Keywords

1 Introduction

The East and Horn of Africa is a region of mixed migration, movements of such nature the International Organization for Migration (IOM) define as, “complex migratory population movements that include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to population movements that consist of entirely one category of migrants” (IOM 2011). Indeed, the discussion found in this chapter highlights why it is difficult to generalize migratory movements in this part of the world.

Although differences exist regarding which countries are included in the East and Horn of Africa region (see Fig. 1.1), this chapter takes an inclusive perspective. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda (IGAD 2019a, b). There is some overlap of the included countries with the East African Community (EAC), which is comprised of six member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (EAC 2017). Then, IOM’s regional office for East Africa and the Horn of Africa operates in Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2019). Lastly, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) includes Chad in the East and Horn of Africa Region (UNHCR 2019a), Chad is not included here but is addressed in the chapter on West and Central Africa. Therefore, this chapter will cover south-south migration from, to and through the following countries in the East and Horn of Africa: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Fig. 1.1
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Conceptions of East and the Horn of Africa

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From a policy perspective, the mixed nature of migration in the East and Horn of Africa makes it difficult to identify and respond to the various and specific vulnerabilities and needs of different migrant groups in a harmonized, or even comprehensive, approach. To better understand migration in the region, this chapter will first look at the main drivers of migration at play, through both regular and irregular channels. As such, it will focus on factors influencing both voluntary and forced migration, as well as temporary and permanent migration, both internally at the country-level, to an extent, as well as within the region as a whole. Lastly, this chapter will review the migration policy priorities at the regional level. A single chapter on this topic has its obvious limits, especially considering the countries within this region, let alone the different aspects of mixed migration in each and for the region as a whole. Furthermore, the environment in which migration takes place is subject to drastic change. Thus, what follows is more of an introduction into the complex migration dynamics at play in the region and their significance.

2 Mixed Migration Trends: East and Horn of Africa

The East and the Horn of Africa as a region is characterized by mixed migration movements, which can encompass movements of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, and other conventional classifications. It is important to establish a basic framework for what kind of channels they move through, i.e. regular or irregular, and the extent to which these are used.

2.1 Regular Migration

Migration literature on the region tends to focus a great deal more on irregular and forced migration than on regular migration. Part of this is due to a relative lack of data concerning this aspect of migration, but it also does not match the volume of forced displacement, which will be discussed in Sect. 1.2.2.

Data on immigrant stocks (see Fig. 1.2) from the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UNDESA), estimated for every 5 years from 1990 to 2015 and 2017 and excluding refugees, shows overall growth in the immigrant stocks for most countries, with Sudan and Tanzania as exceptions, during this period. Immigrant stocks in Somalia and Eritrea have remained under 25,000, and Djibouti under 100,000. Tanzania’s stock has steadily fallen over the period, while Burundi’s has more than tripled. Rwanda’s immigrant stock peaked at around 375,000 in 2005–2010. Ethiopia’s increased slightly while Sudan’s dropped sharply after 2010 from about 434,000 to just under 300,000. Kenya’s has nearly doubled from almost 300,000 to about 600,000. As of 2017, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are the top host countries in the region. Djibouti, while one of the smaller countries in the group, is a key transit country between the region and the Arab Peninsula.

Fig. 1.2
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Immigrant stocks (excluding refugees) for selected years, by host country. Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)

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Emigrant stocks have also exhibited consistent patterns of growth, as seen in Fig. 1.3. However, it is not possible to disaggregate refugees from UNDESA data for emigration. Somali and Sudanese emigrants each number nearly two million and South Sudan has approximately 1.75 million emigrants abroad. These were the top sending countries as of 2017, but as Sect. 1.2.2.2 will discuss, also the top refugee sending countries.

Fig. 1.3
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Emigrant stocks for selected years, by country of origin. Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)

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Besides the aggregate stock figures, it is worth highlighting several migration corridors within the region. Table 1.1 presents stocks by country of origin and country of destination (as of 2017) between the countries that are the subject of this chapter. By far, the largest is between South Sudan and Uganda. As expected, all of the main corridors exist between countries that share a border: Eritrea with Sudan and Ethiopia; Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya; as well as South Sudan with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. This illustrates how much of the migratory movements are to relatively nearby destinations.

Table 1.1 Country-to-country migration corridors (including refugees), 2017
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Many of the countries in the region rank low on the Human Development Index (see Table 1.2), with Kenya being the highest ranked at #142, and South Sudan holding the lowest rank in the region at #187 (UNDP 2018). Lower development does not make the region a popular destination for immigrants. Similarly, unemployment is another driver of migration in the region; Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan all have shares of unemployment greater than 10% (see Table 1.2). Saudi Arabia is a top destination for labor opportunities from countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan.

Table 1.2 Key development and migration indicators
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In fact, while most top destinations from countries in the region are neighboring ones, non-African countries like the United States (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania), United Kingdom (Kenya and Rwanda) and Saudi Arabia (Ethiopia and Sudan) are also top destination countries. Emigration out of the region is an increasingly significant aspect of mixed migration in the East and Horn of Africa. As shown in Fig. 1.4, the stock of emigrants from the region in non-African countries has followed a similar pattern as those in Africa but has remained larger and grown more over the years. So, while the emigrant stocks of most countries grew between 1990 and 2017 (as seen in Fig. 1.3), a majority of this growth has gone beyond the African continent.

Fig. 1.4
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Aggregate emigrant stocks (including refugees) from chapter countries within Africa vs. the rest of the world (selected years). Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)

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2.2 Forced Migration

In terms of the different kinds of human movement, forced migration is a major distinguishing characteristic of the East and Horn of Africa region. This chapter does not aim, nor is it possible in the allotted space, to give a complete picture of the various displacement situations across the 11 countries of interest. But broadly speaking, most of the displacement is conflict- and/or climate-driven, and it is not uncommon for people to experience multiple displacements.

There are violent conflicts in neighboring countries, namely in Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The former of which is driving Yemeni refugees across the Gulf of Aden into Horn of Africa countries, while the latter is adding to refugee inflows into Uganda. Violent conflict in the countries of interest of this chapter also play a role. Conflict in South Sudan has claimed over 400,000 lives and forcibly displaced over one million people to Sudan and Uganda alone since it began in 2013.

A special case in the region is Eritrea, and while it is not in the midst of violent conflict, forced conscription (of indefinite length) of its citizens is commonly cited by Eritrean asylum seekers and often forms the basis for their asylum claims. But with the recent signing of a peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritreans are free to cross the border to Ethiopia without a permit or passport and no longer need to offer proof of intent to return (Jeffrey 2018). However, nothing about the peace agreement compels the Eritrean government to change the very practices that drive its citizens out of the country. Importantly, with Eritreans now being able to freely travel out of the country, there is concern that their refugee status could be altered as a result (Poole and Riggan 2018). Eritreans were still one of the top countries of origin for arrivals in Italy through the Mediterranean Route in 2018 (UNHCR 2018).

2.2.1 Refugees

The refugee situation in the region has been a dynamic one over the past 20 years. As seen in Fig. 1.5, there is a rough pattern in refugee stocks over the course of 1990–2017 for most countries in the region. Over the period, refugee stocks generally decrease until somewhere between 2005 and 2010, after which rising, in some cases, to their highest levels for the period. Burundi, Djibouti, and Somalia have all seen very low refugee stocks over the years, Ethiopia and Sudan have followed a “U” shape arch, while those in Kenya and Tanzania have fluctuated, and Uganda has seen a massive increase since 2010. Given the history of the region, Ethiopia has long held an “open-door” policy with regards to receiving refugees, a position that has contributed to the high number of refugees hosted there (ARRA 2019).

Fig. 1.5
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Refugee stocks by host country for select years, 1990–2017. Source: UNHCR (2017)

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As of 2017, there were nearly four million refugees that originated from this chapter’s countries of interest residing in other countries within the region. These ‘local’ refugees accounted for almost 90% of the total stock of refugees in the region in the same year. Table 1.3 presents a summary of refugee stocks originating from and residing in the region as reported by UNHCR. Most of the major intra-regional stock corridors discussed in Sect. 1.2.1 are between countries that share a border and heavily overlap with the major refugee stock corridors, highlighting the major role that displacement plays in driving migration within the region.

Table 1.3 Refugees by country of residence/asylum and country of origin, 2017
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2.2.2 Internal Displacement

While refugee stocks in the region are considerably high, so is the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of the end of 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) reported that there were nearly nine million IDPs across 11 countries in the region (see Table 1.4). Not only does IDMC track the stock of IDPs, but they also report on how many new displacements occur in a given year and categorize them as either conflict-induced or disaster-induced.

Table 1.4 Internal displacement
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There are a number of key ongoing conflicts that contribute significantly to conflict-induced displacement in the region. Ongoing or periodic violent conflicts have been a major driver in displacement of populations within and from Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. In the first half of 2018, ethnic tensions within Ethiopia caused 1.4 million new displacements (IDMC 2018a, b, c). Similarly, there were 725,000 new conflict-induced internal displacements over the course of 2017 in Ethiopia (IDMC 2018a). Conflict-induced displacement is common in Somalia; there were 341,000 new displacements in the country in the first six months of 2018 (IDMC 2018b), almost as many as in the whole of 2017 (IDMC 2018b). Somalia also exemplifies how these displacements do not happen in isolation; climate disasters, such as tropical cyclone Sagar in 2018, can precede conflict-induced displacement, intensifying already stressed situations (UNSOM 2018). Lastly, ongoing violent conflict in South Sudan, which began in 2013 and is estimated to have claimed almost 400,000 lives (Checchi et al. 2018), continues to uproot people despite tenuous peace agreements (Specia 2018), sanctions (UN News 2018), and arms embargos. South Sudan saw 857,000 new conflict-induced displacements in 2017.

As presented in Table 1.4, there is a wide range of internal displacement situations across the region in question. Notably, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan each had over 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the end of 2018. The year-end total for those countries, with the exception of Ethiopia, are also well above the sum of new displacements were recorded in the same year, pointing to the protracted displacement situations faced by many in the region.

2.3 Irregular Migration

2.3.1 Trafficking in Persons

Among the various irregular migration flows in the region, human trafficking is certainly an area of concern. Many of the countries in the region are and have been source, transit and destination countries for human trafficking. Irregular migrants and refugees in particular are at risk of becoming victims of trafficking (VoTs). Trafficking can take a number of forms, whether it is sexual exploitation of girls and women (Castles et al. 2014), begging or forced servitude for children, or debt bondage for adult victims.

A commonly cited indicator for the state of human trafficking in a country is the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, published by the United States Department of State (USDS). The report ranks countries on a tiered system based on “the extent of governments’ efforts to meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, which are generally consistent with the Palermo Protocol” (USDS 2017, p. 25). Countries are classified to the tiers according to the following criteria (US Department of State 2018):

  • Tier 1: countries whose governments fully meet TPVA minimum standards.

  • Tier 2: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.

  • Tier 2 watch list: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND:

    • The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;

    • There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or

    • The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.

  • Tier 3: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.

According to this system (see Table 1.5), none of the countries discussed in this chapter are classified as Tier 1 countries, nor have they been as far back as 2011. As of the 2018 edition of the report, Burundi, Eritrea and South Sudan were ranked as Tier 3 countries, as each country’s government did not fully meet the minimum standards to address trafficking, nor were they making significant efforts to do so. Sudan was the only country ranked as Tier 2 Watch List in the 2018 report, indicating the same characteristics as Tier 2 in addition to:

  1. (a)

    The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;

  2. (b)

    There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or

  3. (c)

    The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.

Table 1.5 Trafficking in persons report rankings, 2011–2018
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Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all received Tier 2 rankings in 2018, indicating that while these countries’ governments do not fully meet the TPVA’s minimum standards, they are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Somalia stands alone in the region with its ranking as a Special Case.

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling (UNODC 2018, p. 19), a misconception often evident in governments’ policies, or lack thereof, for addressing irregular migration. Human smugglers are sometimes treated as human traffickers in a country’s justice system. However, this conflation of the two kinds of irregular migration is not wholly unwarranted; irregular migrants are especially vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking (VoT). In the 2018 TIP report, the USDS acknowledged that while there were 117,000 crossings from Djibouti to Yemen, mostly economic migrants, what began as voluntary movement could eventually result in forced labor or sex trafficking in the destination country, highlighting the mixed nature of migration movements in the region (US Department of State 2018, p. 168). Given the clandestine nature of trafficking, and sometimes complicit, if not facilitative, role government officials sometimes take, this type of irregular migration is incredibly difficult to measure.

2.3.2 Smuggling

As with human trafficking, the clandestine nature of smuggling makes it inherently more difficult to track the number of people moving this way with accuracy when compared to regular migration and movements driven by displacement. So, while hard numbers are hard to come by, there is consensus and evidence on the major routes. The major smuggling routes mirror those discussed later in this chapter (seen in Fig. 1.7), with Northern, Southern, and Eastern Routes. The reported costs of selected smuggling route are presented in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6 Reported Costs of Selected Smuggling Routes
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While the end destination of the Northern Route is ultimately North Africa and often Europe, its flows draw on a number of feeder routes throughout the region. As seen in Fig. 1.3, migrants and refugees from a number of countries feed into the northern route. Those from Somalia, Somaliland, and Eritrea feed into Ethiopia before crossing into Sudan. Those from South Sudan and Eritrea also feed into Sudan, which is a key transit point and hub for smuggling in the region. In addition to the routes illustrated in Fig. 1.7 (Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives 2017, p. 91), there are reports of an emerging detour that feeds into the northern route (UNODC 2018) (Fig. 1.6).

Fig. 1.6
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Routes within the Horn of Africa feeding into the Northern Route. Note: map adapted from Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives (2017, p. 91)

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For the Eastern Route, key points of departure include Bosaso, Somalia, and Obock, Djibouti. In fact, despite Djibouti’s smaller geographic area compared to most other countries in the region, it is a primary transit country for those making their way along the Eastern Route via sea smuggling (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018; UNODC 2018).

Recalling that irregular migrants are particularly vulnerable to becoming VoTs, those who make smuggling their means of transit are no exception to this. Again, while initially voluntary, they are nonetheless at risk. The risks irregular migrants face are particularly evident on the Northern Route. Based on interviews with migrants, 4mi documented more incidences of sexual violence and fatalities on route from the Horn of Africa to North Africa/Europe than either the route to Yemen/Saudi Arabia or the route to South Africa (4mi 2018).

3 Intra-regional Migration and Routes

As discussed in the previous section, the majority of migration movements within the region are driven by displacement yet generally remain within the East and Horn of Africa. However, some of this intra-regional migration does eventually become extra-regional. This is especially apparent with three migration routes (see Fig. 1.7) leading out of the East and Horn of Africa region.

Fig. 1.7
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Key migration routes leading out of the East and Horn of Africa

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Firstly, there is the Northern Route towards North Africa and Europe. Sudan, Khartoum in particular, is a key hub for those aiming to reach Libya and attempt making the Central Mediterranean crossing. Migrants and asylum seekers enter Sudan from the bordering countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan. As illustrated in Fig. 1.4, migrants and refugees from across the region feed into the Northern Route (Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives 2017). However, the use of this route is relatively small and has been on the decline; arrivals in Europe of East and Horn of Africa nationals have fallen since their peak in 2015 (UNODC 2018).

Secondly, there is the Eastern Route that leads to the Arab Peninsula and Gulf States. This route accounts for a significant amount of the flows out of the region, as nationals from the region migrate to Gulf States in search of economic opportunities (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018). The Eastern Route also accommodates irregular migrants; migrants cross from Djibouti or Somalia into Yemen and then make their way towards countries such as Saudi Arabia for labor opportunities. In the first half of 2018, IOM observed 444,490 migration movements across 42 Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) stationed in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen, reporting that 43% of the migration movements they observed were on the Eastern Route (ibid.). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recently reported that some irregular migrants who make the crossing into the Arab Peninsula make their way north along the coast of the Red Sea, then cross back into Sudan or Egypt and rejoin the Northern Route, as seen in Fig. 1.2 (UNODC 2018).

Lastly, there is the route leading to Southern Africa. Hubs for this journey exist along the Ethiopia-Kenya border, and the route can be taken via land, air or sea, although most migrants travel over land. However, use of this route is also in decline (UNODC 2018). Compared to IOM’s observations at FMPs of migrants using the Eastern Route, only 7% were using the Southern Route (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018).

While these three broad routes help us illustrate migration movements leading out of the region, it is also necessary to highlight those within the region. Aforementioned data from IOM’s FMPs in the region show that a majority (45%) of the migration movements observed were categorized as movements within or towards the Horn of Africa (ibid.). This included relatively small flows from Sudan and North Africa into Ethiopia, from Kenya and further south in Ethiopia, and from Yemen into Djibouti and Ethiopia. Most of the regular movements, as seen in Sect. 1.2, are between neighboring countries.

4 Migration Policy

4.1 Regional Frameworks and Coordination

Policies and governance mechanisms play an important role in facilitating and managing migration movements concerning the East and Horn of Africa region, and a discussion of migration patterns there warrants attention to these. Central to the continent’s development strategy are eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the strengthening and/or establishment of which were detailed in the 1991 Ajuba Treaty, also known as the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Art. 28(1)). As part of the adoption of the Ajuba Treaty, and consequent establishment of the African Economic Community, member states of the African Union (AU), which now number 55 countries (African Union n.d.), committed to institutionalizing freedom of movement and the rights of residence and of establishment for Community nationals (Klavert 2011). Two of these RECs, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC), were mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, and this section will detail those along with a third, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

4.1.1 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

One of three RECs that include countries discussed in this chapter, the vision of IGAD is to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration amongst its member states (see Fig. 1.1) through food security, environmental protection, the promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation and integration (IGAD 2019a, b). Member states include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

Because of the widespread mixed migration and the consequent challenges presented by this across the region, IGAD has a dedicated Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF) that is focused on realizing “the well-being and protection of migrants including IDPs and refugees in all IGAD Member States and the realization of the developmental potential of migration” (IGAD 2016).

4.1.2 East African Community (EAC)

The EAC encompasses a smaller region than IGAD (only six compared to eight) and is a regional intergovernmental organization. Established by treaty in 1999, with its membership growing over the years, “the EAC is widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in various key spheres for their mutual benefit. These spheres include political, economic and social” (EAC 2019b). As it relates to migration, the EAC seeks to “free movement of persons and labor through the adoption of common policies and procedures” (EAC 2019a). A number of articles of the EAC Protocol address different aspects of migration, including the establishment of a common standard system of identification and travel documents, the guarantee of free movement of member state citizens within the region, mutual recognition of professional and academic qualifications, and the harmonization of labor policies, among others.

4.1.3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

Another REC that seeks to establish and promote freedom movement is The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). According to its establishing treaty, COMESA was founded “as an organization of free independent sovereign states which have agreed to co-operate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their people” (COMESA Secretariat 2019). Encompassing more of the continent that IGAD or EAC, COMESA is comprised of 21 member states. Focusing on regional integration, it seeks to establish a Free Trade Area (October 2000), Customs Union (December 2012), a Common Market (2015), and a Monetary Union (2018) (COMESA Secretariat 2017). Additionally, COMESA receives support from IOM through the Migration Dialogue from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Member States (MIDCOM), which is centered on improving migration management through capacity building for member state governments, movement towards harmonized data collection practices, and integrated immigration policy and legislation (IOM 2015).

While these regional communities and frameworks establish freedom of movement in principle, varying degrees of implementation of it by member states has not allowed this to be fully realized yet (Castles et al. 2014). Furthermore, a tripartite trade agreement between three Eastern and Southern African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) does not address labor migration issues, again highlighting the gap between the aims of and actual implementation by these regional governance bodies (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016). Yet even with the progress that the EAC has made in establishing free movement (i.e. regional passport), the collision of national interests and prerogatives with the rights and responsibilities agreed to in international legislation remains a significant barrier to the full implementation of human mobility policies (ibid.).

4.2 Key International Stakeholders

In addition to these regional frameworks, there are a number of international stakeholders that are major players in the region’s migration arena, namely, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations primary agencies for migration and refugees, respectively. These two, among many other international, relief, and development organizations, play roles central to the management of migration in the region (Marchand et al. 2017).

The United Nations’ agency for migration, IOM aims to, “contribute to effective, flexible and comprehensive migration management solutions in East and Horn of Africa, in partnership with states, regional institutions, international agencies, communities and migrants”, and works in harmony with REC’s in the region, like IGAD and EAC (IOM n.d.).

UNHCR, the UN’s agency for refugees, is concerned with meeting the protection and assistance needs of those it designates as “persons of concern,” which include refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returned refugees, stateless persons, and others of concern (UNHCR 2019b). Its budget in the region is divided among four pillars: (1) Refugee program, (2) Stateless program, (3) Reintegration projects, and (4) IDP projects. A majority of funding is earmarked for Pillar 1 for each country in this operation region of UNCHR, but the other three pillars depend on the country situation.

The links between migration and development have also received significantly more attention from international actors operating within the East and Horn of Africa region. Concerns of irregular migrants reaching Europe have translated into European-funded interventions across the region, particularly, “addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration” under the umbrella of the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) (European Commission 2019). Through this funding mechanism, launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration by European and African partners in 2015, a significant cooperative effort is being made to bolster border security, enhance migration management, and provide services and opportunities to host communities and migrants alike.

5 Conclusion

South-south migration in the context of the East and Horn of Africa region is distinguished by the prevalence of mixed migration. Forced displacement is the primary driver of movement within the region in terms of absolute stocks. The region at the focus of this chapter is the location of some of the largest populations of refugees and internally displace persons on the planet. Even so, much of this displacement-driven movement, be it conflict- or climate-induced, is limited to within the region. Looking outside of the region, emigration beyond the African continent has grown at a faster rate than that within it.

It is clear that migrants in this part of the world are motivated by the same fundamental drivers seen in other migration arenas; most people are in search of a better life, be it through living in a more secure country and political stable situation or moving to access better economic opportunities. The difference here is that it takes place in a high-risk environment in which populations face violence and climate disasters like flooding and drought. On top of that, the level of development across the region is relatively low on a global scale, further compounding the above risks, and the boiling over of ethnic tensions also drives movement.

A shortcoming of migration data in general is that it usually does not track how long people stay in another country or away from their place of usual residence, whether they came there through regular/irregular means or under force. This kind of data would be especially valuable in helping inform migration policy throughout the region, particularly with respect to IDPs and the sheer number of people this covers.

The major role of migration in the region and its mixed nature receives attention from regional initiatives as well as international actors, highlighting the need for sustainable solutions. In the coming decades, new but familiar drivers of displacement will surely emerge, as will increasing development drive more economically-motivated movements. From a policy perspective all of these movements must be addressed together for migration to be of the greatest benefit for the region.