Abstract
Distinct from its regional counterparts, the elite Syrian military has withstood mounting strife and domestic unrest since the Arab uprisings ignited in Dar’a in mid-March 2011. Since then, many inside Syria, within the region, and in the West have predicted the demise of the Alawite regime. It is quite apparent why many believed that Bashar al-Assad’s days were numbered. By the summer of 2011, many of al-Assad’s Arab counterparts had been removed from office. Tunisia’s Ben Ali went into exile in Saudi Arabia; Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak faced trial for crimes against his countrymen; Muammar Gaddafi was killed by street fighters after they pulled him from a ditch; and Yemen’s Ali Saleh was forced to abdicate the throne to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. To many inside and outside of Syria, al-Assad was the next dictator-domino to fall. Events in and around Syria seemed to support this prediction. What began as isolated, peaceful, and chaotic protests in early March 2011 morphed into nationwide, violent, and unified protests toward the end of summer. Moreover, by the end of 2011, the Alawite security apparatuses were exhausted; defections began to rise; fissures within the Alawite community spiked; the country’s treasury was depleted; and regional and international actors alike began to call for al-Assad’s departure. The Alawite military could have easily replaced al-Assad with another Alawite dictator (or a puppet Sunni leader) in an attempt to appease the crowds.
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Notes
In order to understand the events of the Syrian uprising, I drew extensively upon the following sources: “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow Motion Revolution,” Middle East/North Africa Report N°108, International Crisis Group (ICG), July 6, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org; “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” Middle East Report N°128, ICG, August 1, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org; Starr, Revolt in Syria; Samar Yazbek, A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution (London: Haus Publishing, 2011);
Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2012); and numerous US, British, and Middle Eastern news syndicates.
Carsten Wieland, Syria—A Decade of Lost Chances: Repression and Revolution from Damascus Spring to Arab Spring (Seattle, WA: Cune Press, 2012), Chapter 5.
David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).
Joseph Holliday, The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2013), 8–10, http://understanding-war.org/sites/default/files/SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf; US defense officials familiar with Syrian military, interview by author.
Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Assad and the Ba’ath Party, 4th ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 36.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2011), 474.
Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 61–63.
Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 199.
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© 2014 William C. Taylor
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Taylor, W.C. (2014). The Syrian Military’s “Fervent Support” of Bashar al-Assad. In: Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137410054_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137410054_5
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