK governments. Chagossians have failed to become metonymies and to crop up in sets of examples by academic cosmopolitans, vernacular or other. More on their case, in Papastephanou (2015).

between 1904 and 1907) (Werner 1990) escape the confines of Bhabha's above exemplarity since their case does not involve the movement that Bhabha (otherwise rightly) politicizes and the relativization of local affect that, as we will see below, Bhabha exalts. Thus, one wonders whether Bhabha's exemplarity is not closer to Nussbaum's than Bhabha might be prepared to acknowledge.

Bhabha's subtle exclusion of the 'rooted' subject from cosmopolitan attention becomes more evident when he dissociates the subject neglected by Nussbaum from local affect in a way that, thought through to its ultimate implications, reasserts rather than questions the Western self-mirroring (a *mesconnaissance*, anyway) (and that of favourite 'others') as 'rootless'. To Bhabha, the '"extreme" conditions [of the migrant and the refugee] are not at the limits of the cosmopolitan world', as much as they emphasize a certain liminality[7] in the cosmopolitan subject mobilized by Nussbaum. 'It is a subject peculiarly free of the complex "affect" that makes possible social identification and affiliation' (ibid). In my view, Bhabha challenges the spatial and geometrical metaphoricity of the concentric circles too literally. That is, he questions the self's inclusion in the particularist circles as such. He questions, and to a degree rightly, the belonging (and the corresponding affect, which, it is important to add, is not adequately differentiated in his text) of the refugee and the migrant in the new locality. True, refugees and migrants may not share with the city dweller a commonality of affect. But this does not rule out the possibility of a rootedness based on less literal (and less synchronic) affectivity, since there is no logical necessity that the mobile or migrant subject ceases affectively to belong to her original locality just by being forced away.[8] In Bhabha's text (read between the lines), refugees and migrants share with the footloose academic cast the movement in space and the experience of disorder that generates the renewal of existence. But is this simplistic description of the lack of affect not a homogenizing tendency as such? Does the freedom of the complex affect come about in the same way in the case of refugees and in the case of migrants? What about the Ovaherero mentioned above, for whom the memory of the suffered genocide and its pending, unfulfilled recognition (and concomitant compensation) has strengthened their sense of collective belonging (Werner 1990) instead of relativizing it?

Bhabha adequately concretizes his examples to make clear that he is not talking about the affect of the well-fed burgher who has learnt to live and work within and across borders. Still, he is not specific about how this freedom from the affect is obtained in the case of various migrants and refugees, if it is 'obtained' at all, and, more, how it might be relevant in visibly 'rooted' people who demand cosmopolitan attention. I place the verb 'obtain' in quote marks because I do not take the overcoming of the affect as a feat – though it is certainly felt so in Bhabha. Through

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[7] True, during liminal periods of life, social hierarchies may be reversed or temporarily dissolved and continuity of tradition may become uncertain. But this does not quite amount to wholesale freedom from local affect.

[8] The experience of most refugees and of many migrants is heart-rending, and this is more reason for many of them to 'carry along' their affect for their original locality/collectivity (and often to idealize and romanticize it) instead of 'overcoming' it in a deterritorializing mode.

what processes does the refugee (all refugees?) become deterritorialized and its local affect relativized?[9] Conversely, the fundamental assumption of lack of affect proves wrong when the other demands re-territorialization and defends her right to remain rooted. Bhabha's vernacular cosmopolitanism, despite its critique of concentricity, remains a reflection of and on the Western self because it cannot make room for those who wish to remain rooted and reclaim their rootedness and do not come ashore to demand the Western self's granting of citizenship rights. It also neglects those with whom the mobile Western self cannot easily relate because they do not share the Western self-understanding as 'rootless nomads' (even if, like many Herero, they are nomads in the literal sense within their own spatiality).

Two of Adrienne Rich's verses (cf Bhabha 1995: 7) can serve as an example of a decentring of the self that does not go far enough: 'I'm a table set with room for the Stranger I'm a field with corners left for the landless'. They reiterate patterns that domesticate critique and secure a moral self-image for the well-off Western subject. This subject feels that all she owes to the other is either charity or hospitality upon visitation, as if the political expectations of the less affluent or the refugee or the wronged are exhausted in acts of benevolence when the other becomes a visiting stranger. The 'spatiality' of the 'table' and the 'field', the self as surface and receptive chora, the making 'room' and the leaving 'corners' as ontological frames of the 'I' (consider the 'I am' in the verses) fail to evoke a more politicized, active search for debt and responsibility to the other apart from conceding space to the other in a moralist manner.

Some debts to others may not involve charitable aid or redistribution of wealth, much less concessions of one's 'own' 'corner' or citizenship right. For instance, most of US military base construction has created pending ethico-political debts of a different kind. It 'required' and effected the removal of the inhabitants of the relevant place. It thus dislocated and made them refugees. The inhabitants' claims to justice involve neither Western making room for them as supposed 'strangers' nor leaving a corner to the landless, but, rather, acts that restore the now landless to what is theirs. And they also require a cosmopolitan outlook different from the mainstream that dominates even polycentric approaches.

(b) Like Bhabha, Connolly also criticizes Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism. He grants that 'Nussbaum does advise cosmopolites to pay attention to the "particularities" of other cultures. You compare your cultural assumptions to theirs to locate the element of commonality between them' (Connolly 2000: 608). He considers this recommendation good, but insufficient. 'For often enough, dominant commonalities across cultures themselves need to be subjected to critical scrutiny'. Connolly points to the fluctuating and unstable character of grouping. 'Previous conceptions of women, sexuality, race, and the necessity to ground a nation in one religion have carried considerable weight across several cultures at one time or another, only to be called into question at a later date by new movements within and across those cultures'. This has critical implications for what Connolly sees as too rigid universalism.

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[9] As such a challenging case, we may consider the processes by which the Chagossians were 'deterritorialized'. The Chagossians themselves use the Creole verb: 'deraciner' (Vine 2009).

'Because we are defined, to some uncertain degree, by the concentric circles in which we move, we need periodically to work on ourselves to deuniversalize selective particularities that have become universalized in or by us'. By further implication, concentric belonging appears again insufficient: 'it is not that the concentric image misrepresents territorial culture entirely or that thick universals must be scrapped'. But, to Connolly, without the complication that dense, rhizomatic connections crossing and exceeding concentric circles offer to cosmopolitanism 'the concentric image points you either to the ugly particularism of the nation/civilization (Huntington) or toward single-entry universalism in a putative world of territorial nations (Nussbaum)' Connolly 2000: 609).

To Connolly, rhizomatic connections decentre the self and challenge facile universalisms. 'While respecting the extra-national aspiration that governs Nussbaum's work, I invoke creative tension between concentric and rhizomatic forces in cultural life'. Such forces provide 'a double-entry orientation' to the universal, an element of contestability in any specific rendering of the universal. They also add 'a mode of compassion that includes critical responsiveness to new movements of identity and rights challenging the previous sense of sufficiency invested in concentric renderings of the universal' (Connolly 2000: 609). Thus, Connolly offers us another polycentric version of cosmopolitanism. In what follows, I will briefly indicate that the rhizomatic as such fails to decentre the self when a radically reflective and critical attitude to the collective self is lacking.

In Connolly's approach, the local affect is not wholesale incriminated and discarded. Connolly's cosmopolitanism does not 'delegitimize concentric identifications as such, for you need to participate in the family that nourishes you and the state that governs you' (2000: 603).[10] Emphasis is placed on rhizomatic possibilities, and the idea is 'to appreciate how concentric circles of political culture are complicated and compromised by numerous crosscutting allegiances, connections, and modes of collaboration'. Yet, such complication is subordinated to the ideal of enrichment of existence and individual choice through taking 'advantage of the possibilities created by the compression of distance to enact a more vibrant plurality of connections exceeding the concentric model'. Connolly exaggerates the pragmatic problematization of concentricity by stressing that, in reality, multiple identifications undo the supposed closure of the circles. 'For existing patterns of identification, allegiance and collaboration already exceed the concentric image of them' (ibid). This is true at the descriptive level, but it hardly justifies any stretching of this reality to ethico-political conclusions. That our allegiances are more complex and complicated does not mean that they sensitize us to realities that challenge our goal settings and make us better listeners of diverse others or ethico-politically responsive to them.

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[10] Notice, however, how the above phrasing (as well as Connolly's relevant text as a whole) reduces the immediate circles of family and state to household economy of need and to a household management of government, respectively. What is missing is any ideality that would make belonging in such collectivities ethico-politically more demanding and critical. Hence, the concentric circles are still interpreted in traditional, politically mainstream and uninspiring ways.

Let me explain this with an example. US and UK officials who approved the displacement of locals in then prospective US bases such as Chagos (Papastephanou 2015) were not lacking crosscutting connections and experiences of rhizomatic deterritorializations. But in their minds, the morally repugnant, indeed, criminal approvals of those dislocations of the rightful inhabitants of places such as Chagos were justified as follows: the supposed gains to be realized from the base (for US/UK policies) were much higher than any consideration of human rights. Though the officials knew the destructive effects of those removals for the locals, they felt that the impact of their displacement on US aims, purposes and interests would be limited or even totally insignificant. Protests by relatively small numbers of people (in many cases, 'under colonial control and of non-"white", non-European ancestry' Vine 2009: 16) cannot easily be heard. Kant's (and later cosmopolitans') assumption,[11] as I stated it in the introduction of this book, that a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere, does not hold in the case of small numbers of people. Likewise, Connolly's following assertion misfires when cases such as Chagos are at stake: 'the speed and global scope of communication make it difficult to avoid the question of indigenous peoples in "settler societies"' (Connolly 2000: 610). Despite conditions such as speed and enhanced communication that effect rhizomatic complexity, the Chagos case of displacement and the ongoing protests and demands of the Chagossians to return to their homes have easily been avoided by 'rhizomatic cosmopolitans' and remain sweepingly unknown to most global academia and publics. Thus, I do not share Connolly's optimist faith in the rhizome because precisely this faith effects its own normalizations and marginalizations of claims that do not manage to pass the filter of Western hegemonic metonymization of crises and injustices.

Rhizomatic, culturally enriched and hybrid 'cosmopolitan' experience does not suffice on its own to bear ethico-political fruit. Henry Kissinger's attitude to displaced populations is a case in point: Kissinger 'once said of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands, "There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn"? (Vine 2009: 183). In fact, if we think that hybridity, mobility and enrichment of one's selfhood through other cultures 'while retaining its capacity to achieve self-definition and to advance its own aims effectively' (Hollinger 2001: 239) are the requirements for granting one the badge of the cosmopolitan, we realize that some of those US officials (and Kissinger amongst them) meet all such facile and ultimately monological requirements, despite their ethico-politically repugnant handlings. Was Kissinger not hybrid or mobile enough when he translated the number of the Marshall Islands' inhabitants into eligibility to displacement? Could he be an avatar of cosmopolitanism just in virtue of his hybridity and mobility or on

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[11] Let us recall it: 'the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere' (Kant 1992): 107–8.

grounds of the fact that his latest book deals with a cosmopolitan theme such as the new world order and has already attracted the attention of global academia?[12]

Let me deploy my critique more concretely through Connolly's own examples. Those do not really challenge the centrality of the self; they just show that commitments may have changed into becoming more virtual, less reflecting of older attachments: 'You might cultivate ties to ecologists or feminists in South America that are more significant than those you share on these two issues with some neighbors, in-laws, or corporate leaders in your own state'. True, though not quite unprecedented, this interconnection is enhanced through speed and technology. Yet, surprisingly, the ties, say, of internationalized feminism have not proved sufficient to make the voice of Chagossian women (continually at the forefront of the Chagossian movement- Papastephanou 2015) heard in the West and acknowledged by the academics who otherwise exalt crosscutting allegiance. 'You might support cross-country citizen networks designed to protect rain forests in several countries (including your own) or to reduce toxic emissions in the world, doing so to nourish the future of life anywhere and everywhere on the planet' (Connolly 2000: 604). True again, but, do all these make higher demands on the current self, on the by now more accustomed subject to considering ecological threats that primarily set the subject and his society at risk? The pinpointed allegiances are just different kinds of concentric circles to the extent that the self remains the centre of them; what changes is only the name and the breadth of the circle, e.g. as in the geometrical case where the centre is stable but circles interlock. Certainly, it also depends on what kind of self we are talking about, but the displacement of the self (left so vaguely theorized by Connolly), i.e. the movement toward different forms of allegiances that depend less on physical coexistence than in the past, does not quite entail that internal ethico-political borders are challenged or overcome just through the spatial complication of the self.

Connolly privileges the rhizomatic over the concentric in a way that raises too many expectations from the rhizomatic as such. 'If you have a concentric image of culture, you see little reason why such strategies are needed to bring into the fore rhizomatic dimensions of life obscured by the hegemony of that image' (ibid: 608): thought through, this may mean that the overcoming of the concentric image and the acknowledgement of the rhizomatic dimensions of life automatically ease the passage to something better. If this is indeed a valid reading, then, my objection is as follows. The assumption that cultures have as such a rhizomatic dimension is correct and a useful reminder of potentials inherent in all everydayness and not just in the quotidian as experienced in exceptionalist contexts or in footloose lifestyles; however, it nevertheless involves a danger of self-indulgence (with obviously concentric effects). For, it presents cosmopolitanism as an ideal already approximated due to technology and the compression of time and the changes this has effected or an ideal already accomplished through rhizomatic structures which are already there. From then on, all we need to do is to notice those structures and respect them. This is not only normatively and critically-politically too simplistic. It also fails to

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[12] As I am writing this coda (early 2015), Kissinger's new book on world order has already received the astonishing number of 40 citations although it appeared as late as 2014.

acknowledge realities at the empirical level that disprove the assumption that the mere acknowledgement of rhizomatic structures makes us true cosmopolitans.

16.4   Conclusion

David Hollinger stated back in 2001 that 'one prominent feature of the new movement [of cosmopolitanism – M. P.] is the reticence of most of the discussants about the label, cosmopolitanism. This reticence is displayed in the frequency and earnestness with which its apparent adherents modify the naming noun with one or more of a remarkable string of adjectives'. And he mentioned 'vernacular cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitanism, critical cosmopolitanism' etc. (2001: 237).

Hollinger sees this feature as an effort of 'new cosmopolitans' to insert some distance from modern, Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. To some extent, and at first sight, this may seem to be the case with eccentric cosmopolitanism. It is indeed differentiated from many modern conceptions of cosmopolitanism. But, as I hope to have shown, it is also differentiated from current accounts of cosmopolitanism and thus takes distances from what is seen as 'new cosmopolitanism'.[13] Much more, I have indicated (though surely not argued out) that modern 'cosmopolitanism' was so narrowly defined and conceptualized that in most cases it could not do justice to the potential of the term itself (cosmos, politics) or to the paths that had been paved (though certainly not pursued) in antiquity. It was understood as a universalization that suited the purposes of modern expansion, it did not pursue the counterfactual possibilities of cynic and early Stoic eccentricity (let alone the older, Democritean one- Papastephanou 2013) and it did not dethrone the individual and collective self for the sake of cosmos; it just made cosmos an extension of the self and of the state. Thus, what Hollinger mentions about 'new cosmopolitans' and their criticisms that modern cosmopolitanism 'was insufficiently responsive to diversity, particularity, history, the masses of humankind, the realities of power, and the need for politically viable solidarities' (2001: 237) does not apply to what I have argued in this coda. For, my attempt has not been to preserve modern conceptions of cosmopolitanism and just modify them with qualifiers. My attempt has been to show that the concept 'cosmopolitanism' can be reconstructed, surely with a critical eye to its conceptual history, but more than that, through a different optics that begins with the highest demands that cosmos makes on humanity.

Thus, let me conclude with a disclaimer: my own adjectival qualification of cosmopolitanism with the word 'eccentric' should not quite convey a reticence regarding cosmopolitanism, as if cosmopolitanism were indeed something different from the adjective that aspires to determine it or hold it supposedly in check. I do not preserve the modern conception of cosmopolitanism and modify it with an adjective

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[13] In evoking Democritus' view (that goodness and wisdom make any part of cosmos a patria for those who strive for such goodness and wisdom, see more in Papastephanou 2013) one might say that the conception of cosmopolitanism explored here is in fact rather old instead of new.

that aspires to protect it from degenerations. The conception of cosmopolitanism that I defend is not dependent on the conceptual history of the term other than in a critical mode. As I explain elsewhere (Papastephanou 2012) and have indicated in the introduction of this book, at a definitional level, there are conceptual possibilities inherent in the words that compose the term 'cosmopolitanism', 'cosmos' and 'polis/politics' that should be brought to the fore and turned into enabling metaphors. I believe that, to deserve the name, cosmopolitanism as ideal and virtue can make sense in being as such, i.e. inherently, eccentric as much as it may be concentric, vernacular, rhizomatic or other. A concentric view that excludes eccentricity condemns cosmopolitanism to being primarily about the self rather than about cosmos, and this brings it against its own terminological invocation of the fact that cosmos as the totality of biota and non-sentient beings invites the self to imagine and surrender to a vision of an ideal polis.

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