Abstract
Qassem Soleimani was killed by a U.S. drone strike on January 3, 2020, at the Baghdad International Airport. The leader of the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps designated by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, was killed en route to his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in Baghdad. The Quds Force is responsible for military operations outside of Iran and backs terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. President Donald Trump took great pride in the high-profile targeted killing. The following day, he claimed credit for killing the “Number 1 terrorist anywhere in the world” who “made the death of innocent people his sick passion.” According to the Trump administration, taking out Soleimani was the right strategic decision because “the world is a safer place without these monsters” (Trump Says Iran Strike Has Made The World ‘A Safer Place’, Jan 3, 2020). But what is the empirical basis for this claim? This chapter examines the effects of removing leaders from militant groups in so-called decapitation strikes. Empirical research demonstrates that militant leaders are often more averse than their subordinates to engaging in terrorist attacks against civilians, so taking out militant leaders generally promotes indiscriminate violence.
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Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and to Dr. Adebowale Akande for his professorial editorial assistance. This chapter draws upon the author’s book on the role of leaders in militant groups, Abrahms, M. (2018). Rules for rebels: The science of victory in militant history. Oxford University Press.
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Abrahms, M. (2023). The US-Iran Showdown: Was it Smart for President Trump to Authorize the Assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani?. In: Akande, A. (eds) The Perils of Populism. Springer Studies on Populism, Identity Politics and Social Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36343-6_10
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