Abstract
In this paper, we criticize the way Philip Pettit presents the philosophical traditions he is opposing in his political philosophy, liberalism and populism. Focusing mainly on his book Republicanism, we ask first, if he misrepresents liberalism with regards to the conditions for realizing freedom (Sect. 11.2.1). Secondly, we wonder which authors are considered as proponents of liberalism and which are not (Sect. 11.2.2). After that, we focus on his differences with other republicans, which he calls ‘populists’. We ask whom his theory addresses (Sect. 11.3.1) and how it allows for participation of citizens (Sect. 11.3.2).
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Notes
- 1.
In this text, our main focus will be on Republicanism. In this earlier book Pettit gives the most detailed historical account and we cannot see that he has changed this account ever since.
- 2.
See e.g. R, 50, and the differences between liberals and republicans concerning the understanding of law, R, 84: “The difference between the two ideals on this front connects with their different views of law. Devotees of freedom as non-interference view legal or state coercion, no matter how well bounded and controlled, as a form of coercion that is just as bad in itself as coercion from other quarters; if it is to be justified, then that can only be because its presence makes for a lesser degree of coercion overall.”
- 3.
As Pettit (OPT, 141f) himself emphasizes.
- 4.
Filmer bases his theory on an interpretation of some biblical verses, especially Gen 1:28.
- 5.
“It is a truth undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, either great or small, though gathered together from several corners and remotest regions of the world, but that same multitude, considered by itself, there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the rest, as being the next heir to Adam, and all the others subject unto him.” (Filmer 1949, Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy, 288).
- 6.
Locke certainly used some of Hobbes‘arguments without accepting the whole Hobbesian conception. Therefore, Ashcraft 1987, 41 could mention Locke’s “certain fascination with Hobbes’ philosophy.” Laslett has given a convincing analysis of the relationship between Hobbes and Locke (Laslett 1988, 67–92). He emphasizes that Locke beyond doubt had “a great deal in common” with Hobbes.
- 7.
Macpherson 1962, see e.g. 221: Locke “has erased the moral disability with which unlimited capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped. […] But he does even more. He also justifies, as natural, a class differential in rights and in rationality, and by doing so provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society.”
- 8.
Pettit makes the assumption that his communitarian opposition from Jean-Jacques Rousseau over Hannah Arendt to Michael Sandel shares a common tradition (OPT, 11–18, esp. 12). Unfortunately we cannot analyze this assumption in detail. But we must doubt, if it is not anachronistic to call Rousseau a communitarian. Also this interpretation neglects the strong (systematic) differences between the individual authors. One example is Pettit’s handling of Arendt. She surely does not have a wish for a “close, homogenous society” (R, 8). On the contrary she was deeply horrified of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ of the Nazis, which was an attempt to realize this wish, and analyzed and criticized it in ‘The Origins of Totalitarism’ (Arendt 1951).
- 9.
These comments are loosely based on Iseult Honohan’s introduction into republicanism (Honohan 2002). In her book she analyses four core themes of the republican tradition of political thought, whose increased presence she attributes respectively to four eras of the history of the republican tradition: 1. virtue, 2. freedom, 3. participation, 4. recognition. In each era she also asks which scope a conception has, meaning who it addresses, who is considered to be a citizen and how many people participate in the corresponding republic.
Pettit undoubtedly recognizes and reproduces the theme of freedom, but it is not entirely clear how he positions himself to the other themes of the tradition. Due to the shortage of space we limit ourselves to the questions of scope and participation. Nevertheless we think that Pettit’s conception has equal problems with the theme of virtue.
- 10.
There may be the exception of Pettit’s book covering the reception of his philosophy in Zapatero’s Spain (Martí and Pettit 2010). However, Pettit’s republicanism appears in the book as a general theory which was applied in Spain, not as a theory for Spain (or another western country).
- 11.
We do not think that the gap between Pettit’s theory and the classical texts can easily be bridged with an adoption of a third way between particularism and universalism. Such a solution would suggest for example that freedom as non-domination is a universalistic goal only insofar as it is implemented into a particular society. But the problem of the perspective would remain: Whereas the classical authors addressed their societies, Pettit would still aim for neutral point above a concrete society.
- 12.
Pettit’s republicanism is compatible with pluralistic societies because of the adoption of egalitarian ideas. From his point of view it can be said that his opponents (although he doesn’t call them republicans) remain in an older, pre-modern form of republicanism (R, 96–97).
- 13.
Honohan’s portrayal of Pettit: Honohan (2002, 8, 59, 183–187).
- 14.
At this point it must be asked, if the underlying theory of democracy is not contra-intuitive. In this theory democracy is more about the selection of laws that can withstand the contestations of the citizens than about the making of new laws (R, 201–202). This contrasts with the reality of many processes of democratic decision making, which are sometimes more about the identity of a political community. If we follow Pettit’s theory these are devaluated to mere symbolic gestures, because the consequences of them are often unclear. But in fact they are an integral part of the political system. If one accepts the idea of participation, one does not run into these problems necessarily because the idea of participation helps in bringing out the necessity for the citizens to identify with democratic decisions.
- 15.
Furthermore Pettit claims that majorities alone do not suffice for changing a law (R, 180–182). Even if the fear of policy that harms minorities is certainly reasonable, the contrary concern is not met. This may be a great deficit because one can be certain that it is dangerous for a democracy if the majority has the feeling of not being able to influence democratic decisions.
In reference to direct democracy we have to ask, if one should not separate between how a democratic decision is made (e.g. direct vs. parliamentary) and the frame, in which it can be made (usually the constitution).
- 16.
Arendt (1977, 253ff).
- 17.
Arendt (1977, 255).
- 18.
Here, Pettit could adopt the solution proposed by Habermas in line with Bernhard Peters (Habermas 1998, 429–435). He proposes ‘locks’ (a metaphor from water transport, ‘Schleusen’), with which it is secured that political institutions are responsible to the informal public sphere. One example of such a lock would be a hearing of experts.
- 19.
Kramer (2008, 56): “Although civic republicanism as a general political doctrine can perhaps lay claim to distinctiveness, it does not provide an analysis of the concept of freedom that goes beyond the negative-liberty approach in any significant way.”
- 20.
Honohan (2002, 185): “Yet this account [Pettit’s] is still closer to the negative than the positive conception of freedom.”
- 21.
Dagger (1997, esp. 11–27).
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Lüders, S., Müller-Salo, J.W. (2016). Which Liberalism, Which Republicanism? Constructing Traditions of Political Thought with Philip Pettit. In: Derpmann, S., Schweikard, D. (eds) Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_11
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