Abstract
This chapter attempts to outline a philosophical view of (im)politeness that connects (im)politeness phenomena to either acknowledging or disregarding the other’s subjectivity. After briefly illustrating the speech-act theoretical framework in which my approach is contextualized, I consider why and how the illocutionary force of utterances contributes to eliciting (im)politeness evaluations and I discuss the relationship between implicitness and (im)politeness. I then focus on the three rules of politeness put forward by Robin Lakoff (1973). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.) and, showing how they connect to different layers in the recognition of the other’s subjectivity, I outline a view of (im)politeness phenomena, suggesting that they have an ethical basis that finds expression in different ways, depending on the layer of subjectivity that is in focus. After discussing some counterexamples to this view, I conclude by considering the widespread complaints about the rise of impoliteness in contemporary society and suggest that, while certain cases can be explained away by invoking shifts in evaluation criteria, some concerns regarding the ethical basis of (im)politeness have some reason to exist.
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Notes
- 1.
Here I leave aside the fact that (im)politeness is a matter of receiver’s evaluation, but what I say will be made compatible with it below.
- 2.
An insightful overview (both historical and theoretical) of the “other minds” problem can be found in Avramides (2001).
- 3.
Many hints at this process and its role can be found in philosophy. Recognition of mental functions, capacities and dispositions is taken into consideration and even given a central place in accounts of how we understand another subject’s language and meaning. At the very least, I would like to mention Davidson’s (1984) Charity Principle, Grice’s (1989: 22–40) Cooperative Principle, and Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance. I have touched upon this theme on various occasions, most recently in Sbisà (2013).
- 4.
Marginal cases can be tough. When we consider fetuses, terminal patients or people suffering from grave psychiatric illness, we react to them according to how we take them to be connected to a fully human condition. In the case of terminal patients, this may involve making reference to their previously recognized subjectivity (for example, if there is a living will to abide by).
- 5.
It may be objected that if the cognitive bases of recognition, that is, the ability to attribute attitudes and agency to other people, involve (as has been claimed, e.g., by Goldman, 2006) some kind of simulation of the others’ stance and perspective on the basis of our own, every recognition is dependent on similarities between the subject to be recognized and the recognizing one. But the similarity required might be limited to the attribution of intentional states, that is, would amount simply to possessing similar, or just parallel, capacities to entertain attitudes and to act. Moreover, if it is true (as research on the role of mirror neurons in social cognition suggests: see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007), that what we do is simply use the same action schemes both to project our own action and to understand what another agent is doing, any assessment of similarity between recognizer and recognized previous to recognition of subjectivity can be dispensed with altogether.
- 6.
Hornsby (1994) has used the term “reciprocity” to speak of the audience being willing to take (and then actually taking) the speaker’s utterance as the performance of the speech act it was designed to perform.
- 7.
However, I do not endorse Terkourafi’s view that such perlocutionary effects coincide with the elicitation of implicatures: see, Sect. 5.
- 8.
Elsewhere, I have argued that it is central to Austin’s view of illocution in the first place (Sbisà, 2007b).
- 9.
Narrative semiotics maintains that the structure of a narrative comprises the specification of the state of the agent in the role of Subject as regards these properties (that is, the Subject’s “modal competence”) and its variations. For the semiotic notions of the Subject as a narrative actant and of its modal competence see Greimas and Courtés (1979: 3–5, 52–55, 244–247).
- 10.
The assignment or withdrawal of deontic properties to or from subjects is sometimes referred to as constituting “permissibility facts” or changes in the “normative statuses” of the participants (Kukla, 2014; Langton, 1993; Lewis, 1979). These expressions are in practice largely co-referential, but have different theoretical sources and implications, which there is no room to discuss here.
- 11.
I deal with so-called indirect speech acts as basically a matter of the “physiognomy” of the utterance in its speech situation (the overall design of the utterance, which makes the procedure invoked by the speaker recognizable) as opposed to a matter of inference as in the received account stemming from Searle (1975). (I borrow the word “physiognomy” from Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 568.).
- 12.
- 13.
I use single quotes for sentences that express the implicit meaning of other utterances and cannot therefore be represented as themselves explicitly uttered.
- 14.
I borrow the conception of implicature as meaning that is “made available” from Saul (2002: 245).
- 15.
Blum-Kulka (1989: 66) reports the complaint of an Israeli husband about his wife (brought up in France), who used to make requests of him regarding matters of housework or child care in indirect form: apparently, this meant to him that she did not recognize him as already committed to collaboration in those tasks, or at any rate, as intimate enough to be addressed directly.
- 16.
Disregard of the other’s rights, feelings, and even of her being a living creature is implicit in many crimes, from theft to homicide. It would be pertinent, in the perspective proposed, to reflect on the dividing line between mere impoliteness and harm amounting to crime.
- 17.
See Levi (2015).
- 18.
See Levi (2015: 100–101).
- 19.
Sorry, but this particular corner of the world is the only country I can say something about with expertise.
- 20.
In 1968, and the years immediately following, the “polite” ban against venting one’s emotions in speech got weaker or was suppressed throughout the Western world (at least among the young). People started to think that overt display of one’s psychological state, even by means of swear words, slurs or insults, was more sincere, and therefore more honest than concealing it. Moreover, it seemed to many that venting one’s emotions could give the speaker relief, while constraining their expression in polite forms would add sheer repression to the other causes of irritation. I too held beliefs of this kind. About 50 years later, the language of certain politicians and its impact on people makes me see what was wrong in them.
- 21.
Speculation about remedies cannot be part of the present paper. I would just like to underscore that the official adoption of linguistic taboos or language and behavior held to be “politically correct” is only part of the picture, since these measures can be rejected as repressive impositions by those who do not understand why they would be needed.
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Sbisà, M. (2021). (Im)politeness and the Human Subject. In: Xie, C. (eds) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Advances in (Im)politeness Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81592-9_9
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