Keywords

1 Introduction

This chapter explores the extent to which national and regional urban policies are connected to advancing the Beira Corridor, anchored on the Beira Port. Beira is a secondary city in Mozambique. Both the port and the city are the second largest in Mozambique. They have a national and regional significance, which has been constrained by wars and natural hazards (Shannon et al. 2018) alongside other classic constraints like rapid and underfunded urbanisation (Schofield and Deprez 2019). The city and its hinterland, extending into neighbouring Zimbabwe, are largely affected by the above factors. Urban governance practices at the national and regional level are integral to the management of these factors.

Urban governance refers to how the government (local, regional, and national) and stakeholders decide how to plan, finance, and manage urban areas (Avis 2016). It involves more than just laws and regulations, encompassing mechanisms and strategies to respond to shocks and challenges (Smit 2018). Secondary cities, with their smaller economies and less capacitated local governments compared to primary cities, face severe challenges in performing urban governance functions (Smit 2018). They generally have weaker urban economies and suffer from more fragile institutional and financial bases. UN Habitat (2016) notes that secondary cities experience chronic inequality of opportunities, widespread poverty, inadequate capital investments, and lack of pro-poor social programmes.

SADC countries are experiencing increased urbanisation, and the urban population has increased from 36.5% in 2000 to 46.0% in 2020 and is expected to increase to 51.4% by 2030 (Simkins 2021). This translates to an average annual growth rate of 3.8% between 2000 and 2020. In discussing Beira’s circumstances, an urban development framework becomes important to steer the debate away from capital cities while also engaging with prospects of what can be referred to as past-sovereign urbanisation (Angelopulo 2021).

2 Conceptual Framework and Methodology

There is a long historical relationship between ports and cities. The development of Beira Port, as a regional node, has implications for the city and its national and regional surroundings. The city, port, and corridor onto which they open must be integrated in terms of physical and economic planning and governance. Similarly, the constraints faced require layered responses that go beyond the immediate environment of Beira. Port city governance, planning, and management need to be understood at metropolitan, regional, and international scales. The partnerships and roles of international, regional, and national actors towards improving port corridors, especially those prone to climate change-related disasters, must be clearly understood. These needs enable the identification of governance gaps in the growth of a port city. The degree of participation of the private sector in the governance of the port city is also critical. Where these relationships are unclear, the regional and international significance of ports and the cities that host them can be lost, which impedes the growth and development of port cities.

Development corridors occur along transport routes that facilitate a variety of social and economic activities (Hope and Cox 2015) of international relevance. Evolution into a fully fledged economic corridor requires broader investments in soft and hard infrastructure in the area served by the corridor. These investments require urban governance frameworks that are aware of international-, regional-, national-, and local-level imperatives. The chapter will examine how investments towards improving the Beira port corridor have been impaired over time by war and other disasters. The two clusters of factors that limit Beira’s development are discussed with a focus on illuminating the kind of urban governance responses that Beira City, the national Government of Mozambique, and stakeholders from the SADC can explore to ensure thriving strategic secondary cities in the region.

The chapter is based on a desk study of academic, policy, and development literature. It reviews critical literature on port cities, international development corridors, urban governance structures, and scales of private sector participation in urban development. Some online key informant interviews were held to better understand the experiences of Beira City and the regional trade flowing from/to it.

3 Secondary Cities

There are many definitions of secondary cities. These definitions are based on the size of the population, administrative area, and the political, economic, and social significance of a city (Avis 2016). Secondary cities are the second tier in a national urban area hierarchy based on population thresholds (UN Habitat 2016). They are hubs in the production and distribution of various city systems connecting different spatial levels of human settlement (Marais et al. 2016). Avis (2016: 46) states that ‘secondary cities act as catalysts and secondary hubs in facilitating the localized production, transportation, transformation, or transfer of goods and services, people and information between subnational, metropolitan, national, regional and global systems of cities’. This shows their importance to their local, national, and regional settings. Existing literature, however, shows that urban systems in most secondary cities are poorly integrated, poorly designed, and therefore weak (Marais et al. 2016) at the local, national, and regional levels.

UN Habitat (2016) argues that many secondary cities in developing countries have failed to develop global or even national linkages and struggle to accommodate growing populations. This is partially because resource flows from central to city governments are often distorted in favour of large first-tier cities (Avis 2016). Central governments often fail to appreciate the important role of secondary cities and the different sets of policies and programmes needed to support local economic development (Marais et al. 2016).

4 Wars, Conflicts, and Their Impact on Urban Areas

After independence, many countries in Africa experienced civil war. Examples include Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Somalia, South Sudan, and Rwanda (Muldrow 2002; Annan 2014; Molemele 2015). Civil wars resulted from socio-economic, political, cultural, military, and legal disequilibria forcing individuals or groups to clash over interests, values, and goals within a state (Muldrow 2002).

Conflict is a multifaceted phenomenon (Elfversson t al. 2019). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggested that conflicts result from greed and grievances. Many rebellions appear to be linked to access to and control over resources, for instance, diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timbre in Cambodia (Muldrow 2002). In that respect, civil war can be considered systematically related to economic conditions, such as dependence upon primary commodity exports and low national incomes (Muldrow 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Molemele 2015).

There are grievances that emerge from sociopolitical factors that emanate from extreme poverty, marginalisation, gross inequalities, and weak state capacities to deal with previous conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), resulting in violent conflicts (Molemele 2015). Triggers vary and can be both internal and external to the localities of conflicting parties. In the main, they include exclusionary government policies, external support for repressive regimes, and small arms proliferation (Annan 2014). It is also important to consider mobilising factors such as religion and ethnicity that are used to induce violent action. In countries like Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, and the DRC, conflicts are mobilised around ethnicity, race, sovereignty, language, and cultural factors (Elfversson and Höglund 2021).

The relationship between wars and development is clear in the literature. Collier (2004: 1) argues that ‘the relationship between civil war and failures in development is strong and goes in both directions: civil war powerfully retards development; and equally, failures in development substantially increase proneness to civil war’. Wars in and around cities imply development in reverse. Armed conflict often leads to forced migration, refugee flows, capital flight, and the destruction of infrastructure (Elfversson and Höglund 2021). It creates a development gap between those countries that have experienced armed conflict (even those closer and/or supporting) and those that have not (Lemke 2003).

Wars are becoming more urbanised in nature (ICRC 2017; Elfversson et al. 2019). Cities in countries such as Syria, Ukraine, and Somalia have been the sites of major incidents of armed conflict (Elfversson and Höglund 2021). The impact on interconnected and interdependent urban infrastructure systems and services is drastic (Lemke 2003). These impacts take long and considerable resources to rebuild. Urban warfare and attacks on urban services directly, indirectly, and cumulatively impact urban liveability with consequences for urban populations (ICRC 2017).

Between 1989 and 2016, Elfversson and Höglund (2021) found more deaths in rural areas than in cities. This may result from fewer war experiences in cities than rural areas. Cities were the most fortified places, with wars only reaching them as armies retreated. Conventional civil wars were associated with guerrilla fighting primarily in rural areas (Lemke 2003), mostly triggered by underdevelopment and marginalisation of the peripheries.

Büscher (2018) found that Mogadishu in Somalia, Goma in the DRC, Juba in South Sudan, Bamako in Mali, and Bujumbura in Burundi bore significant scars of war. These cases demonstrate how wars and violent conflict take multiple forms. Wars and conflicts produce many destabilising effects through forced mobility, increasing militarisation of political struggles, state fragmentation, and incapacitation. Regarding the latter, Tahir’s (2021, 2022) work shows Mogadishu’s fractured land administration, conflict around critical infrastructure, and restricted urban reforms are historical outcomes of war. Even after a war, persistent threats of further conflicts within cities may recur. Beall et al. (2011: 2) suggest that ‘external intervention in sovereign conflicts can also give rise to new conflicts – particularly in cities – even where the aim is “post-conflict” reconstruction’. ICRC (2022) observes as follows:

It’s heartbreaking to watch a city you love die. Yet that…happens when armed conflicts are fought in…cities, endangering the lives of civilians and the infrastructure they depend on. The…consequences of urban warfare persist years, and even decades, after the fighting ends.Footnote 1

Beira’s experiences with war before and after Mozambique’s independence align with this framing of the constraints of its development. The effects of war are also closely related to the factors of national political economy. Zimbabwe’s second city, Bulawayo, also had a similar post-independence-restricted growth due to the civil war that constrained local economic activities, as well as government-supported development interventions for more than a half decade. The effects of destabilisation have persisted for over a generation since the end of the fighting.

5 Mozambique’s Political Economy and Its Framing of Beira’s Urban Development

All land in Mozambique belongs to the state (Sumich 2020). Responsibilities for planning, development, and issuing licence are passed to local authorities. Beira is governed by a Municipal Board with responsibility for all urban assets except for electricity, water, and primary roads, which are administered by national entities (Shannon 2020). The city relies on the national government for financial resources, including raising funds through services and land taxes. Land tenure remains largely secure in Beira. The nationalisation of land resulted in a certain level of control over urban development, even if it remains largely informal (Schofield and Deprez 2019).

The spatial planning system of Mozambique comprises four levels: national, provincial, district, and autarchic (UN Habitat 2017). At the national level, the National Institute for Physical Planning (INPF) has, since 1985, prepared physical plans or supported the City Executive Councils (CECs) in their preparation, draughting planning norms and principles, as well as monitoring and controlling implementation (UN Habitat 2008). The municipal/autarchic level regulates local activities (Murithi et al. 2012) (Box 7.1).

Box 7.1: Urban Legal Framework for Mozambique

  • National level: National Territorial Development Plan

  • Provincial level: Provincial Development Plan (Plano Provincial de Desenvolvimento Territorial, PPDT). In practice this level has not yet developed and used

  • Regional level: Special Plans for Territorial Development (PEOT). This instrument is meant to orient the spatial organisation of areas with spatial, ecological, economic, and inter-provincial continuity. It has not yet been applied in Mozambique

  • District level: District Land Use Planning (Plano Distrital de Uso da Terra, PDUT)

  • Municipal level: Urban Structure Plan (PEU), General Plan or Parcelation Plan (Parcial de Urbanização (PGU/PPU) and Detailed Plan (PP)

There has been a huge financing gap for urban development in Beira. Part of this arose from the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s, which focused on reducing the state’s role to a minimum, with state intervention occurring only in the face of market failures (Zattler 1989). As a result, Mozambique and other regional countries made fiscal cuts in government spending (Hofmann 2013), which affected public sector infrastructure financing, with formal land administration and planning coming to a standstill. Urban expansion was predominantly structured by ‘bottom-up’ governance practices, which continue to be the majority practice (Shannon 2019). Local capacity to carry out or maintain infrastructure works is weak (Schofield and Deprez 2019). The dominance of an opposition political party, RENAMO, resulted in the marginalisation of the city, reducing benefits from potential investment programmes (Byiers et al. 2020). This explains the patchwork of mandates that continue to be held by state entities instead of being the responsibility of municipal institutions (Murithi et al. 2012).

On realising the challenges from the SAPs, towards the end of the 1990s, two major changes were witnessed in Mozambique, and Beira in particular. These were the privatisation of Beira City’s Port management and the decentralisation reforms, which paved the way for municipal elections in 1998. The privatisation of port management in 1997 was contracted to a consortium headed by the Dutch Port Company, Cornelder (Shannon 2019). The Beira Port Concession (1998) is responsible for managing activities at the port. The shareholders are (i) Cornelder de Moçambique (CdM), a subsidiary of Cornelder Holding BV (Netherlands), and (ii) CFM Central. The Management Contract was initially from 1998 to 2023 and was extended in July 2018–2038. CFM is the representative of the Mozambique Government. It holds 67% of equity ownership, and the remaining 33% is held by CDM (ACIS 2008). CDM has been operating the Container and General Cargo Terminals at the Port of Beira since October 1998. The Terminals are currently cited among the key bases for transport logistics in the country.

The concession includes the Container and General Cargo Terminals but excludes the Coal and Fuel Terminals, which continue to be operated by CDM (Humphreys et al. 2019). The collaboration between CFM and CDM has proven successful, as evidenced by changes in container and freight volumes between 1986 and 2018. During that period, container volumes grew from 36,090 TEUs in 1986 to 218,876 TEUs in 2017, representing an average annual growth rate of 9.4% per year (SPEED 2018). General freight volumes grew from 577,000 metric tons in 1986 to 2,650,000 metric tons in 2017, representing an average annual growth rate of 7.9% per year (Humphreys et al. 2019).

The second major reform in Mozambique was the implementation of decentralisation reforms which paved the way for municipal elections in 1998 (Shannon 2019). RENAMO boycotted the 1998 elections but later won the 2003 elections for Beira, a major blow to FRELIMO’s consolidation of power. This is often cited as a reason for Beira’s strategic neglect by the national government (Shannon et al. 2018). Tense relationships between national and local government are considered a dominant feature of Beira’s urban governance and civic identity. The antagonist relationship between central state and Beira is widely considered to be the reason that the city has suffered further neglect and underinvestment in the post-war years (Murithi et al. 2012).

The fraught relationship between central and local government in the city resulted in the opposition looking to international agencies for support (Nkhonjera 2020). The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the World Bank, the European Union, and the Netherlands were some of those approached (Nkhonjera 2020). They are working to improve infrastructure and built environment. Infrastructure development projects include water, drainage, sanitation, and green spaces. Unfortunately, Beira’s infrastructure has not kept pace with population growth (UN Habitat 2020). Furthermore, chaotic urban development over the past 60 years and the fall in public sector investments resulted in an urban area that is unequally protected against environmental risks (Schofield and Deprez 2019). The city faces challenges of vulnerability to droughts, flooding, and tropical cyclones (Nkhonjera 2020). As a low-income country city, responses to the multiple hazards related to climate are inadequate given a context of general limitations in capability regarding national preparedness and response. These experiences also affected neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, which ultimately affect trading opportunities within the region. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi were significantly affected by tropical cyclones Idai and Kenneth in 2019. Investment efforts were directed towards recovering from these effects.

Droughts, tropical cyclones, and floods are the most frequent events (Meeuws 2004). Between 1965 and 1998, there were 12 major floods, 9 major droughts, and 4 major cyclone disasters (Wiles et al. 2005). Between 2009 and 2019, there were six major cyclones that hit Mozambique (ACAPS 2019; UNDP 2015, and Phiri et al. 2021). Thus, Beira faces the twin challenge of increased vulnerability to intense adverse weather conditions due to climate change and a lack of adequate and affordable infrastructure development. These challenges weaken the regional contribution of the city to the Beira Corridor. Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which could trade more economically and directly through Beira Port, do not have investment programmes that could benefit the corridor.

6 Urban Development in the Context of War, Disasters, and Regional Strain

6.1 Beira’s Transformation

The Beira Port was the main reason for the establishment of Beira City. The location of the port on the central Mozambique coast remains as important today as it was when what was to become the city was founded in 1887 (Shannon et al. 2018). There are about 600 000 inhabitants in Beira, the second largest coastal city in Mozambique. The city is at a very low altitude, only slightly above sea level. UN Habitat (2020) reveals that 40% of the city’s inhabitants live in high-risk flood zones, while 60% are in flood-free zones. For the most part, Beira is essentially a transit port, handling import, and export cargo destined for landlocked Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, the DRC, and Botswana (Murithi et al. 2012; Nkhonjera 2020) as well as north-eastern South Africa and Swaziland. It lies in the central region of the country in Sofala province, where the Pungwe River meets the Indian Ocean (ACIS 2008). It is one of the three major ports, the other two being Maputo and Nacala ports. Mozambique’s minor ports include Pemba and Quelimane.

Key indicators of urban development are worrying for Beira City. 70% of its residents live in substandard housing in at least one major aspect of construction; 25% do not have access to solid waste management services, 60% do not have regular access to quality energy sources, 45% do not have access to a consistent and quality source of water, and an estimated 45% dispose of human waste in a way that poses a threat to public health (UN Habitat 2020). Despite these challenges in urban planning and management, the City of Beira has continued to take advantage of its strategic location in the country and the SADC region, acting as a growth engine in Sofala province and contributing a third to the national GDP. The economic heart of Beira remains the port and the cluster of transport and logistics services, in the road, rail, and pipeline subsectors associated with national imports and exports and transit trade to key hinterland markets along the Beira Corridor (SPEED 2018) (Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1
A route map of the freight infrastructure of Beira Port. It traces the non functioning rail line, functioning rail line, pipeline, and roadways. The functioning rail lines lead to Nacala in Mozambique, Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania, Lobito in Zambia, Walvis Bay and Cape town via Lobatse, and Gauteng.

Beira Port’s freight infrastructure routes. (Source: European Commission 2005)

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Table 7.1 presents the regional routes available from Port Beira.

Table 7.1 Road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure linked to the port of Beira
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The port thus plays a critical role in the economic development of the southern African region, providing sea links with South Africa, Europe, and Asia. The main cargo segments handled at the Port of Beira are container, combined general cargo and dry bulk, coal, and fuel (ACIS 2008). There have been changes in the origin and destination of cargo since 2000. Before 2000, only 16% of the cargo originated from Mozambique. In 2011, it was estimated that 54% of the cargo was Mozambican, 22% Malawian, 15% Zimbabwean, and 6% Zambian (Sandhop 2013).

6.2 Civil War (1976–1992) and Its Impact on Beira

Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975, after a 10-year liberation war. A civil war began shortly after independence and lasted 16 years (SPEED 2018). The economy of Beira City declined due to wars and sanctions. The war was fought between Mozambique’s ruling Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the anti-communist insurgent forces of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), and several other smaller factions. In the 1970s, Zimbabwe’s liberation war was also fought mainly from bases in Mozambique around Chimoio and other areas along the Beira Corridor.

The corridor was a theatre for the war between RENAMO, which opposed FRELIMO’s attempts to establish a socialist one-party state (Hanlon 2010). Beira was relatively isolated (Noden et al. 2011). Port activity slowed and was only kept afloat by the influx of truckers and military personnel from the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. The isolation of the Beira Corridor during the civil war stalled the growth of the city while RENAMO, whose bases were mainly in the corridor area (Sandhop 2013) and it sought to keep the corridor open for its own needs. These two factors cumulatively debilitated Beira’s growth, creating a regional problem. The wars also delayed impacted the implementation of the Beira Development Corridor Plan until the mid-1990s, when South Africa’s democracy meant that Beira began to compete with more established ports in that country. Additionally, the recent rise in insecurity in the centre of the country from 2017 threatens Beira’s development. Attacks by a RENAMO breakaway group before and after the death of its leader in May 2018 were all centred on the Beira corridor.

Civil wars in Mozambique partly led to the collapse of the Beira Corridor Authority (BCA). The BCA was created by the Government of Mozambique in 1985 with financial support from the World Bank. Its focus was on coordinating and promoting the rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor as part of the government’s economic recovery project that sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency, allowing Beira to compete with Durban (RSA) and provide Zimbabwe with a cheaper alternative to the sea. However, these ambitions did not go as expected because of civil wars and a lack of experience with the concept (Byiers et al. 2020). However, despite the ongoing Mozambican Civil War, the BCA successfully met most of its targets and major projects (SPEED 2018).

Civil wars negatively affected Beira City’s growth. Beira underwent significant urban decay, aggravated by its locational attributes of being on low-lying land prone to flooding. People fled to Beira during the 15-year civil war in Mozambique that ended in 1992 because the city was deemed safe. Frequent droughts in Mozambique’s impoverished countryside also pushed more people to the city. As a result, the city that was originally built for approximately 100,000 residents now has almost six times that number (according to the 2018 census), placing significant pressure on urban infrastructure networks.

6.3 Disasters and Their Impact on Beira

Beira is one of the most vulnerable urban areas to climate change (SPEED 2018). Over the years, it has been hit by violent storms and recurrent flooding. Between 2019 and 2021, it was hit by two severe cyclones and a tropical storm that damaged infrastructure and caused a loss of human life. In 2019, almost 90% of Beira City was destroyed (Nkhonjera 2020). The greatest destruction occurred in the poorest neighbourhoods.

7 Current Developments in Beira City

Beira is one of the largest economic growth nodes in Mozambique. It is currently undergoing rapid urban expansion (Nkhonjera 2020). The growing international attention towards Mozambique has increased interest in the formerly neglected city. Beira is the concentration of various national economic development projects (Shannon 2019) and resilience projects in partnerships involving the City, the Mozambique Government, international development agencies, and NGOs (UN Habitat 2008; World Bank 2022).Footnote 2 The focus of these partnerships has been on building the city back better.

Beira City has been undergoing large-scale redevelopment, mainly supported by international development partners and NGOs (Shannon 2019), while the port is being upgraded with the help of the European Investment Bank and the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark (Shannon et al. 2018). DANIDA is helping to rehabilitate the Beira airport, while the World Bank is supporting an urban water project and GIZ is sponsoring a business environment reform programme. Beira has also been successful in attracting foreign direct investments in construction, food processing, and transport (World Bank Group 2013).

Institutional arrangements for Beira’s development have evolved over time. The city established the SDU Beira in 2018 to steer an integrated urban development process. This private company combines ordered urban development (residential, industrial, and logistical) with the concept of resilient cities (SDU Beira 2022). The intention is to foster the dynamism of the private and public sectors to accelerate the achievement of the Beira socio-economic development objectives (Nkhonjera 2020). SDU Beira is intervening in the land markets for housing development (i.e. social housing), commercial, and industrial real estate (UN Habitat 2020). Other areas include improving the urban mobility infrastructure. The major projects are as follows: (i) Munhava Industrial and Logistics Park, 900 hectares, and (ii) Marraza Residential and Commercial Area, 400 hectares (SDU Beira 2022). The SDU Beira promotes urban development to limit the impact of floods and climate change. The mandate of SDU Beira is to invest in (low-lying) land development and infrastructure to prepare sites for residential, commercial, and industrial construction (UN Habitat 2020). SDU Beira has a key objective of making land available for different land uses, including affordable housing.

8 Beira’s Future (Master Plan 2035)

Since 2012 the Beira Municipal Council, in cooperation with international partners, has been developing a climate-resilient urban development strategy (UN Habitat 2020). The Beira Master Plan 2035 was developed in 2013/2014 (Moron 2014). The Master Plan promotes pro-poor urban development to improve the living conditions of Beira’s residents. It focuses on the multiple issues that affect the city, including (i) port accessibility, (ii) management of the flow of goods, (iii) extension of infrastructure for the industrial sector, (iv) restoration of urban ecosystems and buffering of flood-at-risk areas, (v) enhancement of urban resilience of these flood-at-risk areas to guarantee development also within these areas, and (vi) the strengthening of coastal defences (Comino 2021).

The 2035 Beira Master Plan recognised three main challenges faced in the city. These are as follows: (i) failure to use the economic potential of the city, (ii) poor basic infrastructure and service coverage (see Table 7.2) that affect the improvement of living conditions, and (iii) weak adaptive measures to climate change (Deltares et al. 2013).

Table 7.2 2020 infrastructure financial needs
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The master plan takes its cue from the ‘spatial layer model’, which is commonly used in Dutch planning policy and urban planning, as a land development strategy (Nkhonjera 2020; Van der Meer 2013; Macamo 2021). The model distinguishes between three physical planning layers: the base layer (including water, soil, and topography), the network layer (mainly infrastructure), and the occupation layer (zoning and land use planning). Each layer is different, but interrelated, requiring the participation of different stakeholders. In this sense, the scope of the master plan gives impetus to a sustainable and integrated urban development strategy (Van der Meer 2013).

To update the plan, a ‘Beira Municipal Recovery and Resilient Plan’ was prepared. The plan speaks to rebuilding the resilient City (Beira Municipal Council 2019). It was prepared after the aftermath of Cyclone Idai. It is meant to address immediate recovery needs and introduce mechanisms to build back better and ensure the resilience of the City of Beira (Nkhonjera 2020). The City of Beira prepared it with support from the Dutch government, UN Habitat, and the Shelter Programme. The plan centres on the development of infrastructure (coastal, protection, drainage, sewage, solid waste, and road infrastructure).

9 Regional Contribution to Beira’s Growth

Zimbabwe has been unable to go beyond protecting its interests in the transport infrastructure along the corridor. Thus, the regional changes that came from the mid-1990s affected Beira’s post-war recovery. This left the port and city unable to immediately boost its services to the SADC region. First, South Africa’s independence in 1994 meant that its regionally vibrant ports began to compete with Beira. Before South Africa became independent, Beira was a major trading route for countries in Southern Africa. For example, Durban is much better connected than the port in Beira that is reflected in its higher score in the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index of over 30 compared to 9 for Beira (Byiers et al. 2020). However, Beira could serve as the go-to point for traders in Malawi instead of transporting cargo directly to Durban by road, which remains expensive. However, goods from Beira often must be transported to regional hubs before they are shipped to the end destinations.

In their economic reports, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) emphasises the importance of geographic corridors for regional development (Habiyaremye 2020). However, infrastructural and institutional bottlenecks along these corridors – poor roads and bridges, confusing border logistics, and complex customs procedures – often hamper the operation of these other industries (SADC 2022). In 1996, the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communication, and Meteorology was prepared. It calls for the creation of corridor planning committees to focus on specific strategies for development along the key corridors of the region (SADC 1996) and stresses that SADC member states must cooperate on the development, operation, coordination, and rehabilitation of transport infrastructure.

The Corridor Planning Committees have adopted the Spatial Development Initiatives model following some success stories on the Maputo Development Corridor (Hope and Cox 2015). The 2012 Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan prioritised the North-South Corridor and the Dar-es-Salaam Corridor in its next spatial development initiative. The Beira Corridor is among the medium-priority corridors which prompted the Government of Mozambique partnering with the World Bank Group to implement the national SDIs in the Beira and Nacala corridors (The World Bank 2016). The World Bank Group’s support was requested to build on its previous experience with SDIs to strengthen its spatial planning capacity.

At the regional level, there are no concrete links between urban development in Beira and the rest of the region (Pallotti 2004) that has limited the realisation of Beira’s national and regional significance. Regional SDIs were limited to the Maputo Corridor, which could easily attract investment compared to secondary cities such as Beira. Henderson and Kriticos (2018) noted that urban primacy can be problematic for the economic growth of secondary cities.

Further improvements to trade and transport efficiency along the Beira corridor could be achieved by enhancing the coordination of the corridor development. Various attempts have been made, ranging from highly ambitious investment projects to simple coordination, though none appear to have sustainably retained momentum (Byiers et al. 2020). Coordination between countries towards improving customs movement at the Beira Port has remained weak, while coordination and alignment of interests around reducing transport costs appears to be missing. Although several technical reports suggest that harmonisation of border procedures, including customs, is essential to ensure smooth flow of transit cargo, they also admit to the reluctance on either side of the border towards full cooperation (Mureverwi and Gandanga 2015). Although several regional trade corridors such as the Northern Corridor, the Central Corridor, the Walvis Bay Corridor, and the Maputo Corridor are governed or supported by corridor management institutions (CMIs), no such organisation exists in the Beira Corridor (Ntamutumba 2010).

10 Conclusion: Releasing Beira’s Potential, A National/Regional Urban and Infrastructure Development Agenda

Beira City, the Port, and Corridors connecting to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, as well as the northeastern part of South Africa, are important for the development of SADC economies and societies. Unfortunately, the secondary spatial plans of cities and the infrastructure choices they inform are not deliberately connected to other regional cities in SADC. Essentially, urban development and the benefits arising from the agglomeration effects of urban spaces are not connected to regional economic and infrastructure development. Critical cities like Beira are left to fend for themselves when SADC policymakers could mobilise comparative advantages for these centres to drive the socio-economic development of the regional corridors. The merging of urban and regional infrastructure development will contribute to alternative valuations of shared regional infrastructure linking secondary cities. These are choices that are difficult to leave to private capital. The lack of intra-SADC public sector interventions in investments must be addressed for long-term job and economic growth. The weakening of Beira’s potential shows how underdeveloped urban development is at the regional level. Regional infrastructure investment planning is not in sync with urban development objectives. It leaves secondary cities struggling to attract investment against endemic local governance weaknesses. As engines of growth, SADC secondary cities should not be left starved of urban development and governance support.