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Regional Integration and Migration Governance in the Global South

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Preface

There are an estimated one billion migrants in the world today, and it is predicted that demographic pressure, environmental factors, and ongoing conflict will all cause further large-scale migration movements, making human mobility one of the defining features of our time. While most of the (political) attention focuses on South–North migration and its economic, social, and political impacts on OECD countries, migration flows within the Global South and the issues surrounding it remain much less understood. Migration between developing countries, nonetheless, forms the second-largest migrant flow and is expected to become increasingly important in the future (see e.g. Campos 2017). South–South migration therefore forms a vital yet underexplored source of socioeconomic development, poverty alleviation, and inequality reduction.

Although South–South and South–North migration streams are inextricably linked—particularly because of Northern immigration policies diverting migration flows to the South and Southern middle-income countries serving as transit countries for South–North migration—the two types of migration differ in important ways. South–South migration is known to be less selective and more short-distance, temporary, irregular, and undocumented. While in many regions of the Global South, migration primarily serves as a strategy to cope with local poverty, drought, or conflict, other regions are characterized by a so-called culture of migration in which migration serves as a rite of passage for adulthood or as part of the life trajectory of many individuals from rural communities. Addressing South–South migration as such requires the creation of distinct policies in line with comprehensive development strategies.

To date, few initiatives seem to address the specificity of human mobility between developing countries. Most regions in the South maintain porous borders and, if any, poorly implemented migration policies. The idea of managing South–South migration by developing a more full-fledged policy has, however, gained traction, also influenced by external actors such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Yet, more research on South–South migration is needed to better understand global

migration patterns, which is a prerequisite for developing sound policies to monitor these flows.

This book provides innovative contributions on relevant aspects of South–South migration and regional integration with a particular focus on (1) the reasons for migration from developing countries and its distribution across domestic, intraregional, and interregional corridors; (2) the socioeconomic effects of such movements on countries of origin, transit, and destination, as well as on migrants themselves, their families, and communities; and (3) the need, scope, and added value of the management of South–South migration flows, with specific attention to the role of international coordination by regional and international organizations.

Given the Global South's diversity and complexity, the book does not have the ambition to provide an exhaustive analysis of South–South migration in all its aspects. It rather aims at discussing major issues by means of representative case studies by experts and renowned scholars in the field such that, while based on these case studies, the findings may be applicable beyond the specific region to which they refer, despite the diversity of local and regional contexts in the Global South.

The book consists of two parts: patterns, drivers, and implications on the one hand and governance on the other. The first part starts with a discussion of the migration patterns in the Horn of Africa, showing the diversity, complexity, and interrelatedness of migration flows in the South. The second and third chapters complete this discussion by considering two main drivers of migration flows in the South: labor and climate change. The fourth chapter then develops more in detail the impact of climate change on migration from the perspective of one essential resource, namely water.

In particular, when migration is sudden and disruptive, it can have destabilizing consequences for local communities. In the fifth chapter, this is dealt with by discussing the management of refugee flows, looking for strategies to control conflicts and establish a balanced relationship between locals and refugees. The final and concluding chapter of this part discusses what is at stake in considering migration from a "Southern" perspective by providing an extensive literature review of the links between migration and development in the Global South.

The second part, on the management patterns of migration in the Global South, starts with a review and discussion of the different stages of migration policy in South America, highlighting the role of regional organizations and identifying the distinctive perspectives on migration, relevant for other regions and periods as well. The second chapter continues with a review of migration policies in Asia, focusing on labor migration and pointing to the specificities of the institutional framework of the management of migration in the continent. The next two chapters on the Migration Partnership Agreements of the EU with West African countries assess the potential conflicts in policy priorities between developed and developing countries. Based on one specific application, the last chapter of the second part discusses how technologies can help fight exploitation of migrants and in this way contribute to safe, orderly, and regular migration.

Overall, the book aims at defining policy priorities regarding migration from a Global South perspective in view of the implementation of the recently concluded

Global Compact on Migration. It is in this perspective that the final chapter draws the main conclusions based on the findings and insights of the contributions in this book.

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Reference

Campos, R. (2017). Migratory pressures in the long run: International migration projections to 2050. *Banco de España*, *Economic Bulletin* 4/2017.

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Part I
Patterns, Drivers and Implications of Migration in the Global South

Chapter 1
South-South Migration within the East and Horn of Africa Region

Zachary Strain

1.1 Introduction

The East and Horn of Africa is a region of mixed migration, movements of such nature the International Organization for Migration (IOM) define as, "complex migratory population movements that include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to population movements that consist of entirely one category of migrants" (IOM 2011). Indeed, the discussion found in this chapter highlights why it is difficult to generalize migratory movements in this part of the world.

Although differences exist regarding which countries are included in the East and Horn of Africa region (see Fig. 1.1), this chapter takes an inclusive perspective. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda (IGAD 2019a, b). There is some overlap of the included countries with the East African Community (EAC), which is comprised of six member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (EAC 2017). Then, IOM's regional office for East Africa and the Horn of Africa operates in Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2019). Lastly, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) includes Chad in the East and Horn of Africa Region (UNHCR 2019a), Chad is not included here but is addressed in the chapter on West and Central Africa. Therefore, this chapter will cover south-south migration from, to and through the following countries in the East and Horn of Africa: Burundi,

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

Fig. 1.1 Conceptions of East and the Horn of Africa

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

From a policy perspective, the mixed nature of migration in the East and Horn of Africa makes it difficult to identify and respond to the various and specific vulnerabilities and needs of different migrant groups in a harmonized, or even comprehensive, approach. To better understand migration in the region, this chapter will first look at the main drivers of migration at play, through both regular and irregular channels. As such, it will focus on factors influencing both voluntary and forced migration, as well as temporary and permanent migration, both internally at the country-level, to an extent, as well as within the region as a whole. Lastly, this

chapter will review the migration policy priorities at the regional level. A single chapter on this topic has its obvious limits, especially considering the countries within this region, let alone the different aspects of mixed migration in each and for the region as a whole. Furthermore, the environment in which migration takes place is subject to drastic change. Thus, what follows is more of an introduction into the complex migration dynamics at play in the region and their significance.

1.2 Mixed Migration Trends: East and Horn of Africa

The East and the Horn of Africa as a region is characterized by mixed migration movements, which can encompass movements of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, and other conventional classifications. It is important to establish a basic framework for what kind of channels they move through, i.e. regular or irregular, and the extent to which these are used.

1.2.1 Regular Migration

Migration literature on the region tends to focus a great deal more on irregular and forced migration than on regular migration. Part of this is due to a relative lack of data concerning this aspect of migration, but it also does not match the volume of forced displacement, which will be discussed in Sect. 1.2.2.



Fig. 1.2 Immigrant stocks (excluding refugees) for selected years, by host country. Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)



Fig. 1.3 Emigrant stocks for selected years, by country of origin. Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)

Data on immigrant stocks (see Fig. 1.2) from the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UNDESA), estimated for every 5 years from 1990 to 2015 and 2017 and excluding refugees, shows overall growth in the immigrant stocks for most countries, with Sudan and Tanzania as exceptions, during this period. Immigrant stocks in Somalia and Eritrea have remained under 25,000, and Djibouti under 100,000. Tanzania's stock has steadily fallen over the period, while Burundi's has more than tripled. Rwanda's immigrant stock peaked at around 375,000 in 2005–2010. Ethiopia's increased slightly while Sudan's dropped sharply after 2010 from about 434,000 to just under 300,000. Kenya's has nearly doubled from almost 300,000 to about 600,000. As of 2017, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are the top host countries in the region. Djibouti, while one of the smaller countries in the group, is a key transit country between the region and the Arab Peninsula.

Emigrant stocks have also exhibited consistent patterns of growth, as seen in Fig. 1.3. However, it is not possible to disaggregate refugees from UNDESA data for emigration. Somali and Sudanese emigrants each number nearly two million and South Sudan has approximately 1.75 million emigrants abroad. These were the top sending countries as of 2017, but as Sect. 1.2.2.2 will discuss, also the top refugee sending countries.

Besides the aggregate stock figures, it is worth highlighting several migration corridors within the region. Table 1.1 presents stocks by country of origin and country of destination (as of 2017) between the countries that are the subject of this chapter. By far, the largest is between South Sudan and Uganda. As expected, all of the main corridors exist between countries that share a border: Eritrea with Sudan and Ethiopia; Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya; as well as South Sudan with

Table 1.1 Country-to-country migration corridors (including refugees), 2017

Country of destination	Country of origin											
	Burundi	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Rwanda	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda	Tanzania	Type of Data
Burundi					1066	66,530				921	28,951	B, R
Djibouti				12,732			96,137					B, R
Eritrea	1052			108	353	469	2472	1499	209	1533	529	I
Ethiopia	42	3910	**217,472**			158	**467,508**	**417,150**	41,734	230		B, R
Kenya	4321		2115	36,692		6296	**485,864**	91,862	7573	**332,008**	39,721	B, R
Rwanda	64,729				2590					92,521	42,927	B, R
Somalia			35	13,732								I, R
South Sudan			3,322	12,802	9570				**563,135**	145,799		B, R
Sudan			**188,411**	71,631	3037		153	**301,885**		1481		B, R
Uganda	64,092		4988	1512	61,501	108,638	40,404	**903,199**	90,652		35,789	B, R
Tanzania	**208,949**				32,472	692	3536			5788		B, R

Source: UNDESA (2017a, b). Note: Highlighted cells indicate the top-10 corridors. The column labeled "Type of data" indicates whether the data used to produce the estimates refer to the foreign-born population (B) or to foreign citizens (C). It also indicates in which cases the number of refugees, as reported by UNHCR, were added to the estimate of international migrants (R). Estimates for countries or areas having no data on the number of international migrants were obtained by imputation indicated by (I)

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. This illustrates how much of the migratory movements are to relatively nearby destinations.

Many of the countries in the region rank low on the Human Development Index (see Table 1.2), with Kenya being the highest ranked at #142, and South Sudan holding the lowest rank in the region at #187 (UNDP 2018). Lower development does not make the region a popular destination for immigrants. Similarly, unemployment is another driver of migration in the region; Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan all have shares of unemployment greater than 10% (see Table 1.2). Saudi Arabia is a top destination for labor opportunities from countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan.

In fact, while most top destinations from countries in the region are neighboring ones, non-African countries like the United States (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania), United Kingdom (Kenya and Rwanda) and Saudi Arabia (Ethiopia and Sudan) are also top destination countries. Emigration out of the region is an increasingly significant aspect of mixed migration in the East and Horn of Africa. As shown in Fig. 1.4, the stock of emigrants from the region in non-African countries has followed a similar pattern as those in Africa but has remained larger and grown more over the years. So, while the emigrant stocks of most countries grew between 1990 and 2017 (as seen in Fig. 1.3), a majority of this growth has gone beyond the African continent.

1.2.2 Forced Migration

In terms of the different kinds of human movement, forced migration is a major distinguishing characteristic of the East and Horn of Africa region. This chapter does not aim, nor is it possible in the allotted space, to give a complete picture of the various displacement situations across the 11 countries of interest. But broadly speaking, most of the displacement is conflict- and/or climate-driven, and it is not uncommon for people to experience multiple displacements.

There are violent conflicts in neighboring countries, namely in Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The former of which is driving Yemeni refugees across the Gulf of Aden into Horn of Africa countries, while the latter is adding to refugee inflows into Uganda. Violent conflict in the countries of interest of this chapter also play a role. Conflict in South Sudan has claimed over 400,000 lives and forcibly displaced over one million people to Sudan and Uganda alone since it began in 2013.

A special case in the region is Eritrea, and while it is not in the midst of violent conflict, forced conscription (of indefinite length) of its citizens is commonly cited by Eritrean asylum seekers and often forms the basis for their asylum claims. But with the recent signing of a peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritreans are free to cross the border to Ethiopia without a permit or passport and no longer need to offer proof of intent to return (Jeffrey 2018). However, nothing about the peace agreement compels the Eritrean government to change the very practices that

Table 1.2 Key development and migration indicators

	Burundi	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Rwanda	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda
Development											
Human Development Index (2017)[a]	0.417	0.476	0.440	0.463	0.590	0.524	n/a	0.388	0.502	0.538	0.516
Country rank out of 189	#185	#172	#179	#173	#142	#158	n/a	#187	#167	#154	#162
Unemployment %, 2018[b]	1.53	11.12	6.54	1.81	9.31	0.97	13.96	12.70	12.88	1.93	1.74
Immigration											
Stock of immigrants (excl. refugees) 2017[c]	242,572	90,345	13,443	433,548	562,357	290,967	23,291	580,257	298,303	199,314	529,405
Women as percentage of all immigrants[c]	50.73%	47.43%	44.59%	49.13%	50.05%	50.17%	47.51%	48.95%	53.09%	49.94%	50.08%
Emigration											
Stock of emigrants, 2017[c]	435,630	15,823	607,917	800,879	501,204	568,848	1,988,458	1,752,014	1,951,705	324,394	739,667
Top destination countries, 2017[c]	United Republic of Tanzania∗, Rwanda∗, Uganda	France, Ethiopia∗, Canada	Ethiopia∗, Sudan∗, USA	USA, Saudi Arabia, Israel	UK, USA, Uganda∗	DRC∗, Uganda∗, Burundi∗	Kenya∗, Ethiopia∗, Yemen	Uganda∗, Ethiopia∗, Sudan∗	South Sudan∗, Saudi Arabia, Chad∗	USA, UK, Rwanda∗	Kenya∗, South Sudan, Rwanda∗

∗Bordering country
[a]UNDP (2018)
[b]ILO (2019)
[c]UNDESA (2017a, b)



Fig. 1.4 Aggregate emigrant stocks (including refugees) from chapter countries within Africa vs. the rest of the world (selected years). Figure data: UNDESA (2017a, b)



Fig. 1.5 Refugee stocks by host country for select years, 1990–2017. Source: UNHCR (2017)

drive its citizens out of the country. Importantly, with Eritreans now being able to freely travel out of the country, there is concern that their refugee status could be altered as a result (Poole and Riggan 2018). Eritreans were still one of the top countries of origin for arrivals in Italy through the Mediterranean Route in 2018 (UNHCR 2018).

1.2.2.1 Refugees

The refugee situation in the region has been a dynamic one over the past 20 years. As seen in Fig. 1.5, there is a rough pattern in refugee stocks over the course of

1990–2017 for most countries in the region. Over the period, refugee stocks generally decrease until somewhere between 2005 and 2010, after which rising, in some cases, to their highest levels for the period. Burundi, Djibouti, and Somalia have all seen very low refugee stocks over the years, Ethiopia and Sudan have followed a "U" shape arch, while those in Kenya and Tanzania have fluctuated, and Uganda has seen a massive increase since 2010. Given the history of the region, Ethiopia has long held an "open-door" policy with regards to receiving refugees, a position that has contributed to the high number of refugees hosted there (ARRA 2019).

As of 2017, there were nearly four million refugees that originated from this chapter's countries of interest residing in other countries within the region. These 'local' refugees accounted for almost 90% of the total stock of refugees in the region in the same year. Table 1.3 presents a summary of refugee stocks originating from and residing in the region as reported by UNHCR. Most of the major intra-regional stock corridors discussed in Sect. 1.2.1 are between countries that share a border and heavily overlap with the major refugee stock corridors, highlighting the major role that displacement plays in driving migration within the region.

1.2.2.2 Internal Displacement

While refugee stocks in the region are considerably high, so is the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of the end of 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) reported that there were nearly nine million IDPs across 11 countries in the region (see Table 1.4). Not only does IDMC track the stock of IDPs, but they also report on how many new displacements occur in a given year and categorize them as either conflict-induced or disaster-induced.

There are a number of key ongoing conflicts that contribute significantly to conflict-induced displacement in the region. Ongoing or periodic violent conflicts have been a major driver in displacement of populations within and from Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. In the first half of 2018, ethnic tensions within Ethiopia caused 1.4 million new displacements (IDMC 2018a, b, c). Similarly, there were 725,000 new conflict-induced internal displacements over the course of 2017 in Ethiopia (IDMC 2018a). Conflict-induced displacement is common in Somalia; there were 341,000 new displacements in the country in the first six months of 2018 (IDMC 2018b), almost as many as in the whole of 2017 (IDMC 2018b). Somalia also exemplifies how these displacements do not happen in isolation; climate disasters, such as tropical cyclone Sagar in 2018, can precede conflict-induced displacement, intensifying already stressed situations (UNSOM 2018). Lastly, ongoing violent conflict in South Sudan, which began in 2013 and is estimated to have claimed almost 400,000 lives (Checchi et al. 2018), continues to uproot people despite tenuous peace agreements (Specia 2018), sanctions (UN News 2018), and arms embargos. South Sudan saw 857,000 new conflict-induced displacements in 2017.

As presented in Table 1.4, there is a wide range of internal displacement situations across the region in question. Notably, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and

Table 1.3 Refugees by country of residence/asylum and country of origin, 2017

	Country of origin										
Country of asylum	Burundi	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Rwanda	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda
Burundi		0	0	0	0	422	23	*	0	0	7
Djibouti	0		406	527	10	*	13,108	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	0	0		30	0	0	2286	9	67	0	0
Ethiopia	58	76	164,605		3459	10	253,779	421,373	43,892	*	18
Kenya	1902	*	702	17,873		576	281,692	111,510	2922	9	626
Rwanda	88,209	0	5	*	0		*	0	0	*	*
Somalia	0	*	49	3608	0	0		0	*	*	*
South Sudan	*	0	32	4555	0	*	*		261,983	0	*
Sudan	15	0	108,243	4273	*	0	208	772,715		*	*
Tanzania	251,227	0	0	0	0	0	150	0	0		0
Uganda	38,245	0	4566	1944	193	14,282	25,011	1,037,412	2355	*	

Source: UNHCR (2017)

Note: An asterisk (*) denotes figures between 1 and 4. UNHCR data reflects end-of-year statistics, whereas UNDESA (2017a, b) reflects mid-year statistics

Table 1.4 Internal displacement

Country	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2018	New conflict-induced displacements in 2018	New disaster-induced displacements in 2018
Burundi	49,000	5100	35,000
Djibouti			9400
Eritrea	–	–	–
Ethiopia	2,137,000	2,895,000	296,000
Kenya	162,000	10,000	336,000
Rwanda			47,000
Somalia	2,648,000	578,000	547,000
South Sudan	1,869,000	321,000	6600
Sudan	2,072,000	41,000	121,000
Tanzania			29,000
Uganda	32,000	9000	164,000

Data note: "Total number of IDPs corresponds to the total number of people living in internal displacement as of 31 December 2018; New displacements corresponds to the estimated number of internal displacement movements to have taken place during the year. Figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once. In this sense, the number of new displacements does not equal to the number of people displaced during the year" (IDMC 2019, p. 3)

Sudan each had over 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the end of 2018. The year-end total for those countries, with the exception of Ethiopia, are also well above the sum of new displacements were recorded in the same year, pointing to the protracted displacement situations faced by many in the region.

1.2.3 Irregular Migration

1.2.3.1 Trafficking in Persons

Among the various irregular migration flows in the region, human trafficking is certainly an area of concern. Many of the countries in the region are and have been source, transit and destination countries for human trafficking. Irregular migrants and refugees in particular are at risk of becoming victims of trafficking (VoTs). Trafficking can take a number of forms, whether it is sexual exploitation of girls and women (Castles et al. 2014), begging or forced servitude for children, or debt bondage for adult victims.

A commonly cited indicator for the state of human trafficking in a country is the annual *Trafficking in Persons* (TIP) report, published by the United States Department of State (USDS). The report ranks countries on a tiered system based on "the extent of governments' efforts to meet the *Trafficking Victims Protection Act*'s (TVPA) minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, which are generally consistent with the Palermo Protocol" (USDS 2017, p. 25). Countries are

classified to the tiers according to the following criteria (US Department of State 2018):

- Tier 1: countries whose governments fully meet TPVA minimum standards.
- Tier 2: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.
- Tier 2 watch list: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND:
  - The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
  - There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or
  - The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.
- Tier 3: Countries whose governments do not fully meet the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.

According to this system (see Table 1.5), none of the countries discussed in this chapter are classified as Tier 1 countries, nor have they been as far back as 2011. As of the 2018 edition of the report, Burundi, Eritrea and South Sudan were ranked as Tier 3 countries, as each country's government did not fully meet the minimum standards to address trafficking, nor were they making significant efforts to do so. Sudan was the only country ranked as Tier 2 Watch List in the 2018 report, indicating the same characteristics as Tier 2 in addition to:

(a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
(b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or
(c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all received Tier 2 rankings in 2018, indicating that while these countries' governments do not fully meet the TPVA's minimum standards, they are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Somalia stands alone in the region with its ranking as a Special Case.

Human trafficking is often confused with human smuggling (UNODC 2018, p. 19), a misconception often evident in governments' policies, or lack thereof, for addressing irregular migration. Human smugglers are sometimes treated as human traffickers in a country's justice system. However, this conflation of the two kinds of irregular migration is not wholly unwarranted; irregular migrants are especially

Table 1.5 Trafficking in persons report rankings, 2011–2018

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Burundi	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	3	3
Djibouti	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL	2
Eritrea	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ethiopia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Kenya	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2
Rwanda	2	2	2WL	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2
Somalia	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC
South Sudan		2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	3	3
Sudan	3	3	3	2WL	2WL	3	3	2WL
Tanzania	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2
Uganda	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking (VoT). In the 2018 TIP report, the USDS acknowledged that while there were 117,000 crossings from Djibouti to Yemen, mostly economic migrants, what began as voluntary movement could eventually result in forced labor or sex trafficking in the destination country, highlighting the mixed nature of migration movements in the region (US Department of State 2018, p. 168). Given the clandestine nature of trafficking, and sometimes complicit, if not facilitative, role government officials sometimes take, this type of irregular migration is incredibly difficult to measure.

1.2.3.2 Smuggling

As with human trafficking, the clandestine nature of smuggling makes it inherently more difficult to track the number of people moving this way with accuracy when compared to regular migration and movements driven by displacement. So, while hard numbers are hard to come by, there is consensus and evidence on the major routes. The major smuggling routes mirror those discussed later in this chapter (seen in Fig. 1.7), with Northern, Southern, and Eastern Routes. The reported costs of selected smuggling route are presented in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6 Reported Costs of Selected Smuggling Routes

Smuggling passage or route	Type of smuggling	Reported costs	Sources:
Eritrea ➔ *Sudan/ Ethiopia* ➔ *Libya/ Egypt*	Land route	Around US $4000	The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, *Integrated responses to human smuggling from the Horn of Africa to Europe*, May 2017: 20.
Somalia (Somaliland) ➔ *Sudan* ➔ *Libya/Egypt*	Land route	From around US $2000 to 3500	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Altai Consulting, *Mixed migration: Libya at the crossroads*, November 2013. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, *Integrated responses to human smuggling from the Horn of Africa to Europe*, May 2017: 20.
Horn of Africa ➔ *Southern Africa*	Mainly land route (possible sea route deviations)	Around US $3000–3500	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, *Smuggled south. An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protection risks, human smuggling and trafficking*, RMMS briefing paper 3, March 2017: 16 Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, *Migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa & Yemen: the political economy and protection risks*, June 2013: 30
Ethiopia ➔ *Bossaso (Somalia)* ➔ *Saudi Arabia*	Land-sea-land route	Around US $900	Research and evidence Facility, *Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen*, EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41
Ethiopia ➔ *Obock (Djibouti)* ➔ *Saudi Arabia*	Land-sea-land route	Around US $850	Research and evidence Facility, *Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen*, EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.
Bossaso (Somalia) ➔ *Yemen*	Sea route	Around US $120–150	Research and evidence Facility, *Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen,* EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.

(continued)

Table 1.6 (continued)

Smuggling passage or route	Type of smuggling	Reported costs	Sources:
Obock (Djibouti) ➔ Yemen	Sea route	Around US $60–200	Research and evidence Facility, *Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen,* EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.

Note: table adapted from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2018, p. 46)

While the end destination of the Northern Route is ultimately North Africa and often Europe, its flows draw on a number of feeder routes throughout the region. As seen in Fig. 1.3, migrants and refugees from a number of countries feed into the northern route. Those from Somalia, Somaliland, and Eritrea feed into Ethiopia before crossing into Sudan. Those from South Sudan and Eritrea also feed into Sudan, which is a key transit point and hub for smuggling in the region. In addition to the routes illustrated in Fig. 1.7 (Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives 2017, p. 91), there are reports of an emerging detour that feeds into the northern route (UNODC 2018) (Fig. 1.6).

For the Eastern Route, key points of departure include Bosaso, Somalia, and Obock, Djibouti. In fact, despite Djibouti's smaller geographic area compared to most other countries in the region, it is a primary transit country for those making their way along the Eastern Route via sea smuggling (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018; UNODC 2018).

Recalling that irregular migrants are particularly vulnerable to becoming VoTs, those who make smuggling their means of transit are no exception to this. Again, while initially voluntary, they are nonetheless at risk. The risks irregular migrants face are particularly evident on the Northern Route. Based on interviews with migrants, 4mi documented more incidences of sexual violence and fatalities on route from the Horn of Africa to North Africa/Europe than either the route to Yemen/Saudi Arabia or the route to South Africa (4mi 2018).

1.3 Intra-regional Migration and Routes

As discussed in the previous section, the majority of migration movements within the region are driven by displacement yet generally remain within the East and Horn of Africa. However, some of this intra-regional migration does eventually become extra-regional. This is especially apparent with three migration routes (see Fig. 1.7) leading out of the East and Horn of Africa region.

Firstly, there is the Northern Route towards North Africa and Europe. Sudan, Khartoum in particular, is a key hub for those aiming to reach Libya and attempt making the Central Mediterranean crossing. Migrants and asylum seekers enter



Fig. 1.6 Routes within the Horn of Africa feeding into the Northern Route. Note: map adapted from Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives (2017, p. 91)

Sudan from the bordering countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan. As illustrated in Fig. 1.4, migrants and refugees from across the region feed into the Northern Route (Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives 2017). However, the use of this route is relatively small and has been on the decline; arrivals in Europe of East and Horn of Africa nationals have fallen since their peak in 2015 (UNODC 2018).

Secondly, there is the Eastern Route that leads to the Arab Peninsula and Gulf States. This route accounts for a significant amount of the flows out of the region, as nationals from the region migrate to Gulf States in search of economic opportunities (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018). The Eastern Route also accommodates irregular migrants; migrants cross from Djibouti or Somalia into Yemen and then make their way towards countries such as Saudi Arabia for labor opportunities. In the first half of 2018, IOM observed 444,490 migration movements across 42 Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) stationed in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen, reporting that 43% of the migration movements they observed were on the Eastern Route (*ibid*.). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recently reported that some irregular migrants who make the crossing into the Arab Peninsula

Fig. 1.7 Key migration routes leading out of the East and Horn of Africa

make their way north along the coast of the Red Sea, then cross back into Sudan or Egypt and rejoin the Northern Route, as seen in Fig. 1.2 (UNODC 2018).

Lastly, there is the route leading to Southern Africa. Hubs for this journey exist along the Ethiopia-Kenya border, and the route can be taken via land, air or sea, although most migrants travel over land. However, use of this route is also in decline (UNODC 2018). Compared to IOM's observations at FMPs of migrants using the Eastern Route, only 7% were using the Southern Route (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa 2018).

While these three broad routes help us illustrate migration movements leading out of the region, it is also necessary to highlight those within the region. Aforementioned data from IOM's FMPs in the region show that a majority (45%) of the migration movements observed were categorized as movements within or towards the Horn of Africa (*ibid.*). This included relatively small flows from Sudan and North

Africa into Ethiopia, from Kenya and further south in Ethiopia, and from Yemen into Djibouti and Ethiopia. Most of the regular movements, as seen in Sect. 1.2, are between neighboring countries.

1.4 Migration Policy

1.4.1 Regional Frameworks and Coordination

Policies and governance mechanisms play an important role in facilitating and managing migration movements concerning the East and Horn of Africa region, and a discussion of migration patterns there warrants attention to these. Central to the continent's development strategy are eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the strengthening and/or establishment of which were detailed in the 1991 Ajuba Treaty, also known as the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Art. 28(1)). As part of the adoption of the Ajuba Treaty, and consequent establishment of the African Economic Community, member states of the African Union (AU), which now number 55 countries (African Union n.d.), committed to institutionalizing freedom of movement and the rights of residence and of establishment for Community nationals (Klavert 2011). Two of these RECs, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC), were mentioned in this chapter's introduction, and this section will detail those along with a third, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

1.4.1.1 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

One of three RECs that include countries discussed in this chapter, the vision of IGAD is to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration amongst its member states (see Fig. 1.1) through food security, environmental protection, the promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation and integration (IGAD 2019a, b). Member states include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

Because of the widespread mixed migration and the consequent challenges presented by this across the region, IGAD has a dedicated Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF) that is focused on realizing "the well-being and protection of migrants including IDPs and refugees in all IGAD Member States and the realization of the developmental potential of migration" (IGAD 2016).

1.4.1.2 East African Community (EAC)

The EAC encompasses a smaller region than IGAD (only six compared to eight) and is a regional intergovernmental organization. Established by treaty in 1999, with its membership growing over the years, "the EAC is widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in various key spheres for their mutual benefit. These spheres include political, economic and social" (EAC 2019b). As it relates to migration, the EAC seeks to "free movement of persons and labor through the adoption of common policies and procedures" (EAC 2019a). A number of articles of the EAC Protocol address different aspects of migration, including the establishment of a common standard system of identification and travel documents, the guarantee of free movement of member state citizens within the region, mutual recognition of professional and academic qualifications, and the harmonization of labor policies, among others.

1.4.1.3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

Another REC that seeks to establish and promote freedom movement is The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). According to its establishing treaty, COMESA was founded "as an organization of free independent sovereign states which have agreed to co-operate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their people" (COMESA Secretariat 2019). Encompassing more of the continent that IGAD or EAC, COMESA is comprised of 21 member states. Focusing on regional integration, it seeks to establish a Free Trade Area (October 2000), Customs Union (December 2012), a Common Market (2015), and a Monetary Union (2018) (COMESA Secretariat 2017). Additionally, COMESA receives support from IOM through the Migration Dialogue from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Member States (MIDCOM), which is centered on improving migration management through capacity building for member state governments, movement towards harmonized data collection practices, and integrated immigration policy and legislation (IOM 2015).

While these regional communities and frameworks establish freedom of movement in principle, varying degrees of implementation of it by member states has not allowed this to be fully realized yet (Castles et al. 2014). Furthermore, a tripartite trade agreement between three Eastern and Southern African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) does not address labor migration issues, again highlighting the gap between the aims of and actual implementation by these regional governance bodies (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016). Yet even with the progress that the EAC has made in establishing free movement (i.e. regional passport), the collision of national interests and prerogatives with the rights and responsibilities agreed to in international legislation remains a significant barrier to the full implementation of human mobility policies (*ibid.*).

1.4.2 Key International Stakeholders

In addition to these regional frameworks, there are a number of international stakeholders that are major players in the region's migration arena, namely, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations primary agencies for migration and refugees, respectively. These two, among many other international, relief, and development organizations, play roles central to the management of migration in the region (Marchand et al. 2017).

The United Nations' agency for migration, IOM aims to, "contribute to effective, flexible and comprehensive migration management solutions in East and Horn of Africa, in partnership with states, regional institutions, international agencies, communities and migrants", and works in harmony with REC's in the region, like IGAD and EAC (IOM n.d.).

UNHCR, the UN's agency for refugees, is concerned with meeting the protection and assistance needs of those it designates as "persons of concern," which include refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returned refugees, stateless persons, and others of concern (UNHCR 2019b). Its budget in the region is divided among four pillars: (1) Refugee program, (2) Stateless program, (3) Reintegration projects, and (4) IDP projects. A majority of funding is earmarked for Pillar 1 for each country in this operation region of UNCHR, but the other three pillars depend on the country situation.

The links between migration and development have also received significantly more attention from international actors operating within the East and Horn of Africa region. Concerns of irregular migrants reaching Europe have translated into European-funded interventions across the region, particularly, "addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration" under the umbrella of the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) (European Commission 2019). Through this funding mechanism, launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration by European and African partners in 2015, a significant cooperative effort is being made to bolster border security, enhance migration management, and provide services and opportunities to host communities and migrants alike.

1.5 Conclusion

South-south migration in the context of the East and Horn of Africa region is distinguished by the prevalence of mixed migration. Forced displacement is the primary driver of movement within the region in terms of absolute stocks. The region at the focus of this chapter is the location of some of the largest populations of refugees and internally displace persons on the planet. Even so, much of this displacement-driven movement, be it conflict- or climate-induced, is limited to

within the region. Looking outside of the region, emigration beyond the African continent has grown at a faster rate than that within it.

It is clear that migrants in this part of the world are motivated by the same fundamental drivers seen in other migration arenas; most people are in search of a better life, be it through living in a more secure country and political stable situation or moving to access better economic opportunities. The difference here is that it takes place in a high-risk environment in which populations face violence and climate disasters like flooding and drought. On top of that, the level of development across the region is relatively low on a global scale, further compounding the above risks, and the boiling over of ethnic tensions also drives movement.

A shortcoming of migration data in general is that it usually does not track how long people stay in another country or away from their place of usual residence, whether they came there through regular/irregular means or under force. This kind of data would be especially valuable in helping inform migration policy throughout the region, particularly with respect to IDPs and the sheer number of people this covers.

The major role of migration in the region and its mixed nature receives attention from regional initiatives as well as international actors, highlighting the need for sustainable solutions. In the coming decades, new but familiar drivers of displacement will surely emerge, as will increasing development drive more economically-motivated movements. From a policy perspective all of these movements must be addressed together for migration to be of the greatest benefit for the region.

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Chapter 2
Contemporary Labor Migration in West and Central Africa: The Main Patterns, Drivers and Routes

Chiara Janssen and Katrin Marchand

2.1 Introduction

Migration movements in and from the West and Central African region are diverse and have largely been reported about in relation to forced displacement and irregular migration. The region has been affected by widespread poverty, violent conflicts and challenging climate conditions, all of which have caused significant migrant flows both within the region as well as beyond. Moreover, migration is, to some extent, historically a way of life in West and Central Africa and is fostered in the Western part of the region through the promotion of free movement of persons and goods within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Existing literature on these movements has largely focused on migration from the Global South to the Global North, specifically looking at the various external migration routes to Northern Africa and onwards to Europe.

However, there is a growing body of evidence that emphasizes that the largest part of African migration, in fact, occurs intra-continentally, and even intra-regionally, most commonly to neighboring countries (Horwood et al. 2018; RMMS West Africa 2017). Between 1960 and 2000, a larger number of Africans migrated within Africa than from Africa to the rest of the world (Flahaux and de Haas 2016); a trend that is confirmed in a contemporary data analysis of migration volumes within and from Africa conducted by Mberu and Sidze (2017). Reflecting

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these general trends, the West and Central African region is especially characterized by intense intra-regional mobility (RMMS West Africa 2017). As Horwood et al. (2018) note, the largest migration flows in Central, East and West Africa in 2017 were to other countries within the respective regions. Overall, intra-regional movements seem to be far more significant in volume than migrant flows towards Europe and the rest of the world (UNICEF WCARO 2016).

Furthermore, existing evidence shows that, next to conflict-induced migration, contemporary migration in the region is often driven by the search for employment and other economic opportunities as well as a growing labor demand, predominantly for low-skilled migrants. Economic inter-regional migration patterns are mostly concentrated in agriculture and domestic service sectors as well as the informal trade sector (UNCTAD 2018). Along the same lines, Flahaux and de Haas (2016) suggest that migration in West and Central Africa is foremost voluntary and driven by development, education, employment and economic growth. Others have indicated that most Africans migrate for reasons related to family, work or study; or more generally in search of economic opportunities (Schoumaker et al. 2015; Awumbila 2017).

Considering the importance of labor and other economic factors as drivers of migration within West and Central Africa, this chapter focuses on the drivers and trends of contemporary migration in the region for economic purposes. In order to provide an overview of the evidence that exists on the topic, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the regional context will be set in Sect. 2.2, where necessary background information will be presented. Following that, this chapter analyses the intra-regional patterns of labor migration. These patterns look at both, the main drivers of labor migration (Sect. 2.3) and the most important labor migration routes within the region (Sect. 2.4). Within both of these sections, specific attention is paid to labor migration of women and children as they currently represent a growing and significant share of migratory flows in the region. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main patterns of labor migration in the West and Central African region in Sect. 2.5.

It is important to note that there may be differences across studies with regards to what African countries are considered to make up the West and/or Central African region. Therefore, differences may also exist in how the region has been researched and discussed in the literature, and the data reported may include different countries.

2.2 Regional Context

The countries in West and Central Africa show a different regional context than the rest of the continent. Intra-regional migration seems to be particularly present in this region and is not necessarily a transit strategy towards other, extra-continental destinations; instead other countries in the region are a destination in the search of better (economic) opportunities. In addition, migration intensities in the region seem to evolve, especially in comparison to other African regions. While the overall

volume of intra-African migration has decreased in recent decades, the trends in West Africa are an exception in this regard. More concretely, research has found that the majority of African migrants reside in other African countries and move within the continent. However, an increasing share of African migrants is also going to North America and, especially, Europe, showing a declining trend in intra-African migration. This, however, does not apply to the West African region. Intra-continental migration from West African countries has remained on a consistently high level and West Africa has, on average, become most open to African migration (Flahaux and de Haas 2016).

The most recent data for 2017 on the international migrant stock, available from the United Nations Population Division (UN DESA), confirms that migrants from West and Central African countries are predominantly represented in destination countries that are also in the West and Central African region. While the reported numbers are only estimates, a clear representation can be seen of Middle and West African migrants that have migrated within the region (UN DESA 2017a). Other sources have estimated that intra-regional movements make up 84.0% of overall migration movements in West Africa (SWAC and OECD 2012 as cited in Awumbila 2017) and that 75.0% of migrants from West and Central Africa travelled within Sub-Saharan Africa more generally (Devillard et al. 2015).

It is also important to mention that migration of women is increasingly common in the West and Central African region. The UN DESA (2017a) data shows that for some countries the share of women amongst migrants is comparatively higher than for others. When looking at the percentage of female migrants among the total migrant stock,[1] the available data shows that, for example, the majority of Beninese migrants in Niger and Sierra Leone are women, with percentages above 60.0% for both countries. Togolese migrants in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger are also more often female than male; the percentage is especially high in Niger with 68.7%. The stock of Ghanaian migrants in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Togo is likewise dominated by women (around 60.0%, Burkina Faso almost 65.0%). Overall, Niger and Burkina Faso seem to host comparatively higher percentages of female migrants than the other countries in the region, suggesting that these are popular destinations for female migrants.

Many of the intra-regional movements are undertaken by labor migrants who take advantage of opportunities in other parts of the region (Awumbila 2017). Historically, migrants have generally considered West Africa as a single socio-economic unit and, nowadays, labor migration is fostered by the promotion of free movement of persons and goods within ECOWAS. This allows individuals to travel without visas, and move and trade between member states.[2] ECOWAS was established in the early 1970s as an important step towards regional integration and even further

[1] Where this data is available.

[2] The ECOWAS region consists of 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

integration into the global economy, with one of its key objectives being the removal of obstacles to the free movement[3] of goods, capital and people in the sub-region (Adepoju 2007).

Next to ECOWAS, the other main regional economic community in the West and Central African region is the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS[4]) (African Development Bank Group n.d.). Both, ECOWAS and ECCAS are recognized by the African Union (AU) as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). RECs are regional groupings of African states, which have developed individually and therefore have differing roles and structures. Generally, the purpose of the RECs is to facilitate the economic integration between countries in the individual regions across the continent (AU n.d.).

Besides such institutional factors, another important factor that likely impacts migration in West and Central Africa, as well as Africa as a whole, is of demographic nature. It is prospected that the global population will grow by 2.2 billion people between 2017 and 2050, where more than half of this growth is expected to occur on the African continent (1.3 billion) (UN DESA 2017b). The African continent as a whole is furthermore characterized by, on average, relatively young populations. In 2017, children under the age of 15 accounted for 41.0% and youngsters between the age of 15 and 24 for 19.0% of the African population (UN DESA 2017b). The World Population Prospects of 2017 estimate that the West as well as Central African region will more than double its population between 2017 and 2050. At the same time, the population is already rather young. In mid-2017, 44.0% of the West African population and 46.0% of the Middle African population was under the age of 15 (UN DESA 2017c). This is important to mention insofar that migration movements of young individuals in the West African region are becoming increasingly prominent (Charrière and Frésia 2008). The situation in Central Africa is similar. The lack of employment as well as future prospects push young people into rural-urban movements, which has resulted in unexpected migration levels in various Central African countries and has encouraged international migration (Fall 2017).

The rapidly growing and extremely young population in West and Central Africa is posing major challenges to the labor markets in the region's countries. West African labor markets do not have the capacity to absorb the working age population. Contemporary labor markets in West Africa are therefore characterized by high unemployment rates, especially among youth, and by economies that structurally offer few opportunities for formal employment (Dimechkie 2015). The socio-economic conditions are expected to remain weak and (economic) growth among

[3]The first ECOWAS protocol, as adopted in May 1979 , stipulates the right of ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in the territory of other member states (UNECA n.d.). ECOWAS citizens visiting other member states are free of visa requirements for a period of ninety days (through the official entry point) (ECOWAS/9791979).

[4]The ECCAS Community is composed of the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Rwanda (ECCAS n.d.).

ECOWAS Member States has largely been uneven. As a result, poor living conditions still prevail due to an unequal distribution of wealth (Devillard et al. 2015). Some of the West African countries' economies, such as Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, have shown considerable growth from 2010 to 2015[5] (Awumbila et al. 2018; UNDP 2010, 2016). Guinea specifically has shown considerable growth for the period 2015 to 2017, when the country's economy almost doubled its gross national income per capita (UNDP 2018). However, many countries also remain within the low-income category and disparities continue to exist within the region (Awumbila et al. 2018). This may help to explain some of the migration flows within the region, often directed towards neighboring countries. Cape Verde and Ghana are an exception and are considered to have medium levels of human development (UNDP 2018). The Central African region shows a somewhat different reality. In terms of growth rates, there is similarly a small group of countries, such as Angola, Congo, Gabon and São Tomé and Principe, that have shown considerable growth from 2010 to 2015 (UNDP 2010, 2016). However, in comparison to the West African region, more Central African countries are considered Medium Human Development countries (UNDP 2018). The Fragile States Index[6] data furthermore shows that six West African countries are among the 30 highest ranked countries (out of 178 countries) in terms of uneven economic development. For the Central African region, the majority of countries are among the 30 highest ranked countries, with three of its countries, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad, even ranked among the top 10 (FFP 2018).

Considering the migration trends in West Africa specifically, it is safe to say that population movements mostly take place within the region (Devillard et al. 2015). Looking at the total migrant stock[7] at mid-year in 2017, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria hosted the highest number of migrants within the Western African region; Côte d'Ivoire accounts for a bit over 30% and Nigeria for almost 20%. Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Saint Helena hosted the smallest stocks of migrants in the region (UN DESA 2017a). In Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had the highest migrant stock in the region (almost 25%) and Angola also hosted a considerable share (around 15%). Sao Tome and Principe hosted the smallest stock of

[5]When looking at gross national income (GNI) per capita.

[6]"The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP), is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policymakers and the public at large" (FSI 2018, Methodology).

[7]It is likely that these official statistics underestimate the true size of migration between countries in the region due to the nature of flows, which, among others, include many temporary and unregistered movements. Yet, the data provides important insights into the significance of migration in the region.

migrants (UN DESA 2017a). In the next section, the focus will be on the factors driving these trends.

2.3 Main Labor Migration Drivers in West and Central Africa

2.3.1 Mixed Migration in the Region

This section will focus on the contemporary drivers of labor migration in the region. Consensus has been reached that there are forces that lead to the inception of migration and to the perpetuation of movement (Massey et al. 1993). In other words, "drivers are the factors which get migration going and keep it going once begun" (Van Hear et al. 2012, p. 4). As such, this section will show that migration, including migration for economic purposes, has always formed a part of West and Central Africa's history. This includes seasonal and circular migratory flows, nomadic migration as well as cross-border workers. Overall, it is clear that migrants in the region have been and continue to be in search of better (economic) opportunities. This is the case for men, women and children.

Before looking at the particular drivers of labor migration in West and Central Africa, it is important to acknowledge that migration is historically a way of life in West Africa (Adepoju 2007; Agyei and Clottey 2007; Devillard et al. 2015). In some communities, migration is seen as a common and important phase of one's life trajectory (RMMS West Africa 2017). Labor migration has become widespread among adolescents in rural Sub-Saharan Africa, such as in Southeast Mali as well as other West African populations with low school enrolment, as a key event in the transitions into adulthood. In many populations, labor migration, usually temporary, has now also developed among adolescent girls (Hertrich and Lesclingand 2013). Migration patterns and processes in the West African sub-region have furthermore continued to change throughout the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras (Ikwuyatum 2012). The post-independence era is characterized by changing patterns of migration, including a 'feminization' of migration, commercial migration as well as a shift in the diversification of migration destinations within the West African region (Ikwuyatum 2012).

Throughout history, migrants in West and Central Africa have included temporary cross-border workers, seasonal migrants, clandestine workers, professionals, refugees and asylum seekers. Cross-border migrants have typically been in search of new land or trade-related opportunities (Adepoju 2007). Historically, these types of migration took place on a routine basis between neighboring countries with similar social and ethno-cultural features (Adepoju 1998 as cited in Adepoju 2007, p. 162). An example includes nomadic communities that have continually been moving for economic and social reasons, also in pre-colonial times when current territorial borders were not yet established. Before national borders were established,

intra-regional mobility was not restrained and ethnic groups not separated across different countries (UNICEF WCARO 2016; Devillard et al. 2015).

In present-day, migratory movements continue across national borders within the region, mostly in the form of labor migration (Devillard et al. 2015). Movement might take place across greater distances within the region, for example from the Northern zones to the coastal regions, but also on a smaller scale from rural to urban areas (Adepoju 2007). Geographical proximity, together with socio-cultural and economic ties, seem to link West African countries and populations and facilitate long-distance movements (Devillard et al. 2015). Other factors influencing the choice of destination might include colonial legacy, common official language and ethnic ties. Many ECOWAS migrants also perceive mobility across borders as being within one socio-cultural space rather than between two nations (Awumbila et al. 2018).

As discussed previously, the migration movements in, between and from countries in the region are rather diverse and mixed in nature. They include forced migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees alongside voluntary migrants, such as labor migrants. The drivers of migration are therefore likewise of mixed nature and include conflict, persecution, political and socio-economic conditions in countries of origin, health epidemics and environmental stresses (Bruni et al. 2017), but also economic factors, including strategies to diversify risks and seek economic opportunities (Charrière and Frésia 2008). Traditional labor-importing countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have also experienced political and economic crises, which have encouraged their nationals to emigrate. The same applies to some coastal countries and attractive migrant hubs, such as Nigeria and Senegal (Adepoju 2006). In addition, other migration drivers, such as (state) conflicts and environmental degradation, have aggravated the pressure for migration from poorer to relatively more prosperous regions (Adepoju 2006). Charrière and Frésia (2008) note that migratory movements within the West African region also constitute a number of people in need of international protection, such as refugees and victims of human trafficking. They, however, tend to use the same migration routes as other (labor) migrants.

2.3.2 Economic Factors as Drivers of Regional Migration

Although different mixed migration routes exist within the region and migratory movements are characterized by different migration drivers, migration from the West African region is largely driven by economic reasons (Horwood et al. 2018). In line with this, major reasons for migration are indeed the lack of job opportunities in origin countries, but also social pressures to (financially) support one's family (Altai Consulting 2015). For the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) Review 2018, 4451 interviews were conducted with West African migrants (including refugees) en

route to West and Central Africa[8]; of these 87.3% indicated to have left their home country due to economic reasons (Horwood et al. 2018). Specifically, reasons to migrate were not earning enough in their home countries and/or being unemployed and unable to find work.

Other main drivers that can be identified also seem to be linked to economic factors. One such driver is improving the living conditions of the rest of the family that often remains in the village. This type of migration is often pursued by men on their own as part of a 'family project' (Charrière and Frésia 2008, p. 10). Another driver is characterized by strategies for diversifying risks. According to Charrière and Frésia (2008), the majority of migration movements correspond to a strategy of diversifying risks and seeking economic opportunities, and as such, take advantage of the (minimal) economic disparities between the countries of the sub-region. The same authors furthermore found that migrants of rural origins generally do trade or other small crafts in the city and send back funds to the family remaining in the village to pay for agricultural or pastoral activities.

In line with the economic factors that drive labor migration in the West African region are the low employment rates in most ECOWAS countries. The unemployed labor stock in West Africa that is struggling to find employment in the formal sector of the economy is furthermore showing a shift towards commercial migration: entrepreneurial self-employment (especially) in the informal sector. As such, trading has become a survival strategy and commercial migration is evolving as a major migration pattern (both internal as international) in West African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana (Ikwuyatum 2012). A recent Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa indeed confirms that, similar to the local population, the vast majority of foreigners or migrants in ECOWAS countries work in low-skilled positions in the informal sector and tend to have a low level of education (Devillard et al. 2015). Lower-skilled migrants, for example, work in the agricultural sector, in mines and other industries, but also in small-scale businesses and trade (Manby 2015).

Although labor migration in West Africa is primarily low-skilled (Dimechkie 2015), it also includes highly skilled migrants to some extent. Examples include doctors, paramedical personnel, nurses, teachers, and others moving from countries such as Ghana and Benin to other countries in the region (or beyond) (Manby 2015). Since the 1970s, highly skilled Ghanaians have, for example, migrated to Nigeria and elsewhere (Dimechkie 2015). Other examples include Beninese teachers who emigrate to work in Gabon as well as Togolese teachers who work in Nigerian and Ghanaian schools (Devillard et al. 2015). Highly skilled workers furthermore also tend to migrate to countries in other regions in Africa or abroad, for example to Europe or North America (Dimechkie 2015). Therefore, the region experiences what can be described as a 'brain drain'. Cape Verde, for example, has an emigration rate of 67.0% of its highly skilled workers, and The Gambia and Sierra Leone see many of their highly skilled nationals leaving the country. This 'brain drain pattern' might

[8]"West Africa to West and Central Africa (interviews with nationals from a wide range of West African countries in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)" (Horwood et al. 2018, p. 12).

be explained by the fact that all three countries have relatively small economies and hence have little to offer in terms of employment opportunities for (highly) skilled workers (Dimechkie 2015).

Another demographic trend that influences economically driven migration decisions is Africa's rapidly growing population and urban growth. The continent's 'urban transition' is proceeding rapidly and urban growth is expected to continue in the future. Urban growth and spatial transition are increasingly driven by people on the move, in search of social and economic opportunities, but might also be a consequence of environmental deterioration. As such, rural-urban migration remains a dominant migration stream and will continue to play an important role in the urbanization process (Awumbila 2017). Adepoju (2007) has similarly argued that rural-urban migration of farm laborers in search of wage labor in the cities has intensified. Migrants might also move to urban centers, because cities provide different opportunity structures to create livelihoods, for example, by engaging in entrepreneurship and accumulating assets. These employments activities then also contribute to human capital development (Awumbila 2017).

2.3.3 Drivers of Regional Labor Migration of Women and Children

Women and girls make up a significant, growing share of the contemporary mixed migration movements in the West and Central African region. Women increasingly move alone and decide to do so as an independent economic actor (MMC 2018; Adepoju 2005). Adepoju (2007) argues that interdependent economies across the West African region have facilitated, and poverty has propelled, a wide variety of migration configurations, including the autonomous migration of women. Therefore, in this subsection, female migration, particularly for the purpose of labor, will be addressed specifically, in order to better understand the drivers of this growing migrant trend in the region.

The MMC has collected new data on women on the move through the Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi) to generate insights on the drivers, expectations and experiences of migrant and refugee women travelling in mixed migration flows, including from and through West Africa (MMC 2018). Data from the West (and Central) African region includes interviews with women from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Although there is rarely a single driver for women and girls to migrate, the 4Mi data does show that the most common migration drivers combine violence, insecurity and economic considerations (Horwood et al. 2018; MMC 2018). In the West African region, the search for better economic opportunities is the most predominant migration driver for (female) refugees and migrants. Indeed, 37.0% of the respondents indicated that they did not earn enough in the job they had and

22.0% indicated that they were unemployed or could not find work. These are then among the most important economic migration drivers for migrant women in the West African region (MMC 2018).

In line with these economic migration drivers, other important decision-making factors for women and girls to migrate are expectations regarding the situation in the destination country and what opportunities it may offer, believing the country may offer favorable conditions (Horwood et al. 2018). Nuclear and extended families, however, also seem to play a role in encouraging women in the West African region to migrate (MMC 2018). This applies, for instance, to women joining their husbands, in which case the husband usually organizes the journey, as well as to women who are encouraged to migrate to join family abroad (MMC 2018; Altai Consulting 2013). The MMC's research (4Mi) furthermore shows that participants from West Africa were among the ones most likely to believe they would find a job within six months of arrival in the destination country. The most common type of employment for West African women (similar to other regions) was suggested to be domestic work. However, West African women also commonly expressed their intention to apply for family reunification. In contrast, 55.0% indicated to intend to migrate only temporarily, of whom most were looking to stay between one and five years before returning to their country of origin (MMC 2018).

Although highly skilled emigration from West Africa has increased among female migrants, women continue to be disproportionately represented among low-skilled migrants (Dimechkie 2015). In addition to domestic work in specific, female migrants seem to be generally more drawn to the wage labor market (both formal and informal) as a strategy to augment meagre family income and as a response to deepening poverty in the region (Adepoju 2005); again, showing that the search for better economic opportunities is the predominant driver of migration for females. Commercial migration in the region is also heavily female-dominated, with female traders dominating the Nigeria-Benin-Togo-Côte d'Ivoire-Senegal-Gambia trade network (Adepoju 2005). Dimechkie (2015) indeed confirms that female migrants are represented in low-skilled employment such as cross-border trading.

Lastly, it should be reported that women and girls are a more vulnerable migrant group and often more constrained than men and boys in their ability to exercise agency over their migration trajectories (MMC 2018). Therefore, trafficking in persons[9] is a major concern in the West and Central African region and women and girls are more vulnerable to becoming a victim of this, although men are also

[9]"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character" (Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross 2011, p. 99).

being trafficked for purposes of forced labor, domestic servitude and sexual exploitation (Bruni et al. 2017). Trafficking of women within and outside of the region is a reality, especially in relation to (forced) labor. Trafficking in women and young persons for sexual exploitation, both inside and outside West and Central Africa, as well as to Europe and South Africa can be considered one of the main trafficking types (Manby 2015). Within the West African region, however, victims are mainly trafficked within a country or to a neighboring country, which is in line with the evidence suggesting that the largest part of African migration occurs intra-regionally and often to neighboring countries. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo are among the ECOWAS countries that are most affected by trafficking as an origin, transit and/or destination country (Manby 2015).

Migration of children is also an increasing reality in West and Central Africa as the region is facing population and urban growth. This demographic trend might affect migration patterns in the region (Devillard et al. 2015) and one such pattern that is likely to intensify is migration by young people. Therefore, it is relevant to better understand the different factors influencing this specific migrant flow, especially since children can be considered to be a particularly vulnerable migrant group (UNICEF WCARO 2016).

The West and Central African region has the youngest population in the world with a median age of 17 to 18 years old and young people are willing to migrate from rural to urban areas in search of better opportunities. In addition, families may also feel pushed to send their young children away as a coping mechanism in response to social pressures and poor education and economic opportunities (Global Migration Group 2014). Hence, labor motivated migration among youngsters and children towards urban areas and across borders is likely to intensify within the region. Flahaux and de Haas (2016) confirm that processes of development and social transformation have increased young Africans' capabilities and aspirations to migrate. It is likely that this trend will continue in the future.

The preceding sections have shown that, historically, different migration movements have been part of the 'way of life' in West and Central Africa, and child migration flows are also a part of this. Children in the region have traditionally been sent away by their families as part of their education, their socialization in the wider kinship network or as a family strategy to cope with shocks. Migration of children can, therefore, be regarded a widespread phenomenon in the region. Just as migratory movements in general take on different forms, children's movements do as well. Children might migrate voluntarily or involuntarily, for a variety of reasons, at a young age or later in life as an adolescent, either accompanied or unaccompanied, and through regular or irregular routes (UNICEF WCARO 2016).

Child migration is often of involuntary nature and sometimes associated with trafficking and forced labor. Work placement channels are still used in West Africa to secure work for migrant children. Work placements have, for example, been organized by men (and some women) in Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. Brokers might recruit children on request of employers, but might also help to find work or an apprenticeship abroad (one of the most desired routes out of poverty) on the request

of the child or the parents themselves. Hence, there is also evidence of child migration that has more voluntary characteristics. Young migrants might for example, for reasons of age and experience, migrate in search of social adulthood and independence (Thorsen 2018).

The 2015 Report on Mixed Migration in West and Central Africa furthermore notes that many children across the region undertake risky journeys for work in the informal sector, often with a high child labor component and exploitative working conditions. The informal sector may include activities such as street vending and begging, but also domestic work and work in the gold and diamond mines (UNICEF WCARO 2016). Manby (2015) furthermore notes that trafficking in children also includes trafficking for farm labor and domestic work purposes, but also in the mining and fishing sector, and other sectors. This includes trafficking within and across countries.

A recent baseline study on 'Child Migrants Along the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor' provides some more insights in the factors 'driving' children to migrate for labor purposes. The study shows that in West Africa, adolescents (under the age of 18) often take on social responsibilities such as caring for younger siblings and their own children, but also earning a wage to contribute to family wellbeing. Adolescents might, for example, migrate temporarily for work or to earn money to pay for school fees. These are mostly economic needs, however, adolescent's motivations also include the social responsibility to contribute to their families, as well as the desire to grow and learn, and to overcoming hardships. Adolescents in the study frequently indicated that severe poverty and families' inability to feed and care for family members, and to educate their children, was a reason for leaving home. Other reasons included the loss of one or both parents and intra-familial conflict (Thorsen 2018). Lastly, according to Awumbila (2017), young West Africans are also increasingly moving to take advantage of educational facilities in other parts of the region.

2.4 Main Labor Migration Routes in West and Central Africa

After having provided an overview of the drivers of labor migration in the West and Central African region, this section will focus on the direction and routes of migration in the region. Emphasis will be placed on contemporary trends, which are often linked to historic directions and routes. Generally, this section will show that economically driven migration movements in the region are mostly directed towards the relatively more developed coastal countries in the Southern part of the region as well as to neighboring countries; with the latter often being the case for migrants with fewer resources.

As has been discussed, African migration mainly takes place intra-continental, rather than extra-continental. Within the African continent, intra-continental

migration intensities are highest in inland West African countries (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). This trend seems to be linked to the fact that West Africa is comprised of many smaller countries, with smaller populations, which increases the likelihood that migrants cross borders for rural to urban migration purposes (de Haas 2010; Flahaux and de Haas 2016). However, other factors might also be influential; such as the region's many ethnic groups that are spread across borders, the migration patterns already established under colonial rule and, lastly, the visa-free movement between ECOWAS countries (Flahaux and de Haas 2016).

2.4.1 Historically Rooted Migration Patterns

In order to understand contemporary labor migration, it is important to recognize the history of migration in the region. Contemporary patterns of migration are rooted in socio-economic, political and historical-cultural factors that have shaped the direction of development and types of economic activities (Adepoju 2005). One such movement builds on a long history of circular trade and migration across the Sahara Desert, connecting West and North Africa, passing through Mali and Niger. Traditionally, circular labor movements along these routes constituted an important livelihood strategy for those living in the Sahara. Movements along the route also provide labor to the expanding economies of the North African countries and, more recently, are used by refugees and migrants en route to Libya and onwards to Europe (Horwood et al. 2018). Furthermore, the colonial period also provoked large-scale labor migration towards coastal areas to establish plantations, mines and public administration (Adepoju 2007). Contemporary migration patterns show a certain historical continuity of such colonial mobility patterns, such as the migratory flows from hinterland African countries and the Sahel towards coastal territories (Robin 2014 as cited in RMMS West Africa 2017). Seasonal migration is especially common among the agro-pastoral communities in the Sahel region and includes migration flows from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire for agricultural or informal trade activities. Another flow includes emigration from Niger to neighboring countries to work in the agricultural sector. These are mainly rural to rural movements (Devillard et al. 2015).

Three main intra-regional routes in the West African region can be identified, as also shown in Fig. 2.1. Firstly, there is the South coastal route, which links the west coast of the region (including Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) to the south coast (up to Nigeria), following the coastal line of the region. On this route, migrants travel by land or by sea. It is clear that the coastal zones attract most migrants in the region, which is related to the development of income crops and pioneer agricultural fronts there as well as the urbanization of ports. Environmental deterioration in the Sahel region is also causing migration movements to the south. Hence, a second migration route is referred to as the Sahelian route. One could say that this route is 'agricultural' in nature, as it was traditionally used by cattle guards. This route crosses Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and then Nigeria, and some



Fig. 2.1 Main migration routes and hubs in West and Central Africa

migrants move on to Cameroon. The third route is the 'Middle' route, which links Senegal and Mauritania to Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana. It is a combination of the North (towards Europe) and South route and combines travel by train, public transport such as buses and sometimes travel by sea (Charrière and Frésia 2008).

In addition, the RMMS West Africa (2017) summary on Mixed Migration in West Africa notes that since the late 1980s, three migration patterns can be identified that are tied to economic dynamics. These are migratory flows (1) towards Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, countries that are rich in commercial crops and mines; (2) towards Senegal where there are a lot of trading networks and agriculture; and (3) towards Nigeria, which is rich in oil and industries. Côte d'Ivoire specifically is a major destination country, partly due to its vast natural resources, but also because the domestic labor force is relatively small. As such, foreigners have for many years constituted about a quarter of the country's waged labor force. Another concrete direction of labor migration includes the flows from Sahel West African countries to mineral and plantation rich countries in the South of West Africa located along the coast. Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Ghana have attracted migrants in the past to work on plantations and do menial jobs, work that the local population despised (Adepoju 2007). Another example includes North-South patterns from inland marginal rural areas to fertile agricultural areas, towns and cities, between

(e.g. Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire) and within countries (Flahaux and de Haas 2016).

This information corresponds with UNICEF WCARO's current report on Mixed Migration in West and Central Africa. The report identifies three migration hubs within West and Central Africa: the Southeast area around Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, the Central area around Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire and the Western area around Senegal (UNICEF WCARO 2016). Overall, a clear trend of movements can be identified, directed towards the more Southern, coastal countries in the region, especially in the context of labor migration. The coastal countries in West and Central Africa are furthermore the more developed countries that have relatively higher urbanization rates and higher levels of economic development. Migrants from these relatively more developed countries have access to better infrastructures and transportation and are more inclined to move over greater distances. Therefore, these urban coastal zones, including Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, form an emergent zone of increasing extra-continental emigration (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). Dimechkie (2015) also identifies Nigeria as a transit zone and country of origin for extra-regional movements.

Migrants from less-developed countries, on the other hand, often have fewer resources and tend to migrate over shorter distances, for example into neighboring countries (Flahaux 2017). In fact, most intra-regional movements remain cross-border, accounting for up to 80.0% of the movements in the region. Common cross-border movements, besides those already mentioned, are movements around the northern borders of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, between the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, but also Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, between Mali and Burkina Faso, Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as Nigeria and Chad (Charrière and Frésia 2008). Cross-border commuting also makes up a considerable proportion of migration in the West and Central African region. This includes commuting at key borders within the region; for example, the borders between Ghana and Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin, Senegal and The Gambia, and others (Kwankye and Anarfi 2011 as cited in Siddiqui 2012).

2.4.2 West and Central Africa: A Region of Origin, Destination and Transit Countries

Drawing on the above information, one can conclude that many West African countries are now simultaneously immigration, emigration and transit countries (Adepoju 2007). Manby (2015) similarly acknowledges that all countries in West Africa are places of origin, transit and destination of complex population movements. There seems to be general agreement in the literature that Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria are attractive hubs for immigration in the West African region (Adepoju 2007; Carciotto and Agyeman 2017; Charrière and Frésia 2008; Dimechkie 2015). Côte d'Ivoire, in particular, is considered to be a major intra-

regional destination and more an immigration than emigration country (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). The data shows that Côte d'Ivoire holds the highest number of immigrants in the ECOWAS region (UN DESA 2017a; Awumbila 2014 as cited in Awumbila et al. 2018; Devillard et al. 2015), of which the majority originates from other ECOWAS countries. Other main host countries are Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ghana. In relation to the size of the total population, however, Nigeria hosts a relatively lower share of immigrants as compared to countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and The Gambia (Devillard et al. 2015).

Countries such as Gabon and Congo have emerged as new migrant destination countries as they are natural resource rich and hence considered poles of economic prosperity (Charrière and Frésia 2008; Lompo 2015 as cited in UNICEF WCARO 2016). In the case of Gabon, the oil economy has attracted increasing numbers of migrants. As a consequence, Gabon has grown as a migration hub more recently (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). This information is coherent with the 2015 Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa that confirms that labor migration patterns change in response to the discovery of natural resources and subsequently, the establishment of new industries (Devillard et al. 2015). The major labor-exporting or sending countries in the region include Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Togo (Adepoju 2007; Carciotto and Agyeman 2017). Different authors furthermore conclude that Mali and Cape Verde are two main emigration countries (Charrière and Frésia 2008; Devillard et al. 2015).

Looking at the labor migration context in more detail, it is observed that migrants in West and Central Africa who come from the same country of origin tend to work in the same labor market niches as fellow migrants from the same country. Looking at the specific countries and niches one can see that in Côte d'Ivoire, migrants originating from Burkina Faso mostly work in the agricultural sector, while migrants from Mali work in the herding, fishing, industry, service and trade sectors. Ghanaians in Côte d'Ivoire similarly work in the fishing, trade and service sectors. Another example of this pattern is found in Liberia where Guineans and Malians work as petty traders, artisans and plantation workers; similarly, Guineans in Senegal also work in fruit and vegetable trade as well as in the transport sector. Of the Malian migrants, women however specialize in selling paintings, although men are more active in the cola nut business. Overall, migrants from Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo more often seem to be employed in higher-skilled positions (Devillard et al. 2015). In Mauritania, migrants work in fishing, construction, as well as various urban occupations following more recent urban growth. New migrants often arrive with the help of existing members of the community, which emphasizes the role played by network effects, and suggests some sort of self-regulation regarding capacity and job availability (Bensaâd 2009). The work of Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2014) has also emphasized the role played by networks in the West African context. They, in particular, highlight family networks, especially with regards to stabilizing or helping workers to enhance their professional situation.

2.4.3 *Patterns of Regional Labor Migration of Women and Children*

As described before, a 'feminization of flows' in the West African region has been observed to some extent. In their research, the MMC (2018) finds that women select their destination before leaving the country of origin and generally 'stick' to their plan along the journey. This helps to explain the main migration routes of women and girls in West Africa. The route that refugee and migrant women take is furthermore closely related to what they can afford, given the geographic and legal context (ECOWAS, free movement policies) of West Africa. Women have relatively easy access to public transport, making travel by bus, car and truck a popular mode of transport (Horwood et al. 2018). In the West African region, 59.0% of the 4Mi respondents indicated travel by bus as the most common mode of transport. Indeed, in countries such as Nigeria bus travel is common, also for women traveling alone (MMC 2018). According to the MMC (2018) this accords with other reporting that indicates that West Africans have easy access to visas and public transport networks within the ECOWAS region.

Evidence furthermore shows that trade and commerce motivated migration in the region is increasingly dominated by females. According to Awumbila et al. (2014), female migrants are increasingly drawn to the wage labor market, stimulating intra-regional migration by women for commercial trade purposes as a livelihood strategy. The 2015 Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa furthermore reports that female migrants in West and Central Africa tend to work in certain labor market niches. Female labor migrants in Niger, for example, work in domestic and hospitality sectors and Malian women in Senegal often specialize in selling paintings in the market (Devillard et al. 2015).

Turning to migration of children for the purpose of labor, a recent baseline study on 'Child Migrants Along the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor' was conducted in major markets and border points in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. These research sites represent vibrant economies that attract many migrants who are trying to make a living, children included. Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, in particular, were found to be important (labor) migration destinations within West Africa. This includes cross-border regional flows as well as internal flows. Child migration routes and destinations may be explained by the fact that most child migrants follow adult migratory flows, although historical networks also seem to play a role in placing children with employers and skilled masters (Thorsen 2018).

It should be noted that there is a lack of research into the variety of migration forms young people might engage in and that there is insufficient knowledge about why they migrate (migration drivers) and what their journeys look like (UNICEF WCARO 2016). Therefore, the UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Office (WCARO) 2016 report on Mixed Migration in West and Central Africa aimed to identify key trends affecting children, including the key directions or routes taken by children and youth, particularly by those working in the streets. Important known routes include those from Togo and Benin to the Gulf of Guinea countries. Gabon

and Equatorial Guinea have become important destination countries for young people across the region. This can be explained by the fact that oil windfall and the lumber industry in these countries generate significant employment prospects. It is important to mention that children are frequently exposed to issues of child abuse, exploitation and trafficking along these routes (UNICEF WCARO 2016).

Child trafficking for (forced) labor purposes from Benin has similarly been identified by Sawadogo (2012) as a significant issue. This concerns employment in the cocoa agricultural industry in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, but also domestic, commercial and agricultural work in Nigeria, Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire (Devillard et al. 2015). Sawadogo (2012) furthermore notes that girls are more frequently victims of child trafficking than boys are. Adepoju (2005) additionally identifies child trafficking flows from Togo, Nigeria and Mali, also to work on plantations in Côte d'Ivoire and for domestic work in Gabon. The 2015 Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa confirms Guinea as a destination country for child trafficking from countries in the ECOWAS region. Children in Guinea mostly work, or are exploited, in prostitution and domestic servitude (Devillard et al. 2015).

In addition, child migrant flows have been identified from countries with a significant Muslim population such as Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Niger, to other largely Muslim countries in the region such as Senegal or Mali for Koranic education. Children on these routes may also be exploited through begging (Devillard et al. 2015). Carrion et al. (2018) identified Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger as destination countries for children who move in order to learn the Koran. The 2015 UNHCR and IOM West Africa study identifies additional types of child trafficking for labor in the farming, mining and fishing sector. Overall, child trafficking is highlighted as a major concern in West Africa and it is clear that there are 'established trafficking routes' in West Africa (Manby 2015).

2.5 Conclusion: Drivers and Routes for Labor Migration—What Are the Main Patterns in West and Central Africa?

The majority of migrant flows in West and Central Africa are intra-regional and most migrants, in fact, move to neighboring countries. These migration patterns, including labor and other economically driven migration, are historically a part of the 'way of life' in the region. Intra-regional migration can, furthermore, be considered a dominant livelihood strategy of households. Therefore, although different factors might influence migrants' decision to move for labor or other economic purposes, it is clear that migrants in West and Central Africa have been and continue to be in search of better (economic) opportunities. This holds for men, women as well as children.

The region is facing demographic changes that are and will continue to affect (labor) migration in the region. In particular, West Africa is experiencing rapid population growth, resulting in an, on average, extremely young population. West

African labor markets are struggling to provide the (growing) working age population sufficient opportunities, resulting in growing unemployment numbers and informal employment. These challenging conditions are main drivers of migration from countries in the region and it is likely that this trend will not change in the near future. Migration for employment purposes is often directed towards the informal labor market, associated with vulnerable employment conditions, especially for children. Female labor migration is mostly directed towards trade and commercial related opportunities.

The region is also facing rapid urban growth, which has intensified rural to urban migration movements of people in search of wage labor and employment in informal business sectors in cities. In particular, the coastal cities in the Southern part of the region are considered attractive hubs. More generally, the main migration pattern in the region that stands out is that consisting of movements from the North to the South or, more especially, from the more Northern located inland countries to the more developed coastal countries in the South. This trend also shows historical continuity, as migratory flows from hinterland African countries and the Sahel towards coastal territories were already common during colonial times. Nowadays, countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria are relatively more (economically) developed than other countries in the region. They also tend to have higher levels of urbanization and attract the highest number of international migrants in the ECOWAS region. In the ECCAS region, Gabon stands out for being an attractive destination country for intra-regional migrants. Migrant children often follow adult migratory flows and, hence, have similar directions and routes, increasingly moving towards urban centers and cross-border areas.

Overall, migration in the context of West and Central Africa is characterized by intra-regional mobility, with a large proportion of migrants being economically driven. However, it is also important to note that there is a general lack of reliable, up-to-date and complete statistical data on African migration. This makes it challenging to capture mixed migration patterns, their drivers and routes (Black and King 2004; Flahaux and de Haas 2016; RMMS West Africa 2017). Most data is furthermore based on national migrant stocks, which makes it difficult to capture actual movements. Hence, the data used in this chapter, as well as the research referred to that is based on migrant stocks, should be considered with caution, since it might not be able to provide a complete picture, nevertheless it still helps to demonstrate and map the main migration patterns.

Lastly, based on the evidence presented in this chapter, some recommendations for policy-making can be put forward by arguing that labor migration in the region could be organized or managed more effectively. Intra-regional migration, and labor migration in particular, is and has been a common phenomenon in the region, yet many differences exist between countries' migration patterns and drivers, as well as their national labor migration laws. Hence, it would be essential that regional labor migration be placed higher on the development and political agenda of the countries in the region. Especially regarding informal work, as this is a reality and many vulnerabilities are associated with this type of labor migration. In particular, human trafficking is a challenge very much present in the region. Further efforts to combat

trafficking are therefore essential to make migration in and from the region safer, especially for women and children.

Although free movement of persons and goods is only officially formalized in the ECOWAS region, it also exists, at least informally, in the wider region (Adepoju 2007). Irregular movements are a reality in the region and should be taken into account when looking at a possible framework for more effectively managing labor migration. Orderly labor oriented movements have the potential to enhance the region's economic integration and, as a consequence, to catalyze the region's integration into the wider global economy.

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Chapter 3
Human Migration in the Face of Environmental Change: A Global Empirical Approach

Els Bekaert, Ilse Ruyssen, and Sara Salomone

3.1 Introduction

Climate change and migration take center stage in daily news reports and have shaped debates during many recent elections around the world. Climate change is affecting weather patterns, ecosystems and sea levels. As a consequence, an increasing number of people and countries on our planet is confronted with severe environmental problems. Broadly speaking, a distinction is made between fast or sudden onset hazards—in the literature also referred to as natural disasters—such as floods, storms or tropical cyclones; and slow or gradual onset hazards such as gradual changes in precipitation or (ocean) temperatures, desertification and sea level rise. Both types of environmental hazards directly impact people's lives and increasingly threaten the livelihoods of entire communities.

Changes in temperature and rainfall lead to droughts, heat waves, water scarcity and land degradation and have significant impacts on agricultural yields, as well as on fishing industries and food production more generally. Eventually this can result in rising famine, a greater frequency of infectious disease epidemics and substantial health effects, all of which are likely to cause decreasing labor productivity and

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economic decay (IPCC 2014). Additionally, floods due to extreme rainfall or sea level rise and increased intensity and occurrence of storms might lead to major and recurrent destruction of lives, assets and livelihoods (Rigaud et al. 2018). Furthermore, global warming has large impacts on glaciers and ice sheets, which will keep declining and subsequently accelerate the rising of the sea level (Mousavi et al. 2011; Nicholls and Cazenave 2010). Especially for large coastal cities and low-lying rural areas the rising sea level is a major issue (Goldbach 2017).

When severe environmental events are recurrent and people lack the means to diversify their assets and livelihoods, moving away from the deteriorating environment might be the only alternative (Rigaud et al. 2018). In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) first put forward human migration as the greatest impact of environmental change. Today, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) clearly identifies environmental degradation, natural disasters and climate change as drivers of contemporary migration. In response, it stresses the need for more investments focused on strengthening evidence, data and research to address environmental migration challenges.

Migration in the face of environmental problems can take up many different forms including local migration (e.g. between rural areas), internal migration (e.g. from rural to urban areas) and cross-border migration (to neighboring countries or further away). Environmental migration can furthermore encompass voluntary movements, forced displacement as well as planned relocation. In this chapter, we follow the International Organization for Migration (IOM) definition of environmental migrants as "A person or group(s) of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are forced to leave their habitual residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move within or outside their country of origin or habitual residence" (2019).

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), an estimated 227.6 million people worldwide were displaced *within their country* because of sudden onset environmental hazards between 2008 and 2016. In 2017, the number of environmentally displaced within their country was estimated at 18.8 million people in 135 countries, primarily located in South and East Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This number exceeds the 11.8 million internally displaced people due to conflict and violence by far (IDMC 2018). Scientists agree that climate change will force even more people to move in the future. A 2018 World Bank Group report, for instance, finds that climate change might push more than 140 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America to migrate within their countries by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). Quantifications of *cross-border* movement in the context of disaster are more scarce and challenging. This is primarily due to the lack of harmonized data collection and accompanying methodological issues, as well as the difficulties in isolating the influence of environmental factors from other migration drivers such as economic, political and demographic factors. Similarly, data on the number of people displaced because of slow onset processes are mostly qualitative and fragmented, commonly based on case studies. General forecasts typically vary from 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050, moving

either internally or internationally, with 200 million being the most widely cited estimate (UN 2015).

Well-planned migration can form a successful strategy to cope with environmental problems when there is no credible long-term pathway to viable livelihoods. Yet, given the development implications of migration for both sending and destination regions, it is important that governments are able to anticipate the scale of ensuing migration flows as well as the places people will move to or stay in (Rigaud et al. 2018). There are, however, inherent difficulties in predicting the size and dispersion of such flows. Empirical analyses are typically subject to binding data constraints, inducing a reliance on a coarse spatial and temporal aggregation of the data (e.g. Barrios et al. 2006; Dell et al. 2014; Beine and Parsons 2015; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg 2015; Cattaneo and Peri 2016). As put forward by Piguet (2010), individual sample surveys often only document a single event (e.g. a hurricane) in which case it is hard to disentangle environmental change from other contextual effects. Macro studies, on the other hand, cannot account for the local character of such shocks, i.e. there is no evidence that people who emigrated from a country or area under environmental stress were actually subject to it.

This chapter contributes to the current understanding of environmental migration patterns across countries. We aim to overcome some of the data limitations often faced in existing studies by using an original micro dataset, the Gallup World Polls (GWP), to address the critical nexus between climate change and migration. Specifically, we will present stylized facts on the number of people affected by environmental problems as well as on individual migration propensities in a large set of (developing) countries. Subsequently, we conduct a cross-country individual-level analysis of the impact of severe environmental problems on people's short-term migration intentions. Given that environmental change may influence both incentives to migrate as well as migration costs, we expect that the relationship between environmental drivers and migration differs across countries depending on their exposure to environmental hazards and migration costs. To account for this, we estimate our model separately for different groups of countries, either by geographic region or by development level. Furthermore, we also allow the migration response to environmental hazards to vary with respondents' demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 elaborates on the channels through which environmental factors influence migration. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the current stance of the literature on the climate-migration nexus. Section 3.4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis obtained from the GWP as well as some stylized facts on individual experiences with severe environmental problems and migration intentions. Section 3.5 outlines the theoretical and empirical framework, while Sect. 3.6 presents the evidence and main conclusions of the impact of severe environmental issues on people's migration intentions. Section 3.7 concludes with a summary and policy recommendations.

3.2 Channels of Transmission

Environmental problems can induce migration both directly and indirectly through their effect on the existing drivers of migration. According to Coniglio and Pesce (2015), climate variability can directly affect migration in two ways. First, an adverse climatic shock can reduce human survival in a certain environment, for example, because of unsustainable water supplies. Secondly, an adverse climatic event can also impact a person's future expectations of shocks, which could increase the incentive to migrate. Coniglio and Pesce (2015) find robust evidence of climate change directly inducing international migration and demonstrate that changes in precipitation foster migration from poor to rich countries.

Nonetheless, the literature shows that most of the impact of the environment on migration occurs through indirect effects, also known as transmission channels (Berlemann and Steinhardt 2017). A multitude of channels through which environmental factors spur or hamper migration have been identified. In what follows, we attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the different mechanisms at play. The most important is the income channel, also referred to as the wage differential channel, the labor market channel or the economic channel in the literature. Environmental hazards directly decrease income in the affected area by disrupting business and reducing labor productivity. This is likely to widen the wage differential between the affected region and potential destinations, making it more attractive for individuals to migrate. The income channel is particularly decisive in regions that rely heavily on agriculture. In these regions, environmental issues directly impact agricultural productivity through crop failure or decreases in yield, which subsequently affect farmers' income and employment opportunities (see e.g. Cai et al. 2016).[1] The latter effects are likely to increase the incentive to migrate in middle and high income countries, but could reduce emigration in poor countries where liquidity constraints are more binding (see Cattaneo and Peri 2016).

This brings us to a second potential transmission mechanism, namely that of liquidity or credit constraints. Environmental problems may damage or destroy private assets such as real estate as well as capital goods and infrastructure, thereby raising migration costs and making credit constraints more binding (Beine et al. 2016). As such, affected individuals might lack the resources to bear the costs of migration (Naudé 2010; Waldinger 2015). Consequently, the extremely poor could get trapped into poverty in the most hazard-prone areas. Receiving remittances may, however, smooth the income channel and loosen liquidity constraints.

Third, detrimental environmental shocks tend to decrease the attractiveness of affected regions independently from income, making people more inclined to migrate. Given their impact on food production, environmental hazards are likely to affect human health. In regions where water resources become more scarce and food supply decreases, food prices are likely to rise. This may in turn induce famine

[1] In this context, the income channel has also been denoted the agricultural channel (see e.g. Cattaneo and Peri 2016).

and malnutrition, thereby increasing the incidence of disease and morbidity and even influencing the life of unborn children (Simeonova 2011; Marchiori et al. 2012; Beine et al. 2016, Berlemann and Steinhardt 2017). The increased threat to human life and health can be seen as negative amenities which may act as an additional push factor, on top of reduced income and employment opportunities, inciting people to leave.

A fourth channel is that of violent conflict. Several studies have demonstrated that changes in climatic conditions increase the pressure on resources which can lead to violent conflict, which itself forms one of the root causes of migration and fleeing (Hsiang et al. 2011; Burke et al. 2015; Dell et al. 2014; Beine and Parsons 2015). Kelley et al. (2015), for example, demonstrate that a drought in the Fertile Crescent in Syria, which took place just before the Syrian uprising in 2011, was a contributory factor in the onset of the Syrian civil war (see also Maystadt et al. 2015, for the case of Sudan; or Maystadt and Eckers 2014, for the case of Somalia). Yet, the effect of changing climate conditions on conflict largely depends on a country's political, socio-economic and cultural characteristics (Kelley et al. 2015; Waldinger and Fankhauser 2015). It has been shown, for instance, that the risk of armed conflict is particularly high in low-income regions where changes in climate often affect economic conditions directly through agriculture (Burke et al. 2015) as well as in regions where fresh water resources are limited (Toset et al. 2000; Hauge and Ellingsen 2001). The risk of conflict can, however, be mitigated by the presence of good institutions (Gizelis and Wooden 2010; Beine and Parsons 2015; Berlemann and Steinhardt 2017). In any case, environmental hazards affect incomes, increase the scarcity of resources, thereby stimulating conflict and encouraging migration.

A fifth potential channel is the institutional channel. Environmental factors have been shown to affect the quality and stability of institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Beine and Parsons 2015), which are known to play a role in the decision to migrate and the destination choice of ensuing migrants. Several studies provide evidence for an impact of different types of institutions including economic (rule of law, property rights), political (civil rights, democracy) and social institutions (gender inequality, social protection) (see Baudassé et al. (2018) for a recent review of the link between migration and institutions).

Finally, the urbanization channel—working partly through the agricultural channel—has been put forward as spurring migration in the face of environmental change. The environmental impact on migration is likely to be larger in rural areas, i.e. those relying relatively more on agricultural activities, and relatively smaller in urban areas, where the manufacturing sector is more important. Therefore, migration following weather anomalies is expected to take place from rural to urban areas. This inflow of workers in urban areas can in turn depress urban wages. As the gap between urban wages in the home and potential destination countries widens, people in urban areas might be more inclined to migrate abroad in search of higher wages (Beine and Parsons 2015).

The above overview shows that the relationship between the environment and migration is not clear-cut. The fact that environmental factors can influence migration through many different channels hampers accurate inference on the impact of

environmental hazards on migration. The literature typically does not identify the different channels at play. Many studies have considered only one or two of these channels, with most emphasis on the income and agricultural channels for which plenty of evidence has been reported [for an overview see Beine and Jeusette (2018)]. Also, the liquidity channel has deserved quite some attention often leading to compelling evidence of its presence (Naudé 2010; Waldinger and Fankhauser 2015; Beine et al. 2016).

3.3 Empirical Evidence on Environmental Migration

A large body of literature has empirically analyzed the relationship between climate change and human migration. There is, however, no consensus on the role of environmental factors as determinants of global migration (Piguet 2010; Millock 2015; Berlemann and Steinhardt 2017; Beine and Jeusette 2018). A large part of the empirical research has focused on the migration response to precipitation anomalies in Sub-Saharan Africa where many countries rely heavily on agricultural productivity, and most inhabitants already live on the brink of starvation (see e.g. Marchiori et al. 2012; Henry et al. 2004; Gray and Mueller 2012b; Strobl and Valfort 2015).

Yet, Asia is the continent experiencing more natural hazards than any other region. In 2015, 85% of people displaced by sudden onset disasters were in South and East Asia, primarily related to flooding in Southern India, the Cyclone Komen in Bangladesh, India and Myanmar as well as monsoon floods in Myanmar (IDMC 2016). In Latin America, the number of people affected by flooding in 2015 was estimated at 171,000 in Paraguay, followed by Brazil (59,000) and Venezuela (45,000) (IDMC 2016). On top of that, the continent experiences frequent forest fires and tropical storms devastating the coasts of Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Guatemala, all of which might spur human mobility, both within and across borders. Research on the effects of climate change on migration in Asia and Latin America is, nonetheless, scarce.

This section provides an overview of the current stance of the empirical literature on the migration response to environmental hazards. We distinguish between research focusing on internal and international migration, and between studies considering the impact of slow versus sudden onset hazards. The importance of accounting for the heterogeneity of climate shocks (in terms of size, type and sign of the shock) is explicitly highlighted in Coniglio and Pesce (2015). Overall, the literature provides more rich and conclusive evidence on the impact of environmental factors on internal migration as opposed to international migration. Internal migration patterns are assessed mostly on the basis of individual country case studies using survey data on the individual or household level. Generalizing the findings of such studies across countries is therefore not straightforward. The effect on international migration patterns is, however, mostly evaluated on the basis of cross-country macro studies, which rely on aggregated cross-country macro data (such as used in the research of Beine and Parsons 2015, 2017; Backhaus et al. 2015; Coniglio and

Pesce 2015; Cai et al. 2016; Cattaneo and Peri 2016). While such studies guarantee the comparability of estimated effects across countries, they rely on the assumption that all individuals within a country are equally exposed to and affected by an environmental hazard, without acknowledging the circumstances at the individual level (Piguet 2010).

3.3.1 Internal Migration

A large number of micro studies show that *slow onset hazards*, and rising temperatures in particular, form an important driver of internal migration. Using a large survey dataset collected in eight South-American countries, Thiede et al. (2016), for instance, show a growing internal migration pattern due to temperature variations (both positive and negative). Mueller et al. (2014) find a robust positive effect of severe heat in Pakistan, especially during the wheat season. Dillon et al. (2011) find increasing temperatures in Northern Nigeria to increase the probability that household members are sent away as a form of income insurance.

There is also ample evidence of internal migration being influenced by rainfall variations. Henry et al. (2004) find individuals living in dry regions in Burkina Faso to be more prone to migrate towards other rural areas than those from wetter regions. A rise in internal migration is also found by Gray and Mueller (2012b) for the case of rural Ethiopia, and by Dallmann and Millock (2017) for the case of India, especially in states which depend greatly on agriculture. Barrios et al. (2006) find a positive impact of decreasing rainfall on rural-urban migration in Sub-Saharan countries, but find no evidence for other developing countries. In contrast, Thiede et al. (2016) and Gray (2009) respectively find a negative effect for excessive and low precipitation levels in South America and the Southern Ecuadorian Andes. In general, the estimated impact for excess precipitation is ambiguous, varying from positive (Mastrorillo et al. 2016) to negative (Dallmann and Millock 2017).

When temperature and rainfall are studied together, temperature typically is found to produce the largest effects (Berlemann and Steinhardt 2017). Bohra-Mishra et al. (2014), for example, find temperature and precipitation to both have nonlinear effects on internal migration in Indonesia, although the effect of temperature was much stronger. Di Falco et al. (2012), on the other hand, found only a minimal reaction to changes in temperature and precipitation in the Nile Basin in Ethiopia; while Gray and Bilsborrow (2013) find no systematic effect of temperature and precipitation in rural Ecuador.

Most of the evidence on the effect of *sudden onset environmental hazards*, such as natural disasters, on internal migration originates from micro-level case studies which provide very mixed results. On the one hand, natural disasters lead to very short-term moves, sometimes in the form of evacuations after and even before the natural disaster takes place. This was, for instance, the case when over 100,000 evacuees moved to Houston as hurricane Katrina made landfall on the US in 2005 (McIntosh 2008), after the predicted eruption of the Kelud volcano in Indonesia in

2014 (Ionesco et al. 2017), and in the face of hurricane Irma in Florida in 2017 (Alvarez and Santora 2017). This type of migration is, however, mostly temporary with most people eventually returning to their area of origin. On the other hand, sudden onset hazards may drive individuals to move permanently to other regions or to cross international borders. In their comprehensive cross-country study, Beine and Parsons (2015) find natural disasters in developing countries to beget internal migration flows towards urban areas. Gröger and Zylberberg (2016) furthermore indicate the importance of rural-urban migration as a coping strategy in a case study of Vietnam in the aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana in 2009. Also, in the case of Vietnam, Dun (2011) shows that floods have significantly driven outmigration from the affected areas. Robalino et al. (2015) find floods and landslides to increase metropolitan populations in Costa Rica.

In contrast, floods in Bangladesh (Gray and Mueller 2012a), in Ghana and Indonesia (Goldbach 2017), and in Pakistan (Mueller et al. 2014), appear to have no or only modest effects on migration. One explanation for this lack of impact is related to the liquidity channel described in Sect. 3.2. Natural disasters destroy physical assets (housing and infrastructure) and financial assets (reduced income and increased living costs), and may thus impoverish the most vulnerable even further. Decreasing incomes and loss of assets might stimulate migration, but the poorest may not be able to cover the costs of migration. In addition, direct damage to roads and transportation networks may make short-term migration prohibitively costly (Millock 2015). Others have attributed the absence of a migration response to natural disasters to the increased demand for labor for reconstruction in the affected areas (see e.g. Gray and Mueller 2012b). Alternatively, Paul (2005) highlights post-disaster aid from outside the region as a plausible explanation for why no internal migration effect could be observed after the 2004 tornado in Bangladesh (see also Boustan et al. 2012, for the US case). It is shown that emergency aid can compensate in monetary terms for damage caused by disasters so that victims did not have an incentive to leave.

3.3.2 International Migration

The majority of empirical research on international migration in the context of climate change has focused on variations in temperature and/or precipitation. There is, however, little evidence on the impact of slow-onset environmental hazards on international migration. Studies relying on individual sample surveys typically document no rise in international emigration (Piguet 2010). However, recent contributions using cross-country panels produce conflicting results. Beine and Parsons (2015), for instance, find no direct impact of long-run deviations in temperature and precipitation on international migration, only indirect effects operating through wages (see also Ruyssen and Rayp 2014 for sub-Saharan African countries). Robust proof of both direct and indirect effects on international migration is provided by Coniglio and Pesce (2015), Backhaus et al. (2015) and Marchiori et al. (2012).

Coniglio and Pesce (2015) specifically highlight the direction of migration from poor developing regions towards rich OECD countries, while Marchiori et al. (2012) find weather anomalies to induce international migration both directly through the amenities channel, and indirectly through the urbanization channel in Sub-Saharan Africa. A large part of the cross-country literature, furthermore, highlights the importance of the agricultural channel. Cai et al. (2016) find that long-term warming induces out-migration only in agricultural-dependent countries. In contrast, Cattaneo and Peri (2016) conclude that it reduces migration in extremely poor countries, which are exactly the ones likely to depend strongly on the agricultural sector. In a follow-up paper, Beine and Parsons (2017) also provide evidence for liquidity constraints hampering emigration from poor countries.

Knowledge on the impact of natural disasters on international migration is even more scarce and fragmented. Most evidence comes from macro studies, which provide no conclusive evidence. Only a limited number of studies report a positive effect of natural disasters on international migration (see e.g. Reuveny and Moore 2009; Gray and Mueller 2012b; Drabo and Mbaye 2011, 2015; Coniglio and Pesce 2015). In contrast, Halliday (2006) shows that earthquakes in El Salvador reduced migration flows towards the United States, and this for both wealthy and poor households. He interprets this as a sign that liquidity constraints only form part of the explanation for a lack of migration. Most cross-country studies do, however, not find direct evidence for an impact of natural disasters on international migration (Naudé 2010; Gray and Mueller 2012a; Ruyssen and Rayp 2014; Beine and Parsons 2015; Cattaneo and Peri 2016; Gröschl and Steinwachs 2017).

Yet, as pointed out by Drabo and Mbaye (2015), the relationship largely depends on the geographical location of countries and the type of disaster considered. In addition, Beine and Parsons (2017) and Gröschl and Steinwachs (2017) both notice the importance of considering the heterogeneity across income levels at origin and distinguish between poor and middle-income countries. Gröschl and Steinwachs (2017) do not find evidence for an impact of natural hazards on medium- to long-term international migration using the full sample (all countries in the Global Bilateral Migration Database) but do report a positive effect in middle-income countries. The latter are not financially constrained like low-income countries and have high insurance penetration rates like high-income countries. Beine and Parsons (2015) show that natural disasters in poor countries even reduce migration, confirming the relevance of the liquidity constraint channel, while they spur migration to former colonies and common-border countries. Alternatively, Naudé (2010) shows that whereas natural disasters do not directly affect international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is an indirect impact through civil conflicts, in line with the conflict channel.

In sum, this literature review reveals that the relationship between climate change and migration is highly context-specific. While numerous studies find evidence for increased internal and international migration to neighboring countries, plenty of others have shown that environmental change can also have a neutral or even negative effect on migration, especially for the poorest households. Overall, it seems that evidence on the impact of gradual environmental hazards is more robust

than that related to sudden climate events. Whether or not individuals will migrate and where they will end up (within or across national borders) depends on characteristics of the individual (financial status, occupation, risk aversion, etc.), the country (size, migration policies, institutional setting, demography, etc.), as well as the type and severity of climatic events, the alternative coping strategies and government assistance programs. In what follows, we take a comprehensive, multilevel approach by relying on individual survey data that are comparable across a large number of countries. Our analysis allows to distinguish different regions around the world, with a particular focus on developing countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia. This is valuable as both climatic conditions and situations significantly differ across regions and countries.

3.4 Data and Descriptives

Our empirical analysis relies on the rich and unique Gallup World Polls (GWP), a comprehensive cross-country dataset collected through individual surveys conducted worldwide. Specifically, we draw on data from 114 countries where at least one Gallup World Poll has been conducted in the year 2010, the year for which all our variables of interest are available.[2] Gallup collects detailed individual and household characteristics of respondents, and tracks attitudes and behaviors concerning a wide variety of areas such as politics, economics, well-being and trends. The surveys conducted by Gallup typically have a sample of around 1000 randomly selected respondents per country. The data are collected either through face-to-face interviews or through phone calls in countries where at least 80% of the population has a telephone landline. In addition, an area frame design is used for face-to-face interviewing in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the developing world, including much of Latin America, former Soviet Union countries, nearly all of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.[3] The sampling frame represents the entire civilian, non-institutionalized population aged 15 and over, covering the entire country including rural areas.[4]

Our sample contains 93,197 individuals with complete information on all the variables of interest used in the model, interviewed worldwide during the year 2010. In what follows, we explain in detail how the variables of interest (related to individual exposure to environmental problems and migration behavior) have been constructed.

[2]For a description of the methodology and codebook, see Gallup (2017).

[3]In some large countries such as China, India and Russia as well as in major cities or areas of special interest, over-samples are collected resulting in larger total numbers of respondents.

[4]That is with the exception of areas where the safety of the interviewing staff is threatened, scarcely populated islands in some countries, and areas that interviewers can reach only by foot, animal, or small boat.



Fig. 3.1 Percentage of individuals experiencing severe environmental problems. Note: the map reports the percentage of individuals interviewed in 2010 who state having experienced severe environmental problems in their area in the past 12 months for each country. Source: Authors' elaboration on the Gallup World Polls

3.4.1 Severe Environmental Problems

The GWP allows to measure people's exposure to severe environmental problems. For the purpose of this chapter, we rely on the following question: (Q1) "In the past 12 months, have there been any severe environmental problems in your city or area, or not? For example, pollution, floods, droughts, or long periods of extreme heat or cold?". These data are available for all 114 countries in our sample for the year 2010. The question directly asks whether people have experienced any extreme environmental problems during the last 12 months, covering a wide range of both slow and sudden onset environmental hazards related to climate change.[5]

On average, about 34% of the respondents in our sample indicated having experienced severe environmental problems in the last 12 months. However, there are significant differences across countries. As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, the share of individuals indicating having experienced environmental hazards in the year preceding the interview ranges from around 4% to slightly over 80%. The lowest shares of perceived environmental problems are found in Libya (3.8%), the Netherlands (4.5%), Denmark (5.6%), Japan (5.9%; surveyed before the tsunami in 2010), Luxembourg (6.5%), Germany (7.9%), Finland (8.1%), Belgium (8.4%), and Sweden (9.7%), i.e. mostly European high income countries. The countries with the highest shares of self-reported environmental issues are Burkina Faso (82.3%), Chad

[5]It could be argued that the list of examples provided in the question refers not only to climate-related hazards. Indeed, given the presence of "pollution" in the list and the open end question, also other hazards for which the link with climate is less obvious could be considered by respondents. The question, nonetheless, can safely be interpreted as providing information on whether or not individuals have faced any environmental hazard which could be both a cause (e.g. pollution) or a consequence (e.g. drought, flood, extreme weather) of climate change.

Table 3.1 Pairwise correlations between Q1 and alternative measures of environmental hazards (in the GWP and EM-DAT)

Measure of environmental hazards	Pairwise correlation
Alternative GWP measures	
(Q2) Water access	0.079***
(Q3) Storm frequency	0.076***
(Q4) No water for crops	0.211***
(Q5) No water for livestock	0.208***
EM-DAT measures	
Cold wave	0.208**
Drought	0.337***
Fire	0.169*
Riverine flood	0.289***
Tropical cyclone	0.391*

Source: Authors' elaboration on the Gallup World Polls. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

(81.1%), Kenya (79.3%), Niger (75.5%), Mongolia (74.7%), Uganda (68.2%), Mauritania (67.4%), Cambodia (66.3%), Tanzania (62.7%), the Philippines (62%), and Guatemala (60.2%), i.e. predominately low-income countries located in Africa or Asia.

To explore what exactly this self-reported measure of environmental hazards captures, we correlate the share of individuals reporting to have experienced severe environmental problems with other variables in the GWP as well as with external indicators of environmental problems taken from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).

There are several other relevant questions on climate change effects in the GWP which we can rely on to know more about what exactly is picked up by our variable of interest. Particularly relevant are the following questions:

(Q2) "Some people say the weather around the world is changing. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements. Water is getting harder to find."
(Q3) "[. . .] There is more extreme weather such as rain or windstorms now."
(Q4) "Please think about the last 12 months. In the area where you currently live, would you say there has been enough water for growing crops, or not?"
(Q5) "Again thinking of the last 12 months, in the area where you currently live, would you say there has been enough water for raising livestock, or not?"

The pairwise correlations with these alternative GWP questions (reported in Table 3.1) are all positive and highly significant. The strongest correlation is obtained with questions Q4 and Q5, which capture a lack of water availability for growing crops or raising livestock, respectively. It thus seems that our key variable of interest picks up exposure to drought, resulting in water scarcity particularly affecting agriculture and stock raising and, hence, the livelihoods of people working in these sectors.

Subsequently, we compare our variable of interest with indicators of the share of people affected by natural disasters taken from the EM-DAT,[6] kindly provided by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. It is constantly reviewed for inconsistencies and incompleteness. The environmental problems that we consider are climatological disasters (droughts, glacial lake outbursts, wildfires), geophysical disasters (earthquakes, dry mass movements, volcanic activity), meteorological disasters (extreme temperatures, fog, storms), and hydrological disasters (floods, landslides, wave actions). These events enter the dataset only when at least one of the following criteria is met: 10 or more people are reported killed, 100 or more people are reported affected, there has been a declaration of a state of emergency, and/or there has been a call for international assistance. For each of these environmental problems, we know the affected countries, the dates between which they occurred, the number of people who lost their life, and the total number of affected, i.e. the sum of people injured, people requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency (requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance), and people left homeless after a disaster.

In order to match these data to those in the GWP, we compute the ratio of the total number of people affected by disaster subtype in each country during the years 2009-2010 over the country-specific population aged 15+ in 2010. These ratios are then correlated with the shares of people answering positively to question Q1. Table 3.1 reports only those disaster subtypes for which the pairwise correlation with the GWP shares are significant at least at the 10% significance level. It appears that the GWP question Q1 particularly picks up environmental shocks related to drought, riverine floods and cold waves and to a lesser extent also fires and tropical cyclones.

3.4.2 Migration Intentions

To capture individual migration propensities, we rely on the following GWP question: (Q6) "In the next 12 months, are you likely or unlikely to move away from the city or area where you live?". We refer to the individuals who express their intention to leave their area or country of residence as intending migrants. The duration of the intended move is left unspecified so that it might pick up not only permanent but also temporary (including seasonal or circular) migration episodes. In addition, it is not restricted to international migration, for which a wide variety of reasonable estimates are available, but also captures internal migration for which statistics are much more scarce and hard to construct from available data (see Bell and Muhidin 2009, for a discussion). Yet, as the number of internal migrants worldwide is roughly three

[6] See https://www.emdat.be



Fig. 3.2 Percentage of individuals intending to move within 12 months. Note: the map reports the share of individuals interviewed in 2010 who state an intention to move (irrespective of the destination) within 12 months for each country. Source: Authors' elaboration on Gallup World Polls

times that of international migrants (IOM 2015), such an omission might be quite serious (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). Furthermore, the dataset documents migration intentions rather than actual migration,[7] which permits an assessment of the migration propensities for a representative set of individuals in each of the countries studied. While nothing guarantees that these migration intentions will materialize, migration intentions have been shown good predictors of future actual migration (see e.g. Bertoli and Ruyssen 2018; Docquier et al. 2014). Manski (1990) attributes the failure of migration intentions to translate into actual migration plans to the additional information received by the respondent after the intentions have been stated. The formation of these intentions is thus important in its own right and may contribute to our understanding of migrant selection and possible future migration dynamics (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014).

Figure 3.2 plots the percentage of people intending to move away from where they currently live in the next 12 months. Again, significant differences across countries arise. The lowest shares are reported in Singapore (2.3%), Kyrgyzstan (5.7%), Vietnam (5.7%), Azerbaijan (5.8%), and Belarus (6.2%). The highest shares of people intending to migrate are reported in Ghana (37%), Liberia (35.9%), Sudan (35%), Dominican Republic (33.5%), Botswana (33.1%), Cameroon (32.9%), and Nigeria (32.7%).

Subsequently, it is interesting to see whether countries where more inhabitants report having experienced severe environmental problems in the last 12 months are

[7]The way in which this kind of hypothetical question is interpreted might vary across countries, as observed by Clemens and Pritchett (2016) who underlines the risk of using contingent value surveys. Typically, respondents may interpret "opportunity" in light of the possibilities currently available to them (legal migration, irregular life-threatening trip, with or without funding, etc.), which vary across countries. To account for this, we will include country fixed effects in the econometric analysis.



Fig. 3.3 Migration intentions and experienced environmental problems by region. Note: the figure plots the average share of respondents answering that they are likely to move away from where they currently live in the next 12 months against the share of respondents indicating that they have experienced severe environmental problems in their area in the past 12 months by region. Source: Authors' elaboration on Gallup World Polls

also those where more individuals indicate that they are likely to move away in the coming year. To test whether such a positive correlation exists, Fig. 3.3 presents a scatterplot of the two questions of interest (Q1 and Q6). Countries where both shares are relatively high (in the upper right corner) seem to be mostly located in Africa (Eastern Africa, Western Africa, and Middle Africa) and Latin American and (predominantly) Caribbean countries. Southern Asia is characterized by relatively high shares of experiences with environmental problems, but in general less individuals indicate to be likely to move away from the area where they currently live. In Europe, Northern America and Oceania (lower left corner) shares of reported environmental problems are relatively low and intentions to move away are quite modest.

In Fig. 3.4, the same relationship is shown at the country level, which immediately reveals a significant heterogeneity across countries. While Asian countries are mostly situated in the lower quadrants, in some countries the share of experiences with severe environmental problems is strikingly higher than in others. In Singapore, for instance, this share amounts to 19.4% while in Cambodia it is as high as 66.3%. In both countries, the likelihood to move away in the next 12 months is relatively low (2.3% in Singapore and 6.6% in Cambodia). A different picture emerges, for



Fig. 3.4 Migration intentions and experienced environmental problems by country. Note: the figure plots for each country the average percentage of respondents answering that they are likely to move away from where they currently live in the next 12 months against the percentage of respondents indicating that they have experienced severe environmental problems in their area in the past 12 months in 2010. Source: Authors' elaboration on Gallup World Polls

instance, in Afghanistan where 56% of respondents experienced environmental problems in the last year and 27% are likely to move away in the next 12 months. Such discrepancies in the mobility response of inhabitants clearly exposed to environmental hazards could be due to financial capacity, differences in long-term climate conditions, culture, or adaptation capabilities (Bertoli et al. 2019).

An additional question included in the GWP specifically refers to the likelihood of people to migrate in the face of environmental problems, again, available for 114 countries: (Q7) "In the next five years, do you think you will need to move because of severe environmental problems?" This question focuses directly on environmental migration over a relatively longer timespan than Q6 (5 years rather than 1 year), again regardless of destination (hence covering both internal and international migration). Similarly to Q6, the duration of the intended move is unspecified, so that the question encompasses not only permanent but also temporary (as well as seasonal or circular) migration episodes. We refer to the individuals who express the intention to move away because of severe environmental problems as *intending environmental migrants*.

Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of people who will have to move in the next 5 years because of severe environmental problems. Again, we observe significant heterogeneity across countries. The lowest percentages of individuals which need to move are found in Poland (0.43%), Sweden (0.80%), Czech Republic (0.94%),



Fig. 3.5 Percentage of individuals who will have to move in the next 5 years because of severe environmental problems. Note: the map reports the share of individuals interviewed in 2010 who state they will have to move within in the next 5 years because of severe environmental problems for each country. Source: Authors' elaboration on Gallup World Polls



Fig. 3.6 Short-run migration intentions versus mid-term environmental migration intentions. Note: the figure plots for each country the percentage of people indicating that they are likely to move away in the next 12 months from their current location against the percentage of respondents who have experienced severe environmental problems in the past 12 months and that, because of this, they will need to move in the next 5 years. Source: Authors' elaboration on Gallup World Polls

Finland (1.2%), Denmark (1.4%), Austria (1.4%), Germany (1.8%), and the Netherlands (1.8%), i.e. European high income countries. The highest shares of individuals who will have to move away in the next 5 years are reported in Haiti (38.6%),

Sudan (36.5%), Syria (34.7%), Liberia (30.7%), Ecuador (28.4%), and Afghanistan (27.9%).

Subsequently, Fig. 3.6 plots for each country the percentage of people indicating that they are likely to move away in the next 12 months from their current location against the percentage of respondents stating they believe they will need to move in the next 5 years because of environmental problems. It is important to note that the latter question was asked only to people who confirmed having experienced severe environmental problems in the past 12 months, meaning that this indicator was calculated on a much smaller sample than the former question. It is nonetheless clear that both shares are positively correlated. Yet, the picture again shows significant heterogeneity across countries. Most of the countries displaying the lowest shares of individuals likely to move away are situated in Europe, Northern America and Oceania, and located in the lower left quadrant, indicating that these are also the countries with the lowest shares of potential environmental migrants in the next 5 years. Also Asian countries seem to display relatively low shares of (environmental) migration intentions. Most of the African countries are situated in the upper quadrants, suggesting that more of their inhabitants are likely to move away in the next 12 months. For seven of these countries, a lot of this migration could be related to environmental issues. For 13 African countries, located in the upper left quadrant, a significant amount of people in these countries is likely to move away in the next 12 months, but not necessarily because of environmental drivers. For Latin American countries, no clear pattern emerges, suggesting a great deal of heterogeneity in this continent. Finally, the lower right quadrant is the least populated. This seems to suggest that most respondents indicating that they will have to move because of environmental problems in the next 5 years already have plans to do so quite fast, i.e. in the next 12 months.

3.4.3 Additional Individual Information

Besides these key variables of interest, we keep track also of additional individual- and household-level information contained in the GWP. Specifically, we record respondents' age and gender at the time of the interview, whether they are highly educated or not (i.e. have completed 4 years of education beyond high school and/or received a 4-year college degree or not), whether they live in a rural or urban area (a rural area covers residence on a farm or in a small town or village while an urban area is defined as a large city or a suburb of a large city), and whether they have a relative or friend abroad whom they can count on for help when needed. We also include information on the number of adults (aged 15 and above) in the household and the number of children (below 15 years of age) in the household as well as self-reported household income per capita. Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for our variable of interest and the controls.

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Environmental problems	0.357	0.479	0.000	1.000
Age	42.286	17.696	15.000	97.000
Male	0.447	0.497	0.000	1.000
Highly educated	0.156	0.363	0.000	1.000
Urban	0.400	0.490	0.000	1.000
Ln of hhincpc	7.719	1.638	0.804	14.509
Nr adults	3.102	1.833	1.000	40.000
Nr children	1.258	1.871	0.000	37.000
Network	0.301	0.459	0.000	1.000

Notes: The table reports for each variable its mean value (column 2), standard deviation (column 3), minimum (column 4) and maximum value (column 5). There are 93,197 observations for each variable

3.5 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Specification

This section presents the theoretical framework and the empirical specification that we will estimate. The model that we use to analyze the migration decision is a Random Utility Maximization (RUM) model of migration. The migration decision is based upon the comparison of the lifetime utilities of staying in the current location and of migrating to a potential destination. Consider an individual i, residing in region r of country j; the choice set D of individual i includes her/his home region r (which we refer to as $k = 0$ without loss of generality), the rest of country j, i.e., $R_j/\{r\}$ where R_j is the set of regions of country j (we refer to this second alternative in the choice set as $k = 1$), and the set $W/\{j\}$ of other countries of the world ($k = 2$). Thus, the choice set D includes three alternatives: staying at origin, moving internally, and migrating to an international destination. Let U_{ik} denote the utility that individual i would derive if opting for alternative $k \in D$. We assume that this alternative-specific utility includes a deterministic component V_{ik} and a stochastic component ϵ_{ik}. If the stochastic component follows an independent and identically distributed EVT-1 distribution, then the probability p_{ik} that $k \in D$ will be the utility-maximizing alternative is given by:

$$p_{ik} = \frac{e^{V_{ik}}}{\sum_{l \in D} e^{V_{il}}} \tag{3.1}$$

The relative probability of migrating domestically over staying at origin is given by:

$$\frac{p_{i1}}{p_{i0}} = e^{V_{i1} - V_{i0}} \tag{3.2}$$

The relative probability of migrating to the foreign destination $k = 2$ over staying at origin is given by:

$$\frac{p_{i2}}{p_{i0}} = e^{V_{i2} - V_{i0}} \tag{3.3}$$

The relative probability of intending to move (irrespective of the destination) over staying at origin is given by:

$$\frac{p_{i1} + p_{i2}}{p_{i0}} = \frac{e^{V_{i2}} + e^{V_{i1}}}{e^{V_{i0}}} \tag{3.4}$$

Relative choice probabilities are solely determined by the difference in the levels of utility associated to each pair of alternatives (and not by the levels themselves). This, in turn, entails that we can normalize the utility associated to the baseline option (staying) to zero. Thus, the estimated coefficients for all the regressors give us the differential effect of each variable on the attractiveness of moving versus staying.

Let mig_{ir} represent a dummy variable taking the value one if individual i residing in region r expresses the intention to move within 12 months (regardless of destination), the probability to migrate is then given by:

$$\Pr(mig_{ir} = 1) = \frac{e^{V_{ir}}}{1 + e^{V_{ir}}} \tag{3.5}$$

Denoting the country-of-origin index by j, the reduced-form expression for the utility differential between migrating and staying writes as:

$$V_{irj} = \alpha_j + \gamma X_{irj} + \beta EP_{irj} \tag{3.6}$$

where X_{irj} denotes a vector of individual and household-level characteristics including: dummies for different age groups (i.e. 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–98, with 15–19 representing the reference category), a dummy for male individuals, a dummy for highly educated individuals (i.e. who have completed 4 years of education beyond high school and/or received a 4-year college degree), a dummy for individuals living in urban areas (i.e. a large city or a suburb of a large city as opposed to residence on a farm or in a small town or village), and a dummy for having a relative or friend abroad whom one can count on for help when needed, the number of adults (aged 15 and above) in the household and the number of children (below 15 years of age) in the household as well as the self-reported household income per capita. We also include country of origin fixed effects, α_j, to account for the fact that the migration behavior of people in the same country might be driven by common unobserved time-invariant factors.

Our specification of the deterministic component of the utility associated with migrating also includes a dummy EP_{irj} for whether the individual has experienced any severe environmental problems in the past 12 months. If the coefficient $\widehat{\beta}$

associated with this dummy is positive, then this means that severe environmental issues make the origin location relatively less attractive than the intended destination. The marginal effect on the probability of intending to move is given by $\beta_{p_{ik}}(1 - p_{ik})$, with $k = 1,2$, while $\widehat{\beta}$ itself represents the partial derivative of the logarithm of the relative choice probability with respect to our variable of interest.

A possible concern in the regression on the intention to migrate is the following: if an individual considers moving to a neighboring region, then environmental factors at origin could be positively correlated with environmental factors at destination. Following, this correlation confounds the effect of the estimated coefficient, possibly biasing it towards zero and reducing its statistical significance.[8]

In Sect. 3.2, we elaborated on the potential role played by credit constraints. Some individuals, for whom migration forms the optimal choice, might not be able to afford migration costs, so that they are constrained to stay in their current location. In order to explicitly account for credit constraints, Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) introduce a budget constraint into the model. Migration is assumed to come at a cost, C, which needs to be paid up-front and could be financed from current wealth or by borrowing. Furthermore, it is assumed that the amount of capital that the individual can raise to cover the costs of migration, f, increases her/his overall wealth in the current location, w_i, and does not depend on potential future wealth due to credit constraints. This gives the following budget constraint:

$$f(w_O, \zeta_1) \geq C(\zeta_2) \tag{3.7}$$

where ζ_1 denotes individual circumstances influencing the relationship between wealth and the amount of capital that is available to the individual (such as family networks, etc.). ζ_2 captures individual variations in the costs of migration stemming from characteristics of the individual (e.g. age, education level or preferences), of the intended move (such as the distance that needs to be covered or travelling time), of the origin (e.g. emigration procedures), and the destination (e.g. the cost of living, cost to acquire visa) (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). We can then determine the threshold value for wealth above which the individual is able to cover the migration cost as $w_O \geq T(\zeta_1, C(\zeta_2)) = T(\zeta_1, \zeta_2)$. Individuals whose wealth is below the threshold T will not be able to finance migration and will hence decide to stay even if they desire to migrate. In other words, individuals will decide to migrate if $U_{ik} > U_{i0}$ with $k = 1,2$, subject to the constraint $w_O \geq T$. Accounting for credit constraints hence increases the total number of stayers, which not only includes those who believe their lifetime utility is maximized in their current location, but also those who think they are better off elsewhere but cannot finance the migration (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). The reduced-form expression for the utility

[8]Thus, when you have incentives to migrate, potential (internal) destinations can look less attractive.

differential between migrating and staying, accounting for potential credit constraints, can then be written as:

$$V_{irj} = \alpha_j + \gamma X_{irj} + \lambda w_{irj} - \rho w_{irj}^2 + \beta EP_{irj} \tag{3.8}$$

To evaluate the impact of severe environmental hazards on migration intentions, we estimate linear probability models with country of origin dummies.[9] Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered across origins. The overall F-test always rejects the hypothesis that all parameters are jointly zero.

3.6 Empirical Evidence

Table 3.3 presents linear probability estimates of the impact of environmental problems and traditional controls on the intention to migrate in the next 12 months. The first column reports estimated coefficients for the model including only personal and household characteristics. In line with expectations, migration intentions peak for individuals aged between 20 and 29, and decrease as people get older. The likelihood to move away is relatively higher for men, for highly educated people (holding a tertiary education degree), and to a lesser extent also for those living in urban areas (large city or suburb of a large city). Household income per capita is found to have a marginally positive effect, but the strongest positive impact is obtained for networks: respondents, who have a family member or friend abroad whom they can count on when needed, are significantly more inclined to migrate than those without such a network (see also Bertoli and Ruyssen 2018).

In the second and third columns of Table 3.3, we respectively include a dummy for having experienced severe environmental problems in the last 12 months and an interaction term of the exposure to environmental problems and living in an urban area (which we consider our benchmark model). Overall, we find that individuals who recently experienced severe environmental problems are more likely to migrate in the next 12 months. The results for the individual and household controls are similar to those reported in the first column. The marginal effect of our variable of interest on migration intentions at the mean is positive and highly significant. Having recently experienced severe environmental problems increases the probability that an individual intends to migrate on average by 2.1 percentage points.

The interaction term also reveals that environmental hazards particularly drive away people residing in urban areas (though only at the 10% level). This could be

[9]The Gallup World Polls provide information on the region in which individuals were interviewed. Yet, for some countries, these are (partly) missing. Including regional dummies would thus result in a significant drop in the sample size which is why we do not systematically do so. Re-estimating our benchmark model including regional fixed effects, nonetheless provides very similar results (available upon request).

Table 3.3 Impact of traditional controls and severe environmental problems on migration intentions

	Traditional controls	Environmental problems	Benchmark
Environmental problems		0.021***	0.016*
		(2.99)	(1.87)
Env probl × urban			0.013*
			(1.80)
Aged 20–29	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***
	(2.90)	(2.84)	(2.85)
Aged 30–39	−0.052***	−0.053***	−0.053***
	(−7.33)	(−7.32)	(−7.33)
Aged 40–49	−0.089***	−0.090***	−0.090***
	(−9.82)	(−9.78)	(−9.79)
Aged 50+	−0.127***	−0.127***	−0.127***
	(−13.00)	(−12.98)	(−12.97)
Male	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(3.41)	(3.37)	(3.39)
Highly educated	0.018***	0.017***	0.017***
	(4.20)	(4.16)	(4.17)
Urban	0.014**	0.014**	0.009
	(2.44)	(2.46)	(1.54)
Ln of hhincpc	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
	(1.80)	(1.79)	(1.76)
Nr adults	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(−0.69)	(−0.69)	(−0.73)
Nr children	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003
	(−1.40)	(−1.49)	(−1.47)
Network	0.046***	0.045***	0.045***
	(11.71)	(11.64)	(11.63)
R-squared	0.078	0.079	0.079
Observations	93,188	93,188	93,188

Note: All specifications include country of origin dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

interpreted as signaling that the main transmission channel for environmental migration in the overall sample is not necessarily the agricultural productivity channel, which has been most stressed in the literature. Instead, this finding seems to support the relevance of the urbanization channel (more rural-urban migration associated with environmental change pushing people from urban areas abroad in search of higher wages), but it is just as well in line with the credit constraint channel, which stipulates that people in rural areas (who are likely to be hit harder by environmental hazards) are more likely to be pushed further into poverty and hence less likely to respond by migrating in the near future (as they cannot afford the migration costs).

Table 3.4 Impact of environmental problems on migration intentions by geographic region

	Africa	Asia	LAC	Europe	NAM	Oceania
Environ problems	0.037*	−0.008	0.041***	0.028***	0.056**	−0.001
	(2.04)	(−0.55)	(4.18)	(5.01)	(41.79)	(−0.05)
Env probl × urban	0.031	0.032***	0.001	−0.024**	−0.067	0.045
	(1.16)	(3.80)	(0.07)	(−2.50)	(−5.14)	(1.56)
Aged 20–29	0.002	0.019**	0.014	0.024*	0.003	−0.017
	(0.21)	(2.34)	(1.14)	(1.71)	(0.08)	(−0.20)
Aged 30–39	−0.072***	−0.025***	−0.053***	−0.067***	−0.093	−0.102
	(−3.97)	(−2.92)	(−4.76)	(−4.93)	(−2.07)	(−4.53)
Aged 40–49	−0.131***	−0.042***	−0.086***	−0.117***	−0.187*	−0.161
	(−5.61)	(−4.60)	(−5.77)	(−8.42)	(−7.51)	(−3.72)
Aged 50+	−0.216***	−0.071***	−0.138***	−0.148***	−0.220*	−0.201*
	(−8.67)	(−7.88)	(−5.98)	(−8.68)	(−10.09)	(−6.85)
Male	0.048**	0.012*	−0.001	0.005	0.024	0.025
	(2.94)	(2.03)	(−0.15)	(0.94)	(4.04)	(3.08)
Highly educated	−0.026	0.026***	0.021**	0.025***	−0.009	0.023
	(−1.54)	(3.25)	(2.43)	(4.99)	(−1.18)	(0.61)
Urban	0.024	0.004	0.013	0.004	0.040	−0.003
	(0.93)	(0.31)	(1.19)	(0.60)	(1.29)	(−0.21)
Ln of hhincpc	0.004	0.007*	0.009***	−0.006*	−0.026**	0.004
	(0.84)	(1.93)	(3.27)	(−1.99)	(−28.91)	(0.19)
Nr adults	−0.002	0.001	−0.006*	−0.002**	0.002	0.003
	(−1.00)	(0.74)	(−1.99)	(−2.19)	(1.67)	(0.36)
Nr children	0.001	−0.005*	0.004	−0.013***	−0.014	−0.007
	(0.39)	(−1.88)	(1.12)	(−3.64)	(−1.08)	(−0.44)
Network	0.075***	0.030***	0.042***	0.045***	0.005	−0.015*
	(6.49)	(5.19)	(4.42)	(9.57)	(0.18)	(−6.54)
R-squared	0.066	0.040	0.063	0.060	0.065	0.042
Observations	15,948	32,490	12,205	28,898	1953	1694

Note: All specifications include country of origin dummies. *LAC* Latin American and Caribbean, *NAM* North America. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered across origins. *t* statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

To account for potential heterogeneity in the migration response to environmental hazards based on the characteristics of the respective geographic region, we split the sample of countries by continent[10] (see also Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). As can be seen in Table 3.4, the relative importance of the different factors driving migration intentions strongly differs across geographic regions. Overall, we find that the significant positive impact of severe environmental problems on migration intentions reported in Table 3.3 is mainly driven by countries in Africa, Latin America,

[10]An overview of the countries in our sample by geographical region can be found in Appendix Table 3.7.

Europe and North America, while no significant effect is obtained for Asia and Oceania. It should be noted, however, that for North America and Oceania, the sample is considerably smaller than for the other regions which may (partly) explain the lack of significant effects for most variables. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term between recent exposure to severe environmental problems and urban areas are positive and highly significant in Asia, and negatively significant at 5% in Europe. These findings suggest that, while overall, we cannot confirm that migration intentions in Asia respond to environmental hazards, the likelihood to move in the face of severe environmental problems does appear higher for respondents residing in urban areas. In Europe, the estimated positive impact of environmental problems on migration intentions is much stronger for people residing in rural areas.

While Table 3.4 clearly shows a differential migration response to environmental factors depending on the geographic region, it does not distinguish rich from poor countries. We therefore classify countries based on their income per capita level, following the World Bank Country Classification, to allow for a heterogeneous migration response depending on a country's development level (in line with e.g. Cattaneo and Peri 2016). This classification distinguishes between low income (LI), lower middle income (LMI), upper middle income (UMI), high income non-OECD (HnOECD), and high income OECD (HOECD) countries.

Rerunning our benchmark estimation on these subsamples, reported in Table 3.5, reveals a particularly strong positive effect of recent exposure to severe environmental problems on migration intentions in high income OECD countries. The effect, however, seems to decrease with countries' development level: the effect is still positive, but significant only at 5% for high income non-OECD countries and only at 10% for upper middle income countries. It is insignificant for lower and lower middle income countries. For the latter, we do find a positive significant effect for the interaction term with the urban dummy, suggesting that exposure to severe environmental problems in lower middle-income countries increases the likelihood to migrate but only for people residing in urban areas. Although we have to be careful again in interpreting these results, given that splitting the sample considerably reduces the sample size across country groupings. Yet, the findings seem to confirm that people's intention to migrate in the face of severe environmental hazards depends positively on the country's income per capita (in line with Cattaneo and Peri 2016).

In order to test to what extent these discrepancies can be interpreted as evidence of credit constraints in the poorest countries, we extend our benchmark specification in the following ways. First, we include an interaction term of people's exposure to severe environmental problems and the log of the household income per capita. Table 3.6 (column 1) shows, however, that the migration response to environmental problems does not vary with per capita household income. As an alternative, we augment our benchmark specification with an individual wealth index as constructed by Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) as well as the square of this term. Specifically, the wealth index is the first principal component computed through an origin-specific polychoric principal component analysis on four of the seven questions

Table 3.5 Impact of environmental problems on migration intentions by development level

	LI	LMI	UMI	HnOECD	HOECD
Environ problems	0.027	0.000	0.017*	0.017**	0.030***
	(1.53)	(0.01)	(2.01)	(2.67)	(3.93)
Env probl × urban	0.014	0.033**	0.004	0.002	0.001
	(0.45)	(2.23)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.07)
Aged 20–29	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.011	0.057***
	(0.96)	(1.01)	(0.56)	(0.41)	(4.28)
Aged 30–39	−0.054***	−0.053***	−0.054***	−0.043	−0.054***
	(−3.02)	(−3.98)	(−4.12)	(−1.55)	(−4.24)
Aged 40–49	−0.084***	−0.083***	−0.089***	−0.079***	−0.106***
	(−3.56)	(−4.16)	(−6.36)	(−4.03)	(−6.85)
Aged 50+	−0.137***	−0.124***	−0.129***	−0.102***	−0.141***
	(−4.82)	(−6.07)	(−5.87)	(−3.80)	(−9.07)
Male	0.034**	0.028***	−0.000	−0.004	0.010*
	(2.31)	(3.49)	(−0.04)	(−0.51)	(1.76)
Highly educated	0.020	0.021**	0.023*	0.018*	0.019***
	(0.95)	(2.47)	(2.00)	(2.28)	(3.38)
Urban	0.057**	−0.003	0.001	−0.017	0.014**
	(2.56)	(−0.14)	(0.15)	(−1.45)	(2.66)
Ln of hhincpc	0.009*	0.004	0.011***	0.000	−0.007**
	(1.82)	(1.23)	(3.02)	(0.05)	(−2.17)
Nr adults	−0.001	−0.001	0.002	0.001	−0.002**
	(−0.77)	(−0.18)	(0.68)	(0.46)	(−2.43)
Nr children	0.001	−0.005	0.005	−0.007	−0.013***
	(0.19)	(−1.34)	(1.61)	(−0.96)	(−4.10)
Network	0.064***	0.057***	0.046***	0.041**	0.036***
	(6.22)	(5.92)	(4.85)	(3.45)	(7.35)
R-squared	0.081	0.076	0.086	0.046	0.059
Observations	16,266	22,177	19,503	9016	25,486

Note: All specifications include country of origin dummies. We follow the World Bank Country Classification, which distinguishes between low income (LI), lower middle income (LMI), upper middle income (UMI), high-income non-OECD (HnOECD), and high income OECD (HOECD) countries. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered across origins. *t* statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

used by Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) that are available for all countries in our sample in 2010. The questions relate to (1) the ownership of a TV set, (2) access to the Internet, to whether in the previous 12 months the respondent did not have enough money (3) to buy food or (4) to provide adequate shelter of housing to her family.

In line with Dustmann and Okatenko (2014), we find that migration intentions respond to individual wealth by alleviating budget constraints: the estimated coefficient on the wealth index is positive and strongly significant, while its squared term is not. Note that in the specifications where we account for the household wealth,

Table 3.6 Impact of environmental problems and credit constraints on migration intentions

	Income pc inter	Wealth	Wealth inter	Wealth and urban
Environmental problems	0.027	0.014*	0.012	0.016*
	(0.79)	(1.68)	(1.54)	(1.95)
Environ probl × urban	0.015**	0.014*	0.017**	0.015**
	(2.14)	(1.86)	(2.37)	(2.18)
Aged 20–29	0.015***	0.015***	0.016***	0.015***
	(2.85)	(2.99)	(3.05)	(3.02)
Aged 30–39	−0.053***	−0.054***	−0.054***	−0.054***
	(−7.33)	(−7.48)	(−7.45)	(−7.47)
Aged 40–49	−0.090***	−0.092***	−0.092***	−0.092***
	(−9.79)	(−9.98)	(−9.96)	(−9.97)
Aged 50+	−0.127***	−0.131***	−0.130***	−0.131***
	(−12.95)	(−13.25)	(−13.24)	(−13.27)
Male	0.014***	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***
	(3.38)	(3.79)	(3.77)	(3.81)
Highly educated	0.017***	0.022***	0.021***	0.022***
	(4.18)	(5.11)	(4.94)	(5.26)
Urban	0.009	0.013**	0.011*	0.011*
	(1.58)	(2.04)	(1.88)	(1.86)
Ln of hhincpc	0.004*	0.008***	0.008***	0.007***
	(1.70)	(3.79)	(3.74)	(3.65)
Nr adults	−0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(−0.73)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Nr children	−0.003	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002
	(−1.53)	(−1.44)	(−1.48)	(−1.42)
Network	0.045***	0.048***	0.048***	0.048***
	(11.67)	(12.07)	(12.08)	(12.17)
Env probl × ln hhincpc	−0.002			
	(−0.41)			
Wealth		0.021***	0.017***	0.017***
		(7.56)	(5.43)	(5.43)
Wealth^2		−0.002		
		(−0.99)		
Env probl × wealth			0.007	−0.003
			(1.35)	(−0.41)
Env probl × wealth × urban				0.029***
				(3.21)
Observations	93,188	90,833	90,833	90,833
R-squared	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.080

Note: All specifications include country of origin dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered across origins. t statistics in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

also the log of the household per capita plays a bigger role. It is, however, even more interesting to see whether the migration response to severe environmental problems also depends on the household's wealth. To this end, we interact the dummy for having experienced severe environmental problems in the past 12 months with the wealth indicator (column 3) and the combination of the wealth indicator and the urban dummy (column 4). The results reveal no significant impact of the interaction term, but we do find a very strong significant impact of the last interaction term, while the other results are largely preserved. It thus seems that intentions to migrate in the face of severe environmental problems are stronger for people in urban areas who are part of wealthier households. This is in line with the fact that international migration – which is more costly than internal migration—typically originates in urban rather than rural areas (see e.g. FAO 2017).

3.7 Conclusion

Migration and climate change are two topics increasingly shaping our everyday lives as well as public debates. Despite enormous progress in the literature, it remains unclear to what extent environmental factors actually shape migration around the world. Numerous case studies have been conducted to identify the impact of natural disasters more generally. In addition, recent cross-country studies have attempted to empirically estimate the role played by environmental drivers in (bilateral) migration to the OECD or worldwide. Both types of studies, however, come with their own limitations, particularly related to the country-specific or very coarse cross-country data that they rely on.

In this chapter, we provided a comprehensive overview of the potential transmission channels underlying the climate-migration nexus. While most of the literature has focused on the agricultural channel, the importance of other channels is further (implicitly) documented in this literature review. We distinguish between studies which have focused on internal versus international migration in the face of climate change, as well as between studies looking at the impact of slow onset versus sudden onset hazards. We conclude that while there is particularly strong evidence for an impact of environmental hazards on internal movements, this is much less the case for international migration.

Subsequently, we provided a first attempt to bridge the gap between the two types of studies (micro versus macro) and the two types of migration (internal versus international). Specifically, we rely on the very rich and unique Gallup World Polls survey dataset, which, among others, collects information on individual migration intentions and people's exposure to severe environmental problems as well as a whole series of personal and household characteristics in a large number of countries. This dataset allowed us to empirically estimate the influence of recent exposure to environmental hazards on people's stated short-term migration intentions, and to test for a differential migration response in rural versus urban areas, in different geographic regions, and across countries with a different levels of development. We

also test to what extent the migration response to environmental hazards depends on household wealth.

Overall, we find that people exposed to environmental hazards are more likely to migrate away in the next 12 months. This effect is found to be stronger for people residing in urban areas, which could be interpreted as evidence for the urbanization channel being at play (people from rural areas are more inclined to migrate abroad following increased rural-urban migration associated with environmental hazards), although it might just as well signal the relevance of the credit constraint channel (people in rural households are probably hit harder and might therefore not be able to cover the costs of migration in the short run). The migration response to environmental problems is, however, heterogeneous across different groups of countries and locations of residents. Severe environmental problems are associated with a higher probability of intending to move in Africa, Latin America, Europe and North America, while in Asia the effect is only significant for residents of urban areas. Furthermore, the migration response to environmental hazards depends positively on the country's income per capita and is higher for residents of urban areas. Our results finally indicate that the migration response of people in urban areas is crucially determined by household wealth.

The preliminary analysis presented in this chapter shows how the literature would gain from empirical analyses applying an integrated approach, i.e. combining both micro and macro level information, and considering both internal and international migration responses to environmental change. By combining information on both country and individual/household characteristics, one can better identify the subpopulation that is actually affected by environmental hazards, and compare results across countries. Furthermore, this integrated approach allows to explore heterogeneity in the migration response across countries and groups of people.

Our analysis suggests that individuals exposed to severe environmental problems are more likely to move in the next 12 months. This could be seen as a first indication that we may expect an increase in human mobility in the face of environmental change. Of course, in order to provide more reliable results, more precise indicators tracking exposure to specific environmental hazards is required. It would also be interesting to distinguish between the internal and international migration response to these different environmental hazards. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present study but forms an interesting pathway to further assess and advance the existing evidence on the complex nexus between environmental change and migration.

Appendix

Table 3.7 Countries in our estimation sample by geographical region

Asia	**Freq.**	**Europe**	**Freq.**
Afghanistan	839	Austria	977
Armenia	904	Belarus	872
Azerbaijan	876	Belgium	935
Bangladesh	972	Bulgaria	904
Cambodia	981	Czech Republic	901
China	3082	Denmark	977
Cyprus	981	Finland	986
Georgia	896	France	970
India	5425	Germany	988
Indonesia	1022	Greece	937
Israel	919	Hungary	973
Japan	967	Ireland	971
Kazakhstan	815	Italy	938
Kyrgyzstan	914	Lithuania	859
Malaysia	926	Luxembourg	951
Mongolia	913	Malta	912
Nepal	895	Moldova	905
Pakistan	841	Netherlands	974
Philippines	920	Poland	938
Singapore	961	Portugal	933
South Korea	925	Romania	890
Sri Lanka	996	Russia	3528
Taiwan	932	Slovakia	917
Tajikistan	901	Slovenia	978
Thailand	958	Spain	968
Turkey	872	Sweden	974
Uzbekistan	964	Ukraine	901
Vietnam	893	United Kingdom	941
Total	32,490	Total	28,898
Africa	**Freq.**	**LAC**	**Freq.**
Botswana	993	Argentina	944
Burkina Faso	981	Bolivia	929
Cameroon	1194	Brazil	982
Central African Rep.	981	Chile	924
Chad	980	Colombia	937
Kenya	969	Costa Rica	924
Liberia	986	Dominican Republic	939
Mali	990	El Salvador	916
Niger	998	Haiti	291

(continued)

Table 3.7 (continued)

Nigeria	995	Honduras	856
Senegal	997	Panama	857
Sierra Leone	953	Paraguay	950
South Africa	986	Peru	885
Tanzania	994	Uruguay	871
Uganda	976	Total	12,205
Zimbabwe	975		
Total	15,948		
Northern America	**Freq.**	**Oceania**	**Freq.**
Canada	982	Australia	978
United States	971	New Zealand	716
Total	1953	Total	1694

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Chapter 4
The Water-Migration Nexus: An Analysis of Causalities and Response Mechanisms with a Focus on the Global South

Nidhi Nagabhatla and Cameron Fioret

4.1 Introduction

Migration has long served as a coping strategy to respond to environmental disturbances, including issues about water availability and access. Parry et al. (2007) argue that human migration triggered by climate crises is a new and emerging challenge that may destabilize sustainable future world prospects and human development, noting that Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has integrated this narrative in their synthesis. Also, the World Economic Forum (2015) Global Risk Report underlines how water crises and water-based shocks, including resultant human migration, offer new risks and vulnerability scenarios for the sustainability and human development agenda. Currently, perceptions and measures in the migration discourse often focus on the 'response' context (IOM 2015; UNDESA 2017). Additionally, there is increasing evidence that migration patterns can trigger political conflicts and should be investigated using an integrated approach focusing on drivers and response mechanisms. The need for current and concrete empirical evidence that supports the 'causality' dimension of human migration related to water and climatic variability [referred to as environmental migration (EM)] remains pertinent for migration studies.

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Causality, defined as the relationship between cause and effect in the water-migration nexus, the phenomena that embed the water- and climate crisis triggered migration to possibly inform strategies to cope with this migration. Gaps in the current understanding of the water-migration nexus can best be handled if data, information, and knowledge on multiple settings of water and climate crises are explored with a contextual, scale-based approach. These settings include pollution, resource degradation, resource-related conflicts, and their resulting instability, droughts, floods, and extreme events. The need for a regional or global overview that can facilitate interpretations of various facets of human migration is a continuing challenge.

In recent years, the gradient and intensity of water quality, water quantity, and extreme water events have been high. Given the fact that 1.2 billion people currently live in areas of physical water scarcity—a figure that is predicted to increase to 1.8 billion by 2025—a continually growing population will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity. This means that two-thirds of the world's population could be living under water stressed conditions (WWDR 2012).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Paris Institute of Political Studies (Ionesco et al. 2017) published a review of major environmental migration case studies from 2010 to 2017. It indicates that between 2008 and 2016, more than 195 million people were internally displaced by floods and tropical cyclones (climate events with a large water footprint). In summary, environmental migration, and more specifically, water-driven migration is one of the critical challenges facing the global community today as more people's identity, habitat assets and livelihoods are impacted due to forced migration. This is particularly true for populations living in the Global South [an emerging term steered by the World Bank for countries seen as low and middle income in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean] due to theses regions' high vulnerability to natural hazards, multiple impacts of climate change, and a range of direct and indirect environmental drivers that influence human development.

A recent FAO (2017) report predicts that by 2050, more than 50% of the world's population, some 4.8 billion people, and an equal percentage of food-related agriculture production, will be at risk due to water stress. This interlinkage is described in the water quantity scenario, i.e., increased variability in rainfall and droughts. Critical factors influencing this situation are a surge in fragility or vulnerability caused by a scarcity of specific vital natural resources, such as water, and by the climate crisis and related conflicts. Table 4.1 presents examples to support this argument.

The lack of commonly agreed definitions and explanations of migration that is driven by the water and climate crisis presents difficulties in defining and measuring new and emerging migration trends—both within and across national borders. Gaps in data and up-to-date information on water and migration, linked to forced or seasonal displacement, adds to the lack of understanding of these issues. In this light, two points are of concern: firstly, the water context in human migration is generally reflected in the climate or environmental migration; and secondly, water-

Table 4.1 Selected examples of the water-migration nexus from the Global South that demonstrate links between water quality, quantity and extreme scenarios (aggregated from various sources, mainly Ionesco et al. 2017)

Country/ region	Year	Global South Region	Migration and the link to water crisis scenarios	Number of people displaced
Pakistan	2010	Asia	Water Quantity/Extreme—Floods—Heavy monsoon rainfall caused Indus River to crest. Floodwater impacts water quality in supply water storage and supply systems.	11,000,000
China	2010	Asia	Water Quantity/Extreme—Floods—28 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in the West of China. Floodwater intrusion impacts water quality of supply systems.	15,200,000
India	2009	Asia	Extreme Event—Cyclone Aila hit west region of the country.	2,300,000
India	2012	Asia	Water Quantity/Extreme—Floods—monsoon flooded Assam State (north east India).	6,900,000
Indonesia	2008	Asia	Water-Related Extreme Event (landslide—heavy rainfall in the northern coast of Java).	30,000
Papua New Guinea	2012	Pacific Islands	Water-Related Extreme Event (Heavy rainfall and large landslide (2 km long, 500 m wide) occurred in the Como areas after heavy rainfall).	10,000
Guatemala	2010	Central America	Water-Related Extreme Event (Flood and landslide—after heavy rains in Guatemala's highlands).	50,640
Papua New Guinea	2006	Pacific Islands	Sea level rise and salinization—inhabitants of Han islet initiative a relocation plan to adapt to sea level rise, salinization, and food insecurity.	2000
Vanuatu	2004	Pacific Islands	Sea level rise and floods—after significant floods and sea level rise the Lataw village on Torres Island relocated inland.	N/A
Solomon Islands	Long term	Pacific Islands	Sea level rise—Choiseul (township located 2 meters above sea level) threatened by sea level rise. As a result, authorities are planning to relocate inhabitants.	1000 (potential)
Tuvalu	Long term	Pacific Islands	Sea level rise and salinization—Funafuti island is located 2 m above sea level and is facing sea level rise, salinization, and coastal erosion. Migration as the adaptation strategy.	4500 (potential)
Mexico	Long term	Central America	Water Quantity (mostly scarcity)-Drought—Reduction in crop yield due to droughts is linked to increasing international migration to the USA from Mexico.	N/A

(continued)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Country/ region	Year	Global South Region	Migration and the link to water crisis scenarios	Number of people displaced
Burkina Faso	Long term/ annual	Africa	Water Quantity (mostly scarcity)-Drought—Drought—increase rainfall deficit has led to increased migration from dry, rural areas to areas with more favorable weather conditions.	N/A
Ghana	Long term/ annual	Africa	Water Quantity (mostly scarcity)-Drought—Drought—farmers are relying on rain-fed agriculture are engaging in seasonal migration during the dry periods as a coping strategy.	N/A
Republic of Tanzania	Long term/ annual	Africa	Water Quantity (mostly scarcity)-Drought—Drought and water shortage—increased drought frequency and water shortages have made people migration to cities or rural areas with better weather conditions.	N/A
Bangladesh	Long term/ annual	Asia	Water Quantity (mostly scarcity)-Drought—Drought—Rice growing is affected by rainless periods in the northwest of Bangladesh. The rural, poor are engaging in seasonal migration in search of agricultural employment as a coping strategy.	N/A

and climate crisis is not often identified as a direct influencer (push factor) for migration.

The dimensions of 'causality'—in this case, water and climate crisis scenarios causing human migration—is complex, often bearing a connection to water quality, accessibility, and availability. Availability pertains to basic provision needs, livelihood, and income generation contexts. In other instances, it relates to extreme events, disasters, and situations stemming from competing and conflicting use of water resources, such as the construction of dams, or economic interventions like water transfer projects. The water-migration nexus operates in specific situational and contextual aspects of water and climate crises scenarios. To explain this, lets us consider the example of communities living near polluted water systems which report health issues and decide to move from their current dwelling to a new destination. Behind this scenario is a complex web of linked factors. This means that reliable data and information are required to have a clear picture of the how water- and climate crisis is influencing the emerging and evolving migration pathways.

A 3Scenario (3S) framework is proposed in this chapter to enhance the understanding of the water-migration nexus (Fig. 4.1). This thinking builds on critical water crises scenarios explained by Guppy and Anderson (2017). The three scenarios are migration triggered by *water quality, water quantity, and water extremes*, and they are outlined to cluster various situations observed and noted in the water-



Fig. 4.1 Visual representation of the 3Scenario (3S) framework in the context of the water footprint in migration in the Global South

migration nexus. This framework will help decision-makers to generate a clearer understanding of the water context that will benefit research and development programs on human migration. It will benefit planning and policy decisions in the Global South, where these three scenarios apply in many contexts. The 3S approach will address human migration, nationally, regionally, and globally, in areas such as causalities in migration management, planning, and policy decisions. It frames temporary, seasonal, or permanent issues, water-crisis scenarios that cause migration.

On the issue of how water quality adds to the vulnerability of populations and communities, the World Health Organization estimates that two billion people use drinking water from a contaminated source containing excreta and that half a million die each year due to water quality-related adverse health outcomes such as diarrhea (WHO 2017). A significant number of these people live in vulnerable situations, including migrants. Water pollution and the consumption of contaminated water are two of the leading causes of illnesses and death (WWAP 2019—Chap. 2 and Nagabhatla et al. 2020).

Water quantity scenarios address availability and accessibility of potable water. Estimations point that four billion people live in severe water scarcity conditions [1 month/year], 1.8–2.9 billion people live in extreme water scarcity [4–6 months/year], and 500 million people live in continual water scarcity [12 months/year] (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016). Lack of water clubbed with diminished water quality. However, that is not always the case, noting that complexity, the water-migration nexus is explained using the 3Scenario framework (Fig. 4.1).

An excess of unwanted water is caused by periods of high rainfall resulting in flooding. Or in small island states, scenarios of sea-level rise. Strauss and Kulp (2014) estimate that as many as 650 million people may be exposed to sea-level rise, with most of the affected people living in China (41–63 million). Water-extreme scenarios are illustrated by disasters with a high-water footprint (severe floods, cyclones, and storms) or chronic water shortage conditions such as persistent droughts. This is supported by case studies from the Global South, to present the multiple dimensions of water crises and management and its likely influence for local and cross-boundary migration patterns, mostly for vulnerable communities and people. A set of arguments is provided to explain the pluralistic facets of the water-migration nexus. They couple the known aspects—quality, scarcity, extreme events, and transboundary—with lesser known ones—conflicts, peace, and security. Based on these observations, a case for re-positioning migration as a central factor to this set of challenges in the globalization and sustainable development goals and targets is argued, along with the need to analyze the gaps in migration-related institutional reforms and policy agenda. These three main sections of the chapter will help develop an up-to-date understanding of the water-migration nexus by presenting a set of narratives, a tool and multiple levels of information on direct and indirect drivers of migration, stemming from water- and climate crisis scenarios. As such kind of information is limited or mostly lacking in the available migration literature and all is deficient on the causality context, the synthesis presented in this chapter

bears relevance to the ongoing and planned discussion for safe and orderly migration.

4.2 Water-Migration Nexus: Overview of Multiple Narratives from the Global South

This section presents a set of narratives, describing the links between water and human migration using the nexus concept explained by Galaitsi et al. (2018), with an enhanced explanation of the 3S framework outlined in the introduction. The concept identifies the multifaceted interdependencies between sectors and the need to analyze these connections to provide the basis for effective decisions on resource sustainability and effective governance. For the sake of integrating with the existing explanations on human migration linked with environmental and climate parameters, water-triggered migration is considered as a subset of environmental/climate migration.

The view of the International Office for Migration (IOM) is that "environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad" (*The* Atlas of Environmental Migration, Ionesco et al. 2017, p. 124). In this context, the 3S approach outlined above—that applies the lens of water quality, water quantity, water extreme—provides an organized explanation for better understanding of the water-migration nexus. This approach offers insights on a working concept of the water-migration nexus. It helps assess consistency and demonstrates the framework's potential to be transferred as a tool to manage environmental migration issues. The primary motivation for providing empirical arguments to illustrate the role of water-crisis scenarios is that they possibly influence stability, security, and sustainability of populations and communities in various socio-ecological, socio-cultural, and socio-political realms. In the Global South (mainly Asia and Africa and most recently in Latin America) people opt for migration due to environmental destruction and climate extremes (e.g. flooding, disasters that lead to loss of economic opportunity, etc.) (Nagabhatla et al. 2014).

Gemenne and Blocher (2017) have written on how floods, storms, and tsunamis influence human migration, using case studies in their work. However, many of these case studies, and indeed much of the quantitative environmental migration literature, focus on internal migration. The reason for this may be because tracking the exact cause of environmental migration, unless it is mass migration, can be difficult, as migrants may not recognize environmental factors as the primary cause of their move. Further clarification is brought by specific case studies that blend the aspects of water quality, quantity, and cross-boundary water cooperation. This water context exists alongside socioecological variabilities and socioeconomic realities.

The selected case studies outline a regional approach and attempt to embrace the 3S framework thinking towards analytical explanations of the region-specific migration trends.

4.2.1 Case Studies from Africa

A first example of the water-migration nexus is the Lake Chad water crisis, although in the available literature, this connection is not investigated explicitly. Lake Chad is the largest transboundary (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) aquatic ecosystem in northern Africa (approximately 2,500,000 km^2 in size) and was once the sixth largest lake in the world. It is in a semi-arid [south] and arid [north] climate. More than 90% of the lake's water originates from the Chari/Logon river system. The lake is a closed system, meaning that there is no outflow (Birkett 2000). The lake was a vital source of water to more than 30 million people in the Sahel who relied on farming, fishing, and pastoral activities as livelihoods and means of income generation (Coe and Foley 2001; Tower 2017). Its surface water has been shrinking since the 1960s. By the 1980s, its size had reduced 22,000 km^2 to 300 km^2 due to persistent droughts and increased irrigation withdrawals (Gao et al. 2011). Consequently, the communities surrounding the basin area have suffered asset and income loss. The scenario also led to forced migration, the most noted of which was internal migration in Niger and Nigeria. This case study reflects the influence that climate variability and unsustainable human interventions have had on water quantity and availability. In the past four decades, Lake Chad has contracted by 95% largely due to climatic variability and the high demand for agricultural water. A logical conclusion is that this trend has led to internal and transboundary migration, and conflicts between different resource users (Taguem Fah 2007).

A recent survey by the Climate Refugee project says that among 150 respondents contacted to understand the correlation of migration with water crisis scenarios, many had experienced adverse environmental conditions. This included unpredictable weather patterns, droughts, flooding, shorter off-season, and, at times, severe rain spells, which were a trigger for them to move in search of more secure habitation and livelihood options (Tower 2017). Some reports also link social and political conflicts, including those connected to Boko Haram, either stemming from crisis-related triggers or exacerbating the existing situation of scarcity and security. For the north Nigerian region, IOM reports that more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in recent years, including more than 2.4 million internally displaced persons and 190,636 obtaining refugee status in another country (IOM 2016). While the Boko Haram insurgency has been labeled as the main driver of these trends, the report mentions that natural disasters, mainly heavy rains and succeeding flooding during the wet season, also have roles to play. The fraction attributed to the former and latter set of drivers varies significantly from a human

security perspective,[1] with violence marked as urgent and critical compared to slow or sudden impacts of nature-based disturbances. In most instances, those who migrated were in the transboundary region (i.e., more than 90% in Cameroon, almost 100% in Chad, and 92.81% in Nigeria). The report also suggests the militant group benefits from the existing food and water insecurity in the region. In that context, the argument from Felter (2018) that young men are likely to join the extremist groups not for religious motives, but rather because of frustration stemming from the social situation, seems fitting.

4.2.2 The Case of Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Most of the SIDS are developing countries located in the Global South and quite often listed as highly vulnerable to climate and environmental variability and change. SIDS present a specific context of human migration, particularly as the impact of climate change has added an extra level of vulnerability to coastal communities. Reckoning that most of the migration episodes may not directly reflect the water context, the argument that the lack of available and accessible water provision in those instances indirectly influences migration pathways, in tandem with influences of social or political conflict situations, is a fair deduction. Some SIDS are beginning to plan for future mass migrations of their citizens due to ecological degradation, water crises, and extreme climate events (Gheuens et al. 2019).

A study by UNU EHS (2015) employed a survey-based method to analyze inhabitants' experiences and attitudes on migration in Kiribati (2799 individuals or around 2.72% of the total population), Nauru (1246 individuals or about 11% of the total population), and Tuvalu (2807 people or about 25% of the total population). Milan and Ruano (2014), Campbell and Warrick (2014), and Oakes et al. (2016) reported that the outcome of the survey presented a revealing 97% of households having been affected by natural hazards, water quantity, and extreme water scenarios (including drought and irregular rains, sea level rise, cyclones, saltwater intrusion, floods, and storm surges) between 2005 and 2015. Of the recorded 4000 migration cases, environmental reasons are acknowledged as a driver for internal movements and international migration. Noting that direct and indirect drivers are closely linked (e.g., livelihood opportunities and income generation for communities are related to agriculture production or tourism sectors), people are in turn crucially dependent on water availability.

Most SIDS show a negative net migration rate, with more people emigrating than immigrating (Fig. 4.2). In the Pacific, an unusually high emigration rate is seen in the case of Micronesia and Tonga (around −20/1000 population), the lowest in the

[1]Cameroon noted little more than 8%, and Nigeria only around 1%, of the total migration occurring because of natural disasters (IOM 2016).



Fig. 4.2 Migration trend and pattern expressed as net migration rate in SIDS: (**a**) Africa, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean region, (**b**) Caribbean Islands and (**c**) Pacific Islands. Data Source for both: The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (2018)

world. In the Caribbean, the net migration rate varies at a lower range between −2 and −6/1000 population (The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Note that another closely related aspect of analyzing net migration is the remittance statistics of SIDS. For these small islands, remittances remain an essential part of the GDP, especially in Caribbean SIDS, where migration has three key characteristics: more than 50% of emigrants are women, most out-migrants are in a highly productive age group, and higher educated individuals are most likely to migrate (Gheuens et al. 2019). The financial flow attributed to out-migration has positively influenced poverty alleviation. In Haiti, for example, remittances account for 21% of the GDP. High economic and environmental vulnerability are increasingly reported as the 'push-factors' stimulating this trend. It is expected that climate change, chiefly the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, will exacerbate the situation impacting the habitable possibilities, thereby influencing migration patterns (IOM 2017).

While environmental and water stressors are on the rise, few studies make a direct correlation between migration and nature-based drivers. The previously mentioned study explains what communities in SIDS perceive as direct influencers on the decision to migrate. For example, in Tuvalu, people chose to migrate (move to) to Funafuti (nation's capital) and Fiji, Vaitupu (the largest atoll in Tuvalu) and New Zealand. Campbell and Olivia (2014) clarify the gradient of drought and irregular rains (61%), sea level rise (34%), saltwater intrusion (17%), storm surge (6%), floods (3%), and cyclones (2%) impacted nearly 75% of households in Nauru between 2005 and 2015. A staggering total of 95% of Kiribati households were affected by natural hazards between 2005 and 2015, as shown by Oakes et al. (2016). An interesting aspect of this analysis is that it mapped people's attitudes to future migration. Noting that 40% of households interviewed in Nauru felt that the primary cause for potential migration could be sea-level rise or flooding, while 70% of households interviewed in I-Kiribati and Tuvalu labeled sea-level rise, flooding, drought, and saltwater intrusion as the leading environmental reasons they would flee in the future. The numbers reflect the incidences of household impacted by the events bearing the water quantity and water extreme connection. Future studies expanding investigation on such interconnection can potentially adopt the 3S framework for classification of human mobility scenarios in the water-migration nexus.

Haiti, an under-developed, low income, and resource-limited SIDS in the Western hemisphere, and the Dominican Republic, a middle-income state, have both suffered various extreme environmental events and disasters (e.g., heavy rainfall, flooding, coastal and topsoil erosion, and cyclones). These adversely impacted a large portion of their population (more than 40,000 people in Jimani, Dominican Republic and the Mapou and Fond Verettes regions of Haiti) triggering internal and international migration. Alscher's (2011) interviews and structured questionnaire research reflect on the link between environment and migration, more so the water crisis caused by heavy rainfall and floods as the leading cause of human migration. Although few respondents' noted migration as an option to expand on livelihood and income generation options, a large portion stated that extreme events causing loss of assets leave them with no other choice but to look for safer destinations.

Communities do feel that environmental (including water-related) problems could be a key driver for future migration, though they do not explicitly mention environmental issues as a trigger for their decision to relocate or possibly migrate. In terms of contextualization, the perspective to view migration as a response mechanism is deep-rooted, and the focus on understanding and addressing causalities remains a persistent gap.

4.2.3 Case Studies from Asia

To further understand the geographical and social context of the water-migration nexus, selected examples of water crises that potentially drive human migration from and within Asia are discussed. Bangladesh is cited frequently in the risk reports as highly vulnerable to climate variability and change. Most water-related natural hazards like cyclones, storm surges, droughts, and riverbank erosion are a frequent occurrence in the country, especially flooding of the low-lying basin and coastal zones. Approximately 20 million people living in these areas are subject to flooding, and around one-fifth of the country's territorial region is affected by annual floods (Nagabhatla et al. 2014). Each year the loss of life and assets is substantial; for example, in August 2014, several districts in north-western Bangladesh flooded because of the melting of the Himalayas and heavy monsoons. A total of 3.5 million people was affected, 34,000 homes were destroyed, and 200,000 homes were damaged. Migration is a common coping strategy in Bangladesh due to water access and extreme water events (e.g., massive floods, cyclones). The 2014 floods led to 325,000 internally displaced people (Walter 2015; Herrmann and Svarin 2009).

The Philippines also ranks high on the natural hazards risk ranking, adding to the existing development challenges such as high rates of poverty, child mortality, and lack of health services. In 2013, a Super Typhoon caused significant damage in 9 regions, 44 provinces, around 600 municipalities, and impacted more than 14 million individuals (Makhoul 2014). While the early warning systems helped manage the evacuation of about 800,000 people to safety, the aftermath in the following weeks internally displaced more than four million people, of which a significant number (1.7 million) were children and elderly (46,000 older than 60 years of age). A steady rise in internal migration in the few days after the extreme event triggered thousands to leave for other islands (and this number increased daily to tens of thousands). As the shelters around the impacted zones could accommodate only 2% (about 100,000), millions were left without shelter (Makhoul 2014).

The Indonesian capital city of Jakarta provides another example. The urban center is surrounded by a large bay and sits on subsiding lands and floodplains, making it extremely vulnerable to floods and extreme climate events. The rise in the frequency of events that lead to difficult access to clean water and, in some instances, extreme water situations, is an alarming call for the state to strengthen efforts for managing the resultant human migration. For example, flooding in 2007 subjected 340,000–590,000 people to forced migration (Lyons 2015). In 2014, floods

accounted for almost a third of more than 1500 natural disasters. Also, they were the most frequently occurring type of natural hazard over three decades. While showing a detailed account of the water footprint in temporary and seasonal mobility, the analysis also highlights how the gradient and frequency of torrential rain drive the migration. On 12 January 2014, several days of rain caused the surrounding rivers to outflow into Jakarta, and the government declared a 30-day emergency. The following week (19 January 2014) more than 30,000 residents were forced to evacuate the city due to continuing or worsening floods. Two days later, another 33,000 people moving into shelters, and a month then, while thousands began to return home, another 18,500 were re-evacuated due to prolonged flooding on 3–4 February 2014. More flooding continued in the following months.

Beyond the straightforward narrative that water has a significant footprint in migration in the context of causality, water facets apply in the post-migration scenarios. For example, the fast movement of migrants in substantial numbers can have many repercussions in economic, financial, and social terms, both for the destination (host) region and place of origin.

It may translate to an over-burdening of water resources, issues related to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and incidents of conflicts linked to resource ownership, use, access, and rights. Take the case of Syrian refugees' migration during and after 2014 to the neighboring regions such as Turkey and Jordan (MercyCorps 2014). A study by Oxfam shows how more than 3000 m^3 of water is delivered to the Zaatari camp for drinking, cooking, and cleaning per day (Gluck 2013). The water and sanitation facilities installed for refugees in water-scarce regions like Jordan also triggered civil and social outcry/conflicts, as well as a great deal of financial burden for the host country. To better address the water-climate crisis triggered migration, the focus on states and communities reporting scenarios stated in the 3S framework can serve as a starting point for clear and up-to-date assessments.

4.3 Multifaceted Aspects of the Water-Migration Nexus

4.3.1 Focus on Gender

Human migration driven by climate crises is a new and emerging challenge that may destabilize future sustainable world prospects and human development (Parry et al. 2007). Unpacking the causality aspects in water-triggered human migration requires accurate and up-to-date data and information to serve as evidence for bringing attention to newer trends and emerging migration pathways. Various other socio-economic and sociocultural aspects may apply to the water-migration nexus both in Global North and South. In instances, when water is denied to those who cannot afford it in Detroit (CBC News 2014), First Nations communities in Canada (Human Rights Watch 2016), or bottled on expired permits in Ontario (CBC News 2014), or in forced national privatization by large international organizations in Bolivia

(Balanyá et al. 2005), water inequalities lead to migration or can seed practices that contribute to water-driven strife and migration in the future.

These episodes described above ask key questions: Is stability and peace present in communities and states that value human rights to water? Can the state privatize and commodify water and other natural resources? Can access to water be denied to communities stating inability to supply as a reason? It follows then that mismanaging people's access to resources or unsustainable management of resources (for instance polluting water bodies that serve as a source of drinking water, livelihood management and income generation for communities) may be a driver of conflict and strife; and may lead to migration. This shows that water and climate crises are a 'push' factor for migration in a variety of contexts. The spillover effects may include increased migration.

The role gender plays in this nexus is expanded to provide a detailed understanding of one crucial aspect. Migration affects men and women differently. Men mostly decide to migrate for economic opportunities (a common trend in seasonal migration), women migrate in search of livelihood and income. Movement in situations of water- and climate crisis (floods and droughts) show an increase in the trend of women migrating for livelihood and income prospects—women account for nearly half of all global migrants by 2017 (IOM 2017). This pattern is a collective reflection on voluntary and involuntary migration. Effectively addressing migration scenarios requires access to gender-disaggregated data to manage how many causalities operate while deploying response mechanisms. Some specifics of the Global South help to examine multifaceted aspects of the water-migration interlinkages, including the gender dimension.

In Africa, water scarcity (quantity/availability/access) and increasing episodes of drought have aggravated the gender dynamics. For example, in Ethiopia, drought-hit families and communities employ cultural norms such as early marriage, that do not favor females in the household (Miletto et al. 2017). In Bangladesh, the insecurity in land tenure, crop failure, hydro-climatic variabilities and extreme events such as flooding, influence internal displacement, often leading people to migrate in the subcontinent. Limited land ownership and tenure rights for women make them more vulnerable to limited coping strategies, and perhaps more likely to migrate. People in the Mexican state of Sonora depend on producing canned and candied vegetable and fruit products, but due to drought and forecasted declines in water availability, their water-dependent livelihood has suffered (Hunter and David 2009). As a result, men find themselves migrating to the US, and many women are dependent on the remittances, with limited options available for the less educated. This has negatively impacted the recent progress in women's empowerment gained through the expansion of the fruit industry (Hunter and David 2009). In Nigeria, men temporarily or seasonally migrate to urban centers, if income generation activities are influenced by floods or droughts, while women are caretakers of the household that usually engage in "petty trading to supplement the income from the men" (Goh 2012, p. 13).

Such pluralistic facets bolster not only the current migration discourse but also migration management in general. For instance, forced migration due to natural disasters may differ in the pattern and gender distribution when compared with

regular migration pathways. Emerging data show that women are more likely to evacuate in such scenarios, especially if children are involved (Chindarkar 2012). However, biophysical, economic, and cultural contexts largely determine whether men or women migrate. In settings and regions with a high level of gender equality, women and men migrate for similar reasons, such as security, better livelihood, and education (O'Neil et al. 2016). Mapping the competencies of actors and agencies that are assigned to design migration policies on gender-sensitive decision-making remains crucial. Also, in the crisis scenarios that lead to migration, the concerns of safety and sanitation apply differently to men and women and are most likely high for women due to reported observations on incidents of physical and sexual assaults (Chindarkar 2012).

Generating a better understanding of the multiple aspects of the water footprint (i.e., the role of hazards, climate and environmental variability and change) as drivers of human migration remains vital for policy and decision makers at global/regional and national scales. In this context, inter- and transdisciplinary approaches can help capture the complexity of the water-migration nexus, serving as a fitting approach to investigate water crisis impacts and the reform policies and agreements that govern migration challenges. Participatory development, a bottom-up, grassroots form of development that engages with the community, can help steer a holistic and inclusive development agenda leading to resilient communities and informed populations.

It is pertinent to explicitly identify the role of water as a driver of migration, capturing the consequences of economics growth-oriented interventions like commodification and privatization, the shift of resource governance from the public realms to the private domains. Inequitable decisions around natural resources, including water, can trigger unintended consequences such as forced human displacement. For example, private actors can deny water to those who cannot afford it or deny them access due to other reasons. Several models exist wherein water pricing structures, and water stress scenarios that may include denial of water to individuals and communities has driven strife, stress, and conflicts (Soto Rios et al. 2018). Also, an assessment of the (positive or negative) spillovers in new and emerging pathways of the water-migration nexus are openly investigated in discussions with hosting states/communities and states of origin of migration.

The global community can get a good grasp of the pre-emptive strategies to tackle the emerging trends in human migration by analyzing data, research, and policy outcomes with a balanced focus on direct and indirect drivers. Also, the development of practical tools like real-time monitoring systems and living dataset, aggregated and freely available information, and knowledge on the various facets of migration (pre and post event scenarios) can assist in pre-emptive strategies. For example, gender sensitive planning is essential as a part of this management approach, and the pattern of seasonal movements commonly observed in migration that is triggered by the water and climate crisis involves relatively overlooked aspects. These include increased burdens on women who stay behind. Women are often left to assume responsibilities that would otherwise have been done by men. It can be particularly challenging for societies that do not allow women to have equal access to "financial, technical and social resources that men may have" (Skinner 2011, p. 33).

4.3.2 Institutional and Policy Assessment

Chellaney's (2011) monograph "Water: Asia's New Battleground" makes an argument as to how fragility or vulnerability caused by natural resource systems including water is deepening, and how the related social, economic, and political conflicts are intensifying in tandem. The narratives are rooted in the Asian context; however, it may generally apply to many scenarios in the Global South, including Sub-Saharan Africa and politically turbulent regions of Latin America. Globally, the response mechanism towards managed migration is strengthening. International experts and UN agencies, and state and non-state actors are trying to broaden the migration discourse to integrate aspects that were either overlooked or relatively under-investigated, such as water- and climate crisis scenarios. It is well argued that implementing solutions with an enhanced understanding of direct and indirect drivers of migration can assist towards a firm response to United Nations Declaration A/RES/68/4 (Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 2014).

Some of the existing guidelines and strategies offer a platform to integrate the multi-faceted complexity of human migration-related challenges. For instance, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (A/RES/71/12016) instigated a global debate on issues of migration and refugees. On September 19 2016, 193 Heads of State jointly discussed and acknowledged human migration as a significant challenge for the international development agenda and flagged a need for a comprehensive approach and enhanced cooperation at the global level in the UN General Assembly. These discourses also tend to steer the plan to holistically address the water-migration nexus, setting out a range of actionable commitments, means of implementation, and a framework for follow-up and review between Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions.[2]

This process has resulted in the creation of the Global Compact on Refugees (A/73/12) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. The item lists of the resolution are reflective and insightful. For example, items 13 and 118 of the provisional agenda (A/RES/71/L.1) reflect on climate-related scenarios, most of which embed a water footprint, although an explicit mention of water crises or similar conflicts is missing. Item 43 of the declaration captures some views on drivers of water displacement. The specific mention of water contexts in the statement is limited to two items, both related to post-migration WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene); see Table 4.2 for more details.

Noting that water is a human right, collective ownership thinking aligns with the vision outlined in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution [(A/RES/64/292), adopted on 28 July 2010]. The resolve of international and UN agencies as well as state and non-state actors to find and implement solutions to understand and address multiple causalities/divers/triggers in addition to "strengthening response mechanisms" is growing. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular

[2]Available at https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/NY_Declaration.pdf

Table 4.2 Items from the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants reflecting on water-migration nexus (Data Source: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration) and the alignment with SDG's

Item as stated	Context and explanation
Item 1: "*in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate change), or other environmental factors...*"	Water crisis, climate change, and natural disasters noted as a driver of migration. This aspect is researched and established within the current literature. The current information in the water-migration nexus do not present in-detail, the dimensions of the social and political system that apply- for example ownership structures, human rights, links with peacebuilding, etc.
Item 5: Part c states, "*...assess and meet the essential needs of refugees, including by providing access to adequate safe drinking water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter, psychosocial support, and health care...and assistance to host countries and communities in this regard, as required.*"	Access to adequate and safe drinking water is considered crucial to the well-being of migrant.
∗***Item 18***: "*...the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) and its recommendations concerning measures to mitigate risks associated with disasters...the Paris Agreement on climate change ...committed to its implementation. Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development... including its provisions, applicable to refugees and migrants."* ∗*Sentence abbreviated to present key highlights*	Item 18 correctly, and relevantly, discusses issues of water-related to natural disasters. There is a deep normative component to the study of attaching economic value to water because, when studying this topic, one has an idea of *right and wrong* and how we *ought* to act leading to the discussions such as: Does our right to water mean that it must not be privatized? Does the right to water exclude selling water for profit? What are the corporate responsibilities attached to water, primarily when it is sold to private interest groups/corporations? These are questions that must be analyzed when thinking about water- and climate-driven migration. More arguments on this aspect presented in Soto Rios et al. (2018).
Item 43: "*addressing the drivers that create or exacerbate large movements. Analyze and respond to the factors, including in countries of origin, which lead or contribute to large movements. Cooperate to create conditions that allow communities and individuals to live in peace and prosperity in their homelands.*"	Item 43's proposals on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies based on international human rights and the rule of law, creating conditions for balanced, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and employment, combating environmental degradation- aligns with the spread of SDG 16 and 17 goals and targets.
Item 50: "*...assist, impartially and based on needs, migrants in countries...experiencing conflicts or natural disasters...in coordination with the relevant national authorities."*	This point recognizes the importance of coordination and cooperation between relevant states and authorities regarding human development challenges, that includes migration. Within such "needs" are the water and climate crisis context.

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Item as stated	Context and explanation
Item 80: *"committed to providing humanitarian assistance to refugees to ensure essential support in key life-saving sectors, such as health care, shelter, food, water, and sanitation. Support to host countries and communities. Use of locally available knowledge and capacities, while supporting community-based development programs for the benefit of all…"*	These points relate to a significant, pressing issue of water- and climate crisis (also reflected in SDG 6 and 13 goals and targets, WWDR 2019 on water quality, distribution, and access: The need for water to be available to all while Leaving no one Behind. The item reflects on a participatory and interdisciplinary approach that should embed local capacity, knowledge, and "community-based development programs for the benefit of all." It is crucial to note that it makes explicit mention on the point of water to be accessible to all, regardless of socio-economic standing.

Migration (GCM) is a concrete step in this direction. Within the context of globalization and interdependence, **UN General Assembly Report 71/296** summarizes the global migration patterns, highlighting the role of migration in population change, and presents the current state of ratification of relevant legal instruments as a response to General Assembly resolution 69/229 (UN General Assembly 2016a, b, c).

Speaking to the pervasiveness of human migration—of more people being on the move than ever before (p. 3)—the report offers a detailed breakdown of the migration statistics, covering questions such as: Who is migrating? From where, and to where, do they migrate? What systems and agreements have been instituted to deal with such migration? To address these questions, an improved explanation of causality/drivers/triggers (relating to natural disasters, more so the water context) is needed, along with an enhanced understanding of interlinkages between direct and indirect drivers of migration, as these aspects are somewhat overlooked in the current migration literature.

Following Report 71/296, a new inter-governmental negotiation agreement, Resolution 71/237, was created in April 2017 to address challenges linked with international migration and development. The agreement outlines a comprehensive approach to inform state and non-state actors on relevant migration-related issues and to recognize the influence of migrants and migration in sustainable development. Also, the plan calls for an open, transparent, and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations; noting stakeholder's participation clearly in the agenda. The GCM agenda also aligns with the guiding principles of the 'Modalities Resolution'—wherein Sect. 16 states, "*Addressing drivers of migration, including adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters, and human-made crises, through protection and assistance, sustainable development, poverty eradication, conflict prevention, and resolution*."

The UN General Assembly resolution 71/237 (UN General Assembly 2017) was created to address migration and development, although it does not explicitly cover the water-driven migration nexus from the viewpoint of causality. It does refer to the

Sendai Declaration and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Resolution 69/283, Annexes I and II, pg. 2- and UN world conference on disaster risk reduction, 2015 March 14–18, Sendai, Japan), as well as natural disasters connection with water, typhoons, droughts, floods, etc. (p. 5).

The Sendai Framework, however, does not address more profound challenges of the water crisis and water management, such as privatization, cordoning-off water for strictly private actors. Although it underlines extreme water events bearing on people and communities, the seven targets outlined by the framework in 2020–2030 include: (a) focus on reduction of mortality caused by disaster; (b) reduce the number of affected people globally by disasters (noting that communities employ migration as a coping strategy, the focus of this target is very fitting); (c) reduce direct economic loss caused by disasters; (d) reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of essential services; (e) increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies; (f) enhance international cooperation to developing countries (focus on the Global South) towards their federal actions for implementation of this Framework; (g) increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments. Most aspects underlined in the set targets can assist with better attention to the spillover impact of water and climate extremes, wherein migration is acknowledged.

It is important to note that human migration is an evolutionary paradigm. Also, the benefits and repercussions are self-balancing if externalities, such as water- and climate crises, are not the main driving force. A key challenge in managing migration in an organized and sustainable manner is to increase understanding between countries on the role that the water and climate crisis has in driving migration and addressing the reasons for the low uptake of existing instruments and policies on migration by state agencies, in place of origin, transit locations, and destination countries. Global governance mechanisms have taken some note of this phenomenon in the existing tools that aim at sustainable human development, including the recent Sustainable Development Goals. Examples are shown in Fig. 4.3.

The current set of institutions and policies, primarily established in the 1950s, have directly or indirectly demonstrated immeasurable importance for migration-related challenges and affected populations. Post-2015, the global community's implementation of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs are focused on a variety of goals. The agenda cover various dimensions of human development such as eradicating extreme poverty and inequality, addressing gender facets through education, health and nutrition aspects (SDG 2, 3, 4 and 5). In addition, revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (SDG 17), promoting peaceful and inclusive societies (SDG 16) based on international human rights and the rule of law, creating conditions for balanced, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and employment, combating environmental (land and water) degradation and ensuring effective responses to natural disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change (SDG 6 and 11).

Most aspects of migration are embedded in the SDGs, even if not in an explicit manner, often integrated with the set of outlined goals and targets, for example, SDG



Fig. 4.3 A comprehensive overview of international management and governance tools and instruments that apply or relate to the water-migration nexus (includes only key events until 2018)

6.1 -by 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. Or SDG 6.2 to achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying particular attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations—reflecting on accessibility and availability context. And, SDG 13.1—to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries—that shows focus on drivers that influence socioeconomic stability, and, can include the case of migration. Seeing the interlinkages, one can anticipate that implementation planning of the SDG targets will set the pace for multi-stakeholder endeavors for likely instituting participatory mechanisms for inclusive migration planning. For instance, the IOM migration data portal (https://migrationdataportal.org/sdgs#0) includes a specific space to capture the SDG-Migration nexus. However, to date, concrete measures to address the water-migration are yet to be seen.

To support the international apparatus and optimize solutions for managing the migration challenges, enhanced understanding of the water and climate crisis as a driver remains relevant. Coordination apparatus of migration at national, regional, and global levels (more so, for human migration triggered by water- and climatic crisis), or of temporary, seasonal, or permanent migration should address causalities and responses mechanisms in tandem. Such an integrated approach to migration challenges can go a long way in designing smart strategies for effective migration planning. Overall, the synthesis calls for causalities to be suitably represented in the migration discourse.

The set of documents steering the international discourse on human migration-related issues do talk about protecting the rights of migrants. Access to water for migrants could be done through a participatory approach as well (Ecowatch 2015). The discussion (High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development) report, as well as the resolution, is expected to improve the understanding of drivers of human migration, beyond the usual push-pull factors. The General Assembly planned an intergovernmental event in December 2018 and adopted the Global Compact. Emphasis on 'causalities' in the interventions discussed in this high-level gathering on migration is limited.

4.3.3 Collective Agenda and Co-Management

Water crisis scenarios and their impacts could be combatted by instituting a system of shared ownership and by making a distinction between territory and property. The promotion of peace as well as open, inclusive, and democratic societies that value and follow the rule of law operate best without water privatization and commodification aspects. A joint ownership model, like the elaborations of political philosopher Matthias Risse (2009a, b) or the commentary of Avery Kolers in 'Land, Conflict, and Justice' (2009), provides some food for thought to differentiate between property and territory, where territory implies stewardship of the earth and its resources (including water) whereas 'property' suggests something that can

be cordoned-off and privatized. The concept of territorial rights means that states cannot evict tenants and destroy the resources of the earth (Kolers 2009). Stewardship can be adopted in the water sector, meaning that the state takes care of water and natural resources of the land for not only the current generation but *future* generations (Kolers 2009).

The prevention of water-influenced migration due to lack of access to water can be tackled through shared ownership and co-management thinking. For example, ownership and tenure rights for water can be exercised through common and collective rights wherein water ought to be accessible and available to all. Commodification is contrary to shared ownership. Selling water for profit has roots both in the Global North and the Global South and might be regarded as an indirect driver of water-triggered migration. Privatization and commodification affect the poor most, and most existing water provisioning facilities and services are focused on the wealthy portion of the populations, of agriculture and industry, while the poor, or in some states rural, people are often neglected (Harvey 2018). This practice serves as an indirect driver to water triggered migration and, sometimes, forced displacement.

To tackle the spill-over impacts of water crises, joint ownership of water resources could offer a gainful and long-term solution. Privatization and other forms of resource ownership, especially in the water sector, can limit access and, therefore, potentially drive human migration. The agencies involved in the water dimension of migration planning could look into water matters both at "origin" (Is water or climate stress a key factor influencing the decision to migrate?; Does water crisis impact the food security of the communities?; Is it forced or voluntary migration?) and "destination" (water is distributed to migrants, do migrants receive clean water in the location that they flee to? Are corporations involved in the distribution of water to migrants? Do communities or states become beholden to—indebted to—corporations or other countries when distributing water?). These are pertinent aspects to investigate when researching the water-migration nexus.

4.4 Discussion

Linking human migration to environmental factors can be challenging. In the environmental (climate and water dimensions serving as a trigger) migration context—the cases of extreme water events (e.g., tsunamis, tropical cyclones, or large-scale flooding) is easy to quantify, as these events have an immediate effect on a population and require a direct response, so tracking the movement of people is part of the response mechanism. Additionally, government agencies and humanitarian organizations tend to be more involved in the mitigation of, and recovery from, natural disasters (i.e., forced evacuation and shelters), making it easier to assess the number of displaced or affected individuals. In cases of migration because of water quality (e.g., water pollution) or quantity (e.g., water shortages), the effects are often slow or gradual, meaning that there might not be a mass movement of people.

Instead, people might leave areas at different times, and these environmental drivers are often working in conjunction with economic factors.

This chapter makes a case to acknowledge and consider water among the drivers of human migration and examines how water crises trigger newer trends and patterns of mobility and migration. Also, as there is no universally recognized legal definition of, nor an established framework to capture and explain, environmental migration, the proposed 3S framework could help to make a strong case for the water footprint in human migration. It can also provide a clear framework to unpack the complexity of managing migration-related information (note important points in Table 4.3). Also, the set of narratives and references from case studies (mainly from Global South) outlined earlier in this chapter highlight crucial aspects that can contribute to

Table 4.3 Five key observations and assessment of 3S framework for enhanced understanding of the human-migration nexus

Key observations	3S Framework and the water-migration nexus
The water crisis scenarios around the ownership, rights, distribution, and privatization/commodification of water can influence the decision to migration or creates a scenario of conflict pertaining to water quality and availability (quantity).	Scenarios of strife and suffering, leading to possible conflict can be seen in states in the Middle East (e.g. Syria), Bolivia, Ecuador and many the Global South regions and communities.
The Global South is facing and tackling the interconnections between water and migration, which are not only complex but, also, multifaceted, sporadic, or sometimes ambiguous—water quality, quantity and extreme scenarios are central to the said interconnections.	States and communities in the Global South can better address the issue of water-driven migration through possible application of the 3S framework, complimented by participatory, bottom-up development that is inter- and transdisciplinary.
Human migration explorations need to embed gaps and needs assessments on gender and vulnerable groups. The emerging trends and patterns in human migration need to be carefully examined from a causality viewpoint.	Recent UN resolutions outlined in this chapter do not examine water causalities in any meaningful depth. The 3S framework offers a simple approach to classify and analyze the water-migration nexus, while providing flexibility to integrate scenarios that represent multifaceted aspects- quality and availability aspects apply in tandem, for example.
Enhanced understanding of spillover (positive or negative) impacts of the new and emerging pathways of water and climate crisis driven migration.	Case studies from the Global South explained with the context of the 3S framework (SIDS, The Philippines, etc.) address the need for an investigation that focuses on highlighting 'causalities' (i.e., direct and indirect driver).
The availability of quantitative data and information (national records) on water-driven migration are mainly on internal migration or at the country scale while creating a regional or a global quantitative overview remains challenging.	Acknowledging that data and information management of the water-migration nexus can be a challenging task. A clear and simple framework that embraces inter- and transdisciplinary thinking could lead to desired progress to schematically organize available data and information, and to outline gaps and needs for future work. The 3S framework shows promise in that direction.

the ongoing or proposed discourses on human migration. Furthermore, these recommendations could be used to better integrate the water-migration nexus in ongoing discussions on migration policies and planning. For example, recognition of water as a public natural resource, to one that is increasingly private, needs much study concerning how that interfaces with human migration.

4.4.1 Water-Migration Nexus: Summary Points

First, coordinating the involvement of all stakeholders in discussions that address the water-and climate-driven migration connection is crucial. Note that state actors on water issues are mostly restricted to ministries of water, wherein the migration context is not explicitly reflected in resource-related decision making; for example, water allocation decisions and climate adaptation planning reckoning migration as a coping strategy issue do not have specific positions in policy decision-making. Often, expected migrations are reflected in a piecemeal format in internal or state migration policies. The agencies/affairs for international migration in countries of origin, transit, and destinations are also missing 'causalities' aspects of water- and climate crisis, often calling for the better policy coherence on migration issues.

Second, improved focus on livelihood diversification (with less or optimized water footprint) options to ensure that migration is not the only adaptation strategy water- and climate crisis scenarios, particularly for groups and individuals living in vulnerable situations, and more importantly so for regions/communities facing climate extreme scenarios like floods and droughts.

Third**,** better emphasis needs to be placed on addressing 'causality' and 'response' in a balanced manner. Institutions and policies should emphasize community-level interventions aimed at groups and individuals living in vulnerable situations, as most often the impoverished people occupy the most sensitive areas are more exposed to like scenarios of floods etc., and these populations are mostly at the high risk of forced migration.

Fourth, a participatory approach could be applied to migration research to generate required local-scale evidence for creating inclusive policies and multiple narratives to engage with various relevant agencies and actors. Participatory methods of evaluation and development bind communities and development professionals, allowing all stakeholders to be involved. For a technique to be participatory, it must be bottom-up and community-based as well, and it is with this method that empowerment and engagement become fostered. The significance of participatory development thinking in new international agreements (e.g., the Paris Agreement, where articles 7 and 11 support such methods) provides a useful reference for the adoption of this thinking for migration research.

Fifth, inter- and transdisciplinary thinking can be embraced in migration planning to unpack the complexity of the water-migration nexus skillfully. Agencies, policies, and agreements about water- and climate crisis triggered migration must weave their way through various areas of study—quantitative and qualitative assessments,

political science, ethics and justice within philosophy and the humanities broadly, climate sciences—within cross-disciplinary projects, programs, peacebuilding and development planning agendas, and activities.

To conclude, it is becoming evident that to address the water- and climate crisis triggers of migration, the focus must be given to countries and communities that are in the frontline of these crises and regions in Global South, specifically those already hosting large numbers of migrants. A migrant might attribute their decision to flee to an environmental driver and could serve value towards building a knowledge base for future discourse on this nexus. It remains challenging to pinpoint the proportion of the influence water-crises scenarios have on decision-making related to migration; however, is it more than clear that water- and climate crises are directly or indirectly reflected in human migration.

4.4.2 Limitations and Opportunities

The absence of standardized terms and definitions makes identifying new and emerging trends in human migration within and across the borders of sovereign territories challenging. Filling the gaps related to the broader nexus of resource dependence (land, water) and migration, mainly in the context of forced or seasonal displacement, remains crucial. It is important to note that water and climate crisis scenarios are not always directly driven by anthropogenic-influenced environmental degradation. There are also situational contexts regarding water quality, quantity and water and climate extreme events in case of natural hazards and disasters. These aspects are more complicated for communities in the Global South, due to the high exposure and vulnerability of many states and communities to water and climate crisis scenarios.

Aggregated quantitative information related to water and migration is limited to large-scale environmental disasters and local scale seasonal or temporary (internal) migration. For instance, migration data related to water exists if a drought is declared as a disaster. On the contrary, information on water quality-based migration is severely lacking. This synthesis' aim is not to establish clear boundaries in the context of one kind (quality, quantity, or extreme) of water crisis scenarios governing the migration patterns of populations, or to endorse specific views to limit the general conclusions in this understanding of the nexus; the goal is to aggregate evidence towards refining outcomes in migration management and planning. The arguments are meant to present a distinct approach to tackling water crises and resulting spillover effects to better understand the water-migration nexus from both causality and response viewpoints.

The global community could understand pre-emptive strategies in water-influenced human migration through the co-creation of data, research, and policy outcomes. Such outcomes require a balanced focus on direct and indirect drivers, development of practical tools like real-time monitoring systems and living datasets, aggregated and freely available information, and knowledge of the various facets of

the migration (pre- and post-event scenarios) nexus, with a clear focus on causality. For example, while examining water crises and climate change impacts, the risk assessment and management solutions could also reflect on additional dimensions such as human migration while providing scientifically rooted evidence to widen the understanding on causalities of human migration. Designing smart land and water governance measures—the application of the appropriate technologies/innovation and increased land, water, and human security—could serve as a foundation for outlining a 'preventative' outlook for new and emerging pathways of human displacement.

In addition, data sharing arrangements with agencies (e.g. IOM, UNHCR, Peace Building operation of the UN) that have a presence in migration hot spots (those areas and regions with high rates of emigration, e.g. after a disaster or a conflict situation) can help to organise an integrated database and knowledge system for better decision making on migration-related challenges. The argument here is that the proposed 3S framework, if adopted systematically to explain the increasing footprint of water and climate crises in the migration pathways, can serve to create a concrete set of evidence to feed the migration dialogue and related decision making. Moreover, this decision making could involve revision of international migration policy to better reflect the causal agents of migration, beyond the sole emphasis on geopolitical conflicts and related aspects. A better understanding of the water-migration nexus will help create solutions to effectively manage the broad and multifaceted challenges that apply in case of migration, especially in the Global South.

4.5 Conclusions

Having a clear understanding of the water-migration nexus and the effects of climate crises on migration flows is critical for decision makers in the Global South to do effective crisis management and scenario planning to protect their populations.

Water and climate shocks are not generally perceived to be the leading cause of people's decision to migrate. But the reality for many communities is that they are a primary trigger that pushes people to leave their homes. This is especially true for the causes of international migration.

The case studies from the Global South presented in this chapter highlight the need for countries to do in-depth investigations to identify the root causes of migration events; and build a body of evidence to help manage risks resulting from climate change impacts, such as water scarcity, socio-economic dynamics, socio-cultural and socio-political complexities.

These facets are typically managed from a 'vertical' sectoral viewpoint and lack the integrated view that is needed to develop effective solutions to a migration crisis. Other issues that influence the socio-economic dynamics of migration are the context of rights (customary vs legal), ownership, and allocation policies for natural resources.

Migration events attributed to water and climate crises often involve other, ignored facets such as gender, youth, identity, cultural and value aspects. It is important to understand how these aspects influence migration patterns as a direct or indirect influence. In policy analysis processes, the various causality and response dimensions of migration driven by water and climate crises also need to be unpacked.

Effective migration policies need to identify all the drivers of migration events and look closely at the effect that water and climate crises have on them. This chapter presents the 3S framework, a guide that helps decision makers develop a clear picture of their potential migration situation linked to water and climate issues. This tool promotes cross-sector and inter-regional dialogue to link the water footprint to human migration trajectories in migration policies. Using 3S, planners build a set of narratives that describe a specific situation. This promotes a better understanding of the water-migration nexus. 3S enriches existing data, complementing countries' existing planning and policy processes with its cross-sectoral analysis of different drivers of migration.

The integrated analysis from 3S feeds into Disaster Risk Planning programs such as the Sendai Framework, climate change and adaptation planning and water resource planning, connecting to the related SDG goals and targets. The tool can be applied to assess migration issues at local, national, regional or global scales. It integrates perspectives from a range of stakeholders to help decision makers better understand the multifaceted aspects of migration in their policy planning processes.

Water and climate crisis scenarios that influence migration operate in combination with socio-economic, socio-cultural and socio-political factors that trigger peoples' decision to migrate voluntarily, and in some cases in forced migration. Dialogue using the 3S framework looks at a range of related issues such as immigration and employment movements at state, region and international level, promoting better regional coordination between countries affected by migration events. Aggregating data across sectors helps pinpoint the causes of human migration and displacement in each specific case.

Current perceptions on human migration by leaders of host and transit countries are mixed, leaning towards problems and seeing migrants as threats to national and international security (Nagabhatla et al. 2014). It is critical that the voices of people in the countries of origin and destination locations—mainly in the Global South—are part of the migration discourse. This will help address inconsistent perceptions. Up-to-date data, information and knowledge that apply in the water and migration nexus will help analyze the spectrum of technical, human, capacity and financial interventions that is required to address different migration situations. This will help reveal current gaps and show what is needed to effectively manage pre- and post-event responses to migration situations. A focus on causalities will help countries of origin and destination identify and address water-related risks together in a shared migration agenda that includes causality and response dimensions.

A productive next-step can be a comprehensive assessment of the water-migration nexus across the migration hotspots in the Global South (including conflicts scenarios resulting in cross-border migration e.g. the case of Rohingya)

to inform migration policy reforms. This new view, that will include a careful examination of economies' reliance on water, will provide the data to guide effective channeling of funding, and support policy makers in their efforts to build resilient societies.

An assessment will help answer questions such as how migration triggered by water and climate-crises impact men, women, and children and what the levels of impact on societies are. Such insights will inform effective interventions to support 'at-risk' communities and socially vulnerable groups, especially women and girls. This new data will contribute to SDG 5 on gender goals and SDG 6 on water targets. It will also inform capacity development needs for technical and institutional teams to better address migration issues at point of origin, transit, and in recipient states. Improved capacities are specifically needed in regions susceptible to water-driven crises in Asia, Africa and South America.

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Chapter 5
Taking Stock of the Evidence on the Consequences of Hosting Refugees in the Global South

Craig Loschmann

5.1 Introduction

At present there is intense public attention on the plight of refugees and the long-standing challenges related to forced displacement around the globe. Ironically, it took an increase in refugee arrivals to Europe in 2015–16 to trigger recognition of an issue that predominately occurs within the developing world itself. Overall 85 percent of refugees in the world today reside in low and middle-income countries that are within the immediate region of their home country (UNHCR 2018a). Africa alone, for instance, hosts around 5.3 million officially registered refugees from other African countries, along with another 12.6 million internally displaced within their own borders (EC 2018). As such, even though the rhetoric around South-North displacement may receive greater publicity on popular media, South-South displacement is overwhelmingly more significant and warrants greater consideration.

In addition to the geographic concentration of displacement in the Global South, the share of refugees that find themselves in a protracted situation[1] is on the rise. Today the average duration of displacement is estimated to be over 10 years (Devictor and Do 2016)[2], compelling the international community and national governments to explore more sustainable solutions beyond short-term humanitarian

[1]UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country.

[2]The estimated average number of years in displacement is highly variable across situations. Nonetheless, the mean duration in exile for refugees has generally remained between 10 and 15 years over the last two decades (Devictor and Do 2016).

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assistance. There are presently greater incentives to integrate development and humanitarian approaches in refugee-hosting contexts, in order to more adequately address the challenges faced by refugees themselves as well as host communities. Indeed, the way in which local households are affected by the sudden arrival and extended presence of refugees, along with the assistance-based infrastructure that typically accompanies them, is at the center of the debate.

A clear point of departure in this discussion is that the cross-section of host communities is not homogeneous, with dissimilar local households impacted in different ways. For example, local business owners catering to refugee camps may stand to benefit from increased demand on the market. Conversely, increased demand may contribute to rising prices which in turn hurts the consumption of especially poorer host community households. On the other hand, greater public and private investment in and around refugee camps, due to the arrival of the refugee population, may help improve local services like education and healthcare that everyone relies on. Hence the question is not just do refugees impact host communities, but more importantly in which ways are local households affected and why. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish between immediate vs. long-term impacts where possible, and look across a variety of refugee-hosting settings including those that are camp-based or alternatively urban in nature.

In an effort to lay the groundwork for future scholarship, this chapter takes stock of the recent empirical evidence on the consequences of hosting refugees. Given the fact that most displacement is concentrated within the global South, the focus is on host communities in developing country contexts. Moreover, attention is given to those general subjects with relatively more established evidence from the literature including economic and social impacts, as well as to a lesser extent issues like environmental and health effects. Heterogeneous impacts are emphasized where possible—for example, based on gender—considering the diversity within host communities themselves, as are the varied refugee-hosting contexts. The final section discusses policy-related issues and relevant directions of future research on the consequences of refugees on host communities.

5.2 Contextual Background

Before diving into the academic literature, some general statistics help place the issue in better context. Globally, there are an estimated 68.5 million people forcibly displaced from their homes as of end of year 2017, with 25.4 million of those considered official refugees (UNHCR 2018a).[3] While it seems to be an exaggeration

[3]The figures reported here highlight how nearly two-thirds of the forcibly displaced population are not official refugees given they never cross an international border. However, the literature on internally displaced persons (IDPs) more generally and specifically their impact on host communities is rather limited, therefore the review here focuses attention on refugees only. Similarly, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of non-official refugees, e.g. those individuals not



Source: World Bank 2018a.

Fig. 5.1 Refugees stock per region, since 2000

to claim that the number of refugees today is without precedent (see, e.g., Postel et al. 2015; Ferris 2017), it is also clear that the rise in the number of refugees from specific source countries over the last few years is concerning and requires a coordinated response from national governments and the international community alike. But as already emphasized, the vast majority of refugees do not move far from their original homes making this an issue first and foremost centered in the Global South.

Across regions, there is wide variation in where refugees are located as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. The Middle East and North Africa have typically hosted the largest number since the turn of the century, with a stock of around 10 million refugees as of end of year 2017. Sub-Saharan Africa often has accounted for the second highest number of refugees over this time period, with the most recent count greater than 6 million individuals. Europe and Central Asia also host around 6 million refugees at present, although the majority of those reside in one country, Turkey.

While informative, these regionally aggregated figures mask a more nuanced perspective per country. As alluded to just prior, Fig. 5.2 shows how Turkey accounts for more than half of total refugees listed in Europe and Central Asia, primarily due to its proximity to war-torn Syria. For similar reasons, Lebanon and Jordan host a considerably large number of refugees especially in relative terms given their small native populations. Likewise, Pakistan and Iran have some of the

registered with UNHCR, considering they are a particularly hard-to-reach population that is seldom included in representative surveys.



Source: UNHCR 2018a.

Fig. 5.2 Top refugee-hosting countries

largest populations mostly as a result of their shared borders with conflict-affected Afghanistan. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a large share of refugee population is located within Central and East Africa including notably Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia as a result of lingering insecurity across the region. In fact, the stock of refugees in these three countries alone is greater than all of those hosted across the European Union and North America combined, including Germany which for its part has accepted a considerable number of refugees in the past few years.

Beyond these deservingly publicized cases given the sheer number of refugees hosted in each, there are other arguably neglected crises which have received far fewer attention and are already flashpoints or are likely to be so in the near term. For one, the deteriorating situation in Venezuela continues to push families to neighboring Colombia, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador, among other Latin American countries. Recent estimates place more than 3 million Venezuelans abroad, the vast majority of them since 2015, and some predict that number could rise to greater than 8 million in the coming years (Bahar and Barrios 2018). Similarly, escalating violence in Myanmar has led to one of the fastest growing refugee emergencies today, with some 700,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh since late 2017 (UNHCR 2018b). And in Africa, political uncertainty, renewed fighting and food insecurity has led to concerning levels of displacement in parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Burundi and Nigeria, among others. A major concern is the lack of political will to address these often termed ‘silent’ crises, which includes severe shortfalls in humanitarian funding that have devastating effects for both refugees and host communities alike.

5.3 Economic Impacts

Even though economists have traditionally had a keen interest in migration, only recently as their attention turned to the economics of forced displacement (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; Verme 2017). Likely as a result of the more general awareness on the topic, in the last few years there has been a noticeable surge in the number of empirical papers documenting the ways in which refugees influence host community economies. Fundamentally the economic impacts of refugees may be positive or negative depending on local conditions, and create winners and losers among the host population (Chambers 1986). More often than not the focus of this literature is on local economic activity, labor market outcomes of host community members, price changes of essential goods and services, and economic well-being.

Taking into consideration first the potential for refugees to influence local economic activity of their host communities, there seems to be a general consensus that a refugee shock—that is, the sudden arrival of a considerable refugee population into an area—can prompt economic expansion and innovation, and breathe new life and dynamism into a local economy (World Bank 2011). Several studies provide useful descriptive accounts of the positive economic interactions between refugee and host populations, as well as the benefits of the aid community moving into the area. For instance, Whitaker (1999) highlights the economic opportunities for host communities in western Tanzania due to the influx of Burundian, Rwandan and Congolese refugees and associated relief resources. In particular, the study details an increase in market activity because of an upsurge in business and trade between hosts and refugees, as well as the arrival of entrepreneurs from around the country. Local farmers were also seen selling and trading a wide range of products to the refugee and expatriate markets, while refugees provided hosts with food and non-food items they received from relief distributions. Similarly, Bakewell (2000), Polzer (2004) and Betts et al. (2014) concentrate on the integration of refugees in Zambia, South Africa and Uganda, respectively, and similarly report cases of increased trade between refugees and host communities. Taylor et al. (2016) and Alloush et al. (2017) investigate Congolese refugees in Rwanda and describe active economic interaction between refugees and host communities, the former of which speculates that refugees fueled trade between the local economy and the rest of the country. Alix-Garcia et al. (2018) combine nighttime lights data with original household survey data to estimate the net benefit to locals close to Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. They show increased economic activity in areas very close to the camp, primarily due to greater wage-earning and agricultural employment opportunities generated from the refugee camp and associated aid community. They also provide evidence of the long-term benefits to host communities in terms of greater agricultural production even after the withdrawal of the refugee population and relief organizations.

As just highlighted, the labor market is one of the direct mechanisms through which refugees influence host communities. A common understanding is that refugees are likely to represent a source of cheap labor for local producers, which may

potentially drive out local workers depending on the level of substitutability between the two groups. Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) look at the case of refugees in western Tanzania, and show evidence that local agricultural workers faced fiercer competition in the labor market due to refugees' presence. On the other hand, skilled workers outside of the agricultural sector were able to benefit from increased job opportunities in international organizations focused on refugee programs, while those self-employed in business activities were worse off possibly as a result of increased competition from outside entrepreneurs. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) find complementary results in the same setting, showing that the refugee shock made it more likely that natives were engaged in within-household agriculture activity as opposed to working outside the household as an agricultural employee. Correspondingly, Ceritoglu et al. (2017) document a labor market adjustment as a result of Syrian refugees in Turkey, showing a modest decline in natives' informal employment however slight increase in natives' formal employment within the local economy. Loschmann et al. (2019) arrive at a similar finding in the case of host communities nearby refugee camps in Rwanda, showing a shift away from subsistence-based farming and towards wage-based employment activities. They also highlight a gender-based dynamic in that local women nearby refugee camps had a higher occurrence of being involved in self-employment activities, suggesting local women in particular took advantage of small-scale trading and selling opportunities in and around the camps. This gender-based effect is also found by Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018), who show that the refugee shock in western Tanzania led to women being less likely to be engaged in employment outside the home relative to men, and more likely to be involved in household chores. However, this gender-specific outcome differs across skill levels, as literate females with simple math skills were more likely to find new work opportunities with, for example, international and nongovernmental organizations.

While a refugee shock may increase local demand that benefits native business owners and some laborers depending on skill level, the flipside is that it may also have consequences for local prices of goods and services. And the cause of any such price fluctuations may not be simply due to increased demand, but also because of increased supply if food rations provided to refugees happen to enter the local market. On this, Whitaker (2002) documents a substantial increase in the cost of living around refugee camps in western Tanzania, including for staple food items like meat, cooking bananas and cassava. On the other hand, farmers noticed lower bean and maize prices as a result of refugees selling parts of their food aid. Alternatively, Landau (2002) questions the casual link by comparing a market nearby a camp to one further away, and concludes that prices on average had not changed for local foodstuffs due to the influx of refugees as earlier asserted but rather because of normal seasonal variation. Revisiting the topic in the same context, Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009) provide empirical evidence of significant increases in prices of agricultural goods that are consumed and produced by the local population. More specifically, they document large increases in the prices of non-aid food items in markets nearby refugee camps, and only modest increases in aid-related food items, suggesting food aid actually helps mitigate inflationary effects if only partially.

Overall though, the fundamental issue is how the above impacts due to a refugee shock are reflected in the economic well-being of host community households. Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009), for example, look at household assets as an indicator of wealth and find evidence of a positive wealth effect of refugee camps on nearby rural households, and negative wealth effects on households in urban areas. They interpret this as suggesting local producer households benefit from higher prices in agricultural goods, and invest that money in durable goods. Likewise, Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) show that refugees on average had a positive impact on household consumption (per adult equivalent) even though this effect is highly differentiated by occupation. Similarly, Maystadt and Duranton (2014) find that the refugee presence significantly increased real consumption, and turn their attention towards the channels of transmission of such a persistent and positive welfare effect. They show that the most important driver of this change was a sizable decrease in transport costs following increased road building, which continued to benefit the local population even after the refugees returned to their countries of origin. Additionally, Kreibaum (2015) studies the impact of Congolese refugees in Uganda and documents increased monthly consumption due to the refugee presence, although economically small. On the other hand, locals subjectively felt they were worse off in areas with a higher level of refugees despite this objective improvement, and even more so when living close to settlements. Loschmann et al. (2019) arrive at a similar result in that living in close proximity to a refugee camp in Rwanda is associated with greater household asset ownership in comparison to residing further away, yet the perception of ones' own economic situation is no different. This somewhat contradictory finding on how a local might perceive she is affected by the influx of refugees regardless of material benefits, especially in relation to others in the host community, has important social implications.

5.4 Social Impacts

While the economic impacts of hosting refugees are an important part of the story, communities also face a variety of potential social consequences of refugees moving into their communities. In certain cases, economic interaction between host and refugee households can stimulate healthy social relations that promote cohesion at the local level. In addition, improvements to social services because of the influx of refugee might also benefit host community members. On the other hand, the sudden arrival of a culturally dissimilar population has the potential to breed uncertainty and mistrust that leads to heightened social tension and even violence. Of course the conditions under which these potentially positive or negative impacts might be generated within a given context must be taken into consideration, including the role of policies and programs targeting the refugee population.

A number of case studies have focused on the issue of social cohesion and tension in various refugee-hosting situations. For instance, Guay (2016) looks at Syrian refugees in urban-based settings of Lebanon and Jordan, and describes the refugee

crisis as complicating an already fragile situation based on historical, political, cultural and religious complexities. Interestingly, the study highlights the role of local media in exaggerating the perception of insecurity due to the influx of refugees. Likewise, beliefs about the uneven access to external support from humanitarian assistance is suggested as a source of tension amongst host community members. Alternatively, Ghosn et al. (2019) provide evidence that Lebanese hosts are more likely to support hosting Syrian refugees if the two groups have had significant interactions. Likewise, Lehmann and Masterson (2014) report that a cash assistance program in Lebanon led to increased mutual support between beneficiaries and other community members, with beneficiary refugee households in fact more likely to receive help from and provide help to their host community neighbors. Along this same line, Valli et al. (2018) look at the impact of a transfer program in urban and peri-urban hosting settings in Ecuador, showing that it contributed to the integration of refugees and host communities through an increase in personal agency, confidence in institutions and social participation. They emphasize the importance of joint targeting, messaging (i.e. framing) and interaction between refugees and hosts.

One of the reasons social tensions fail to emerge in many refugee-hosting situations is because of the tangible benefits community members often see as a result of the refugees' arrival and associated aid community. Whitaker (2002) discusses how refugee-related projects in Tanzania became another source of development resource for the host community due to the influx of local and international organizations, with schools and hospitals upgraded despite the lack of government funds. In the case of refugee-hosting communities in Uganda, Kreibuam (2015) finds evidence that NGOs and other private agencies helped the state cope with additional demand for services. Correspondingly, Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) show no negative impact on hosts' accessibility of health and social services as a result of overcrowding or overburdening due to the refugee population. Regarding education in particular, Bilgili et al. (2019) document better access to primary schooling facilities for children living nearby refugee camps in Rwanda relative to children residing further away, as well as greater school attendance. Moreover, they find largely positive perceptions on the effects of refugees on education and schooling outcomes by host parents which further helped promote stable relations between refugees and host families. In addition, Tumen (2018) examines the impact of Syrian refugees on high school enrollment of native youth in Turkey. Using a quasi-experimental approach, the study shows an increase in high school enrollment for the youth of native households as a result of the refugee inflows, mostly coming from young males with lower parental education backgrounds.

Despite the generally encouraging findings with respect to social cohesion and public services, there is also a relevant strand of literature that focuses on potential security risks of hosting refugees. Jacobsen (2002) emphasizes the security-related problems associated with refugees, one of the most serious of which is the possibility of cross-border raids and the import of conflict from sending countries. Studying the issue empirically, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) finds evidence that displacement may spread civil conflict across borders, and the presence of refugees from neighboring countries increases the chance of violence. Similarly, Choi and Salehyan

(2013) investigate whether the inflow of humanitarian resources directed towards refugees is linked with domestic and international terrorism, finding a positive association that is suggested to be driven by looting from militant actors. In a similar line, Böhmelt et al. (2018) argue that refugees may be linked to an increased risk of non-stake conflict in weak states, but that this risk can be mitigated by governments with sufficient state capacity. Alternatively, Masterson and Lehmann (2018) use a quasi-experimental research design to examine whether aid to Syrian refugees in Lebanon impacts their choice to return home and join an insurgent group. The authors find evidence against the dominant narrative, that is insurgent mobilization is rather low to begin with and that a cash transfer program targeting refugees contributed to a decrease in the probability of returning home to participate in the insurgency. This seems to support the general claim by Rutinwa and Kamanga (2003) that any increased crime and insecurity around refugee-hosting locations is more likely attributed to the proximity to a conflict zone than the refugees themselves.

5.5 Environmental and Health Impacts

The sudden influx and extended presence of a large refugee population also has potential consequences for the physical environment and health of host community households. In an area highly dependent on agricultural production including subsistence farming, environmental degradation is a serious challenge. And although investment in local health services may help counteract any negative health spillovers, it is still relevant to consider the possibility of disease spreading from refugee populations to hosts under adverse conditions.

In terms of environmental damage, Whitaker (1999) reflects on the competition for natural resources such as firewood and water around refugee camps in western Tanzania. Deforestation in particular was a problem in this remote setting in which refugees cut down trees for wood-based cooking fuel and shelter, and cleared land to cultivate crops. Despite efforts by local organizations to combat these detrimental practices through, for example, tree-planting programs, deforestation constituted a long-term environmental shock because it takes years for the land to fully recover (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2018). What is more, the felling of trees resulted in soil erosion along with the depletion and pollution of water resources (Berry 2008). On the other hand, deforestation was believed to be a problem amongst the local population even prior to the influx of refugees, and their arrival may have led some host households to recognize the value of conservation and better environmental practices including the replanting of trees (Whitaker 1999).

Interestingly, these environmental consequences are argued to have had noticeable gender-based implications. Whitaker (1999) emphasizes how women tended to suffer more from environmental degradation because of their traditional roles in collecting firewood or water. The distance required to travel for such resources after the arrival of refugees meant they had less time and energy to dedicate to other areas

of the household. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) follow-up on this gender-based dynamic and corroborate that women were less likely to engage in outside employment because of more time spent on household chores including fetching water and collecting firewood.

With respect for health outcomes, a number of case studies have hypothesized that a refugee population may lead to an outbreak in disease even though only a relatively few studies have attempted to answer this question empirically. Baez (2011), for instance, looks at the same area in western Tanzania to examine the short- and long-run effects of the refugee influx on host children. The study finds adverse impacts in terms of a higher incidence of infectious disease as well as higher mortality rates for children under five. Alternatively, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007) take a macro-perspective and look at the influence of forced migration on the spread of malaria in refugee-receiving countries. They find that the size of a refugee population from a tropical country with civil war is reflected in the number of cases of malaria in host country. While they stop short of blaming the refugees themselves, they argue that dislocation plays a part in the spread of the disease and efforts to reduce civil wars and control their causes can help moderate the transmission of malaria.

5.6 Discussion

While in no way exhaustive, the scope of the empirical evidence highlighted in this chapter reveals an underlying encouraging message. Contrary to common rhetoric, refugees need not necessarily be a burden to host communities and on the whole can be an asset that leads to positive local change and development. However, any potentially beneficial impacts are not automatic and necessitate supporting policies and programs tailored to the local environment that encourage positive interaction between refugees and hosts. As an example, local partners might help promote the unique skills refugees bring to a host community and create relationships between refugees and local businesses, or support awareness raising of the new forms of assistance made available to the host community. Just the same, any potentially detrimental effects can be mitigated through smartly designed policies that take into consideration the various sub-groups within the local population affected by the influx and presence of refugees in different ways. For instance, targeted social assistance towards vulnerable parts of the host community would help minimize potentially negative impacts related to price changes for local goods and services, as would interventions focused on upgrading the skills of those local workers more likely to be displaced by newly arrived refugees.

Given the current reality of displacement worldwide, there is a widespread eagerness to come up with new, innovative solutions to refugee-hosting situations. Much of the discussion centers around integrating development and humanitarian approaches in order to promote refugees' livelihoods and self-reliance, and expand targeted support to host populations. It seems clear from the literature reviewed in

this chapter that refugees are most likely to benefit host communities when they are provided basic liberties like freedom of movement, the ability to work, access to land and access to social services like education and health. On the part of national governments, relaxing laws that ensure these essential rights is a means to make refugees less dependent on assistance and stimulate positive interaction between refugee and host populations. A handful of countries stand out in this regard including notably Uganda, and recent examples of jobs compacts in Jordan and Ethiopia support such measures in exchange for preferential agreements from donors and the international community at large. Nonetheless, the vulnerable nature of refugee households means that many are still likely to necessitate some form support on a routine basis. On this, there has been a general shift from in-kind to cash assistance in certain refugee-hosting settings where local markets are sufficiently robust. How these and other new initiatives influence host communities, however, is not entirely clear and necessitates greater attention from academic scholarship.

Therefore, any future research agenda needs to address not just the impact of refugee inflows themselves on host communities, but also the consequences of policies and programs in refugee-hosting settings on host communities. The impact of cash assistance in refugee contexts, for example, has been discussed only sparingly (see Doocy and Tappis 2017) and more often than not the focus is on refugee households alone. Likewise, if new schemes like job compacts, skills training or targeted social assistance aim to support host community households, it is essential to include in the budgets funding for rigorous impact analysis on that specific population. To date, much of the discussion relies on qualitative evidence which although provides valuable insight, fails to generate robust estimates needed to better understand the direct and indirect consequences for refugee and host community households alike.

Indeed, a major limitation in making progress on this subject is the availability of high-quality information in order to be able to produce empirically grounded findings. Gathering data in refugee-hosting settings is usually costly given the often difficult situations, yet an increase in resources for purposively designed surveys would give researchers more opportunities to document the dynamics of displacement. Methodological challenges related to endogeneity (i.e. reverse causality or selection-related biases) also make teasing out causal estimates a non-trivial task. However recent innovative research designs and methodological approaches are beginning to yield more credible results across a wider range of settings. Lastly, it is apparent from the reviewed studies in this chapter that the majority of work to date focuses on a handful of cases including notably Tanzania, Kenya and Turkey, among a few others. Going forward, it will be essential to produce more generalizable insight from a wider variety of refugee-hosting contexts.

Looking past the data and methodological limitations, there are also a number of topics that warrant further investigation outside the range of issues highlighted in this review. From a political perspective, it is not difficult to imagine the influx of an outside group triggering changes to local organizing behavior or even voting for local public officials. Alternatively, while the social and health impacts of being displaced rightly have been given more importance as of late, host community

members are often overlooked with respect to trauma, stress, anxiety and the like. To make progress on these and surely countless other relevant matters in refugee-hosting settings will require interdisciplinary collaboration amongst researchers with diverse portfolios of experience and insight to bring to the table.

At the end of the day, building the knowledge base on displacement and the impacts refugees have on host communities is only of value if findings inform policymakers and practitioners working with these populations. Such an objective is all the more important considering the general consensus that traditional responses are currently failing to address the complexity of the challenges many countries now face. As a result, new approaches are required that promote social inclusion, self-reliance and the general socio-economic well-being of both refugee and host community households. Innovative schemes are also needed that help improve the financing of refugee-hosting nations and more generally facilitate burden-sharing among countries. Above all, new initiatives must strive to take an evidence-based, human-centered approach that supports displaced and host communities to not only survive, but to advance their lives as they so desire.

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Chapter 6
The Impact of Migration on Development in Developing Countries: A Review of the Empirical Literature

Lisa Andersson and Melissa Siegel

6.1 Introduction

The migration-development nexus is not a new topic and has been studied for many decades. The debate about the development impacts of migration in countries of origin has, however, gone through different phases from more optimistic views to more pessimistic views while the reality is something more nuanced (de Haas 2012).

Perhaps the most direct link between migration and development is remittances. Remittances have not only grown steadily over time, but these inflows have displayed much more stability than other private capital inflows and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). The development potential of money sent home by migrants has been extensively highlighted in the literature, with many studies pointing towards a positive effect on economic and social development. However, there are not only benefits but also costs to migration, for migrants themselves as well as their family members and the migrant communities. The costs can take on various forms, from mental health issues due to separation to additional work that has to be taken on when household members emigrate.

In the past decade, focus has also turned beyond remittances to consider a broader range of development processes, such as human capital investments, diaspora networks and transfers of more than money, such as technological developments, cultural norms and political ideas (Clemens et al. 2014).

The growing interest in the impact of migration on development has generated a large empirical literature. However, there is a lack of comprehensive literature reviews that provide an overview of the scope and evidence on the matter. The aim of this chapter is to bring together the empirical evidence on migration and development drawing on findings from quantitative studies from multiple research

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disciplines using a broad definition of both development and migration. By looking at different development aspects and outcomes, the chapter provides a general overview of the various effects of migration on development in developing countries, establishing what have been concluded so far, what is still inconclusive, and where there are research gaps. The focus of this chapter is how international migration affects development in the Global South, and more specifically in countries (places) of migrant origin. While migration most definitely also affects growth and development in developed (often destination) countries, this is outside of the scope of this particular chapter.

In this chapter, we take a wide view of migration (both voluntary and forced) as well as a holistic encompassing view of development (looking at different dimensions of development). We focus on four key development areas: economic, social, institutional and environmental. These effects can display themselves at the individual or household (micro), community (meso) and country (macro) level.

The chapter continues by first defining key concepts and the methodological approach. It then goes on to review the evidence on the impact of migration on the four development areas previously specified. Section 6.3 looks at the impact of migration on economic development. Section 6.4 covers the impact of migration on social development. Section 6.5 reviews institutional and political development impacts, and Sect. 6.6 investigates the impact of migration on environmental development. Finally, Sect. 6.7 provides a discussion on the findings of the review and implications for future research.

6.2 Key Concepts and Methodological Approach

This section begins with a discussion of the different forms of migration and their potential impact on development. It then goes on to define development and the multidimensional approach used in the chapter. The second half of this section then presents the methodology, search strategy and the sample of studies before and after the inclusion/exclusion criteria have been applied.

6.2.1 Different Aspects of Migration

Migration can affect development not only through the direct effect of people leaving their country, but also through remittances (economic and social), return migration and diaspora engagement. Migration may be long-term/permanent or short-term/temporary. Migration can take place for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to factors related to finding employment (better or more interesting jobs), education, family reunification, retirement, life-style, environment, war, conflict and persecution. Migrants may be young or old, male or female and come from a range of backgrounds, skills levels, religions and ethnicities. This chapter considers

development effects of migration through many different channels including but not limited to the absence or return of a household member, additional resources in the household and new information. The focus is on the emigration of people from low- and middle-income countries and the effects of this migration.

6.2.2 *Different Aspects of Development*

A significant part of the empirical migration literature is concerned with the impact of migration on various economic development outcomes, such as growth, poverty, employment, wages and productivity. In this chapter, we expand the definition of development and consider the impact of migration on a broad range of outcomes that in different ways contribute to development. Development is defined as the process of improving the overall quality of life of any given group of people, and the review considers four key development dimensions: economic, social, institutional or environmental. In Table 6.1 we describe in more detail the different aspects under each dimension. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of possible development effects but rather to provide an overview of the possible outcome variables represented in the broader literature on the topic.

Table 6.1 Potential migration development outcomes, by development aspect

Economic	*Social*
Growth	Health
Poverty	Education
Inequality	Social protection
Investment	Social cohesion
Consumption	Gender equality/roles
Savings	Well-being
Assets	Happiness
Employment	Satisfaction
Wages/income	
Entrepreneurship	
Trade	
FDI	
Institutional	*Environmental*
Corruption	Urbanisation
Political participation	Water and sanitation
Knowledge transfers	Energy
Networks (scientific, Professional)	Climate change adaptation and resilience
Democratization	

6.2.3 Methodological Approach

A systematic literature search across a large set of databases was performed using Litoscope. The search was based on a number of inclusion criteria including published papers in English dating from 1990 and onwards that analyse the impact of migration on development. As discussed in the previous section, both migration and development were defined in a broad sense. The focus was on papers published in peer reviewed journals, other published work, such as working papers, book chapters and dissertations, were therefore excluded. In the first selection round, over 2000 papers were identified and registered, covering research from numerous disciplines (e.g. social science, natural science, medicine) and topics. The list was first narrowed down based on an initial review of all titles and abstracts, which revealed some titles related to a different topic (e.g. bird migration) and papers covering developed countries, which were not part of the inclusion criteria. This process narrowed down the number of papers to 432. These studies were more closely analysed and coded according to the type of development outcome, their regional coverage and the methodologies used, keeping only papers with a focus on the Global South (either studies of one single country, or studies covering a larger set of countries from one or several regions in the Global South), using a quantitative methodology with rigorous ways of measuring development impacts. The search strategy was finally complemented by an additional search with the help of key words directly related to the development outcomes, and a final selection of 114 empirical papers were included in the review in this chapter.[1] The final sample of papers represented studies undertaken in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (and in some exceptional cases Easter Europe),[2] published in journals spanning various disciplines such as economics, human geography, medicine, migration studies, political science, psychology and sociology.

6.3 The Impact of Migration on Economic Development

Migration and remittances can affect economic development at different levels. At the macrolevel, migration and remittance flows can have a direct impact on key economic variables such as growth, productivity, financial sector development, poverty levels and inequality. Migration also affects economic development through microlevel effects on for example labor supply, employment and entrepreneurship.

[1]These 114 papers are by no means an exhaustive list of all papers on the development impacts of migration in Global South, but provides a good overview of the main channels and outcomes discuss in this chapter.

[2]Countries in Eastern Europe where included when the topic was judged of particular importance, or when included in a cross-regional perspective comparing development impacts of migration across regions.

This section reviews both macro- and micro-level evidence of the effects of migration on economic development.

6.3.1 *Impacts on Growth and Other Macroeconomic Outcomes*

A growing empirical literature show that remittances boost growth and other macroeconomic impacts. Remittances have shown to have positive effects on growth in studies covering a large set of developing countries (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009), and in studies covering particular geographical areas such as North Africa (Zghidi et al. 2018), Latin America and the Caribbean (Mundaca 2009), South Asia (Cooray 2012) as well as individual countries such as Pakistan (Shahbaz et al. 2014), Kyrgyzstan (Kumar et al. 2018), and Ecuador (Pontarollo and Muñoz 2018). A study comparing the growth impact of remittances across regions found the largest effect in Eastern European economies, followed by Americas and Asia but no effect on African economies (Cruz Zuniga 2011).

Studies have also highlighted several factors that can enhance, or impede, the growth impacts of remittances. In some studies, remittances are shown to have a stronger influence on growth in a context where the financial sector is less developed and remittances can help overcome credit constraints and stimulate investments (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Konte 2018), while other studies have shown that remittances are more likely to boost growth where financial services are available (Mundaca 2009). Furthermore, remittances tend to have a stronger influence on growth in countries with higher economic freedom (Zghidi et al. 2018), with sound policies and institutions (measured through indicators of corruption and political risk) (Catrinescu et al. 2009), with more social capital (Borja 2014), and higher levels of skilled human capital (Cooray et al. 2016). The remittance growth impact may on the other hand be sensitive to negative shocks such as climate variability: a study for West Africa showed no positive effect of remittances on growth in times of drought (Couharde and Generoso 2015).

Studies have further shown that remittances indirectly affect growth by reducing output growth volatility and macroeconomic risk, which boost the growth-enhancing direct effect of remittances (Bugamelli and Paternò 2011; Issahaku et al. 2016).

However, there are also factors that may lead to no or even negative impacts of remittances on growth. The inflow of remittances may cause a real appreciation of the exchange rate, so called "Dutch Disease", which could decrease export performance and limit output and employment. It has also been argued that remittances can cause moral hazard problems that reduces the work efforts of household members receiving remittances. Some empirical studies have given support to the former concern in Latin America (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004), while a cross-country study including 113 countries shows that remittances are countercyclical and negatively associated with GDP growth (Chami et al. 2005). A study of remittances in

Bangladesh found a U-shaped relationship between remittances and growth, where remittance effects initially hampered growth, but were shown to have a positive effect in the longer-run (Hassan et al. 2016).

While most of the empirical literature has looked at the link between remittances and growth, a few studies also investigate the link between migration *per se* and growth. Two studies investigating the impact of migration on per capita income in Africa found either no effect (Coulibaly et al. 2018), or a negative effect of migration rates on economic growth (Akanbi 2017).

6.3.2 Impacts on Poverty and Inequality

Migration may also affect poverty and inequality, which in turn can have implications for development. In theory, the effect on inequality will depend on several factors. If migrants are negatively selected, and the remittances they send home are spent on investments, remittances can have a reducing effect on both poverty and inequality. However, if remittances are spent on consumption rather than investment, there is a risk that poorer households become remittance dependent and remittances have an adverse effect on poverty and income equality. On the other hand, if migrants are positively selected, remittances will be directed towards high-income households and lead to increasing inequalities (and either positive or negative effects on poverty). The empirical evidence, using both macro- and micro-level data, in general tends to find a reduction in poverty levels from remittances (Acosta et al. 2008; Bang et al. 2016; Vacaflores 2018) while the evidence on distributional impacts are less conclusive. Existing evidence shows both decreasing inequality (Acosta et al. 2008; Garip 2014; Vacaflores 2018) and increasing inequality (Barham and Boucher 1998; Stark et al. 1988) following remittances.

6.3.3 Impacts on Savings, Investments and Financial Sector Development

Remittances can help households smoothing their consumption and overcome financial constraints, and allow them to make productive investments, especially in contexts with limited access to credit and underdeveloped financial markets. However, it has often been argued that households spend remittances on daily consumption rather than making long-term investments in productive assets and activities.

The empirical evidence is somewhat mixed. Several studies from different countries, such as Guatemala, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines and Tajikistan, have shown that households use the remittances for investments in productive assets such

as land, non-land assets and business investments[3,4] (Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Buckley and Hofmann 2012; Carvajal Gutiérrez and Johnson 2016; de Haas 2006; Quisumbing and McNiven 2010; Taylor 1992; Yang 2008). Other studies show that remittances tend to be used primarily for consumption goods and satisfying daily needs (Chami et al. 2005; Fransen and Mazzucato 2014; Koc and Onan 2004). However, investments in consumption goods may still contribute to development and growth through an increase in demand for goods and services which generates in increase in production and employment (Durand et al. 1996). Remittances have also been shown to increase savings in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baldé 2011) and the possession of saving accounts in Mexico (Ambrosius and Cuecuecha 2016).

More recently, researchers have investigated the link between remittances and financial sector development. Two views emerge regarding the impact of remittances on access and use of financial services. Remittances can act as a catalyst for financial development by creating a demand for financial services. Migrants may also transfer knowledge about financial products along with the remittances. On the other hand, remittances can act as a substitute for credit and make up for the barriers to formal financial systems faced by many households in developing countries. Studies show that migration and remittances support financial development both at cross-country level using a sample of 113 countries in the Global South (Aggarwal et al. 2011), at regional level using a sample of Sub-Saharan countries (Gupta et al. 2009), and at national level in Mexico (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011). However, there is also evidence that remittances have an adverse effect on financial development, a cross-country study found a negative relationship between remittances and financial deepening (Brown et al. 2013).

6.3.4 Impacts on Labor, Entrepreneurship and Employment Outcomes

Migration and remittances can influence labor supply and employment outcomes of both remaining members and migrants who decide to return to their origin countries. The emigration of a household member, and subsequent remittances, may affect the labor supply of other members of the household, but the direction is not clear.

In general, migration and remittances have found to negatively influence female labor supply, while the evidence for men is more mixed. Studies from Mexico and Nicaragua found reduced labor supply for women, while the labor supply patterns of men showed to either shift from formal to informal work (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006), from wage employment to self-employment (Vadean et al. 2019) or to increased self-employment (Funkhouser 1992). A study from the Philippines found

[3]The impact of (return) migration on business development and entrepreneurship will be further discussed in the next section.

[4]It should be noted that what is defined as 'productive investments' varies across studies.

a decrease in both male and female labor supply from temporary migration, with a stronger negative impact for men (Rodriguez and Tiongson 2001). A study from Nepal showed a reduction in female labor supply from male migration (Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009). However, empirical evidence at aggregate level paints a different picture. Contrary to a decrease in labor supply, a study covering more than sixty developing countries shows that remittances increase aggregate labor supply, driven by an increase in male labor supply (Posso 2012). The author suggests three potential explanations for this increase: migrant household members need to increase their labor supply to defray the costs of migration; households without migrants in the community increase their labor supply to obtain funds to finance migration; and remittances overcome credit constraints and generate employment opportunities in the community.

When it comes to return migrants, evidence shows that well educated return migrants in Uganda are more likely to be employed than their peers who never emigrated (Thomas 2008), that past migration experience increases the likelihood of upward occupational mobility in Albania (Carletto and Kilic 2009), and that migration experience result in a wage premium in Egypt (Wahba 2015). Forced return migration, without time to plan the return back to the origin country, is however negative for labor market outcomes and makes migrants vulnerable on the labor market in the origin country, as shown by a study from the Maghreb (David 2017). Several studies have also shown that return migration spurs entrepreneurship and investments in businesses (Batista et al. 2017; McCormick and Wahba 2001; Piracha and Vadean 2010; Wahba and Zenou 2012). This effect is not only the result of accumulated savings, but can also stem from informal human capital transfers of new skills acquired abroad that facilitate business creation upon return, as shown by a study from Mexico (Maria Hagan and Wassink 2016). Furthermore, business creation by return migration has shown to positively affect employment and earnings of non-migrants in Albania (Hausmann and Nedelkoska 2018). However, a study from Senegal found that the higher rate of self-employment among return migrants was not necessarily associated with a choice but rather a necessity (Mezger Kveder and Flahaux 2013), and evidence from Mexico show that migrants are more likely to start informal businesses rather than formal ones (Sheehan and Riosmena 2013).

6.4 The Impact of Migration on Social Development

Besides economic impacts of migration, the effect on social development is an important part of the migration-development empirical literature. It is sometimes hard to distinguish social effects from economic ones since they are often interlinked and many outcomes simultaneously influence both social and economic aspects of development. For example, improvements in education and health could have important implications for both the economic and social development in a country. In this chapter social development outcomes are defined as measures related to

education, health, fertility, subjective well-being, decision power and social protection. The impacts of migration on these outcomes are discussed below.

6.4.1 Impacts on Education

Migration and remittances can affect education through multiple channels. One important channel is the ability of remittances to loosen household's budget constraints and allow households to spend more on education. Another strand of literature has addressed the impact of migration on educational incentives for those left behind.

Migration and remittances can both play a role for children's school enrolment and outcomes, but potentially in different directions. Existing empirical literature has shown that remittances tend to encourage household investment in education (Edwards and Ureta 2003; Yang 2008). However, the impact may not always be gender neutral. A study from Nepal found that the increase in educational spending from remittances was disproportionally spent on education of boys, while a positive effect for girls was only found in higher-income households (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009).

Studies do not generally separate the effect of migration from that of remittances. However, a study using household data from Haiti showed that while remittances positively influenced education outcomes, as expected, an absent household head did not have any influence on children's schooling (Bredl 2011).

Migration of parents may cause an education lag among left-behind children, as they may suffer from psychosocial issues. However, a study looking at children with absent parents in Tajikistan found that having a migrant parent actually reduces the risk of an educational lag, especially for girls with a migrant mother. This effect is extra pronounced if the migration is short-term and if the migrant sends remittances. For boys, legal status of the parents who migrated and maternal migration have a positive impact on their education (Cebotari 2018).

Migration may also affect the incentives to attain education. If the returns on education when migrating are high, the prospect of future migration can raise the expected returns to education and lead to increased educational attainment in the country of origin (so called "brain gain"). However, in a setting where returns to education are higher in the origin country and migrants face barriers to more high skilled jobs in the host country labor market, this incentive effect may go in the opposite direction. A study from Mexico, a country with high- and low-skilled migrants, show that children in migrant households have a lower probability of completing high school (McKenzie and Rapoport 2011).

Another strand of the migration-education literature has investigated the impacts of emigration of the most highly skilled, often called "brain drain". The discussion on brain drain has largely been focused on the negative implications of the departure of the well-educated for the origin country in the form of poverty traps and stagnating economic growth. However, the effect of migration on human capital

accumulation in migrant origin countries is complex, and the emigration of the highly skilled have also shown to have beneficial effects on human capital accumulation, productivity and equality (Mountford 1997). The empirical literature on the "beneficial brain drain" or "brain gain" have shown that high-skilled migration can increase educational attainment if the returns to education are high abroad (Beine et al. 2001).

Furthermore, return migration of the highly skilled can generate positive effects in terms of knowledge transfers. The impact of migration on technological and scientific transfers is further discussed in Sect. 6.5.

However, other research highlights negative implications of the migration of the highly skilled, especially when it comes to medical brain drain (Bhargava and Docquier 2008; Chauvet et al. 2013). Evidence also shows that while some countries are benefiting in terms of increased human capital formation from highly skilled migration, others are not (Beine et al. 2008). Studies have also shown that highly skilled migrants tend to send less remittances (Faini 2007).

6.4.2 Impacts on Health

Migration and remittances can have both direct and indirect effects on health spending, outcomes and practices. First, migration can reduce household budget constraints and allow households to invest in health of the family members left behind in the origin country. Remittances have been found to increase household health expenditures in Mexico (Airola 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2011) and Ecuador (Ponce et al. 2011), as well as on a broader scale analysing data for 122 developing countries (Azizi 2018).

The results are more ambiguous when it comes to impacts on child health. While remittances have shown to reduce child mortality in a large set of developing countries (Chauvet et al. 2013), migration has at the same time also been shown to have a negative influence on child survival in the short term in Mexico (Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999), although the effect diminishes over time and is also counterbalanced by a positive influence on child survival from remittances. Furthermore, studies on the effects on anthropometric measurements show that migration has positive effects on length/height-for-age measures, but no impact on stature of children in migrant households in Guatemala (Davis and Brazil 2016). Migration can also act as an insurance to mitigate risks during crises, such as food price crises, and smooth the negative influence on anthropometric measures among children (de Brauw 2011). Community remittances and return migration have been shown to be associated with a lower risk of low birthweight but an increase in the risk of macrosomia (i.e. heavy birthweight) in Mexico. The opposite was however found for out-migration, which was linked to higher risk of low birthweight and lower risk of macrosomia. Finally, the positive influence of remittances on child mortality found by Chauvet et al. (2013) was partly counterbalanced by a negative effect of medical brain drain (emigration of physicians) on child mortality.

Other studies have looked particularly at the impact of parental migration on child health and psychosocial wellbeing. Results show that parental migration can have a negative influence on children's health, especially for children with parents who are divorced or separated in Ghana and Nigeria (Cebotari et al. 2017). Surprisingly, the migration of mothers in Nicaragua was shown to have a positive influence on child cognitive development (Macours and Vakis 2010), which may be explained by income and empowerment gains resulting from the migration of mothers.

Migration may also affect health outcomes, practices and behaviour of both migrants themselves (while abroad and upon return) and their families in the origin country. Migration has shown to reduce underweight of remaining household members in Indonesia (Lu 2013). On the other hand, there is evidence that migration may negatively affect diet habits and increase overweight (Lu 2013; Zezza et al. 2011) and the prevalence of heart disease, emotional/psychiatric disorders, obesity and smoking (Ullmann et al. 2011). Migration experience have also shown to increase the risk for anxiety and depressive symptoms (Familiar et al. 2011) and the drug and alcohol use among return migrants in Mexico (Borges et al. 2011). Migration of family members has been shown to lead to an increase in mental health disorders among family members left behind in Sri Lanka (Siriwardhana et al. 2015). On a positive note, migration experience has shown to increase knowledge of contraceptive methods among women in migrant households in Afghanistan, but the information transmission is dependent on the destination country context (Roosen and Siegel 2018).

6.4.3 Impacts on Gender and Decision-Making Power

Migration can affect gender norms, relations and behaviours among migrants and their family members in the host country. A study from Georgia distinguishes two types of effects: *migrant absence* and *migrant experience* effects. The former takes place when the migrant is still abroad and household tasks need to be reorganised among the family members left in the origin country, while the latter is focusing on effects that take place once the migrant has returned. The study finds that both types of effects can affect gender divisions of housework and leisure, but the link is not straightforward and affected by the gender of the migrant. Female migration seems to have a more favourable effect on gender differences in housework and leisure (Torosyan et al. 2016).

It has also been shown that the migration of men is positively associated with women's autonomy, and this effect can remain even after the return of the man (Yabiku et al. 2010). On the other hand, evidence from Burundi points to women being less likely than men to perceive that migration has improved their social status or given them more decision-making power (Ruiz et al. 2015).

6.5 The Impact of Migration on Institutional and Political Development

Migration can affect institutional and political development in the migrant origin country through multiple channels. The effect is largely dependent on the characteristics and the experiences of the migrants. The papers reviewed in this section are mainly looking at the influence on two main outcomes related to institutional and political development: institutional reform and democracy as well as technology and scientific knowledge diffusion.

6.5.1 Impacts on Institutional Reform and Democracy

The empirical literature on the links between migration and institutions is rapidly growing. There are in general three main strands of empirical literature in this field: studies looking at the impacts of institutions on migration decisions; the effect of migration on institutional reform; and the impact of migration on (social and informal) institutions in the host countries (Baudassé et al. 2018). This section gives an overview of the literature in the second category.

There could be multiple channels explaining how and why migration affects institutions and democracy in the migrant origin country. First of all, migrants may be inspired by observing a positive link between the level of institutional development and wellbeing in countries of destination, and wanting to influence institutions in the origin country while still in the destination country or upon return. Migrants may also want to improve institutions to secure the wellbeing for their family members left behind, and to improve the prospect of for example entrepreneurship or other types of investments upon return (Baudassé et al. 2018).

The empirical evidence on the impact of migration on institutional and political development is mixed. A large cross-country study has shown that skilled migration can lead to improved institutional quality (Li et al. 2017) and increase democracy levels (Spilimbergo 2009). In another cross-country study, Beine and Sekkat (2013) did not find any effect of low-skilled migration on institutional quality.

Some studies have specifically investigated election outcomes. A study from Mexico found that remittances seem to be negatively related to voter turnout rates in municipalities. However, the negative relationship was decreasing with a higher rate of return migrants in the municipality (García 2017). The increase in political participation stemming from return migration is supported by another study from Mexico that found that return migration positively influence electoral participation (Waddell 2015) and a study from Mali showing that voter turnup and electoral competitiveness increases with size of the stock of return migrants, particularly for return migration from countries outside Africa (Chauvet and Mercier 2014). The effect was shown to be larger in areas with a less educated population, which can be

interpreted as evidence that return migration diffuses political norms to the community members in the origin country (Ibid.).

Furthermore, migration can also influence political development through political leaders with migration experience. A study that investigated the correlation between political leaders with experience of studying abroad found a positive relationship between the country's democracy score and studies abroad, especially when it comes to student migration to high income OECD countries (Mercier 2016). Additionally, Batista and Vicente (2011) show that return migration increases the demand for political accountability in Cape Verde.

Finally, also remittances may play a role in institutional and political development, the direction of the effect is however not clear. Studies for Mexico have shown that remittances can reduce corruption and make policymakers more accountable (Tyburski 2012), and promote democratic consolidation and decentralisation of political decision-making (Waddell 2015). However, the latter study also showed a risk that collective remittance programmes can be used for political lobbying by policy makers. A study from Sub-Saharan Africa found that remittances positively affect democratic institutions through effects on schooling and poverty (Williams 2017).

6.5.2 Impacts on Technological Development and Knowledge Diffusion

Another channel through which migration can affect political and institutional development is through effects on technology and knowledge diffusion. Migration can bring back valuable technology and scientific knowledge to the country of origin, and help develop national scientific knowledge institutions and innovation.

Empirical evidence from China shows that both internal and international migration lead to rural technology diffusion, but that internal migration seems to play a more important role for such diffusion than international migration. However, the results also show that migration negatively affect household mobile phone ownership ("technology drain") (Hübler 2016). Other evidence shows that return migration can lead to more patent applications, and return migrants can act as a bridge for knowledge transfers between headquarters and employees working in other countries (Choudhury 2015). Furthermore, migration can bring back ideas and knowledge related to organisational practices from the host country (Dan Wang 2015). Hometown associations and return migrants have shown to transfer organisational practises from the United States to Bolivia (Strunk 2013).

Finally, migration can influence development through scientific networks and knowledge transfers by highly skilled migrants. Current migrants have proven to produce more research than their peers who never migrated, but also more than those who emigrated but returned to the origin country. Return migrants have shown to be a main source of research knowledge transfers between international and local

researchers (Gibson and McKenzie 2014), and emigration and return of researchers positively affect their collaboration and research output upon return (Jonkers and Cruz-Castro 2013; Velema 2012). International migration of researchers can hence strengthen research systems and outputs in the origin country and stimulate international scientific cooperation.

6.6 The Impact of Migration on Environmental Development

The empirical literature linking migration and the environment has so far mainly focused on the impact of natural disasters and climate change on migration decisions and flows. However, a small but growing literature is also concerned with the effect that migration can have on environmental development and resilience. The existing literature is however relatively focused on theoretical linkages and small-scale case studies, while empirical evidence from large-scale surveys is still scarce.

How countries and communities are affected by climate change and natural disasters depends on their vulnerability and ability to adapt. Low diversity of income-generating activities in areas that are exposed to natural disasters and climate change increases households' vulnerability to climate change, environmental stresses and market failure. Migration can in these circumstances both be a coping strategy and facilitate adaptation (Scheffran et al. 2012). From a theoretical point of view, migration reduces population pressure, facilitates risk reduction and removes constraints related to scarce resources and can thereby help households and communities cope with environmental stress. Furthermore, migrants can bring new resources, networks, technology and knowledge that help build capacity. At the same time, the loss of human capital, income and knowledge as a result of migration can negatively affect adaptive capacity and resilience. Remittances and return migration can also contribute positively to improved resilience through resources, knowledge and networks. Technology transmission, as discussed in the previous section, can support a more efficient use of resources, the introduction of new natural resources and crops, and sustainable energy supply. These different channels have been discussed in theory (Qin and Flint 2012; Scheffran et al. 2012), while the empirical evidence is scarce.

Agriculture practices are closely linked with environmental outcomes and development. A transformation of agricultural practices and land use due to financial resources or knowledge acquired abroad can promote sustainable livelihoods through for example changes in land use. However, a case study investigating the nexus between the environment, rural livelihoods and labor migration found that the use of remittances to buy livestock combined with current pasture practices risk leading to environmental degradation (Sagynbekova 2017).

Migration can indirectly affect environmental development through impacts on the choice and use of fuels. Collecting and burning firewood have potential negative

environmental consequences through deforestation, depletion of local resources and increased Co2 emissions. Migration to the United States has proven to decrease households' reliance on firewood collection in favour of stove and gas purchases in Mexico. These findings have potentially far-reaching environmental implications as labor moves off the farm (Manning and Taylor 2014).

Migration has also shown to have various effects on resilience in coastal Vietnam. Remittances can on the one hand enhance resilience though risk diversification and investment in human and physical capital. On the other hand, remittances may increase inequality, limit access to resources and erode social resilience, which in turn implies greater risk of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation. The authors note that migration occurs alongside the expansion of unsustainable coastal aquaculture (Adger et al. 2002).

6.7 Discussion and Implications for Future Research

This chapter has reviewed a large amount of empirical evidence on the migration-development nexus, spanning multiple scientific disciplines and channels through which migration can affect different aspects of development.

The evidence shows that migration, though emigration, remittances and return migration, can have both positive and negative direct and indirect impacts on development.

The evidence related to economic and social development is relatively large, but not entirely conclusive. While remittances sometimes are assumed to mainly affect household consumption and have limited influence on long-term growth, a growing empirical evidence base shows that remittances indeed have the potential to stimulate economic growth. Evidence also points to rather unambiguous positive impacts at household level when it comes to investments in human capital such as education and health.

Much less evidence is available for effects on institutional and environmental development. The empirical literature on the impact of migration on institutions is small but growing. The evidence concerned with effects on environmental development is even more scarce, and builds mainly on small-scale, case studies. There is thus a need to develop better methodologies and more large-scale, cross-country empirical evidence on this topic to be able to draw more firm conclusions, especially when it comes to environmental development where migration can play an important role in facilitating coping and adaptation strategies.

The overview has also shown that although migration is beneficial for development in many ways, it also implies costs. Most striking is perhaps the negative health outcomes for migrants and their families in terms of increased prevalence of mental disorders and substance abuse. The evidence also highlights the complex relationship between migration and development, where findings often are context-specific, and where different aspects of migration (emigration, remittances and return migration) may have opposite impacts on development. Another striking feature in this

review is the concentration of papers to certain regional or country contexts. While some countries are very well studied, others have been overlooked. This highlights the importance for future research to sufficiently disaggregate the analysis of the migration-development nexus by migration outcome, and make sure that the evidence has a broad geographical coverage.

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Part II
Governance of Migration in the Global South

Chapter 7
Four Generations of Regional Policies for the (Free) Movement of Persons in South America (1977–2016)

Leiza Brumat

7.1 Introduction

In the last two decades, South America created a regional regime for human mobility that is regarded as the most developed one after the EU (Acosta 2018; Geddes et al. 2019; Lavenex 2019). This regime is characterized by equal social and economic rights and working conditions, non-criminalization of migration, the enunciation of the 'right to migrate', and the right to reside in other Member States. In the last two decades, South America has also become an important regional actor in migration-related international forums, as it sustains and promotes very unique positions. During the negotiations for the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), for example, it called for the global recognition of the 'right to migrate', for the universality of migrants' rights and, instead of expulsions, for migrant regularization as a solution to irregularity. These positions are in sharp contrast with the ones sustained in Europe and the US and challenge the assumption that there is a trade-off between openness to migration and rights (Ruhs 2013) and the 'need to fight against irregular migration' that prevails in Europe and in the US (Acosta and Geddes 2014). It is also the only region whose Regional Consultative Process (RCP) do not focus on security issues (Lavenex 2019).

Despite these important advances and the ground-breaking positions that this region sustains at the global level, South America remains understudied in governance, Regional Integration (RI) and migration studies, particularly in the English-

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language literature. Moreover, most of the regional achievements are largely unnoticed by the literature on the Free Movement of Persons (FM), which is mainly centered on the case of the EU.

The two main RI processes in South America are the Andean Community[1] (CAN, for its initials in Spanish) and the South American Common Market[2] (Mercosur, for its initials in Spanish). Despite the varied institutional configuration of these two Regional Organizations (ROs), I will argue that the human mobility agenda in ROs tends to follow 'generations' of policies.

My argument is that the 'first generation' of policies for the mobility of persons started with the creation of the CAN. It was centered on labor mobility and it was selective, as it facilitated the movement of the most qualified workers. The 'second generation' (1991–2001) was highly technical and viewed intra-regional migration only from an economic perspective. During the 'third generation' of policies (2002–16), South America developed a regional mobility regime that has a strong discursive component linked to the promotion of a regional identity or 'regionality' (Van Langenhove 2011). The regime has a dual character: on one hand it expands and promotes migrants' rights while creating a right to residence and on the other hand, it improves border controls. Mercosur turned out to be the leader in proposing regional migration policies for the whole of South America by multilateralizing its Residence Agreement in the early 2010s, and by developing more far-reaching measures than the CAN. This can be explained by three factors: 1- Argentina's 'thematic' leadership. Argentina was recognized as a legitimate leader on migration issues by her regional partners, who accepted her proposals, mostly aimed at regularizing her irregular immigrant population; 2- foreign policy strategies of the leading countries (Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador) that prioritized relations with the region; 3- the ideologies of the governments in power in that moment, that had a strong focus on human rights and opposed the US and the EU's 'restrictive' policies (Brumat and Acosta 2019). Mercosur was the leading RO because Argentina, the country with most 'thematic' or 'positional' power and Brazil, the country with most aggregate power (Zartman and Rubin 2000), are part of it, and not of the CAN. I finally identify the possible emergence of a fourth generation (2015–present), where many South American governments experienced a 'conservative turn', evident in more restrictive domestic measures, views and ideas around migration that tend to praise policies of countries in the Global North. I also propose four possible scenarios for the medium and short term.

This chapter will make a contribution to the studies of regional migration governance in the Global South by explaining the development of this regional regime throughout time. I adopt a governance approach to better understand

[1]The CAN is a regional organization created by the Cartagena Agreement in 1969. Its current member states are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

[2]MERCOSUR is a regional organization created by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. The original four member states are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela joined MERCOSUR in 2012, but its membership was suspended in 2017. Bolivia joined on 17 July 2015 and the only requirement left for its full membership at the time of writing this chapter in 2018 is the final approval by Brazil's Parliament. The remaining six countries in South America are Associate States.

policymaking processes and policy change. I understand governance as a structure and as a process. As a structure, it implies "the architecture of formal and informal institutions" that regulate human mobility in a region and as a process it signifies 'the dynamics and steering functions involved in never-ending processes of policy-making', that include a wide range of actors seeking to govern and influence 'the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choices and preferences' (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 7).

This chapter draws information from more than a hundred in-depth interviews with key government actors, as well as representatives of the business sectors and unions in Mercosur and CAN that took part in the elaboration of these norms, conducted between 2012 and 2018 within and outside the framework of the MIGPROSP project. It is also based on an analysis of the regional legislation on migration as well as policy documents.

The chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I define regional policies for the movement of persons, the concept of generation, and processes of convergence. In the second section, I briefly describe the main characteristics and evolution of migration flows and stocks in South America. In the following three sections, I explain the main characteristics of each generation of regional migration policies and analyze the development of a regional regime for the movement of persons and regional policy convergence. I finally conclude and discuss the possible emergence of a 'fourth generation' of policies and propose three possible scenarios for this policy agenda for the short and medium term.

7.2 Regional Policies for the (Free) Movement of Persons

I consider that regional policies for the mobility of persons are comprised of international (bilateral and multilateral) legislation that regulate migration flows. This legislation can be either adopted by the agreement between two or more states in a specific region, or by the institutions of a specific RO.[3] The instruments and operative actions taken by the institutions of a RO aimed at executing what was established in the international regulations are also part of regional policies. The regional dimension of regional migration policies is not given by the nationality of the persons whose mobility is regulated, but by the fact that the states of the same region or a RO adopt and develop a common policy.

The instruments and operative actions include three subareas: (1) measures for the (cross-border) entry and exit of persons; (2) measures that regulate the residence of the persons in the territory; and (3) measures that affect the execution of labor activities within a specific region, for the nationals or non-nationals of the member states (Brumat 2016; Brumat and Acosta 2019). Thus, my analysis will only look at the regulations that deal with these dimensions.

[3]This means that the study of national migration policies is out of the scope of this chapter.

The human mobility agenda in ROs tends to follow 'generations' of policies. The concept of 'generation' is useful to compare regional thematic agendas, as it can better grasp their complexity and understand the 'coexistence of several kinds of regional arrangements different in quality/content, while meanwhile also acknowledging that some forms of regionalism build upon previous ones', thus avoiding the 'strict separation' of RI processes into 'chronological clusters' (Langenhove and Costea 2005, p. 2). These generations of policies, particularly in Latin America, are strongly influenced by the ideological and political context (see Dabène 2012). Generational change is determined by an alteration in 1- one or more of the three dimensions of regional policies for human mobility and 2- in the actors that take part in the negotiation, formulation, adoption and development of the policies.

The processes leading to the adoption of policies for the intra-regional movement of persons involve discursive acts and interactions in which ideas are exchanged. I consider that ideas matter, particularly in South America where 'rhetorical regionalism' (see Jenne et al. 2017) characterizes RI processes. These ideas lead to labels and categorizations that result in outputs of regional governance (Geddes and Vera Espinoza 2018). The sustained interactions and exchanges of ideas can lead to policy convergence. Convergence is 'the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances' (Kerr 1983 in Drezner 2001, p. 3). It can be either spontaneous, when a country unilaterally 'adapts itself' to other countries' policies, or it can be 'intentional', when countries voluntarily harmonize their legislation (Malamud 2011, p. 225). Migration policy convergence ('formal convergence') refers to the 'increasing commonality of the methods used to control population movements' (Pellerin 1999a, p. 996). The existence of a 'regional paymaster' that is willing to 'offer' regional integration and pay a higher cost than its partners for the adoption of regional policies (Mattli 1999) collaborates with policy convergence.

7.3 Migration Flows in South America

Latin America currently hosts 10 million immigrants in its territory and, at the same time, 38 million Latin Americans are emigrants (within or outside the region), which makes it the third sending region in the world, after Asia and Europe (United Nations 2017). But this has not always been the case: between the late 1800s and until the 1950s, some South American countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were net receiving countries of mainly European immigrants.[4] Extra-regional emigration in Latin America is a relatively recent phenomenon, but intra-regional migration is a 'classic' pattern in the region, due to its frequency and historical roots (Martínez

[4]For instance, after the 'large movements', in 1960, Argentina and Uruguay's foreign population was 12.6% and 7.2% of the total population respectively. Nowadays, they account for 4% and 2.5% of the total (Perera 2010, p. 24).

Pizarro and Villa 2005; Durand 2009). In South America in particular, mobility in border areas is one of the prevailing patterns, which is facilitated by geographical and cultural proximity and commercial exchanges (Martínez and Vono 2005; Massey et al. 2008). The prevailing migration corridors are from Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to Argentina and from Colombia and Ecuador to Venezuela.[5]

Migration flows in the region are highly dependent on the economic and political situation in the sending and receiving countries and on migrant networks (Martínez Pizarro and Villa 2005; Durand 2009). Intra-regional flows in Latin America started increasing in the 1970s: stocks went from 1,200,000 in 1970 to 2,000,000 in 1980 (Martínez Pizarro and Villa 2005).[6] In 1990, 2,200,000 intraregional migrants were registered. This small increase was due to the political instability in the 1980s. After the return to democracy, intra-regional stocks increased again, reaching 2.900.000 in the year 2000 (Martínez and Vono 2005; Martínez Pizarro and Villa 2005). The improvement of the economic situation in some countries such as Argentina, combined with a decrease in emigration to extra-regional destinations such as Spain and the USA, collaborated with the sharp increase in the intra-regional migration stocks in this decade: in 2013, 5,400,000 intra-regional migrants were registered (IOM 2015). The Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay) is the subregion where immigration increased the most and where most intra-regional mobility happens (OAS and OECD 2017).

The two main receiving countries in Latin America have traditionally been Argentina and Venezuela. In 2000, these two countries alone hosted almost two-third of intra-regional migrants (Martínez Pizarro and Villa 2005, p. 6) and in 2010, they hosted 46% (IOM 2015). This situation changed dramatically since 2015, when Venezuelans started to emigrate in very large numbers due to the deep economic, social and political crisis in their country. By the end of 2018, Venezuelan emigration had reached a stock of 3.4 million, 95% of which reside in other South American countries (UNHCR 2019).[7]

7.4 The First Generation: The Andean Pact and the "Unidimensional Migrant"

The Andean Community was part of the second wave of Latin American regionalism. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) promoted the industrialization of the Latin American economies and boosting intra-regional trade as a way of reversing underdevelopment. RI processes were seen as a

[5]Source: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-americas/%2D%2D-ro-lima/%2D%2D-ilo-mexico/documents/image/wcms_516605.pdf (visited in October 2018).

[6]For more information on the changing characteristics of Latin American intra-regional migration flows, see Massey et al. (2008) and Cerrutti and Parrado (2015).

[7]For more information on the Venezuelan situation, see Brumat (2020 forthcoming).

way of optimizing the costs of industrialization (Malamud 2010; see Granato and Perrotta 2015).

These ideas drove the making of the initial regional policies for human mobility. The first generation of regional migration policies involved only the states (mainly the Ministries of Labor and Interior) and the RO as the main policymaking actors. This generation started in 1977 with the Andean Instrument of Labor Migration (Decision 116), reformulated in 2004 with the Decision 545 (see *infra*.). It was a foundational document, as it was the first regional agreement that typified migrant categories and migration procedures. It led to an increase in the interaction between member states that resulted in the regularization of undocumented migrants (Mármora 2004). It also stated the preference for nationals of member states (Torales et al. 2003) (what is now known as 'nationality criteria'). Furthermore, it multilateralized basic rights such as non-discrimination and national treatment (art. 12), and it also guaranteed equal rights for education, housing, health and social security (art. 13).

The Instrument standardized the categories of regional workers that could enter the territory of each member state. However, the legislation prioritized qualified workers, because of the order in which those (four) categories were enumerated, as well as the restricted definition of "worker" which was limited to wage-earning jobs. It also created "Labor Migration Offices", run domestically by each ministry of labor, which were in charge of *selecting* migrant workers (art. 7.c). This is one of the main characteristics of this policy generation, which was modified in the following ones: the selectivity of migrant workers and the preference for workers in employments of higher qualifications.

The second piece of legislation was the Andean Instrument of Social Security (Decision 113), reformulated in 2004 with the Decision 583. Its first version regionalized certain rights such as equal treatment (art. 4). But as these instruments do not acknowledge the social, political and cultural dimensions of migration, or even migrants themselves, and were only focused on the economic aspects of migration, they were described as 'unidimensional' (Stang 2009).

Both instruments stopped being enforced in the mid-eighties (Martínez Pizarro and Stang 2006), during a period of crisis in the RI process due to the economic and political crisis created by the debt crisis. But due to their continuous reference to national legislation, they never turned into a 'real' regional policy (Torales et al. 2003, p. 90).

7.5 The Second Generation: Open, Uniaxial Regionalism and the Absence of the Social Dimension

The 'third wave' of Latin American regionalism was known for 'open' regionalism models that combined preferential regional commercial agreements between countries with significant asymmetries, and extra-regional openness. Open regionalism

was closely linked to the predominant neoliberal ideology, centered in commercial liberalization as the main and only end of RI, and a means for the countries to take part in a globalized economy. For this reason, they were labelled as 'uniaxial' regionalisms (Comini and Tussie 2016). They tried to attract FDI while at the same time they developed policies that were 'technical' in appearance and consequently, 'non-political'. As Perrotta (2013, translation is mine) notes, there is an 'apparent contradiction between the hiding of the political dimension and the fact that those are experiences driven by governments (they constitute real public policies)'. During the nineties, Argentina, the main receiving country and the one that made most of the proposals for regional policies for the movement of persons, prioritized relations first with the US, and then with Latin America, Europe and Japan (see Colacrai 2004; Tokatlian and Merke 2014).

7.5.1 The Andean Community During the Nineties/ Early 2000s

After the Andean Pact had a structural crisis during the eighties due to the debt crisis, its institutional configuration was reformed and made more 'flexible'.[8] Its name was changed to Andean Community (CAN). CAN's name shows a fundamental difference with Mercosur's: it aims to be a 'community' and not just a common market.

In the CAN, this second generation of regional policies responded to the neoliberal ideology that prevailed in the region and thus, was focused on 'technical' aspects of human mobility which involved, mainly, the optimization of border crossings.

The regional legislation that was adopted during this stage was the Andean Migration Card (TAM, for its initials in Spanish) in 1996 (CAN 1996, Decision 397), which seeks to improve the exchange of information about the persons that enter or exit the states' territories. In 2001 four policies were adopted: the 'Border Integration Zones' (ZIF, for its initials in Spanish) (CAN 2001a, Decision 501) and the 'Binational Centers of Attention at the Border' (CEBAF, for its initials in Spanish) (CAN 2001b, Decision 502), —both of which are policies seeking to improve the management of the movement of services, goods and persons in border areas- Decision 503 for the recognition of the national documents (CAN 2001c), and the 'Andean Passport' (CAN 2001d, Decision 504) which regulated the documentation to enter and exit the states' territories.

Decisions 503 and 504 introduced some elements that had not been present in regional legislation until that moment: Decision 503 defines the free movement of persons as a 'right' and both decisions call for the consolidation of the 'Andean

[8]This reconfiguration of the RI project was stated in the Quito Protocol, in 1987 and the institutional organization was defined in the Cartagena de Trujillo Agreement in 1996.

identity'. The call for an 'Andean identity' responds to pre-existing ideas that started to gain more importance in the early 2000s. The pre-existing idea is the one of creating, as mentioned, a 'community' and achieving Andean 'integration', something that had been present in the subregion historically and that was consolidated in the Cartagena treaty. In the early 2000s, the idea of a regional citizenship and of promoting a sense of belonging, that had already been debated in the regional institutions during the nineties, started gaining ground and was included in regional legislation (official of the government of Ecuador, interview, April fourth 2019).

7.5.2 Mercosur During the Nineties

In the first 4 years of its existence, and until the adoption of the Ouro Preto Protocol (OPP) in 1994, Mercosur's objective was to complete a Common Market (CM) and thus, to achieve the free movement of persons. For this reason, the first policies that were adopted during this time tried to facilitate the movement of persons as a way of increasing intra-regional economic exchanges. So, Mercosur's first measures were the implementation of preferential channels in airports for Mercosur citizens (CMC 1991), integrated border controls (with the so-called 'Recife Agreement') (CMC 1993a, b), and the regulation of national documents that were valid for travelling inside the area (apart from passports) (GMC 1994a, b).[9]

The OPP redefined the RI process as an imperfect customs union (CU), downgrading the end goal of the integration from CM to CU, and eliminating the free movement of persons as an objective. Consequently, migration issues were labelled as 'labor migration', which reduced the scope of regional policies in this area (Pérez Vichich 2007). The agenda was fragmented in different policy areas, and migration issues started to be treated in diverse regional institutions. The governments' priority was to 'adapt' regional migration policies to the level of the economic integration, an idea that was promoted and sustained by the Argentine government in most negotiations on social and labor issues (see Almeida Freitas 2009, p. 281). As stated by a Brazilian official: "[when] we talked about the movement of persons, there was a discourse that, well, the movement of persons is linked to the movement of the factors of production" (official of the government of Brazil, interview, 13th November 2015).

In 1996, at the same time that the CAN adopted the TAM, Mercosur created its equivalent, the Entry and Exit Card (TES, for its initials in Spanish) (GMC 1996b, c). In 1997 and 1998, two important policies that regionalized workers' rights were adopted: the Multilateral Social Security Agreement (MSSA) (CMC 1997), which created a transference mechanism for pensions and the Socio Labor

[9]Modified in 1996 through the Resolution 63/96 (GMC 1996a) was occasionally adjusted as the countries changed their national documents.

Declaration[10] (DSL, for its initials in Spanish) (Mercosur 1998). These two agreements resulted from the pressure of a new regional actor: regionally-organized worker unions[11] within regional institutions.[12] The unions' strategy was to influence decision-making in Mercosur as a way of 'securing' workers' rights at the regional level, as they had lost their influence on national governments in a neoliberal context. A high-level representative of the CCSCS explains that the Mercosur was "a platform where [we] could say what we could not say at the national level" (CCSCS high-level representative, interview, 9 September 2015).

Some of the provisions included in these agreements are related to equal rights for workers' families, non-discrimination, and national treatment. The DSL promotes the future achievement of the free movement of workers. The mechanisms established by the MSSA, as was pointed by some government officials that were interviewed, helped to reduce the bureaucratic procedures and increase dialogue between national bureaucracies of the member states, as they are basically 'obliged' to be in contact almost daily to coordinate actions (official of the government of Brazil, interview, 11th August 2015). Increased interaction led to the development of a sentiment of regional identity (Gómez-Mera 2005) and was a factor that later helped with policy convergence.

As part of the 'technical' focus of neoliberalism, Mercosur also adopted measures for rapid border-crossing procedures for residents in border areas (the Neighboring Transit Credential or TVF, for its initials in Spanish) (CMC 2000a), for the exemption of translation for documents for migration purposes (CMC 2000b), and an Agreement for the Exemption of Visas between Mercosur Member States (CMC 2000c). This last agreement was limited to temporary, high- qualified workers in the area of services and was never adopted by all the members, so it was only implemented bilaterally by the ones that had approved it.[13]

The end of this generation of policies was brought by a deep economic-political crisis that almost led to the disappearance of the Mercosur (see Gómez-Mera 2005). It signaled the failure of the neoliberal model and opened a new phase in South American regional integration.

[10]It was renegotiated and its second version was approved in 2015.

[11]Organized in the Coordinator of Central Unions of the Southern Cone (CCSCS, for its initials in Spanish), which groups the main central unions of each member state.

[12]In the Working Subgroup no. 10 (SGT 10), which has a tripartite composition including governments, employers and workers representatives.

[13]This is not necessary nowadays because the Residence Agreement goes beyond the scope of this norm (see *infra*.).

7.6 The Third Generation of Regional Policies for the Movement of Persons: The Social Turn

This stage began with the end of the 2001–2002 crisis and the change of the governments in the region. The new administrations have received diverse denominations: populist (Freindenberg 2007; Gratius 2007), neopopulists (Walker 2008), progressives and/or redistributionists (Perrotta 2013), leftist (Castañeda 2006; Gratius 2007; Riggirozzi 2012), social democrats (Walker 2008), developmentalist (Alves Texeira and Desiderá Neto 2012). Despite the diversity of denominations, they share certain characteristics, namely: the rejection of the pro-market policies of the previous decade and the greater importance that is given to social issues.

As a result of the traumas created by the 2001/2002 crisis, South American regionalism was reformulated. A more 'cautious' attitude towards unilateral trade liberalization was adopted (Bouzas et al. 2007, p. 17), together with policies that were oriented towards state intervention in the economy.

These changes led to the adoption of new concepts in the specialized literature: 'postneoliberal regionalism' (da Motta Veiga and Rios 2007; Sanahuja 2012) and 'posthegemonic regionalism' (Riggirozzi 2012).[14] Briefly, these concepts try to explain the main features of this stage: the regional agenda was widened, including issues other than economic, for which it was labelled as 'multiaxial' (Comini and Tussie 2016). The new regional priorities were the political agenda, social questions and development. The predominant political discourses rejected open, 'uniaxial' regionalism and American hegemony and influence in South America's affairs. This reflected the foreign policy orientation of the leading countries (Argentina and Brazil), which shared some commonalities: they prioritized relations with the neighbors, they sought to increase South America's profile in the international scene, they prioritized autonomy and had a strong anti-imperialist and Latin Americanist rhetoric that promoted a regional identity (Simonoff 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Gomes Saraiva 2012; Majdalani 2013; Tokatlian and Merke 2014; Merke and Reynoso 2016). In the CAN, Ecuador was the thematic leader, and it followed similar foreign policy principles (see Zepeda 2011).

This political ideology deeply influenced a re-orientation in the regional policies for the movement of persons in South America. This stage is inaugurated with the milestone in regional migration policies: the Residence Agreement.

[14] See Briceño Ruiz (2014) and Sanahuja (2012) for a deeper discussion on the differences between open regionalism and the RI model that predominated in the 2000s.

7.6.1 *Towards the Convergence of Regional Policies for the Movement of Persons: The Residence Agreement and the South American Conference for Migration*

Towards the end of 2002 there was a significant change in regional policies. Mercosur approved a series of agreements that expanded notably the rights of migrants and liberalized their movement within the region. These agreements were regionalized to the rest of South America.[15] The most significant and well-known one is the Residence Agreement for Nationals of the Member States of Mercosur and Associated States[16] (2002), an international treaty aimed at facilitating the procedure for obtaining a legal residence to all member state nationals. Its main provision is the creation of a simplified process by which regional migrants get a 2-year temporary residence that allows them to get permanent residence after these 2 years.

The Agreement changed the regional migratory agenda by reintroducing the free movement of *persons* as an 'essential' objective of the RI process and by extending its scope to all the persons (not just workers).

The importance of the Agreement relies on several dimensions. First, not only did it change regional policies, but also domestic ones, as it eliminated the 'categories' of immigrants defined by national laws (which were generally linked to the persons' economic activity), for South American nationals. It thus established the 'nationality criteria' as the main requirement for obtaining a legal residence and it eliminated the requirements linked to the socio-labor condition of the migrant. Second, the Agreement aims to prevent South Americans from having an irregular migratory status in the region. It does so by eliminating sanctions and penalty fees that migrants might have to pay in case they have an irregular status and want to change it (art. 3). The documents that are required for the process are simplified and harmonized. It also established meaningful rights such as equal treatment, family reunion and the right to transfer remittances (see arts. 8 and 9).

This milestone policy was formulated in the Office of International Relations of the National Direction of Migration (NDM) of Argentina, the main receiving country in the region. Argentine officials based their proposal on the country's knowledge and historic experience in migration management. The underlying ideas were, first, that the reason for the large number of irregular immigrants residing in the region was national legislation that was 'detached from reality'. Also, from this perspective, migration flows would keep entering the country (official of the government of

[15]The Residence Agreement was signed first by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile. Peru and Ecuador joined it in 2011 (CMC 2011a, 2011b) and Colombia in 2012 (CMC 2012a). Venezuela has not signed it yet.

[16]The Agreement entered into force in July 2009, but I consider that it is a milestone in the agenda and that it signalled the beginning of a new generation of policies first, due to the social and political significance of its provisions and second, because the main receiving country (Argentina) started to apply it unilaterally before it entered into force in 2006 with the Patria Grande Program.

Argentina, interview, 9 October 2014). The approval, regionalization and institutionalization of this regime was due to two main factors. First, Brazil, the biggest country in the region and one of the major economies in the world, supported and promoted the approval of the agreement (official of the government of Argentina, interview, 9 October 2014; Acts 1/02 and 2/02 in Mercosur 2015, pp. 22, 28). Second, both Brazilian and Argentine officials had a friendly relationship and shared ideas and experience in migration and human rights issues, so they worked jointly to convince the rest of their partners to take part in this regime (official of the government of Argentina, interview, 9 October 2014; Acts 1/06, 4/06 and 6/06 in Mercosur 2015). The rest of the regional partners accepted the Argentine proposal because they considered that it was 'superior' (Alfonso 2012, p. 51) to previous regional legislation.

At the same time that the Residence Agreement was adopted, the South American Conference for Migration (SACM) was created. The SACM is one of the fourteen consultative regional processes that exist worldwide. It holds annual meetings since its creation in the year 2000.[17] It currently has twelve members.[18] Decisions are taken by consensus and its declarations are non-binding. In spite of this, it influences regional policymaking. It also collaborates with the Mercosur and the CAN and fosters convergence between these two via the exchange of experiences and ideas.

The SACM and the Residence Agreement were the two main factors that started a new stage in the making of regional policies for the movement of persons, as they involved most of South America, and incorporated new principles and ideas, which were promoted when the ideologies, political orientation and RI model changed.

In 2004, the Declaration of Santiago about Migration Principles was signed by Mercosur member states, plus Bolivia, Chile and Peru. It stressed the importance of multilateralism for the management of migration, human rights, equal treatment, family reunion and the social and economic contributions of migrants to the receiving states. In its declarations, the SACM has reproduced and even amplified these principles. The SACM has recognized the 'right to free movement of the migrant person' and defined it as a regional objective in the South American Plan for Human Development of Migration (see *infra*.) (SACM 2010) and the Declaration of Migration Principles of the SACM of 2010.

In the SACM, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are the main actors and decision-makers. This explains the importance that the Declarations give to multilateralism and respect for international law and human rights treaties. It also explains the regionalization of common criteria on migration that led to the adoption of a unified regional position on the subject that was sustained by all South American countries in international forums and in the negotiations for the Global Compact for Migration.

[17]The idea to institutionalize a regional dialogue on migration dated back to 1999, when this was proposed during the "South American Meeting about Migration, Integration and Development" held in Lima, Peru. The first official SACM meeting took place in Santiago de Chile in 2001.

[18]Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guyana and Surinam.

The Latin American common position for the GCM (see ECLAC 2017) was centered on the respect of migrants' human rights, access to justice for migrants, non-criminalization of irregular migration, the elimination of detention centers and migrants' contributions to host societies and economies. During the negotiation phase, Latin America called for the global recognition of the 'right to migrate' and the 'freedom of movement' (Milesi 2017; official of the government of Spain, interview, 22nd May 2018), for the universality of migrants' rights and, instead of expulsions, for migrant regularization as a solution to irregularity (SACM 2017). Some countries even called for the GCM to be a binding agreement.[19] This human rights and open border position was regarded as South America's 'international projection' (SACM 2018). This progressive and high-profile stance towards migration was adopted by most of the countries in the region and has led to policy and rhetoric convergence. It built from two characteristics of 'post hegemonic/post neoliberal' regionalism: first, opposition to American hegemony, materialized in a Latin Americanist rhetoric and the rejection of American and European 'restrictive' policies (Brumat and Acosta 2019). Second, Argentina and Brazil's foreign policy orientation that sought to increase South America's positioning in the international scene.

7.6.2 The Andean Community in the 2000s

The Cartagena Act (CAN 1999) introduced the completion of the Andean Common Market as an objective for 2005 (which has not been accomplished yet). Consequently, the free movement of persons became a regional objective with a specific deadline.

The Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of 2002, a nonbinding agreement, was the first regional norm that seeks to acknowledge migrants in a more comprehensive manner, and not only in relation to the economic or work activity that they perform. The adoption of the Andean Charter is closely related to the participation of the member states in the SACM (Stang 2009; Official of the CAN, Interview, 12 January 2012). It defines migrants' basic rights and it includes the free movement and transit of migrants and their families as a priority (art. 51) regardless of their economic situation.

In 2003, the Andean Instrument for Labor Migration (Decision 116) was reformulated (CAN 2003a, Decision 545). Its objective is to achieve the free movement of 'Andean migrant workers' (art. 20) as a way to 'progressively' achieve the free movement of persons. This Instrument is less selective than the previous one, as it eliminates the categories of 'qualified' and 'undocumented' worker. It also adds new rights such as family reunification and the free movement for the workers

[19]See for instance https://www.telesurtv.net/news/bolivia-onu-pacto-mundial-sobre-migracion-20180228-0059.html (visited in January 2019).

and their families (art. 12). Another disposition that reduced the selectivity of the Instrument is the modification of the Labor Migration Offices' responsibilities, as they will no longer have the capacity of selecting workers. These Offices also have an informative function, as they have to provide information to migrant workers (art. 17), changing their selective approach and adopting an inclusive one instead.

That same year (2003) the Decision 583 (CAN 2003b) modified the Andean Instrument for Social Security of 1977. The new Instrument goes beyond its predecessor, as it recognizes the same social security rights and obligations for any Andean *resident* worker (not only Andean nationals), apart from equal treatment, non-discrimination, health services and state welfare (art. 1).

The Andean Forum of Migration was created in 2008 following a proposal from Ecuador. In this occasion, Ecuador also presented a first draft of an Andean Plan for Human Development for Migration, whose name was later changed to Andean Migratory Statute. This was part of Ecuador's strategy to 'andinize' its (very progressive) domestic migration policy (Official of the CAN, Interview, 2016)[20] and become a regional leader in migration issues.

The Andean Migratory Statute would be a binding instrument that seeks to be the main orientation for regional policies for the CAN and Chile (Andean Parliament 2015). It defines the freedom of movement and residence as rights, calls for a regional citizenship that includes political rights and for the 'regional harmonization of national norms' to guarantee the rights of migrants persons. It also promotes the 'socialization' of the Statute with the Mercosur, 'to advance in regional integration' (art. 73). The Statute would codify and deepen Andean migration Law. It was approved by the Andean Parliament in 2015, but its final approval by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that would enforce it, is still pending.

7.6.3 *Mercosur During the Postneoliberal-Posthegemonic Era*

A turning point in Mercosur's migration agenda was the creation of the Mercosur's Specialized Migration Forum (FEM, for its initials in Spanish) in 2003. The FEM 'unified' the migration agenda and separated it from labor and security. From that moment on, Mercosur's migration agenda was centered on updating old legal instruments, on border control and on the formulation of 'action plans'.

FEM's initial activities aimed at reducing the fragmentation of regional legislation on migration and at further harmonizing border control instruments[21] that were 'inherited' from the nineties.

[20] See Ramírez (Ramírez G. 2013, 2016) on Ecuador's migration policy.

[21] Agreement for the Verification of Documents for the Entry and Exit of Minors (RMI 2006); standardization of the 90-day term for tourists citizens of Mercosur (CMC 2006); the adoption of a resolution that replaced the Resolution 75/96 (GMC 1996a), which enumerates the documents that

In late 2010 the Plan of Action for the Statute of the Mercosur Citizenship (CMC 2010) was approved. It was largely the result of two factors: first, the impulse of the Lula administration that, in its last months, tried to get a relevant regional agreement that marked a milestone in regional integration approved under its Pro Tempore Presidency (official of the government of Brazil, interview, 11 August 2015), as a way of showing regional leadership. Second, the convergence of the governments' interests on social questions in the postneoliberal/posthegemonic stage.

The Plan of Action for the Mercosur citizenship is supposed to be completely implemented by 2021 (for Mercosur's 30th anniversary) (art. 7). This Statute does not create any new rights or institutions; it is a compilation of norms that simplifies and speeds up some procedures for Mercosur nationals. As part of the Plan, the Argentine government made some far-reaching proposals, for instance: a Unique Migration Agreement[22] (Act 4/12 in Mercosur 2015, p. 122) and the modification for the Recife Agreement—an Agreement which would have left migratory border controls to only one country (the receiving one). But countries did not agree on any of these proposals. Most of the policies that were adopted in these last years were centered, again, on the facilitation border crossings,[23] similar to the nineties.

7.7 Final Considerations: A New Generation?

The first generation of regional policies was highly influenced by the regional context, in which the RI model's main objective was to achieve economic development through industrialization and intra-regional trade liberalization. The first regional policies for the movement of persons seek to regionalize certain standards for labor mobility (such as equal treatment and non-discrimination) and showed a preference for high skilled migrants. It also established the 'nationality criteria' for the first time. Due to their continuous reference to national legislation and the only presence of state actors in policymaking processes (particularly, the Ministries of Interior and Labor of the CAN) they never turned into a 'real' regional policy.

The second generation of norms was shaped by the neoliberal ideology that characterized regionalism in South America during the nineties. Open regionalism centered regional policies on economic and commercial issues, leaving the social aspects of RI behind. 'Social' integration had to be in line with the level of economic

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are required to enter or exit the territory of the member states and the modification of the Recife Agreement.

[22]Which is a compilation of all the norms and rights already valid in Mercosur (see FEM 2013, annex V).

[23]Decision 8/12 (CMC 2012b) (modified in 2014 with the Decision 25/14, CMC 2014) created a network of specialists in documentary security, known as RED SEGDOC, whose objective is to prevent falsification of documents. The agreement of travel documents was also renovated (CMC 2015a) and the TES was updated with an agreement for electronic migration registration (CMC 2015b).

integration. This explains the fact that Mercosur retroceded in its original objective of achieving the free movement of persons as a way of consolidating a CM, which never happened, also explains the central role of easing border crossings (to facilitate trade) and the fact that the greatest advances in social-labor aspects were the result of pressure from a new regional actor, workers' unions. The unions, which were organized transnationally, sought to influence decision-making in Mercosur as a way of 'securing' workers' rights at the regional level, because they had lost influence towards national governments.

Second generation policies were focused on 'technical' aspects, such as border management, documents to enter and exit states' territories and the simplification of bureaucratic procedures for human mobility. These apparently 'technical' measures had a double political objective: they worked as an instrument for economic integration and liberalization (Pellerin 1999b) while giving an initial push to the promotion of a sense of regional identity among the population, that would help to sustain the existence and development of ROs (Gómez-Mera 2005; Malamud 2010). At the same time, the adoption of regional procedures for regional mobility promoted communication among regional bureaucrats who knew each other better, and developed a sentiment of regional identity (Gómez-Mera 2005). Increased interaction proved to be an important incentive for policy convergence in the following decade.

After the 2001–2002 crisis and the failure of the neoliberal model, the regional migratory agenda underwent a deep change. The Residence Agreement reintroduced the free movement of persons in Mercosur's agenda which was afterwards adopted by all the CAN members. The Residence Agreement is a binding norm that expands the rights of the citizens of the signatory states and modifies domestic migration policies, as it eliminates the migration categories for South Americans. This legislation eliminates the economic condition of the migrant person as a requirement for residence for a 2-year period. The Agreement was signed before the 'neo populist/progressive' governments took office, which shows that public officials already shared ideas related to the expansion of migrants' rights and exchanged them. The posthegemonic/postneoliberal RI model that prevailed in the region, added to the relevance that Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador gave to relations with other South American countries helped to consolidate these ideas, gave them visibility, and also helped in implementing the regime and making policies converge.

During this period, migrant's rights were expanded, border control norms were reformulated, the selectivity of the policies was reduced, and the migration agenda was separated from the security and labor agendas in regional institutions. Migration eventually became a central agenda that helped to reinvigorate RI after the crisis in Mercosur and promoted policy convergence between Mercosur and the CAN.

The third generation of norms can be divided into two groups. The first one is comprised of binding norms that regulate mainly labor migration and border control, most of which were 'inherited' from the previous generation. The second group established and expanded migrants' rights and liberalized the residence of South American citizens in the area. It also incorporated, regionalized and promoted the adoption of international principles and basic rights. In this second group there is

only one binding norm, the Residence Agreement. The rest of this legislation is non-binding: the SACM Declarations, the Declaration of Santiago, Mercosur's Citizenship Plan of Action and the Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. These non-binding norms are the most progressive ones, and they even promote the free movement of persons as a right. The SACM played a crucial role in intensifying interaction between national officials, so it promoted the adoption of these norms and shared ideas and values on the agenda.

The third generation of norms has a dual character: on the one side it expands and promotes migrants' rights and on the other, it improves border controls. This dual character is the result of three factors: 1- Argentina's 'thematic' leadership. Argentina was recognized as a legitimate leader on migration issues by her regional partners, who accepted her proposals, mostly aimed at regularizing her irregular immigrant population; 2- foreign policy strategies of the leading countries (Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador) that prioritized relations with the region; 3- the ideologies of the governments in power in that moment, which had a strong focus on human rights and thus opposed the US and the EU's 'restrictive' policies. Mercosur was the leading RO because the two countries with most aggregate power are part of it, and not the CAN. Also, the influence of certain actors changed: worker unions were more focused on the domestic scene because they had (re)gained access to national governments, who heard their demands.

The renewed interest in border and migration control is explained by 1- the greater economic, political and social state presence during this stage and 2- Argentina's 'thematic' leadership. Argentina's leadership conferred a new character to regional policies that was in line with its own migration policy: more open and oriented towards South America, while increasing control of who entered and resided in her territory. As Argentina is the main receiving country, the creation of a more transparent and predictable regional migratory regime was a central interest to her. The regime is more transparent because more information was shared between partners and is more predictable because the rules are clear, and the costs of managing the regime are more equally shared. For Brazil migration is not a central topic, as it mostly a sending country. As the country with most aggregate power, Brazil's support of Argentina's proposals was crucial for the approval and institutionalization of the regime.

In the Andean Community, Ecuador, who had recently adopted a very progressive migration policy (see Ramírez 2013, 2016) and whose foreign policy prioritized relations with South America, also acted as a subregional leader in this agenda. So, she proposed the adoption of the Andean Plan of Human Development for Migration which included principles that had already been embraced at the South American level, promoting policy convergence.

The political landscape in South America started changing in 2015, when Mauricio Macri, a conservative, took office in Argentina. In 2016, in Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, a neo-populist progressive, was impeached and Michel Temer, another conservative, replaced her. In January 2019, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right politician and former military officer, became Brazil's President. The 'turn to the right' of two of the most influential countries and largest economies in the region

marked the start of a new stage in South American politics. These governments started to debate the possibility of reducing the Mercosur to a free trade area, which contradicts the Treaty of Asunción (Frenkel 2016, p. 21). This suggests that we could be facing the beginning of a new stage in South American RI and consequently, in the regional migration agenda.

7.7.1 Return to Uniaxial Integration? Possible Scenarios Facing the Return of Neoliberalism

As Comini and Tussie (2016, p. 14) point out, the leading RO, Mercosur, is facing a moment of 'internal friction'. Its two main partners and main actors in the regional migration agenda support a RI model similar to the one that prevailed during the nineties: open regionalism, with more flexible legislation. They also reject regional models based on the postneoliberal/posthegemonic, 'multiaxial' projects, which they characterize as 'ideological' and closed to the global economy (Comini and Tussie 2016, p. 13). They also seek to rebuild strategic relations with Europe and the US (Frenkel and Azzi 2018). This could lead them to the securitization of migration policies, to satisfy European and American demands and as an imitation process (see Brumat and Acosta 2019). Also, as a way of 'des-ideologizing' the RI process, they could go back to adopting 'technical' policies. Furthermore, Brazil and Chile have recently pulled out of the GCM, breaking the regional position that had been constructed during the last two decades (see Brumat 2019).

In spite of this, there is still some continuity with the postneoliberal/posthegemonic project. So, in Argentina's foreign policy strategy of 'concentric circles', the first circle is still Latin America (Comini and Tussie 2016). Argentina is pushing for an approach between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance.[24] This new RI project comprises some CAN member states and promotes a RI model based on open regionalism and free trade. The (very few) policies that the Pacific Alliance has adopted on migration are 'technical' and limited to making work and tourist visas slightly more flexible. This, together with the fact that the CAN has lost some of its members[25] and that some aspects of its migration agenda are stalled, could lead to CAN being after the PA in the order of Mercosur's priorities.

At the same time, and due to the high level of institutionalization and domestic internalization of some regional policies, and the benefits that it generates for many states[26] such as the Residence Agreement, second and third generation policies would be difficult –but not impossible- to eliminate.

[24]Its member states are: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.

[25]Chile was the first one to leave in 1976. Venezuela followed suit in 2006, to join Mercosur.

[26]In the face of current Venezuelan emigration, some of the regional policies addressed here are proving to be particularly helpful for some states. For instance, Argentina and Uruguay are applying to Venezuelans unilaterally.

Will all these recent developments and the prevailing ideology of the new governments lead to a change in regional migration policy? To answer this, we need first to point out that there have not yet been any new significant *regional* policies regarding migration. Most of the recent changes were taken at the domestic level.[27] Second, I suggest four possible scenarios for the short and medium term in the South American migration agenda:

First scenario: the second and third generation of regional migration policies will be kept + domestic restrictive measures that focus on security will be increased, in line with the ones adopted in Europe and the US. This domestic legislation would contradict regional policies. As the countries with most aggregate power (Argentina and Brazil) and other regional mid-powers, such as Chile, prioritize their relations with extra-regional (global) powers, such as the US and the EU, they will tend to adopt measures that favor these countries, giving secondary importance to South America. In the absence of a regional Court that enforces regional legislation, the contradiction between national and regional policies would have to be solved with direct negotiations and coordination in regional institutions such as the Mercosur, the CAN or the SACM.

Second scenario: the second and third generation regional migration policies will be kept + domestic restrictive measures that focus on security will be increased + worker unions will bring their focus back to the regional level as they cannot get their demands heard at the national level, pushing for the consolidation of rights for regional workers. Same to scenario one, but with the union (re)emerging as an influential actor. As happened in the neoliberal years, if worker unions do not get responses to their demands, they could return to regional institutions. At the same time, and in line with the neoliberal model of integration that prevailed during the 90s, securitist actors could (re)gain power, pushing for increasing securitist measures at the national level (Brumat et al. 2018).

Third scenario: second and third-generation regional migration policies will be kept + a return to the adoption of measures to favor the movement of highly qualified personnel and for the execution of business activities will happen + adoption of policies that could expand migrants' rights will be suspended. As neoliberal governments tend to have closer relations with employers (see Pellerin 1999b), they could hear their demands and prioritize the migrants in highly qualified employment. At the same time, as human rights pressure groups lose influence within the states and the current governments are less likely to hear their demands, the rights-based approach could be 'frozen' (see Brumat 2019).

Fourth scenario: the most unlikely scenario is (partial) disintegration. If the sceptic and anti-integration constituencies within some of the most powerful governments (such as Brazil's Minister of Economy) gain more power, they could push for a weakening of regional institutions and with them, regional migration policies such as the Residence Agreement could stop being used or even revoked.

[27] See Brumat (2019).

Regional migration policies have proven to be a meeting point for the construction of shared positions, common ideas and values for South Americans. South American regionalism is in a transition moment, and the survival of the agenda proposed by the postneoliberal/posthegemonic regionalism is being put into question. In this scenario, the analysis of the evolution (or involution) of the policies developed in the regional social agenda will become crucial.

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Chapter 8
Asian Migration Governance

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8.1 Introduction

Mobility within and outside of Asia has grown dramatically over several decades and new systems of migration and regional governance are emerging. As of 2017, 80 million international migrants were residing in Asia and it has become the fastest growing migration corridor in the world, taking on 30 million more international migrants between 2000 and 2017 (United Nations Population Division | Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017). In 2017, intra-regional migration in Asia (within Asia) accounted for 60% (63 million) of its international migration stock, in addition to the 20 million out-migrants to Europe and 17 million to North America (United Nations Population Division | Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017). The magnitude and directions of migration, of all kinds, has increased within and out of Asia. Labor migration, in particular, has experienced the most rapid growth and is expected to become increasingly vital to the region for the foreseeable future.

As the volume of international migration increases, the need to create and improve mechanisms to govern it becomes vital. For global issues, the creation of an international "regime" can be useful to support global governance of a sector. But only some policy arenas have been successful in creating an international regime, defined as "implicit or explicit sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of International Relations" (Krasner 1983). Attempts towards creating a global migration regime have not been successful yet so migration is currently governed by a set of formal and informal measures at the domestic, bilateral, regional and sub-regional levels.

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Discussions on global migration governance are proceeding at many global forums such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), but because of their scale, there are frustrations surrounding the lack of concrete outcomes from them. Conflicting views and interests are represented, so finding common ground becomes a challenge. Among the different series of such efforts, the most recent one has been a global non-binding adoption of two Global Compacts: one on refugees and one for safe, orderly and regular migration. Solomon and Sheldon state that various dedicated, state-led, informal dialogues- coupled with the urgency generated by the 2015–16 crises- can fairly be credited with creating the conditions necessary for the progress at the global level that led to the comprehensive agreements on the Sustainable Development Goals, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the Migration Compact (Solomon and Sheldon 2018). Such large forums remain imperative in creating norms and values on acceptable standards on a range of issues related to migration.

As migration has historically taken place at a regional context, there have been many efforts at the sub-regional, regional and inter-regional level for countries to work together on topics related to the management of migration. These formal and informal gatherings of states on migration issues provide venues and opportunities for states to come together, understand each others' perspectives, and identify common solutions.

Migration governance in Asia is intriguing as on the one hand, many Asian states have refused to be a part of international migration conventions or to create a regional legal body, but on the other hand, they have made several efforts towards cooperation at a regional or sub-regional level. Even though the governance mechanisms for migration are still very much state-led, globally and in Asia, much of the current cross-border movement does not always follow state rules and regulations. This dynamic process makes it impossible for states alone to control or manage international migration and the role of non-state actors is becoming increasingly important. According to Igarashi, at the regional level, social, cultural and economic networks are expanding more rapidly than formal political cooperation is (Igarashi 2011). Within Asia, there have been many vibrant developments in regional cooperation on migration between non-state actors including migrant and diaspora associations, NGOs, trade unions, recruitment agencies, with the active engagement from migrants themselves.

This chapter explores the current migration governance mechanisms within Asia as the migration boom within and beyond Asia makes it timely to pay attention to the Asian regional governance of migration. It takes an in-depth look at the various trans-regional governance networks at play in Asia, with a focus on labor migration between South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle-East. The chapter is structured as follows. The next sections will introduce Asian migration and the different multi-layered transnational migration governance approaches, both state-led and non-state-led, between Asian states. The chapter concludes by discussing the challenges and opportunities as seen in the region. This chapter complements other sections of this book by introducing migration governance complexities for the most populous region, Asia. The magnitude of migration within Asia, especially for labor

migration, has meant that there are various state-led and non-state-led cooperation efforts unique to the region, which is presented below.

8.2 Multi-Layered Approach to Migration Governance in Asia

When compared to other areas of the world, the Asian migration system is relatively new. Although international migration in and out of Asia was significant during the colonial era, when Europeans deployed workers throughout the region under the "contract-coolie" system, during the three decades between the Second World War and the mid-1970s, the movements were small, both in scale and impact (Hugo 2005). An exception was the massive redistribution of population that accompanied the partition of India in 1947 (Massey et al. 1993). Movement from Asian countries to the West started to grow in the 1960s, when discriminatory rules against Asian entries were finally repealed in countries like Canada, the United States and Australia.

The discovery of oil in the Middle East in the 1970s opened up a new area for Asian labor migration. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries required human capital, both skilled and unskilled, to develop their infrastructure and economy and thus turned to hiring foreign workers from different parts of the world, including from South and Southeast Asia, to work on contractual basis. The importance and impact of migrant workers is very visible in most of the GCC countries. As a proportion of the host country's population, numbers of international migrants continue to be highest in GCC countries: the foreign-born population makes up 88.4% of the total population in the United Arab Emirates, 75.7% in Qatar and 73.6% in Kuwait (IOM 2016). Rapid economic growth in several Asian countries during the 1980s along with declining fertility rates, led to movements of both highly skilled and unskilled workers from the region to the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), and Japan. The magnitude and types of migration today has increased rapidly as migrants from Asian nations move within and beyond the region requiring new forms of governance policies.

Migration, because of its nature, cannot be confined or governed only through national policies. It is such a topic that requires some form of cooperation between at least two countries. Recent trends show that trans-regional forums and consultations are becoming crucial avenues for both source and destination countries to regularly meet and discuss migration topics in a more manageable format. So in trying to study and understand how Asian countries view migration governance, we can look at their involvement with their neighboring countries, region and with other international actors on the issue. At the international level, Asia as a region may have one of the lowest ratifications on all UN covenants and conventions. Many countries in Asia have refused to become parties to and have not ratified many major

conventions, including those related to migration and thus are not parties to established international norms and principles. At the regional level, it is also a region that does not have an established regional human rights body as other regions such as Africa, the European Union and the Americas have. It has made some progress in that regard with the formation of two sub-regional human rights bodies, for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and for Arab states. There are also several sub-regional and intra-regional Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) on migration such as the Bali Process, the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Process. These efforts at the regional and international levels will be explored in more detail in the next sections of this chapter.

This scenario makes Asian migration governance interesting as even though many Asian countries have refused to be a part of international migration conventions or to create a regional legal body, they have still made several efforts towards cooperation at a regional or sub-regional level. Following Krasner's (1983) definition of an international regime, Asia does not have a single migration regime. Nonetheless Asian states are still involved in creating avenues to cooperate on migration issues, by which they are creating new norms and principles that are more applicable to their situation, which can be agreed on given the current differences. As in the case of global migration, the Asian migration system can also be seen as a regime complex instead of a regime.

A multi-level approach to migration governance is evolving in Asia. The vastness of Asia as a region requires cooperation and dialogue at different levels. This chapter because of its focus on labor migration, focuses on three sub-regions of Asia: South, Southeast and West Asia, specifically in the countries within ASEAN, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and GCC. The largest number of migrant workers come from two regions in Asia: South and Southeast Asia while the largest migrant recipient countries are in Southeast Asia and the Gulf countries. Both source and destination countries and their domestic laws and involvement in trans-regional and international networks matter for the welfare of migrants and their legal rights in another country. Within South, Southeast and West Asia, there are countries that are sending, receiving (or both) and transiting, which create different priorities when it comes to managing labor migration. This makes their efforts of cooperation on the topic more complex and this chapter will focus on these aspects to understand how the different trans-regional governance networks on migration in Asia are contributing to policy learning.

The Asian multi-level migration governance can be characterized by Asian nation's involvement at various levels, including the national, sub-regional (South, Southeast or West Asia), regional (Asia), inter-regional and international, in addition to the participation and influence of non-state actors in discussions. The following sections situate Asian nations and their involvement in international conventions and trans-regional migration networks.

8.3 Asia and International Conventions

Asia is the largest region in the world and has the least advanced common approach of all regions along with the fewest ratifications of all United Nations (UN) covenants and conventions, including those related to migration. Both sending and receiving Asian countries have low ratification rates. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), there are 9 core international human rights instruments. These include: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICMW), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Table 8.1 shows the ratifications (whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act) or accessions (whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states and has the same legal effect as a ratification) by countries from ASEAN, SAARC and the GCC for the nine core conventions. We can see that some conventions, like CEDAW and CRC are ratified by all, while others such as the ICMW and the CPED are ratified by very few.

The major UN convention related to the rights of migrant workers is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their families. It only has 55 parties till date and within Asia, its ratification rate is also very low. Only Bangladesh and Sri Lanka from the SAARC nations and Indonesia and Philippines from the ASEAN nations, all major sending countries, have ratified it till date. None of the major receiving countries from the GCC or Southeast Asia have ratified it, making its impact very limited. Fig. 8.1 shows the ratification of the MWC convention in Asia. The light blue shows the states that have signed the convention (13), the dark blue shows those who have ratified (55) and the orange color shows the states that have taken no action, which is the majority (130).

All countries that are members of the ILO are obliged to comply with the fundamental ILO labor conventions even if they have not ratified them. The eight fundamental Conventions are: the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182), Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). Table 8.2 shows the ratifications from

Table 8.1 UN human rights instruments (SAARC, ASEAN and GCC countries).

	ICERD	ICESCR	ICCPR	CEDAW	CAT	CRC	ICMW	CRPD	CPED
Date	1965	1966	1966	1979	1984	1989	1990	2006	2006
Total State Parties	182	170	173	189	169	196	55	181	62
SAARC									
Afghanistan	1983[a]	1983[a]	1983[a]	2003	1987	1994		2012[a]	
Bangladesh	1979[a]	1998[a]	2000[a]	1984[a]	1998[a]	1990	2011	2007	
Bhutan				1981		1990			
India	1968	1979[a]	1979[a]	1993		1992[a]		2007	
Maldives	1984[a]	2006[a]	2006[a]	1993[a]	2004[a]	1991		2010	
Nepal	1971[a]	1991[a]	1991[a]	1991	1991[a]	1990		2010	
Pakistan	1966	2008	2010	1996[a]	2010	1990		2011	
Sri Lanka	1982[a]	1980[a]	1980[a]	1981	1994[a]	1991	1996[a]	2016	2016
ASEAN									
Brunei Darussalam				2006[a]		1995[a]		2016	
Cambodia	1983	1992[a]	1992[a]	1992[a]	1992[a]	1992[a]		2012	2013[a]
Indonesia	1999[a]	2006[a]	2006[a]	1984	1998	1990	2012	2011	
Laos	1974[a]	2007	2009	1981	2012	1991[a]		2009	
Malaysia				1995[a]		1995[a]		2010	
Myanmar				1997[a]		1991[a]		2011[a]	
Philippines	1967	1974	1986	1981	1986[a]	1990	1995	2008	
Singapore	2017			1995[a]		1995[a]		2013	
Thailand	2003[a]	1999[a]	1996[a]	1985[a]	2007[a]	1992[a]		2008	
Vietnam	1982[a]	1982[a]	1982[a]	1982	2015	1990		2015	
GCC									
Bahrain	1990[a]	2007[a]	2006[a]	2002[a]	1998[a]	1992[a]		2011	
Kuwait	1968[a]	1996[a]	1996[a]	1994[a]	1996[a]	1991		2013[a]	
Oman	2003[a]			2006[a]		1966[a]		2009	

Qatar	1976[a]	2018	2018	2009[a]	2000[a]	1995		2008	
Saudi Arabia	1997[a]			2000	1997[a]	1966[a]		2008[a]	
United Arab Emirates	1974[a]			2004[a]	2012[a]	1997[a]		2010	

Source: Universal Human Right Instruments. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHumanRightsInstruments.aspx. Accessed July 7, 2019

[a]Ratification and accession



Notes: Dark Blue: State Parties, Light Blue: Signatories, Orange: No Action.
(Source: Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard. Universal Human Right Instruments.United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). http://indicators.ohchr.org/ Accessed July 7, 2019)

Fig. 8.1 International convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (Asia)

SAARC, ASEAN and GCC countries. Again, there is a range, with several countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines having ratified all eight conventions, while other such as Maldives and Bhutan have ratified none.

Among the other ILO conventions related to the protection of migrant rights, Philippines and Malaysia (Sabah) are the only ones to ratify C97, Migration for Employment Convention (revised) and Philippines is the only country to have ratified C143, Migrant workers (Supplementary Provisions Convention) and C189, the Domestic Workers Convention till date, while none have signed C181, Private Employment Agencies Convention among the SAARC, ASEAN and GCC countries.

8.4 Asian Trans-Governmental Migration Networks

Without a global migration governance regime, countries in different regions are trying to work in smaller blocs, hoping for an agreement between similar countries as migration has historically taken place at a regional or inter-regional context. In the current global discussion on governance of migration, there are differences with regard to the current level or degree of institutionalization of regional structures, with the EU having the most developed common approach to migration (with regard to inter-European mobility but to a lesser degree with regard to new migration),

Table 8.2 ILO fundamental conventions and dates ratified (SAARC, ASEAN, and GCC countries)

Countries	Freedom of association		Forced labor		Discrimination		Child labor	
	C087	C098	C029	C105	C100	C111	C138	C182
SAARC								
Afghanistan				1963	1969	1969	2010	2010
Bangladesh	1972	1972	1972	1972	1998	1972		2001
Bhutan								
India			1954	2000	1958	1960	2017	2017
Maldives	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013
Nepal		1996	2002	2007	1976	1974	1997	2002
Pakistan	1951	1952	1957	1960	2001	1961	2006	2001
Sri Lanka	1995	1972	1950	2003	1993	1998	2000	2001
ASEAN								
Brunei Darussalam							2011	2008
Cambodia	1999	1999	1969	1999	1999	1999	1999	2006
Indonesia	1998	1957	1950	1999	1958	1999	1999	2000
Laos			1964		2008	2008	2005	2005
Malaysia		1961	1957	1958 (den: 1990)	1997		1997	2000
Myanmar	1955		1955					2013
Philippines	1953	1953	2005	1960	1953	1960	1998	2000
Singapore		1965	1965	1965 (den: 1979)	2002		2005	2001
Thailand			1969	1969	1999	2017	2004	2001
Vietnam			2007		1997	1997	2003	2000
GCC								
Bahrain			1981	1998		2000	2012	2001
Kuwait	1961	2007	1968	1961		1966	1999	2000
Oman			1998	2005			2005	2001
Qatar			1998	2007		1976	2006	2000
Saudi Arabia			1978	1978	1978	1978	2014	2001
United Arab Emirates			1982	1997	1997	2001	1998	2001

Source: Ratifications of fundamental Conventions by region. ILO. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/. Accessed July 7, 2019

followed by NAFTA and the African Union (Grugel and Piper 2007). Asia has the least common approach of all regions.

Transgovernmental cooperation can take various forms and can be state-led or non-state-led as seen in Table 8.3 for Asian migration. Such transgovernmental cooperation efforts are useful as the repeated interactions help build trust among the participants and allow for a longer-term collaboration. The regional consultative processes are especially important as they are repeated, regional meetings of state representatives dedicated to discuss migration even though they are informal without

Table 8.3 Asian Trans-governmental Migration Networks

State-led cooperation	Non-State-led cooperation
Bilateral agreements	Trade unions
Regional Human Rights Body: • AICHR • AHRC	Civil Society Organizations: • MFA • CARAM Asia • APRRN
Regional Blocs: • ASEAN • SAARC • GCC	
Regional Consultative Processes: • Colombo Process • Bali Process • Abu Dhabi Dialogue • Asia-EU Dialogue on Labor Migration	

any obligation or binding rules, which also makes them popular with some states as they do not interfere with their sovereignty. Raustiala (2002) claims that transgovernmental cooperation is a significant development in international law, and that it is synergistic to international treaties and not competitive. He has demonstrated that government networks lead to 'regulatory export' of rules and practices from one country to another. These cooperation efforts have also been used to facilitate the development of 'good practices' and to allow coordination of policies between states through policy learning or policy transfer (Raustiala 2002).

The creation and formalization of different trans-governmental migration networks in Asia points to their usefulness while there is a lack of a global migration regime. The different state-led and non-state-led cooperation efforts in Asia as listed below.

8.4.1 State-Led Cooperation

Asia as a region may be too big to create a single migration regime where states would agree on the same issues, especially when the divide between sending and receiving countries' interest is great. But there have been several state-led cooperation efforts at different levels in Asia: at the bilateral level and the regional levels.

One state-led cooperation is bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) between state parties. As only two states are involved in such negotiation so it is easier to come to an agreement but the power imbalance between sending and receiving countries also come into play as receiving countries are usually stronger both politically and economically. A hierarchy among sending countries may also appear, with some

countries better able to negotiate than others where preferential treatment is given to a specific group of migrants instead of promoting universal standards across all nationality groups. Asian destination countries typically prefer Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) over BLAs because they constitute a soft option, are more flexible and hence easier to negotiate, implement and modify, while BLAs are more specific, action-oriented, more formal and binding (Wickramasekara 2006) and cover a range of issues, such as social security, employment contracts, conditions of work and dispute settlement, which many receiving countries do not want to be bound by (Grugel and Piper 2007).

Among regional efforts, the presence of a regional human rights body can be an important structure to protect human rights and to have a common understanding on the minimum acceptable standard of human rights among member states. Asia as a whole does not have a human rights body yet. Two sub-regional human rights bodies, however, were established in 2009, the Arab Human Rights Committee (AHRC) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), but neither has established a regional Human Rights Court yet. They both have much to accomplish before becoming functional human rights bodies that can protect migrant workers and others. Both AHRC and AICHR are state-led and are criticized for their lack of transparency and the non-consultative nature in which decisions are made as little regard is given to civil society organizations and their voice. They both also have little authority in actually making important decisions on gross human rights violations, especially without a Court. Other regions of Asia are even further behind and need to start from scratch, as they do not have any human rights body at all.

Regional discussions on migration governance enhance exchanges of experiences, improve policy harmonization and are essential in diffusing these perspectives to the broader global migration agenda. Regional blocs like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have state-led meetings for sub-regional cooperation on various issues including migration. Some regional blocs are more integrated than others.

The number of people moving within ASEAN has increased rapidly over the years. Singapore and Malaysia constitute the largest migrant receiving countries, while Philippines and Indonesia, are the largest source countries in ASEAN. Migrant stock data from 2013 reveal that the ASEAN region contributes 12.8 million or 6% of the international migrants of the world; 3.9 million or 30% of whom move within ASEAN (Orbeta Jr and Gonzales 2013). ASEAN is currently embarking on deeper regional economic integration through the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, which hopes to establish a free flow of goods and services, free mobility of business persons, skilled professionals and investments by 2025. The AEC is a major leap for ASEAN as it has agreed that migrants from eight professional categories can move freely between the region from 2015. ASEAN leaders envision free labor differently as the AEC seeks to offer ways to facilitate a ‘freer’ flow rather than aiming for unrestricted or ‘free’ flow of skilled labor. The Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) of the eight agreed on occupations

suggests that less than 1.5% of the ASEAN labor force would be affected by it. The nature of today's intra-ASEAN migration flows, however, is very different, with more than 87% of them being unskilled or low-skilled (Sugiyarto and Agunias 2014). The increasingly important role of migrant workers within the region was recognized in the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promoting of the Rights of Migrant Workers.

SAARC has large migrant numbers as it includes some populous countries such as India and Bangladesh. It is estimated that almost half of South Asian international migrants are within the SAARC region itself. Total annual outflow of labor migrants from the 5 main sending countries in the region, i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka is estimated to be close to 2.5 million migrant workers (Uramoto 2014). Even with such a large migrant population, SAARC has made little progress including migration and labor mobility issues in its agenda. According to Wickramasekara (2011), SAARC is far behind ASEAN. He writes that some major differences between them are that ASEAN over the years has developed an informal sub-regional labor market, with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand as major destination countries, whereas no country openly recognizes itself as a destination country in South Asia (Wickramasekara 2011). There are also considerable security concerns about cross border movements between India and Pakistan and India and Bangladesh. Among SAARC nations, there are few common concerns besides the abuse and exploitation of workers in the Middle East.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional intergovernmental political and economic union consisting of member states Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The six GCC member states currently comprise the third largest regional hub of international migration as they import large number of foreign migrant workers, usually for low skilled/low paid jobs, from other Asian nations. All the GCC countries govern the migrant labor population through the *kafala* or work sponsorship system. Even though there are variations, this system usually binds each migrant worker to a sponsor or *kafeel* and a particular job for a specific period of time. It makes it difficult for workers to change employment or exit the country without approval from their *kafeel*. Through this system, the management of migration has been devolved directly to individual citizens, leading to a 'privatization of migration' (Babar 2013). The *kafala* system has been widely condemned by workers' rights group for its inadequate ability to protect migrant workers' rights. Scholars and practitioners alike have indicated that the *kafala* system has become outdated, yet none of the GCC countries have attempted to entirely dismantle it.

Another state-led cooperation effort concerns various Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), which are repeated, regional meetings of representatives of states dedicated to discuss migration. They vary greatly in their composition, history, purpose and organizational frameworks, but are usually informal and non-binding as well as a 'state-owned' process. Several RCPs exists between Asian labor sending and receiving states.

The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime was established in 2002. It is a voluntary and non-binding

process, co-chaired by Indonesia and Australia and with 48 members including several main UN agencies and 27 observers to the process. The Bali Process has raised regional awareness on the consequences of people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime and has been a forum for policy dialogue, information sharing and practical cooperation.

The Colombo Process is a RCP on the management of overseas employment and contractual labor for countries of origin in Asia. According to best estimates, more than 2.5 million Asian workers leave their countries every year under contract to work abroad (Colombo Process. Migration for prosperity: Adding value by working together n.d.). Such large proportions and resulting problems have resulted in Asian countries of origin discussing contractual labor including protection from exploitative practices in recruitment and employment. There here have been several consultative meetings between Colombo Process member states but it was deemed that talking among sending countries, though an important step, was not enough. The Colombo Process then invited major receiving countries as observer states to enable a conversation.

There have been two offshoots from the Colombo Process. One is the Asia-EU dialogue on labor migration, an inter-regional forum between 11 Colombo Process Asian nations and the 27 EU countries on facilitating managed and legal migration. The objectives of the dialogue aim to improve understanding of the key trends and issues, support the identification of common policy concerns, and promote actions which will facilitate safe and legal labor migration between the two regions and its impact on development (Colombo Process. Migration for prosperity: Adding value by working together n.d.).

The other offshoot has been the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, an inter-regional RCP, which is a voluntary, non-binding and informal state-led consultative process on labor migration. After the third Ministerial Consultation of the Colombo Process in Bali in 2005, which also included countries of destination as observers, the UAE hosted the inaugural Ministerial Consultation between CP member states (11) and GCC countries (6) with the addition of Yemen, Malaysia and Singapore (3) in 2008. It currently has 20 member states. The ADD aims to enhance bilateral and regional cooperation for better administering the temporary contract employment cycle and maximizing its benefits to contract workers, employers and the economies of countries of origin and destination (ADD 2012). During the first ADD meeting in 2008, the members agreed that properly managed contractual labor mobility can generate 'win-win-win' outcomes, benefiting workers, employers and their respective countries (ADD 2008). Discussions on the social, civic and economic contributions made by migrants to the GCC states have been more limited in the ADD though.

8.4.2 Non-State Led Cooperation

In Asia, there are many non-state actors that are involved in developing regional cooperation among themselves, including migrant and diaspora associations, NGOs, trade unions, recruitment agencies, with the active engagement from migrants themselves. As cross-border movements do not always follow state rules and regulations, non-state actors become important partners even while governance mechanisms for migration still remain very much state-led, globally and in Asia. Migrant workers, as non-citizens face many problems and have a more difficult time accessing legal and social support. The role and activities of non-state actors is dependent on the destination country's policies and openness to having them operate there so their level of engagement varies largely. Organizing migrant workers also poses a particular challenge in contexts where migration is characterized by widespread informalization, temporariness and/or illegality (Grugel and Piper 2007).

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are an active set of non-state actors working for migrant workers. The Asian region has many vibrant communities of NGOs and grassroots organization in the field of labor migration, many run by migrants or former migrants themselves. CSOs play a vital role in Asia, where states differ significantly in their level of democracy and national policies for migrants. Rother and Piper argue that this bottom up engagement can have a democratizing potential (Rother and Piper 2015) as it provides voice and agency to an often marginalized but growing population that is transnational in nature.

Even though much of Asian regional migration efforts continue to be state-led, with very few inviting non-state actors and migrants in the discussions, if at all. Over time, the presence of CSOs has increased but only after much protest. ASEAN, SAARC, the GCC and the various RCPs do not always invite CSOs, but some have created opportunities for CSOs to share their opinions or to make statements. The ASEAN People's Forum (or ASEAN Civil Society Conference), held since 2005, is a parallel meeting a day prior to the ASEAN Summit, where a joint statement and recommendations are produced for the ASEAN leaders. The Colombo Process has some CSO participation especially by regional networks that represent their member NGOs in different countries such as the Migrant Forum Asia (MFA). They usually present statements based on civil society consultations held ahead of the Colombo Process.

CSOs provide workers information and services, in addition to or in coordination to those provided by the government. They also go beyond labor union membership, by helping migrants who work in informal sectors and may not be unionized. The informal sector includes domestic work and entertainment work, which has a larger proportion of women working without much supervision and these sectors do not come under national legal frameworks. Undocumented migrants are another group that come to CSOs for support as they may be afraid to go to government officials and seek help. The major issues CSOs work on in Asia revolve around employment-related rights and improved working conditions. Advocacy has not extended to

addressing the temporary nature of prevalent migration schemes; family reunification, settlement and integration-related issues (Grugel and Piper 2007).

In many Asian nations, there is a lack of political space for human rights activism and a large number of migrants who are undocumented makes it very difficult for migrants to set up their own organizations. In Gulf states, migrants usually do not have the right to set up organizations. The same is true for Singapore and Malaysia where self-organizing is legally impossible, so migrants have to depend on local citizens to take up their concerns (Piper 2006). In other countries where it is difficult but not impossible (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) migrants have been more actively involved in setting up their own organizations.

CSOs focusing on migrant workers work at different levels depending on their resources. While some are focused only at the local and national level, in providing information and support to migrants and their families, others are working regionally and internationally. Rother and Piper write that migrant organizations in the ASEAN region employ a multi-level approach, which consists of three levels of engagement through formal and informal channels (Rother and Piper 2015). They participate within the existing framework, which still provides only limited space and restricted access for migrant rights organizations, especially seen during state-led meetings. Secondly, because of these restrictions, migrant civil society have set up their own independent networks from the bottom-up such as MFA, CARAM Asia (Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility) and APRRN (Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network) that meet and act independently of state summits. Finally, the CSOs are highly active at the global level where they try to gain influence and legitimacy by referring to global frameworks and frame migration from various rights' perspectives.

The collaboration between CSOs and their governments are dependent on whether they are seen as partners or as a nuisance. With such a large variety of CSOs in Asia, there has been some effort to bring them together. There are two networks, with similar mandates, made of organizations from different countries working on migration at the Asian region: the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) and Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM Asia). Though the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) is also another important network consisting of more than 400 CSOs, their main focus is on refugee rights, not migrant related issues. CSO networks fill an important role of providing capacity building to smaller national NGOs on migration issues along with bringing them together to discuss common problems and opportunities as well as to see a bigger picture with regional, sub-regional, macro-level discourses are happening. Capacity building programs are also used to engage at the regional and international level such as SAARC, ASEAN or the Colombo Process, Abu Dhabi Process or the GFMD. In such sub-regional summits and processes, these networks are involved in facilitating a sub-regional position rather than a country-specific approach.

Trade Unions have historically been an important institution for the representation of workers' interests as their coverage under collective bargaining ensures equal treatment in terms of wage and employment. International human rights law gives migrant workers the right to freedom of association, to join and organize trade

unions, but their status as documented or undocumented migrants may curtail some rights. Host countries' policies and rights afforded to migrants are also important in determining their right to join unions.

For trade unions at the destination country, migrant workers as non-citizens, aren't usually their primary focus. Ford wrote about the different challenges for trade unions: challenges posed by the importance given to citizenship rather than shared worker identity, by unions operating at the national level; and the sectoral apartheid whereby temporary migrant workers and the undocumented are viewed as 'unorganizable' because they work predominantly in the informal sector or the private sphere (Ford 2006). The temporary nature of migration also make foreign workers less inclined to join unions on a fee-paying basis but they may seek assistance when a problem occurs. The transnational nature of migration requires trade unions to work outside their comfort zones and coordinate with other state and non-state actors. More recently, given the large numbers of migrants and their problems, some unions have become more inclusive and are even discussing portability of union membership.

In terms of organizational make-up, the union movement is characterized by a complex structure at the international, regional and national levels. At the global level, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) is the largest as it was founded by merging two older organizations, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labor. The Asia-Pacific Regional Organization (ITUC-AP), has 59 organizations from 34 Asian countries and is a platform for Asian trade unions to meet regularly.

Asian labor migration pose challenges for trade unions because of its nature of temporary-contract schemes, high number of workers in the informal sector and high number of undocumented workers, in addition to some destination countries discouraging political activism of any kind. Trade unions have thus had to manoeuvre different destination country's laws and policies for their countrymen and women to be represented in collective bargaining. Sometimes employment contracts contain clauses prohibiting foreign workers from joining unions or to be politically active in any other form, as seen in Malaysia, Singapore and the GCC countries.

There are, however, several sub-regional trade union blocs in Asia: the Arab Trade Union Confederation (ArabTUC), the ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC) and the South Asian Regional Trade Union Council (SARTUC). Among the three, the ASEAN Trade Union Council is more evolved and active. Its first meeting was held in 1994 in Manila and it currently has 18 affiliated national unions from 10 nations (excludes Brunei from ASEAN but includes Timor Leste). The ATUC meets once every quarter and they meet the ASEAN Secretariat once a year. There is good collaboration between the national trade unions as they have an agreement where complaints from any ASEAN country of origin will be referred to the national center of the country of destination, which has trained focal points to provide support. The national centers of the ATUC are currently working to develop an electronic database to share complaints and inquiries of migrant workers. ATUC called for a minimum of labor and wage standards in the ASEAN and for national

legislation to strengthen and protect freedom of association and collective bargaining and for union membership and representation portable across borders.

Even though SARTUC was established earlier in 1988, it remained dormant for a long time and became active again only around 2013. SARTUC is currently present in 7 of the 8 SAARC countries, as Bhutan does not allow unions. SARTUC was formed jointly by 18 unions affiliated from seven South Asian nations. The aim of SARTUC is to take the 18 unions in a singular direction. SARTUC also calls for minimum wage and minimum standards of protection among SAARC countries in their negotiations with countries of origin. It also advocates establishing a model standard contract for the use by the SAARC region. A 36 point 'Kathmandu Declaration' was issued during the 18th SAARC Summit in Nepal in 2014, where one of the points related to member countries agreeing 'to collaborate and cooperate on safe, orderly and responsible management of labor migration from South Asia, to ensure the safety, security and wellbeing of migrant workers in their destination countries outside the region'.

The Arab TUC (Arab Trade Union Confederation) is the newest regional trade union bloc and held its founding Congress in October 2014 in Amman, Jordan. It currently has 17 national labor unions from 12 Arab (and African) nations. They estimate that only about 15% of workers are associated with trade unions in the Arab countries (ATUC 2016). Given the lack of various social and political freedoms in the Arab world, trade unions are still fighting for basic rights to organize and for collective bargaining as well as independence from government authorities. The Arab TUC claim that even though in principle most Arab countries recognize the principle of the freedom of association, national laws in some countries do not include the right to join a trade union for broad sections of the workforce; especially public servants and foreign workers, who constitute the majority of the workforce in some countries. There are a range of countries in the Arab world, for example, while Bahrain allows migrant workers to join, vote and run for office in local trade unions; Saudi Arabia has banned unions, collective bargaining, strikes and even public demonstration.

Collaboration between trade unions in Asia and the Arab states has been developing at different platforms. In 2013, SARTUC and trade unions from Lebanon, Jordan and Bahrain adopted the 'Kathmandu Action Plan' aiming to establish migrant workers' organizations and promote equal treatment and better working conditions for South Asian migrants who are working in the Arab states (ILO 2013). The ITUC-AP (Asia-Pacific) is another venue where members from ATUC, Arab TUC and SARTUC meet regularly. In August 3, 2015 during the third ITUC-AP Regional Conference, with the initiation from SARTUC, the three inter-regional trade union blocs signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the protection and well-being of migrant workers. The MOU identified 8 actions to be taken by the trade unions in the regions and in May 2016, they further identified five priority actions for the protection of migrants.

8.5 Challenges and Opportunities

The preceding sections describe in detail the various state-led and non-state-led cooperation efforts between the Asian labor sending and receiving states of South, Southeast and West Asia and show the diversity and disparity within the regions. The different regional efforts are also dependent on the historical and contextual realities on how migrants are treated and what rights are given to nationals and non-nationals. For example, the *kafala* system still dominates much of the GCC countries' stance on labor migration, giving their own citizens a lot of power and authority over migrant workers and despite the many problems and protests from source countries, the GCC states are unwilling to change it. This has been a point of direct conflict for GCC states and South and Southeast Asian source countries. But power differences have meant that Gulf countries have taken charge of the narrative from source countries and the Colombo process, and use a different tactic at the Abu Dhabi Dialogues to go around contentious issues such as the *kafala* system, their domestic laws and migrant rights, to change the focus to the more positive aspects of labor migration and how it is beneficial to everyone involved.

The regional human rights bodies also differ in their ability based on their formation and authority, but overall, it is seen to be weak in the Asian sub-regions. Neither the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights nor the Arab Human Rights Committee have a Court yet and the SAARC region does not even have a human rights body. The power imbalance is apparent in the regional blocs, the regional consultative processes and the bilateral agreements between source and destination countries.

The different cooperation processes show that much of the power still remains with government entities with only very little space provided for the involvement of non-state actors. Non-state actors have nonetheless worked around different limitations at source and destination countries and are increasingly demanding space at the table during different consultations and are also creating their own parallel cooperation efforts. The diversity within CSOs provides for many perspectives but some inter-linkages among themselves and with governments may help in the long term. Migrants have shown their ability to organize and become strong participants in defending their own rights and responsibilities when they are allowed to do so legally. Filipina maids, for instance, were among the strongest organized groups in Hong Kong in the early 1990s who worked together to push better working conditions for themselves and other migrant workers.

Asian labor sending nations continue to face a number of common problems concerning the migration process. First, there are challenges at home that migrants face before they leave. Even though sending trained and informed migrants is now considered vital, governments are still struggling to improve orientation and training programs for migrants. Another major challenge for migrants is paying the various fees, agents' costs, and travel costs. Migrants from different Asian countries are known to take loans at very high rates to pay these fees, which combined with workers earning less than stipulated in the contract keeps them in debt for longer.

The lack of reliable data of migrants as they leave and come back is another problem sending countries are struggling with. This is especially problematic when there is a crisis at the destination country and migrants need to be rescued.

Destination countries also continue to face a number of issues. Contract substitution and differences between expectations and reality are problems for both employers and workers, as employers may be getting a lesser skilled migrant than promised while migrants may be getting a different kind of job and lower salary than promised. Migrants absconding their workplace, overstaying their visas or getting into legal trouble are other common problems embassies have to deal with. In some countries, especially in the Gulf with *kafala* laws, it is not easy to switch jobs or to leave the country without employers consent, which has created problems for embassies of source countries when runaway migrants come and stay at the safe house for months if they are not able to resolve the issue and get an exit permit.

Another major challenge concerns the role of private agencies involved in the labor migration process both in countries of origin and destination. Private agencies are usually the main brokers between migrant workers and jobs abroad. There are considerable transaction costs and information asymmetry involved in the process as well as issues with trust. The volume of recruitment agents and their sub-agents, both in source and destination countries, has increased costs for migrants and has made it difficult to regulate their work. Visa trading in some Gulf nations has also made the whole recruitment system expensive for Asian migrants (Rahman 2015). Common problems faced by migrant workers are related to fraud, higher fees charged than the government price ceiling, change in contracts, jobs and salary changes once they reach the destination, unpaid or underpaid salaries, long working hours, sexual and physical abuse (Shivakoti 2018).

Given the common problems faced by Asian labor sending countries, some good practices can be identified from among the region as opportunities to share and learn from such practices. Innovative practices by some states have been lauded for their successes and are often emulated by other countries with variations of their own. Some such practices are listed here:

- *Improving information provision for migrants*
  Improving access to information for migrant workers about work, rights, salary, host country's culture and practices, financial literacy, the importance of gaining skills and information on what to do in case of problems are all very important practices and many source countries are investing more on these practices. Pre-Deployment Orientation Seminars for migrant workers was created by the Philippines and it has been seen as a good practice that has now been emulated by several Asian sending countries. In addition to orientation and provision of information, there is also an emphasis on acquiring skills before leaving but not all migrants are capable of or interested in investing more time and resources for it. The creation of a place where migrants can go for a 'single door solution,' where all the paperwork can be completed, has been seen in several countries such as Sri Lanka, Philippines and Nepal.

- *The creation of the 'Welfare Fund' and an agency to manage it*
  The Welfare Fund and an agency to manage it have been created in several Asian nations as it has been seen as a successful model. Each migrant is required to pay a certain amount to this fund as an insurance before their journeys so it can be later used to support migrants during legal troubles, to buy a ticket back home, to repatriate bodies, to bring migrants home in case of a health crisis or violence at the destination country. In some countries, there has been criticism, however, that the fund is not used even when there is a dire need or that it is misused.
- *Extending reach at the destination country*
  Sending nations have struggled to protect their migrants at destination countries but they have been expanding their reach by providing services through their embassy premises, so they have diplomatic immunity. At embassies, some countries have labor attaches, specific units for migrant workers, and shelters for migrants in need. The role of embassies and support provided for migrants largely differs based on the destination country, the number of migrants there and their legal systems and on the source country's ability and resources.
- *Data on migrant workers*
  The availability of reliable data on the different types of emigrants and their location help sending nations see trends and plan better long-term policies as well as to contact them in times of need. Investment on improved data collection can benefit source nations as well in destination nations, in case migrants need to be contacted quickly during emergencies or disasters.
- *Financial regulations*
  Remittances are an important source of income for migrant workers and their families so having regulations to improve access and decrease costs of remitting money home is essential. Streamlining banking channels has increased the use of formal channels for sending remittances instead of using hundi or hawala, which is an informal transfer system using a network of money brokers instead of banks and used to be popular for South Asian migrants. The spread of remittance centers has also made it easier for families to access funds sooner. But the costs associated to remit money are still high for some regions such as South Asia. To tackle the high interest rates on loans taken by migrant workers, some countries (like Bangladesh) have established banks from the welfare funds which allows migrant workers to take loans at lower rates freeing them from debt bondage.
- *Fair recruitment*
  The concept of fair and ethical recruitment is being promoted by some international organizations such as the International Labor Organization and the International Organization for Migration as it minimizes the possibility of fraud and the burden of loans for workers. This concept encourages recruitment agencies to charge employers instead of migrant workers, which has succeeded in some cases, especially for high skilled workers. But many recruitment agencies still charge fees, especially for lower skilled migrants where the supply outweighs the demand. Recruitment agencies have also complained that they too have to pay for job contracts as visa-trading has become an issue in the Gulf region.

- *Tripartite Consultation*
  A space for all organizations, private agencies, civil society organization and government agencies, working on foreign labor migration to share their issues and to regularly consult has been seen as a positive practice is some countries but is often lacking. The Government of Philippines, for instance, conducts regular meetings called the Overseas Landbased Tripartite Consultative Council (OLTCC) with all organizations working on landbased migration. It has a separate one for seabased migration as well. Such practices can be improved for better collaboration among actors at the domestic level.
- *Access to Justice*
  Access to justice has been a difficult issue for migrant workers as filing cases at the destination country is not easy, especially if their own legal status changes. It is even more difficult if they have returned home. In efforts to tackle contract substitution, some countries are requiring a standard contract and demanding that migrants receive the contract in their own language. Some countries have created special legal assistance funds to support migrant workers with their cases abroad. The Philippines for example, has created a Joint and Solidary Liability law which shifts the responsibility from migrant workers to recruitment agencies at home in case of fraud or problems at the destination.
- *Government to Government recruitment*
  Government to Government recruitment is practiced in a few Asian countries. Through the Employment Permit System of Korea, for instance, the South Korean government work with their private industry to identify the type of workers needed. They conduct language and other test in several source countries and then choose from the pool of qualified candidates. This lowers the cost for migrants, who do not have to go through recruitment agencies and the wages and conditions are also usually better, which makes it a preferred option.
- *Crises management*
  If there is a crisis at the destination country, sending country embassies are inundated with request for evacuation and support. During such times having a good database on migrant workers and their contact is really helpful. Massive rescue efforts have recently been seen after conflict or natural disasters with some countries better prepared for such rescue operations than others.
- *Civil Society Organizations across borders*
  CSOs are working innovatively on tight budgets to reach and support migrant workers across borders in some countries. They work with government agencies, with CSOs at destination countries, with a network of other CSOs. Trade unions for instance, are increasingly working across borders in collaboration with other trade unions to work for migrant workers.
- *Migrant associations*
  Migrant and diaspora groups are also important actors and their involvement can benefit their home communities. The links with such associations have not always been strong but Asian labor sending nations and COSs are now working to improve their relations with them for development linkages.

- *Regional Consultations*
  Frequent regional consultations have supported the creation of common language and understanding for Asian nations. The different regional meetings also serve as platforms to share and promote good practices, resulting in direct learning. For example, the Abu Dhabi Dialogues have led to agreements to share best practices in the administration of the temporary contract employment cycle.

8.6 Conclusion

The rapid growth of labor migration in Asia is and will continue to remain an important phenomenon with major implications for both labor sending and labor receiving countries and for migrant workers and their families in the foreseeable future. Without a global migration regime, Asian states are working with multi-level governance measures to solve various issues related to migration of different forms.

This chapter introduced the various collaborative efforts taken by Asian countries to govern labor migration. As seen, Asian nations are actively involved in several sub-regional and intra-regional consultations along with bilateral agreements on migration. The Asian migration system functions as a regime complex instead of a regime and a multi-level approach to migration governance is evolving in the region.

As seen from the chapter, the various trans-regional governance networks, both state-led and non-state-led, are contributing to improved discussions and policy learning among labor sending and receiving nations. As a transnational issue, managing migration and associated problems require more partnerships beyond the traditional sense and Asian states are learning to foster such partnerships at multiple levels. Yet, differences in capacity and power imbalances remain major hurdles for Asian labor sending nations, who remain reluctant to work together to collectively demand better rights for their migrant workers. This reluctance is proving harmful for migrant workers as they compete for low paying jobs, leading towards a race to the bottom.

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Chapter 9
The Migration-Development Nexus in Selected African States: Is the Implementation of EU Migration Policies Development-Friendly?

Maud Martens, Ilke Adam, and Florian Trauner

9.1 Introduction

In response to increasing numbers of asylum applications and a perceived 'migration crisis', the EU introduced a new concept of a 'Migration Partnership Framework' in 2016. The EU's key objective has been to support and reinforce migration management in countries of migrants' origin and transit. This new emphasis on externalizing migration policies to countries in the Global South has caused controversy. NGOs and pro-migrant activists have criticized the Migration Partnership Framework. It was seen to reorient EU development policies towards security and control-oriented objectives (Global Health Advocates 2017). As the framework is largely financed by development budgets, development aid may be (re-)directed at migration control instead of fighting poverty. In practice, this may run counter to wider development objectives the EU has been pursuing in partner countries.

This chapter has two main objectives. First, it will assess the aims and strategies of the EU within the new Partnership Framework by means of an analysis of the implementation of the Framework. The analysis is realized through a policy frame analysis (Schön and Rein 1994; Verloo 2005) and builds upon the migration policy frames proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016). The first section shows that the Migration Partnership Framework is largely focused on three strategies, namely (1) strengthening border control and fighting migrant smuggling, (2) protecting refugees and providing them with humanitarian assistance, and (3) addressing the

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root causes of migration via development aid. A fourth objective, facilitating regular migration, is also mentioned in policy documents because of its potential to enhance development in countries of migrants' origin. However, policy measures to create more channels for regular migration or maximize its benefits for development can hardly be identified in the framework. Because of this observation, the second objective of the chapter is to evaluate to what extent security priorities may override the EU's development agenda. Therefore, the second section will look at how the 'development-migration' nexus is translated into the concrete implementation of the European Migration Partnership Framework and examine whether the EU external migration policy is development-friendly.

The chapter analyses the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework in five priority countries of origin and transit, namely Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia. The analysis is based on primary and secondary documents (notably progress reports and other EU documents, see reference list) and eight interviews with migration and development experts and officials from the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as with a project researcher working on root causes of migration governance in West Africa. As the respondents preferred to remain anonymous, their names and precise function will not be quoted.

9.2 Understanding the Implementation of the EU's Migration Partnership Framework

The EU's Migration Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration was launched in June 2016. Within this framework, the EU seeks to better manage migration by cooperating with migrant-sending countries and the transit countries through which migrants travel. Initially, the Migration Partnership Framework targeted five priority countries of origin and transit in Africa, namely Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Ethiopia. However, as the framework adapted to the evolving migration crisis, the geographical scope was extended and now includes other countries in Africa and also Asia. In West Africa, the neighboring states of the priority countries were approached given that a regional strategy may be more effective to regulate migration flows. Therefore, cooperation with Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia and Ghana was also fostered under the framework. As migration on the Central Mediterranean Route increased, it became more pressing to cooperate with countries in Northern Africa too. Indeed, the situation in Libya became a concern of growing importance. Also, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco have been involved in the Migration Partnership Framework. Because of the rising number of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, cooperation with these host countries became part of the framework too. Finally, dialogues with Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been established as increasing numbers

of Asian migrants were using the Central Mediterranean Route (European Commission 2017b).

Besides the partnerships with countries of origin and transit, the EU initiated a closer cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN migration agency, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency. The EU's official objective is to protect and support people on the move, promote resettlement programs for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) and assist voluntary returns to countries of origin (European Commission 2017b). For example, there is an ongoing tripartite agreement between the EU, the IOM and the African Union (AU) on Assisted Voluntary Return. On the one hand, this entails organizing identification missions and providing transportation. On the other hand, it includes advancing sustainable reintegration opportunities once migrants have returned. The reintegration programs seek to minimize the social stigma of the returnee as having failed in a migration process. Reintegration measures cover social counselling, access to vocational training and a certain budget for economic reintegration. Projects also aim to work with the communities that are receiving returnees in order to enhance resilience.[1]

The main instrument that finances the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) (European Commission 2017b). The Fund was founded at the Valletta Summit in November 2015 to develop effective migration cooperation with 26 countries across three regions in Africa: the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. The projects financed by the EUTF for Africa are said to come in addition to traditional development assistance (European Commission 2017b). However, the largest part (approximately 80%) of the EUTF comes from reserves of the European Development Fund (EDF). The EUTF allows the use of budgets in a faster and more flexible way to be able to respond quickly to emergency situations (European Commission 2017a, b).[2] Other EU financing instruments (DCI, ENI, DG HOME, DG ECHO, etc.) have contributed around 15% and the contributions of Member States[3] provide only 5% of the fund (European Commission 2018a). Next to the EUTF for Africa, the EU has set up an External Investment Plan (EIP) to provide more resources to tackle the root causes of irregular migration by boosting private investments in partner countries where investments are usually low due to an unfavorable risk analysis.[4]

The Migration Partnership Framework adopts a comprehensive approach and involves a number of diverse strategies. Objectives range from strengthening border control, fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking, creating agreements on return and readmission, improving international protection and asylum policies to

[1] Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018 and interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

[2] Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

[3] Switzerland and Norway also participated.

[4] Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

creating more economic opportunities in partner countries, building capacity of national governments and increasing the resilience of local communities (European Commission 2017a). The variance in objectives translate the mutual interests of EU and African partners (Adam and Trauner 2019; Van Criekinge 2010).

9.2.1 Narratives and Strategies

To analyze the large number of initiatives under the Migration Partnership Framework, the study uses the typology of Knoll and De Weijer (2016). These scholars identify four different narratives in the European debate about how to deal with migration pressures. These narratives can be understood as policy frames (Schön and Rein 1994; Verloo 2005) as they express a specific understanding of the problem and identify certain guidelines for action (Knoll and De Weijer 2016; Lavenex and Kunz 2008). With the help of this categorization, it is possible to distinguish four strategies in the Migration Partnership Framework.

In a first narrative identified by Knoll and de Weijer migration is regarded as a 'threat'. In the 'threat frame', the focus is on irregular migration, which would pose a risk to the security, welfare and culture of migrant-receiving states. That is why, in this frame, the primary objective is to reduce irregular migration (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). Our analysis of the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework shows that this narrative has been a cornerstone of the current initiatives. The EU centrally focusses on the enforcement of border control, the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and on the increase of returns of irregular migrants. For the EU, an agreement on return and readmission is one of the most important goals as this would reduce the number of migrants in Europe and could function as a disincentive for more irregular migration. To close a deal on returns with partner countries, the EU is planning to use all relevant measures as leverage, including development aid, trade and visa measures (European Commission 2017d, p. 15). For example, stricter regulations for obtaining visas can be used as a negative incentive for partner countries who do not cooperate on return and readmission of irregular migrants in Europe. Likewise, EU visa policy can be turned into a powerful positive incentive as many partner countries desire more legal migration opportunities and visa-free travel (European Commission 2018b). Furthermore, efforts to counter smuggling have been increased and improved in cooperation with Frontex and Europol (European Commission 2017c, pp. 2, 13).

Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, tasked to ensure security at and beyond the European external borders. The agency is mandated to fight cross-border crime, monitor migration pressures and conduct return operations of migrants illegally residing in Europe (Frontex n.d.). Europol, the EU's Law Enforcement Agency, aims to fight terrorism and other forms of organized crime by strengthening states' investigative capabilities and supporting them in the exchange of information (Europol n.d.). To fight organized crime in West Africa, the EU has also started to give financial and technical assistance to joint task forces

in the Sahel to implement more regional projects. These projects will tackle trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons. Regionalization is a new focus of the EU as fighting cross-border crime at country-level is believed to bear little fruits. The problem is said to simply move to neighboring countries.[5]

In the second narrative proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016), migration is seen as a humanitarian issue. The EU calls for the protection of migrants, especially refugees, in accordance with the international human rights obligations of states (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). The main strategies that are used are humanitarian aid and rescue missions in the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea. Analysis of European policy documents indeed shows that projects are trying to increase the resilience of communities by enhancing basic services including food, shelter, education, health care and social protection services. These projects mainly work to the benefit of vulnerable groups such as refugees, IDPs and victims of human trafficking (European Commission 2017a).

The third narrative proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016) considers migration as a consequence of poverty, bad governance and conflict. Advocates of this narrative aim to fight these root causes via development cooperation (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). They argue that investing in employment opportunities and education, building democracy and strengthening the rule of law in migrant-sending countries would reduce migration because it makes migration less necessary (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). Projects under the Migration Partnership Framework that pursue better governance and provide more economic opportunities can be categorized under this narrative. We observe that the EU objectives fitting this narrative are twofold. A first type of projects emphasizes on law enforcement, peace building and conflict prevention, countering radicalization and extremism and addressing human rights abuses. A second type of initiatives focuses on building new enterprises, promoting trade and investment and providing vocational training (European Commission 2017a).

In the fourth and last policy narrative identified by Knoll and de Weijer (2016), migration is viewed as an opportunity to enhance development in countries of origin. This fourth narrative is different from the others as it does not call for less migration. The goal is to facilitate regular migration and manage it in a way that maximizes the benefits for development (Knoll and de Weijer 2016, p. 7). The EU does argue that migration, if managed well, can foster development in developing countries (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84). However, our analysis shows that under the Migration Partnership Framework, no serious efforts have been undertaken and no robust strategy is in place to facilitate a freer flow of people, neither regionally nor to Europe. Awareness raising campaigns are informing (potential) migrants about the legal migration channels to keep them from crossing borders irregularly. Nevertheless, this is hard to achieve given that legal migration channels to Europe are rare and that intra-African migration is very informal.[6]

[5]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018 and interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

[6]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018

To a certain extent, all four narratives proposed by Knoll and De Weijer (2016) can be identified in the Migration Partnership Framework. However, the emphasis strongly differs. Our analysis shows that some narratives have a stronger influence on actual policy making than others. The first three narratives (securitarian, humanitarian and 'root causes') are substantially present in the projects implemented in the five priority partner countries. Policy measures that can be situated in the fourth narrative—which sees migration as an opportunity for development and promotes legal migration channels—have hardly been implemented. This absence of implementation of projects relating an objective which is mainly in the interest of African actors (Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Chou and Gibert 2012) demonstrates the unequal power relations (Holland 2002) in EU-Africa migration cooperation. Table 9.1 presents the four narratives and their role in the EU's Migration Partnership Framework.

9.3 Is the Implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework Development-Friendly?

While the Migration Partnership Framework does not actively seek to use migration for the benefit of development in partner countries, the EU has committed to ensure Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; a commitment that was reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (European Commission n.d.). Pursuing Policy Coherence for Development implies that all EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries have to comply with the development agenda. Mutually reinforcing policies are needed to avoid contradictions and create synergies to maximize effectiveness. PCD works with five broad themes, namely trade and finance, climate change, food and nutrition, security and migration. When applied to the specific policy area of migration, the EU recognizes the way in which migration policies coincide with different aspects of the development agenda (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84). EU documents consider that well-managed and legal migration can contribute to development in both countries of origin and destination, but they also acknowledge the challenges that irregular migration may bring about. The policy documents state that migration and development policies can be interlinked to achieve common goals and create mutual benefits. Accordingly, migration policies need to counter smuggling and trafficking networks and improve border management as well as create options for legal migration and maximize the benefits for development. Development policies, in turn, can be used to address the root causes of irregular migration and support the resilience of displaced persons and returnees by ensuring that they have sustainable (re)integration opportunities (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84).

As incoherencies result in inefficiencies and financial costs and may make the EU less credible, it is crucial to balance the security and development objectives. For this, it is important to understand how migration and development relate to one another. In this section, we evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the

Table 9.1 The four narratives, as identified by Knoll and De Weijer (2016), and their role in the migration partnership framework

	Conception	Strategies	Implementation in the Migration Partnership Framework
First narrative	Migration is a threat to security in receiving countries	Containment strategies and return operations	• Enforcing border control • Actions to dispose of smuggling and trafficking networks • Training of police and security personnel • Joint investigation operations • Forced return operations and assistance for voluntary returnees
Second narrative	Migration is a humanitarian issue	Humanitarian aid and rescue missions	• Provision of basic services, including food and shelter • Strengthening the rights of migrants • Rescue missions in the Sahara desert and Mediterranean Sea
Third narrative	Migration is a result of underdevelopment	Development assistance and cooperation	• Creating employment opportunities • Providing vocational training • Strengthening governance and administration • Promoting democracy • Conflict prevention • Anti-radicalization projects
Fourth narrative	Migration is an opportunity for development in countries of origin	Facilitation of regular migration and improved migration management to maximize the benefits for development	• Awareness raising campaigns to inform on the existing legal alternatives to irregular migration • Lack of initiatives to maximize the developmental impact of existing migration flows and no progress on a freer and safer flow of people

Migration Partnership Framework is development-friendly. Before doing so, we briefly review the academic debate on the migration-development nexus.

9.3.1 The Migration-Development Nexus: A Brief Literature Review

Migration is often seen to be triggered by underdevelopment. Consequently, EU development aid is used to address this root cause. However, evidence suggests that development processes do not reduce migration in the short-term. Instead, they can generate an increase in migration for the first 10–20 years, a phenomenon known as the 'migration hump' (De Haas 2010). While there may not be immediate results in

terms of fewer numbers of irregular migrants, development aid can help partner countries that experience large emigration to better distribute the positive effects and compensate for the negative effects of migration (Concord 2018). For example, better transport and communication infrastructure will facilitate regional migration and allow people to fill labor shortages in other parts of the country. Development projects can also, for instance, compensate for the brain drain in health and education sectors by providing training and enhancing services in these sectors. Furthermore, development aid can support the integration of intra-African migrants or help the successful reintegration of returnees (OECD 2007; European Commission 2015).

The debate on the effects of migration on development is ongoing. Some see migration as beneficial for development while others argue that migration can be harmful for developing countries (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). The most established knowledge of the migration-development nexus is in the economic sphere. Firstly, 'brain drain' refers to the loss of human capital and labor force in developing countries as the productive and educated part of the population is most likely to emigrate (Vullnetari 2012). On the other hand, in countries where unemployment levels are high, people are 'pushed' to emigrate and search for employment opportunities abroad. In this way, emigration can reduce unemployment rates in the countries of origin (Wets 2007). A second element with considerable economic impact on developing countries are the remittances that migrants transfer to their families at home (Collier 2015; Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). These funds can help to protect people living in poor countries from economic hardship and a lack of social security (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). When recipients use remittances to invest in productive activities, it has a direct effect on national economic development and on better standards of living (Vullnetari 2012; Wets 2007). Thirdly, diasporas can stimulate the home economy by facilitating trade and creating new business ties between the receiving and the sending country (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015; OECD 2007). A fourth economic aspect is that the migration industry has become an important driver of economic growth in some of the towns along migration routes and near important borders. Given that these informal economies have created a large number of jobs, the smuggling industry included, it is presumable that reducing migration could hinder economic growth and endanger stability (Knoll and de Weijer 2016; Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017).

While these economic factors have profound consequences for development, development is more than only economic growth. There are several non-economic aspects that equally contribute to the development of a country such as respect for human rights, democracy, sustainability and social cohesion (Wets 2007). Migrants transfer these social remittances to their communities of origin when they return, but also through visits and technological communication (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015; OECD 2007). Therefore, diaspora networks do not only lead to more financial resources and investments, but also to cultural exchange and political advocacy which can play an important role in boosting development in the countries of origin (Misceac 2015).

9.3.2 *Policy Coherence for Development? An Assessment*

The literature discussed above shows that the positive and negative effects of the migration-development nexus vary spatially and temporally; they interact with each other and form a complex relationship (Vullnetari 2012). Additionally, these effects are mediated by policies in both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). NGOs and activists have strongly expressed their disapproval of current EU policies. They suspect the Migration Partnership Framework to have a negative impact on the quantity and quality of European development assistance in partner countries (Global Health Advocates 2017). A concern is that these new developments in the external dimension of EU migration policy might hinder partner countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (11.11.11 2017). Below, an assessment is made to evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework is development-friendly.

NGOs accuse the EU of using development budgets, intended for poverty eradication, to obtain domestic security goals (Global Health Advocates 2017). Available budgets of the EUTF for Africa are indeed coming from the EDF reserve. This reserve contains funds which are currently not used and have not previously been allocated for any other purpose. There is also a part of the EDF reserve that is kept for DG ECHO in case of emergencies and to top up other programs.[7] Next to this, working on security in developing countries can also be part of development cooperation.[8] Strengthening security and the rule of law will benefit countries that suffer from terrorism and other forms of organized crime as violent groups will keep governments from creating any form of stability and inhibit development. EU officials argue that border controls need to be established with the primary aim of disrupting the smuggling and trafficking networks. This may not necessarily lead to a curb of migration, but to an end of the crime relating to it since that is what puts people in danger.[9] As long as security measures have a development component, it does not oppose the Policy Coherence for Development. For example, enhanced border control can be part of a policy that aims to organize migration in a safe and legal way to maximize the benefits for development. The Migration Partnership Framework uses a holistic approach that interlinks security and development objectives. In doing so, it brings together development and non-development officials to discuss how security measures affect development in the partner countries. In theory, this can only be beneficial for PCD.[10] However, the EU must avoid spending development budgets on pure security operations mainly aiming at curbing migration to Europe. While there is sometimes a problematic 'grey area', it must be

[7]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[8]Interview 5, Brussels, 4 April 2018.

[9]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[10]Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018 and interview 3, Brussels, 27 March 2018.

possible to posit a number of criteria that can be used to determine which security operations contribute to development.[11]

Making aid conditional on migration cooperation is another concern. Conditionality refers to the use of different EU policies including development aid, trade, and visa as leverage for cooperation on migration issues. The use of conditionality in the Migration Partnership Framework implies that partner countries that cooperate well on migration control can expect to get additional development funding. Those that do not agree with the containment strategies used by the EU risk to receive less European support for development (Concord 2018). However, the existing partnerships with the five priority countries of origin and transit are based on a positive leverage approach. In principle, the Migration Partnership Framework includes negative conditionality but it has not yet been applied in practice. According to our respondents, there is no evidence that less budgets are going to traditional development commitments, only that additional funding has been allocated to countries that agree to cooperate on migration issues. Therefore, according to one of our respondents,[12] additionality, rather than conditionality, is applicable to describe the current situation. As long as the EU says 'more for more', its policy does not go against PCD. This may change however. Some Member States are pressuring the EU to implement negative conditionality.[13] With the current 'crisis' rhetoric in the EU, it is possible that negative incentives will be increasingly used. This would be opposed to PCD. Only humanitarian aid provided by DG ECHO is certain to remain as it is, even if negative conditionality will be more often used in the future.[14]

Under the Migration Partnership Framework, many development projects are set up to tackle the root causes of irregular migration. While these projects are supported by advocates of the third narrative, which describes under-development as a 'root cause' of migration, the rhetoric has been criticized heavily for diverting focus away from traditional development purposes (11.11.11 2017; Concord 2018; Global Health Advocates 2017). However, EU officials argue that the rhetoric of addressing root causes has not changed development assistance. It is about creating stability, boosting economic growth, promoting social inclusion and enhancing resilience. This is what development projects have been doing for many years. While the migration label is relatively new and the goal of addressing root causes has come to dominate the rhetoric, this does not necessarily change the existing practices. What is new—and can be seen as the added value of the EUTF—is that the flexibility has been strengthened to provide fast results. Indeed, the fund can operate with simplified procedures to an emergency situation.[15]

[11]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[12]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[13]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[14]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018 and interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[15]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

Then again, budgets under the EUTF for Africa are mainly targeted at potential migrants and areas where migrants depart from or transit through. A valid concern is that this is becoming the main criterion for allocating aid. This can undermine the leading principle in EU development policy stating that it targets the most vulnerable. As long as budgets for least-developed countries and poverty eradication do not reduce, it might not counter PCD. Nonetheless, according to one of our respondents, donor countries should be encouraged to give broader development aid in the countries of origin so that it does not just benefit those that are on our doorstep, but also other parts of the population.[16]

Another question is if fighting root causes will reduce the number of irregular entries in Europe. Firstly, fighting root causes is a narrative which provides the countries in the Global South with an incentive to cooperate with the EU on migration issues (Cassarino 2009; Van Criekinge 2010). According to one of our respondents, it is also used to top up budgets for development assistance and to counter hardline Member States proclaiming that the issue is solved simply by closing borders.[17] However, as shown by literature on the migration hump (De Haas 2010), increased development aid will not automatically decrease migration as previously mentioned. There is sufficient evidence that more wealth actually increases migration in the short term. EU officials recognize this and acknowledge that development projects will only generate results over longer time periods. It is argued that, even though the public asks for immediate measures, it is essential to invest in these durable solutions.[18] However, solutions need to be broader than just development aid. For instance, development aid may have little effect while trade policies keep undermining sustainable development in partner countries. As the EU acknowledges, fostering PCD is crucial across all EU policies affecting developing countries to achieve both development and migration goals (European Commission 2015).

Finally, policies addressing migration need to consider how migration can be a driver for development in developing countries to effectively balance security and development goals. It is important to mention in this context that most people migration within regions—and not necessarily from the Global South to the Global North. For instance, an estimated 84% of migration takes place within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (ICMPD 2015). In West Africa, south-south migration is therefore in quantitative terms more important than migration to Europe or other parts in the world. The Migration Partnership Framework does not prioritize this regional dimension of migration dynamics, which plays out importantly for the development of some countries (see Chap. 10).

To actively advance the migration-development nexus, the Migration Partnership Framework would need to facilitate regular migration and manage it in a way that maximizes the benefits for development. While the EU policy documents mainly

[16]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[17]Interview 7, Brussels, 10 April 2018.

[18]Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

cover measures to reduce irregular migration, promoting regular migration, which is very much a demand of the African partners, is also a stated objective. The difficulty is that, within the EU, legal migration is part of a domestic debate about skills and labor market needs, not a development debate. The European Commission or other EU institutions can voice the request for legal migration—and they do so. However, EU officials do argue that regular migration is still an exclusive competence of Member States and the current climate is not immigration-friendly.[19] Whilst there is no doubt about the second argument (on the anti-migration climate), the first argument can be countered. The EU does have competence on legal migration (art 79 Lisbon Treaty), and did develop several legal migration policy tools. It is only prevented from determining volumes of admission for third country nationals for work related migration (art 79§5). Another reason why progress on legal migration appears to lag behind is that well-managed migration is seen as a long-term goal. It is not something to be easily achieved. In the meantime, tackling the crime related to irregular migration is understood as something delivering more immediate results (European Commission 2016).

9.4 A Way to Move Forward

Our close look at the Migration Partnership Framework has shown that many means are attributed to reducing irregular migration. Besides border control, anti-smuggling practices and return operations, also development cooperation and humanitarian aid are used as tools for migration management. The evaluation of the implementation of the Migration Partnerships demonstrates that there is an awareness of the potential of migration for development but that this has hardly guided policy choices. It is fair to state that the Migration Partnership Framework is not particularly directed at development. Despite this, development-orientated migration policies do not have to be juxtaposed to migration policies aiming to increase security—they can be interlinked (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). The migration-development nexus can guide policy-making as follows: on the one hand, well-managed migration can be used as a means to advance development in the countries of origin by facilitating the transfer of remittances, skills and knowledge. In addition, the existence of safe and legal migration channels will also stem the influx of irregular migrants in Europe. On the other hand, development can be used as a tool for migration management as it will support countries of origin and transit to better deal with the complex effects of migration. It might even remove the necessity of migration in the long term.

A way for the EU to move forward may be to explore partnerships based on legal migration. In the following, three measures are discussed as to how EU migration policies can contribute to development in migrant-sending countries.

[19]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

A first policy measure would be to create more channels for regular migration to Europe. Organized recruitment gives people the opportunity to take up employment abroad in the form of seasonal or temporary work schemes, based on the employers' demand for workers. Temporary work contracts can specify return and future re-entry. This allows migrants to move back and forth between destination countries and countries of origin. This kind of circular migration is expected to reduce irregular migration by creating safe and legal migration channels, while maximizing the positive impact on development. However, recruitment from European countries mostly targets high-skilled foreigners. This can cause brain drain, mainly in public sectors like education and health care. To compensate for this negative effect, it is important to target development aid at building adequate working conditions and providing vocational training in these sectors so that skilled workers are more inclined to stay in their home country. In addition, there should be guidelines for the recruitment of highly-educated migrants from developing countries and more incentives to target the less educated. Migration of low-skilled workers usually has more positive effects on development as remittances are sent to poorer families and unemployment among the poor is reduced (OECD 2007). Alongside this, attention should be given to protect the rights of circular migrants. They are more vulnerable to exploitation due to their lack of permanent status. Migrants who suffer from exploitation and discrimination will earn less and gain less knowledge and skills. As such, they will not contribute as much to development in their countries of origin compared to migrants who managed to integrate and work in a regular way in their host country. In this way, policies and structures of European countries can be adjusted to maximize the positive and minimize the negative effects of migration (Hong and Knoll 2016).

A second policy measure of the EU should be to support a better regulation of intra-African migration. For this, it is crucial to invest in regional economic opportunities, to harmonize regulations and to advance an 'orderly and freer flow of people' (Knoll and De Weijer 2016, p. 7). An estimated 20% of the migrants that travel on the trans-Saharan route intend to migrate to Europe. The large majority stays in Africa. For them migration is an important strategy to cope with demographic and climate pressures. It is necessary to ensure the maintenance of intra-African migration as these flows contribute to stability in the region (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017).

The third policy recommendation is to reduce the costs of financial transfers through formal channels. Currently, the costs of sending remittances are relatively high with an average of 7.5% of the transferred amount. Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, transfer costs are extraordinarily high, at an average of 9.5% (IOM 2016). A reduction of transfer costs will lead to a higher amount of remittances. A greater use of formal channels would also be positive as banks are able to encourage recipients to save more and use their savings for productive investment. However, formal channels will not be used as long as the costs of transferring money is too high (OECD 2007).

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Chapter 10
Migration Partnership Framework and the Externalization of European Union's (EU) Migration Policy in West Africa: The Case of Mali and Niger

Amanda Bisong

10.1 Introduction

The European Union's (EU) migration tool box consists of a plethora of instruments as the post 2015–2016 surge in migration (commonly referred to as the 'crisis') has led to the reinvention of most of its instruments and funding opportunities especially in relation to third countries. The instruments are multilateral, regional and bilateral in nature. Of particular relevance in this regard is the migration partnership framework. The demand for new cooperation between the EU and third countries on migration requires one to ask how these instruments influence the migration policies of non-EU states.

Using a case study approach, this chapter therefore aims to understand the influence of EU migration governance instruments on migration governance in West Africa, specifically the cases of Mali and Niger. The overarching argument of this chapter is that the agreements and instruments implemented under the migration partnership framework contribute to the externalization of the EU's migration policies to third countries and the outsourcing of the EU's border management. These outcomes are determined by the power and security dynamics between the EU and West African countries. A characteristic of the new migration partnership framework is the outright focus on the return and readmission of irregular migrants, which stems from the EU's focus on reducing the number of arrivals. The European Commission and its Member States are focused on achieving 'fast and operational returns' (Reslow 2017a, b). This differs from the priority of

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African countries, whose focus is on improving the conditions for free movement on the continent (African Union 2018) and negotiating opportunities and channels for regular migration to Europe (European Council 2018). These differing priorities have resulted in conflicts between African and European migration policies and practice. As succinctly put by Collet and Ahad (2017), "the European Union may be setting unrealistic expectations or, at worst, compromising the very migration management goals it is pursuing" (p. 1). The challenge for the EU and the third countries with which it negotiates is therefore to balance short-term goals with long-term development goals in order to achieve the migration benefit for all parties: the states (sending, receiving and transit) and the migrants, resulting in the much-hailed triple win approach.

The analysis in this article is based on an extensive desk review of the various agreements and the literature including articles, book chapters, textbooks, reports and manuscripts relevant to migration in West Africa. Further sources consulted were the directives and reports of the EU Commission to the European Parliament, and reports on the implementation of the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF) projects in Member States. Media sources, newspaper reports and joint communiques by NGOs & CSOs were also analyzed. Five key stakeholder interviews (KSI) on the impact of the EU policies on ECOWAS regulations and the free movement agenda were conducted with representatives from the ECOWAS Commission, development agencies, civil society organizations, the media and the diaspora. The interviews were semi-structured and conducted via telephone and in-person. Finally, the analysis is also based on long time participation and observation in the migration processes at the regional level in West Africa.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The next section presents the review of the literature on migration in West Africa and the theoretical framework that underpins the arguments in this chapter. The theoretical framework seeks to explain state behavior in international relations. The third section traces the evolution of the EU's migration agreements from the Global Agreement on Mobility and Migration (GAMM) to the current migration partnership framework. The fourth section analyses the implementation of the EU migration partnership framework and the case studies of Niger and Mali. This is followed by a section that provides insights into the upcoming trends in migration policy making in West Africa. The final section concludes and proffers recommendations on what should be the priority of West African States while entering into migration related negotiations with the EU.

10.2 Migration in West Africa: Partnerships and Policies

West Africa is a region with high migratory movements with 84% of these movements happening within the region. Traditional migratory routes and networks pre-date colonial boundaries in the region (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). Colonial borders led to the restriction of movement of people in West Africa. However, cross border movements persisted during the colonial and post-colonial era, especially

among people who live in the border regions. As part of regional integration efforts, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) encourages the free movement of people in the region through its protocols on free movement of persons, the right of establishment and residence.

10.2.1 Abridged Review of the Literature on Migration in West Africa

While previously there was a dearth of literature on migration in West Africa, especially from the sending countries' perspective, the last 3–5 years have witnessed an exponential increase in the number of academic and policy related papers and articles on West African migration (den Hertog 2016; Flahaux and De Haas 2016; Castillejo 2017; Collet and Ahad 2017; Usro 2017; Bisong 2019; Brachet 2018; Kipp 2018; Kirwin and Anderson 2018). This focus on West Africa is relative to the increased attention West Africa has received in terms of funding on migration, media and policy discussions. Earlier research on West African migration focused on the 'push' factors leading to migration from West Africa to Europe. These push factors include unemployment, violent conflicts, famine and a general lack of economic opportunities (Reuveny 2007; de Haas 2008; Cross 2009). Kirwin and Anderson (2018) identify economic reasons as the main motivation for migrating and the love of family and country as the motivation for staying put in five out of six West African countries. In the case of Nigeria, the study revealed that insecurity is not a driver in the desire to migrate. Conversely, economic development does not discourage the tendency to migrate. This interest to migrate is prevalent among the educated urban class in Nigeria. This insight is relevant for policy makers as most interventions targeting the reduction of migrants in Europe focus on empowering potential migrants with the economic potential to dissuade them from migrating, based on the premise that West African migration occurs from the perspective of economic migration (Cross 2009). Their findings show that improved domestic development realities could assuage the concerns and grievances of those that seek to migrate (Kirwin and Anderson 2018).

Migration within West Africa occurs mostly between the Sahel and Coastal states and mixed migratory flows occur simultaneously with inter-regional labor migration (Charrière and Frèsia 2012). Intra-regional migration is largely governed by ECOWAS regulations and protocols. In practice, however, the implementation of these policies by the state agencies differs between the various states. This has implications on migration patterns, labor mobility movements and the migration profile of West African states (Adepoju 2001; Adeopju et al. 2009). ECOWAS regulations on refugee protection and trafficking in persons contribute to governing the mixed migration flows in the region (Charrière and Frèsia 2012).

There has been extensive focus on the movement of migrants from West Africa to Europe despite the high level of movements within West Africa. Exploring the

relationship between the European Union (EU) and West Africa, the initial focus was on irregular migration to Europe and understanding the patterns of migration in West Africa (Cross 2009). This focus has also drawn the EU's migration governance to West Africa. Migration in West Africa is not only governed by the policies of ECOWAS and its member states. For instance, Lavenex et al. (2016) reveal that the EU's migration policies have strongly influenced migration policies in third countries through norm diffusion in complementary regionalism. This practice has largely been viewed as the externalization of migration policies from Europe to the Global South especially in West Africa (Lavenex and Uçarer 2002; Adeopju et al. 2009). The EU, through multilevel interregional governance, has contributed in promoting and broadening the externalization of the its migration policy in Africa (Gabrielli 2016) and West Africa (Bisong 2019). The mobility partnerships of the EU have been regarded as a tool for the externalization of the EU's migration policy in third countries (Brocza and Paulhart 2015). An example is the mobility partnership with Cape Verde (Reslow 2012).

The recent scholarship focusing on the migration partnership framework of the EU discusses its role in shaping the migration policies of third countries especially in Africa (Collet and Ahad 2017). It equally examines the effect in the externalization of EU's migration policy (Gabrielli 2016). Castillejo (2017) conducts an in-depth analysis of the migration partnership framework, examining the effects of these new forms of instruments on EU-Africa relations and the different perspectives of the EU actors on the framework. Country-level case studies on the migration partnership framework and its implementation in Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Niger and Ethiopia (Castillejo 2017) provide an in-depth analysis of the changes between the various types of agreements (Collet and Ahad 2017). The EU migration partnership framework and its effects have been analyzed in particular to understand the motivating factor behind the new partnership framework and its potential effect on the externalization of the EU's migration policy (Borzel and Risse 2016; Lavenex et al. 2016). The European migration crisis has been externalized to African countries more recently through the European common agenda for migration (Crawley and Blitz 2019), using the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) as the main instrument for promoting this externalization through the focus on border management and irregular migration policies in African countries (den Hertog 2016; Kipp 2018). There is a need to deepen this understanding by explaining why states in West Africa accept the externalization of EU migration policies and border control within their borders though it contradicts the objectives of free movement as enshrined ECOWAS protocols.

10.2.2 Power Relations and State Behavior in Migration Policy

While states have the legitimacy to define their migration policies and determine the inclusion and exclusion of prospective migrants (Song 2018), national immigration policies are shaped by international norms and through global policy diffusion. States seek to cooperate with global and regional powers to secure political and economic survival for their rule at home (Natter 2018). Natter summarizes that national migration policy is based on four primary determinants: (1) the role of socioeconomic interests at the domestic level, operating via interest groups and public opinion; (2) the importance of foreign policy and diplomatic interests; (3) the role of state institutions' potentially conflicting interests; and (4) the impact of international norms on national policymaking. Therefore, migration policies, although influenced by third parties, reflect domestic interests.

Although social issues equally play a role in determining immigration policies of states (Natter 2018), the introduction of the EU in the migration dialogue between countries and its focus on security and anti-terrorism have shifted the emphasis in the migration policy dialogue on the security aspects of migration and the need for states to cooperate to address these challenges. The focus on the security and migration nexus equally highlights the links between networks for human, arms and drug trafficking with the networks responsible for smuggling of migrants. As a result, the dialogue on the security aspects of migration and the securitization of the migration policy dialogue has become the focus of the EU's externalization policy in Mali and Niger, as stressed in this chapter, contrary to issues of development, better welfare and unemployment that plague several African states.

Natter's second determinant of immigration policy focuses on the role of foreign policy and diplomatic interest groups and political players within a state that play a key role in shaping the foreign policy of a state through their domestic interests. In the case of Mali, the diaspora community plays a strong role in shaping Mali's migration policy and forming a resistance to the external pressure of third countries in relation to the implementation of its national migration policies (Interview 5). Institutional norms have an impact on national policy making through the actions of international organizations such as IOM and UN, who function as transmission agents for the externalization agenda of the EU in third countries (Lavenex 2006) such as Mali and Niger.

In addition to the above determinants, I argue in this chapter that power relations between the EU and West African states such as Mali and Niger are responsible for shaping the migration policies of these countries. Power in this sense is exerted through the use of financial incentives, conditionalities and development aid. While acknowledging the sovereignty of states and their choice to respond to external pressures based on their domestic interests (in the case of Mali), the power relations still play a strong role in determining the migration policies of these countries. Thus, the European Union and its Member States play a dominant role in exerting power over sovereign West African states through their actions.

10.3 Migration Agreements Between the EU and Third Countries in West Africa

The EU's policies for addressing migration from third countries can be traced from the introduction of the Schengen agreement promoting free movement within the EU space, which warranted the need to ensure that the free movement was guaranteed only for citizens of the community. The revised Maastricht treaty of the EU increased the role of the Commission in harmonizing migration policies. Prior to this, EU Member States were directly responsible for their migration policies in relation to third countries. The introduction of the common short stay visa policy, common asylum policy, rules regarding the common treatment of third country nationals and readmission resulted in harmonized rules in dealing with entrants into the union space. However, Member States still maintained their prerogative concerning other aspects of migration policy.

The Global Approach to Migration (GAM) was introduced by the Council of Europe in 2005 (European Commission 2019). The GAM had four main pillars, which sought to achieve a triple win relationship between the host countries, countries of origin and transit and the migrants. The four main pillars are:

- Strengthening cooperation and action between Member States,
- Increasing dialogue and cooperation between Africa and Mediterranean,
- Promoting the creation of a framework for implementing a strategy on migration and
- Promoting international protection (European Commission 2019).

The GAM issued in 2005, marked the transition in the dialogue from 'controlling migration' to 'managing migration'. The role of all stakeholders in the migration dialogue to reduce human trafficking, irregular migration and improve channels for legal migration to Europe was discussed and steps to concretize these measures put in place. Expanding on this initiative, the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2012, focused on the role of cooperation with third countries in contributing to the EU's migration agenda. The GAMM was built on a regional and bilateral approach with four main pillars:

- Promoting and improving the organization of legal migration,
- Preventing and reducing irregular migration and combatting trafficking,
- Promoting internal protection of the external dimension of asylum and
- Maximizing the positive effects of migration and development (European Commission 2019).

On the part of the EU, the importance was for third countries to actively participate and cooperate in return and readmission of their nationals and to contribute to reducing the number of irregular entrants to the EU from third countries. This led to a period of negotiations of mobility partnership agreements with several countries including Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Serbia, Senegal, Cape Verde, Nigeria amongst others (Reslow and Vink 2015). In West Africa, the mobility

partnerships were negotiated with Cape Verde and Senegal. Only the agreement with Cape Verde was successfully concluded. The negotiations with Senegal broke down (Chou and Gibert 2012; Van Criekinge 2010; Reslow and Vink 2015). A Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM) which is more general and much broader in scope than the mobility partnerships was signed by the EU with Nigeria, Ethiopia and India respectively.

The mobility partnerships were launched by the European Commission in 2007 as a framework for migration relations between the EU and non-EU countries. Countries, in signing the mobility partnerships undertook to make commitments to reduce the irregular migration towards Europe, through signing readmission or return agreements, increased cooperation with Frontex (now European Border and Coast Guard Agency) or the EU Member States' border agencies. The mobility partnerships have the objective of increasing the opportunities for regular migration to Europe through increased labor mobility schemes (including circular mobility), recognition of qualifications, cooperation between academic institutions, scholarships and exchanges. The partnerships equally highlight the migration and development nexus by encouraging diaspora relations and noting the need for easier transfer of remittances (Reslow 2012). They address the need for countries to cooperate in facilitating the return and reintegration of migrants. The mobility partnerships were in the form of political declarations between the partner state, the EU Commission and the interested EU Member States. The mobility partnerships contained an annex of the activities to be carried out by both the interested EU Member States and the partner country in addressing the migration measures identified. These measures were broadly classified along six categories of action: monitoring and awareness of migration flows; employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration; mobility and short-stay visas; links between migration and development, diasporas, money transfers; asylum and immigration; cooperation on border management, identity and travel documents and the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings (Council of the European Union 2008).

A general characteristic of the mobility partnerships was a key focus on return and readmission of nationals and third country nationals. Mobility partnerships were designed to operate on an incentive basis, granting labor market opening in exchange for cooperation on irregular migration. In the Cape Verdean agreement, the main focus of the activities had two dimensions: exploring the channels for legal opportunities for migration to Europe and the fight against irregular migration.[1] The activities suggested under the fight against irregular migration seemed to have a potentially wider impact when implemented due to the participation of broader EU agencies such as EUROPOL and FRONTEX, suggesting greater coordination based on expertise. However, the activities on exploring legal opportunities were mostly Member State driven and included bilateral agreements between the partner state and an EU Member State, in this case Portugal. Multilateral commitments were phrased

[1]The agreement refers to 'illegal migration' as opposed to 'irregular migration' used by the author in the chapter.

broadly and in a careful manner to avoid commitment (Chou and Gibert 2012). Increasing the channels for legal opportunities to migrate to Europe and migration and development are two areas that have been of importance to West African states in the discussions on migration.

Since the introduction of the mobility partnerships, nine partnerships have been signed. The partnerships are negotiated on behalf of the EU Member States by the Commission. Member States indicate their interest in participating during the negotiations which is typically led by the EU delegation and a Member State. At the end of the process, the mobility partnership is launched through the signature of a "joint declaration" between the non-EU country, the participating Member States and the EU. An appendix to the joint declaration lists the projects to be carried out within the mobility partnership (Reslow 2017a, b). While the successful partnerships have been acknowledged, very little attention is given to the negative experiences, particularly failed negotiations (Chou and Gibert 2012; Reslow 2012).

In West Africa, negotiations between Ghana and the EU and Senegal and the EU on mobility partnerships broke down. Chou and Gibert (2012) noted that the web of complex factors which led to the breakdown of the negotiations include Senegal failing to see the 'value addition' which an EU wide mobility partnership agreement would provide in view of the successful bilateral agreements which were already in place with several EU member States, especially France and Spain. The unfavorable cost-benefit-calculation by the French and Senegalese parties to the negotiation led to an unclear and awkward negotiating strategy on both sides. The priorities of both parties were misaligned as the focus of the EU negotiations was on return and readmission, opposed to Senegal's focus on increasing the legal opportunities for migration and the migration and development nexus. "The Senegalese government's migration agenda has a strong orientation towards the migration-development nexus, by focusing primarily on the potential positive effects of migration, such as remittances or diaspora engagement, and brain gain through migrant return" (Van Criekinge 2008, p. 20). Remittances play a huge role in Senegal's GDP contributing about 11.2% in 2017 (World Bank 2018), therefore it was important to the government to ensure that these aspects are captured in the negotiations. Chou and Gibert (2012) equally highlights another salient point in the negotiations, which is the political aspects of the negotiations and the fact that irregular migration offers an escape for the youth in the country who would otherwise be engaged with fighting the political anomalies in the government. The lack of a coherent or unitary EU policy on several issues, such as asylum policies and legal migration options, have contributed to the preference by EU Member States and West African Countries of bilateral migration arrangements over an EU wide arrangement, leading to the breakdown of the negotiations. Chou and Gibert (2012), identified the role of previous colonial powers in the migration negotiations and subsequent agreements. This was evidenced in the fact that the negotiations on the EU part were led by France which also has a bilateral migration agreement with Senegal, and on the part of Cape Verde, the negotiations were led by Portugal. Domestic issues such as internal power struggles between the ministries over who would be in charge of negotiations, also contributed to the breakdown of the negotiations.

The regional processes resulting from the GAMM which some West African states feature in is the Rabat process. The Euro-Africa ministerial conference on migration and development in 2006, resulted in the Rabat process. The focus of the process is on migration management through stronger border controls, renegotiating readmission agreements, assistance to improving access to education, training opportunities for legal migrants facilitating circular migration (EU 2017). It equally aims at improving legal migration, combating irregular migration and exploring the synergies between migration and development. Financial and technical assistance on migration is provided under the European Development Fund (EDF), for example financing measures in 2006 for African Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) under the 10th EDF totaled 25 million Euro.

10.3.1 EU Migration Partnership Framework: Compacts

The European Agenda on Migration, presented in 2015, led to the introduction of the migration partnership framework and 'compacts' by the European Commission as a flexible instrument for addressing the 'crisis' governance of migration in 2015 and 2016. The Valletta summit identified five priority countries in Africa for negotiations of compacts. These were, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Niger and Mali. These countries were selected based on the political will of the states to engage in the dialogue on migration, the number of irregular migrants from these countries in Europe, and previous cooperation on migration including return and readmission with these third countries (Council of the European Union December 2016).

The compacts have been in various stages of negotiations since 2016 and regular reports are made by the European Commission to the Council on the negotiation and implementation of the agreements (Castillejo 2017). While the initial reports were optimistic about the implementation of the compacts and the negotiations were initially deemed to be progressing, the level of negotiation/implementation has stalled in some States (Nigeria, Ethiopia), while in other States like Mali and Niger the implementation of activities under the compact is improving and forging ahead strongly. The number of countries with which negotiations are ongoing has increased to 16 (European Commission 2016a, b).

The compacts are flexible agreements, tailored for each country which combines elements from different EU instruments and policies focused on achieving the same objectives. The conditionality depends on the third country cooperation on readmission and return; effective incentives and leverage created using all EU policies, in particular trade and development (see the EU-Jordan Compact).

The compacts have been criticized as being driven by the short-term goal of reducing the number of arrivals in Europe (van Dillen June 2016). Although in theory, the compacts aim at balancing the short-term goals of reducing arrivals in Europe through irregular means of migration, increased return and readmission of irregular migrants and the long-term goal of migration and development, return and reintegration. However, this balance is not often visible in practice. The focus of the

EU tends to be on the goal of readmissions and return which has been seen to be the common denominator in almost all its migration agreements. On the other hand, the focus of third countries is not limited to returns and readmission, but on other issues, such as migration and development, remittances and creating legal opportunities for migration through regular channels (Chou and Gibert 2012; Castillejo 2017; Collet and Ahad 2017). The priority areas of West African states are clearly indicated in their national migration policy documents at the national level and at the regional level, the ECOWAS Common Approach on migration is the common framework which binds all Member States in developing their various migration policies.

The introduction of compacts under the migration partnership framework and the European Union trust fund for migration as a result of the Valletta summit has also resulted in the increase of 'tied aid' (Castillejo 2017; Collet and Ahad 2017; Bisong 2019). Development aid is used as a conditionality for rewarding or punishing states' cooperation on migration issues. Koenig (April 6 2017) refers to the 'more for more' or 'less for less' approach adopted by the European Commission in the implementation of development projects in countries where migration dialogues are ongoing. The EU in its report to the Council clearly notes that based on humanitarian principles, conditionality cannot be attached to the discussions on migration issues. The EU instead recommends the use of incentives such as visa policies or 'alternative practical arrangements' (Council of the European Union September 2017). The Framework states that "a mix of positive and negative incentives" should be used "[. . .]to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure there are consequences for those who refuse" (European Commission 2016a, b). However, in practice, one sees that the commitments under the EUTF and EDF are increasing in countries where there is perceived positive cooperation. This is especially seen in the case of Niger and Mali. The "Valletta Action Plan" sets out five priority domains of cooperation: (1) addressing the root causes of irregular migration and developing the benefits of migration; (2) promoting regular migration and mobility; (3) reinforcing protection and asylum policies; (4) fighting against human trafficking and migrant smuggling; and (5) strengthening cooperation to facilitate return and reintegration of irregular migrants (European Commission 2015). The EUTF makes use of official development aid especially from the EDF and the new partnership framework (migration compacts) introduces both positive and negative conditionalities and strengthens the externalization of EU migration policy in third countries (Bisong 2019). However, the quick fix approach of the EUTF has been criticized as likely to fail because addressing the drivers of irregular migration requires a long term, coherent and sustainable approach (Concord 2018).

Another important tool is the utilization of investments from the European Investment Bank of up to 44 billion Euros for states where migration compacts are planned. These investments and aid projects are aimed at 'addressing the root causes of migration' through short term measures such as creation of job opportunities for unemployed youth, training in vocational and technical skills (Council of the European Union December 2016). Further tools suggested include the 'EU common

migration bonds', reorienting development funds towards migration policy as suggested by Italy's non-paper on migration.

The EUTF and EDF fund assisted voluntary returns from transit countries, information on legal channels of migration through information/advisory centers; sensitization and awareness raising campaigns on irregular migration and smuggling. Other activities include border management techniques and measures for third country officials, training and cooperation with FRONTEX and EUROPOL on identifying smuggling and trafficking units. While some of these projects are actually targeted at addressing the root causes of migration in West Africa, the rest have been criticized as not being properly designed in collaboration with the national partners and merely dispensing the available funding from the EUTF without considering the impact of the measures on long term migration (Interview 1). The projects under the EUTF are located based on the identification of places seen as origin, transit and destination of irregular migrants, rather than on the basis of traditional needs analyses (Concord 2018).

10.4 The Externalization of EU Migration Policies to West Africa: The Case of Mali and Niger

The southern border of the European Union is increasingly being moved southwards, from the North African countries which have been part of the EU neighborhood, the borders are now extending to the Sahara through policy (Brachet 2018). As one European ambassador said, "Niger is now the southern border of Europe" (Howden and Zandonini 2018). Through the migration policy of the European Union and its implementation of the external aspects of this policy, the states in West Africa are now complicit in the protection of the external borders of the EU. States are cooperating with the EU in enforcing containment policies. According to Landau (2019), these polices are carried out through three main channels: conditional aid, redefining successful development to include limiting the root causes of migration and support to the free movement agenda of the African Union. This support to free movement is in itself self-delusional as the policies of the EU tend to stifle the free movement agenda at both the continental level and in RECs such as ECOWAS, where a considerable amount of progress had already been achieved (Bisong 2019). Several measures have been taken by EU states to keep West African States in line and in compliance with implementing EU migration policies through the use of a mix of positive and negative incentives and the use of leverage and tools (Wagner 2018). Conditionalities are increasingly being used by the EU and its Member States in a more for more approach, meaning that better cooperation with the EU results in more funding for the states. The contentious issue has been the number of returns that are facilitated by the West African States through the issues of emergency travel certificates needed to complete the returns of nationals. As one stakeholder argued, while some states comply in the process of

identification and issuance of the travel certificate, others have a long wait period. The EU seeks to remove the delay in waiting for the documentation to be issued by the African government (Interview 4).

Niger and Mali are two states in West Africa that benefit from the EU Trust Fund for Africa and security cooperation with the EU. These two aspects of their cooperation with the EU contribute to the externalization of the EU's migration policies. The Sahel Lake Chad window in the EUTF has the largest amount of disbursements, 1.466 billion Euros; Mali has received 197 million Euros; Niger has received over 247.5 million Euros under the EUTF. Partner countries migration profiles influence the shape of the EUTF projects. The amount of funds received through the EUTF are used not only in migration issues, and addressing the 'root causes of migration' but these funds are also used towards addressing security issues in both countries, assisting the governments in legitimizing their positions and contributing towards development (Kipp 2018).

The insecurity in the Sahel has been ongoing for several years, characterized by a mix of secessionists, extremist and fundamentalist armed groups combined with rising poverty levels and lack of government control over sizable portions the region. This has contributed to the formulation of several strategies by development actors to address the development and security challenges in this region. First of these was the UN Sahel Strategy, followed by the EU's Sahel Strategy, then the AU's Sahel Strategy and more recently the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy. While all strategies place an emphasis on the security situation of the Sahel and the links between migration and security are highlighted, the ECOWAS strategy focuses on the development of the Sahel region as the main key to addressing the security challenges. While migration has always been a part of the discussions on the Sahel Strategy, the increased focus is due to the challenges being faced in Europe (Interview 4). Migration routes, however, pose a security threat in the region as have been alluded to by governments of Niger, Mali and security experts. This is because these routes also serve for smuggling arms, posing a security threat to these countries.

10.4.1 Niger: A Symbol of Cooperation?

Niger is one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world ranking 187 out of 188 on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2017. The lowest figures are in public health, education and standard of living. Niger is a huge recipient of development aid targeted towards poverty alleviation measures as over 45% of the population lives below the poverty line. The country presents a complex web of interests in relation to migration. Niger has a fragile political context, is a transit country for irregular migrants and a host country for a high number of refugees from Nigeria, Chad and Mali mostly displaced from the Boko Haram crises in the region. Based on these challenges, Niger is open to receiving support on addressing migration issues. Migration has not always been viewed in a negative light in Niger. Migration has contributed to the economy of Nigerien communities for centuries

with major trading routes crisscrossing through certain parts of the country. Seasonal migration has also played a huge role with the nomadic communities in Niger. The negative view of migration is recent in the light of the increased number of irregular migrants transiting through Niger towards Libya and then to Europe. This has also been increased by the migrant crisis in Europe and the need for the externalization of EU migration policy and borders (Interview 3).

Niger is hailed as a country that has cooperated with the European Union and its Member States in combatting smuggling by ensuring the prosecution of smugglers and reducing the number of irregular migrants transiting through Niger to Europe. According to the fifth progress report on the implementation of the migration compacts, the action plan of the national migration strategy has been adopted by the Nigerien government. Under the EUTF, Niger is the third largest recipient of funding with a total of over 247.5 million Euros disbursed since 2015 (Kipp 2018). There was a direct budgetary support of 50 million Euros to the Ministry of Finance (Council of the European Union September 2017). The EUTF in Niger is focused on projects relating to the reduction of transit migrants and the development and protection of communities. There have been concerns raised by the local partners over the limited impact and opaque selection and monitoring and evaluation processes of the implementation of the EUTF projects. Current projects fail to acknowledge the link between the government and the trafficking and smuggling networks (Concord 2018). The overall EU migration cooperation strategy with Niger focuses on three priorities: (1) strengthening migration control, (2) fighting against human smuggling and trafficking and (3) supporting growth and employment alternatives (Concord 2018). There is a strong prioritization of the security dimension of migration based on the projects financed by the EUTF. This clearly points to development resources available through the EUTF being diverted from development to migration control (Concord 2018). The implications for the government in Niger are that it receives adequate funding to support some of its activities through direct budget support measures (Alternatives 2016a, b). Although stricter border control rules along known routes are leading to the emergence of alternative routes, there is a coordinated platform for monitoring the emergence of alternative routes. This has resulted in limiting seasonal migration and freedom of movement within the ECOWAS space. The EUTF measures do not consider this and focus on border control measures, on increased return activities for stranded migrants, training on brick making, jewelry production and the EU emergency action plan against smuggling of migrants in the Agadez region.

The situation in Niger is one where the government is closely aligned with the EU and its Member States in addressing the challenges of migration and security. The government of Niger has put in place a coherent migration policy with a clear strategic framework which facilitates co-operation with the EU and its Member States. The full cooperation of the Nigerien government is evident in the laws passed by the government, the attitude towards ensuring that international organizations operate freely with the cooperation of the local authorities. The recently adopted law '*Loi 2015-36 Relative au Trafic Illicite de Migrants*' (Republique du Niger 2015) criminalizes the trafficking of migrants and is an example of the direct intervention

of the EU in the migration policy of the state. The law, largely praised by the international community and highly contested by the civil society scene in Niger, has rendered several businesses in the Agadez region out of employment. "We need to implement this law gently as many people were living off migration and they were promised compensation by Europe for leaving it behind, but this hasn't happened yet" (Howden and Zandonini 2018). As a result leaving the communities open to increasing instability with loss of jobs from the smuggling industry (Tinti 2017).

The feeling within the state is that the implementation of the law in practice has led to a contradiction of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement (Alternatives 2016a, b). The northern part of the country is also completely cut off as everyone travelling northwards from Agadez is deemed to be a potential irregular migrant. The frequent increase in migrant controls in the desert has led to an increase in migrant deaths (Interview 3) as drivers flee from authorities to avoid paying bribes to corrupt officials. Also, the ECOWAS protocol, which provides 90 days for ECOWAS citizens within the Member States, is not being respected. "It is not the content of the law which is the problem, but it is the way the law is implemented in practice" (Interview 3). The general feeling is that the steps taken by Niger to reduce regional migration are contrary to the national interests as Nigeriens also migrate to Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali. The EU plays a huge role in determining the migration policies of the country, mostly to the detriment of the population as various measures are being tested out in Niger and the potential outcomes or impacts of these measures are not immediately foreseen.

While the cooperation between the EU and Niger is focused on breaking the business model of smugglers and increasing the cooperation on returns and readmission of irregular migrants, European policy makers should understand how anti migrant smuggling efforts might impact the local security dynamics in the country and its political stability (Tinti 2017). It has also resulted in less attention to the needs of the country such as poverty eradication and good governance as the focus of the government is on combatting irregular migration. This is contrary to the ECOWAS objectives of maximizing the benefits of regular regional migration. At the heart of the cooperation with the EU is the need for political legitimacy of the present government and the need for funds to run the government, both of which are offered by the EU as the international visibility and cooperation with the international community has increased the political legitimacy of the government. "For the citizens however, these funds have not translated into improved welfare or living conditions. However, it is also too early to tell" (Interview 3).

The combination of social issues, foreign policies and interests combined with states' institutions and international norms (Natter 2018), as represented in the national migration policy and the national laws on migration linkages, have contributed to the determination of Niger's migration policy. The power dynamics as expressed through the instruments of the EUTF and the security cooperation agreements contribute to the externalization of the EU's migration policy in Niger.

10.4.2 Mali: Prevailing Domestic Interests?

Mali is significant as both a country of origin and transit for migrants mostly from Guinea, Senegal and Gambia. Mali has a sensitive political and security context, with crises in the north and center of the country. There are still 135,000 Malian refugees in neighboring West African Countries (Council of the European Union December 2016). Mali is also a least developed country ranking 175 out of 188 on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2017. Traditionally, Mali is a huge recipient of development aid targeted towards maintaining peace and security and stabilization efforts in the country. Security concerns are identified as one of the main drivers of migratory movements. The government considers that migration, peace and security are strategically linked. The government has been hailed for keeping up with its UN peace agreements recently and there is relative calm in the south of the country. However, there are underlying tensions in relation to political clashes and potential breaches of the peace agreement that could result in the deterioration of the security situation.

The European Union has supported the common security and defense policy (CSDP) missions in implementing stabilization efforts through training advice and mentoring aimed at dismantling smuggling networks. In implementing returns from the EU, Mali has a return rate of 4.8%, which is the lowest for any third country (Council of the European Union September 2017). Mali has successfully implemented returns of its nationals from Niger and Libya. From 2015 to 2016 there was a series of high-level political visits to Mali to improve the cooperation between Mali and the EU. Due to inaccurate media coverage in December 2016, the readmissions operational agreement was not signed between the EU and Mali. This became a highly sensitive political issue, leading to the Malian government responding to the public opinion on the possible readmission agreement (Castillejo 2017). Although the agreement was not signed, the government is still engaged with the EU in the fight against smuggling of migrants, which continues through the high-level dialogues.

Several projects under the EUTF focus on capacity building of the Malian authorities on border control and management. In October 2016, Japan through IOM supported Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali in the collection of data and better data management of migratory flow. Mali has created an information center for the management of migration (ORTM 2019). This is strongly linked with Mali's geographical situation in the Sahel, the strong contribution of the Malian diaspora to development and the tradition and culture of migration in Mali. It will also address the challenges of migration in the country.

The EU still requires the support of Mali in the identification and documentation of undocumented irregular migrants to support the process of return and readmission. The EU and its Member States provide military support to Mali and support for the creation of jobs and skills development in areas with a high migration incidence to address the root causes of migration. The EUTF supports the resilience and self-sufficiency of the refugees' populations. Mali as a transit country has

worked to curb down irregular smuggling and trafficking in persons. However, the country remains a priority in discussions with the EU and its Member States, especially France, in seeking renewed cooperation on return of irregular migrants (Souleyman 2019).

The Malian diaspora is active in the country socially, economically and politically. The diaspora also contributes through investments in development projects in various regions of the country. In 2016, remittances were more than 5 times higher than aid received. In 2015, remittances accounted for 70.2% of GDP. 20% of these remittances were sent from France. 3% of the Malian diaspora live in the EU and Malians migrate to neighboring countries in the West African region (Usro 2017). The government, acknowledging the role and potential of the diaspora, has enacted several laws to regulate the engagement with the diaspora and ensure that their positive contributions to the Malian society are better harnessed (Keita 2016). This role of the government has led to the emergence of a strong diaspora community with a dynamic voice. This was most recently evident when the diaspora together with the civil society organizations in Mali garnered support against the migration deal between the EU and Mali in 2017 (Sieff and Stanley-Becker 2017).

The EU plays a key role in the security situation of the country and ensures that transit movements through Mali, especially when it comes to irregular migration, is curbed. The Malian government cooperates with the EU in these measures; however, their cooperation with the EU is subject to the domestic interests of the civil society and the diaspora organizations who collectively exert more direct pressure on the government. Although the power relations exist between the EU and the Malian government, the presence of a strong civil society and diaspora serves as a check to ensure that domestic interests are equally addressed.

10.5 The Outcome of the Externalization Agenda in West Africa

As a result of the externalization of the EU's migration policies in West Africa, several trends have emerged in the migration dialogue between the EU and West African States. The first trend is the externalization of asylum requests. This is currently being implemented in Niger by the French Embassy. The trend changes the process of requesting asylum where physical presence was deemed necessary based on international law (Nossiter 2018). This process had failed in Mali and Tunisia but is succeeding in Niger. Asylum seekers heading for France can have their requests processed in Niger. The benefit of this process is that it spares the asylum seeker the treacherous desert travel towards Europe. On the other hand, there is no sufficient information about what happens to the asylum seekers whose requests are denied by the French government. Is the government of Niger capable of handling large numbers of rejected asylum seekers in addition to the internally displaced persons and refugees currently residing in the country? The reports of

processing of asylum claims in Niger with hopes of resettlement in Europe sparked arrivals from Sudan, South Sudan and Eretria (Howden and Zandonini 2018).

There is an increasingly transactional approach towards migration as countries that are deemed to be cooperating with the EU receive more funds for development and migration. On the other hand, countries that do not cooperate with the demands of receiving countries are penalized using the 'more for more' and 'less for less' approach (Sieff and Stanley-Becker 2017; Kipp 2018). There are concerns about funding meant for security and development being used for migration control (Sieff and Stanley-Becker 2017), even though the EU's regional Strategy for the Sahel rests on four pillars: preventing and countering radicalization; improving economic and social conditions for young people; managing migration, mobility and border issue; and fighting illicit trafficking and organized crime. In the wake of the 2015 crisis, the mission of EUCAP Sahel Niger has been expanded to include the fight against clandestine or irregular migration, and has been collaborating together with IOM to address the issues (Lebovich September 2018). This has resulted in an increased focus on border management measures which in turn have led to the securitization of migration within the region which hampers the regional labor movement.

The migration partnership framework poses the risk of undermining the free movement of persons' protocol of the ECOWAS region, especially in the light of the border control and management measures being imposed in the countries within the region engaged in the compact. An example is complaints of stricter border controls for travelers to Niger (Concord 2018). It is important that migration strategies in the region and effective border management reflect the needs of African countries and not the result of the international pressure from third countries or regions (Castillejo 2017). The protocols on free movement ensure that ECOWAS citizens can move freely whereas member states still have the prerogative to determine entry of other citizens within their borders. The application of this principle varies in practice between member states and sometimes results in restrictive practices (Bisong 2019).

10.6 Conclusion

A closer examination of the mobility partnerships under the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and the migration compacts under the European Agenda on Migration reveals that the core interest of the European Union in migration cooperation with West African States has always been on returns and readmissions. To some extent, the interests of third countries regarding issues such as increasing channels for legal migration, circular migration and exploring the synergies between migration and development are also addressed. The new migration partnership framework in essence is not much different from the previous migration agreements between the EU and third countries in Africa, which explains

why cooperation on formal agreements in some countries is stalling, as is the case with Nigeria and Ethiopia.

The implementation of the compacts in Mali and Niger, two countries in West Africa, serve to externalize the EU's migration policy in West Africa. This is carried out through the EUTF and the linkages between migration and security agenda in these countries. The power relations between the EU and these countries, exerted through the use of financial incentives, conditionalities and development aid, serve to determine the migration policies of the countries. Socio-economic interests at the domestic level, operating via interest groups and the public opinion, play a role in determining or limiting migration policies as clearly seen in the case of Mali based on the role of the civil society and diaspora organizations. Engaging on the international scene with important foreign interests as the EU allows the government of Niger to improve its political legitimacy. The state institutions in both Niger and Mali are cooperating with the EU in the externalization of the EU's migration policies through the increased focus on border management measures. And lastly, international norms are relevant in national migration policymaking as the development of most national migration policy documents are supported by international agencies.

In a bid to respond to political pressure from its Member States, the EU's intervention in West Africa are usually short sighted and fail to adapt to the local conditions in the country or align adequately with the regional agenda. This leads to increasing local tensions in some cases like in Agadez, Niger and Mali with the diaspora community or potentially contributing to instability in the long run if tenable solutions are not found for the aggrieved populations. The resulting dissatisfaction among the local population may foster local conflict if alternative employment/livelihood situations are not found. The support implemented in Niger should be balanced with policies that maximize the benefits of regular regional migration and promote safe and regular pathways to Europe. The projects implemented under the EUTF should focus on the poverty alleviation and good governance issues which Niger is equally battling with.

The linkages between migration and development, trade, security control and employment have put third countries, especially those dependent on development aid, in a tight position to make decisions regarding cooperation on migration issues with the EU. However, these migration compacts present an opportunity for the EU and third countries to re-evaluate their cooperation on migration. The reduction of arrivals in Europe and successful return of irregular migrants should not be achieved at the expense of other important measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance which contribute to the root causes of external migratory movements outside the region. These successes should also not be achieved at the expense of the regional migration agenda especially in the case of ECOWAS, where this is quite developed.

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Chapter 11
Apprise: Sentinel Surveillance of Labor Exploitation and Its' Potential Impact on Migration Policy

Hannah Thinyane and Francisca Sassetti

11.1 Introduction

Migration within and between countries in the Global South is an increasingly significant factor in the social and economic advancement of developing countries. While this strategy has benefited millions of internal and international migrants, it has also given rise to exploitative working conditions, as booming markets and rapid urbanization have resulted in a constant demand for cheap labor (Benach et al. 2011). These workers are often forced to fill dangerous, dirty, or degrading jobs, which exist due to weak labor governance in the destination country (Zimmerman and Kiss 2017). The exploitation that they face can range from payment under minimum wage and discrimination to more severe kinds of exploitation such as hazardous work, long hours, physical confinement, and violence.

In this work we draw on Skrivankova's (2010) continuum of exploitation (Fig. 11.1) that defines 'decent work' and 'forced labor' as two ends of a continuum, with any situation between the two end points representing different unacceptable forms of work (UFW). UFWs are defined as "compromising conditions that deny fundamental principles and rights at work, put at risk the lives, health, freedom, human dignity and security of workers or keep households in conditions of poverty" (ILO 2015, p. 1). Using this continuum, we can see human trafficking as a process, consisting of a series of exploitative acts that move a worker towards a situation of forced labor.

Weitzer describes this broad range of work situations similarly to Skrivankova (2010), as "range[ing] from highly coercive and exploitative to cooperative, consensual, and mutually beneficial relationships between migrants and their facilitators, with more complex grey areas in between the two poles" (2014, p. 20).

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Fig. 11.1 Continuum of exploitation. Adapted from Skrivankova (2010)

This conceptual ambiguity makes accounting for victims of human trafficking more challenging. For instance, there is a wide disparity in existing estimates of the extent of forced labor and human trafficking. These differ depending on the definition of human trafficking as well as the method for estimating the affected hidden population. Weitzer notes that "it is impossible to satisfactorily count (or even estimate) the number of persons involved or the magnitude of profits within an illicit, clandestine, underground economy at the macro level" (2014, p. 13). Other researchers have raised concerns with the accuracy of estimates because of "methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies" (US Government Accountability Office 2006), as well as a lack of transparency and sources for figures used (Kelly 2005).

In this chapter we argue that while it is important to recognize the global prevalence of human trafficking, more focus should be placed on uncovering patterns of exploitation, in order to support the development of evidence-based policy. If we borrow from medical terminology, a classic approach to epidemiology is used to identify and count every case of a disease. For infections such as HIV, this was difficult because of the related rights issues, prejudices, and the resultant hidden nature of the disease. Practitioners took an approach to track trends over time, instead of trying to determine prevalence, referred to as sentinel surveillance. Using this terminology, this chapter introduces Apprise, a system we have developed and are currently piloting in Thailand to support a sentinel surveillance approach to understanding human trafficking. The system aims to support the broad range of stakeholders whose role it is to assess working conditions and to help potential victims access help or remediation channels (including police, labor inspectors, auditors, non-governmental organizations; who we broadly refer to as frontline responders (FLRs)), but also to support policy makers to assess the stability and changing patterns of exploitation.

Next, we discuss a study being undertaken on the role that technology can play to support FLRs in their initial screening for victims of forced labor and human trafficking. We describe the use of participatory methods to understand the needs of a broad cross-section of stakeholders. In doing so, we highlight a potential role for mobile phones to support communication between FLRs and workers during the initial screening phase of victim identification. While the system we developed, Apprise, is installed on the FLRs' phone, it is ultimately a tool in the potential victims' hands. By listening to and answering a series of yes/no questions, the app provides workers with the ability to privately report exploitative work practices and signal a need for help to the FLR. A vulnerability rating is calculated and displayed to the worker and the FLR, so both parties can understand the severity of the situation that the worker is in and if they would like help to exit that situation. Screening responses are stored on the FLR's phone and then uploaded to their

account to support post-hoc analysis. This process captures the time, date, location, responses, and language that the interview took place in.

The third contribution of this article is to discuss the implications of the post-hoc analysis of screening response data. This is particularly important when considering the small number of cases that are currently identified, where little is known on the specific practices of exploitation. This lack of understanding of key practices becomes particularly problematic when we consider the impact of the development of evidence-based policies, as these new policies are developed based on information from these under-representative samples, which could, in turn, lead to fewer victims being identified. This points to the need for a more nuanced understanding of sector specific patterns of exploitation, to ensure that workers who are currently trapped in these situations of extreme exploitation can be identified and subsequently helped. Currently, anti-trafficking policy discussions are often structured around the four P's: prevention, protection, prosecution, and the more recently added 'partnership' (United Nations 2010). We suggest that to be effective, solutions must be multi-sectoral and multi-lateral in order to take into account the fundamentally migratory nature of trafficking (Zimmerman et al. 2011).

11.2 Sentinel Surveillance, Labor Exploitation, and Migration

Human trafficking and, more broadly, labor exploitation have been shown to be a public health concern with global prevalence (Zimmerman and Kiss 2017). Findings from studies around the world have shown that survivors of this exploitation experience "violence and hazardous, exhausting work, and few emerge without longer-term, sometimes disabling, physical and psychological damage" (Zimmerman and Kiss 2017, p. 8). While labor exploitation affects workers around the world, studies have shown that workers from developing countries are disproportionately affected by exploitative work situations, both in South-North (Lewis et al. 2015) as well as South-South corridors (Hamada 2017).

Zimmerman and Kiss argue that the approach for dealing with cases of labor exploitation and trafficking should be the same as for epidemic diseases such as HIV: to treat them as preventable (2017). We extend this argument and contend that the approach for monitoring labor exploitation and trafficking can also borrow from approaches used for other epidemics. We now turn to a discussion of sentinel surveillance in labor exploitation, and then present links between labor exploitation and migration policy.

11.2.1 Sentinel Surveillance and Labor Exploitation

According to the Dictionary of Epidemiology, sentinel surveillance is the "monitoring of rate of occurrence of specific conditions to assess the stability or change in health levels of a population. It is also the study of disease rates in a specific cohort such as in a geographic area or population subgroup to estimate trends in a larger population" (Last 1995). Using the World Health Organization's (WHO) definition (n.d.-b) and recommendations for surveillance standards (1999), we note that sentinel surveillance:

(a) Involves a limited number of carefully selected reporting sites where there is a high chance of prevalence;
(b) Is a centrally coordinated system, collecting a minimum set of data, with anonymous testing in sentinel sites for diseases or events;
(c) Is used to identify trends, and monitor for outbreaks in a community; and
(d) Involves a core function of 'action', which consists of three components: control/response, policy, and feedback.

Within India for example, an HIV Sentinel Surveillance program has been used since 1998 to provide "essential information to understand the trends and dynamics of HIV epidemic among different risk groups in the country. It aids in refinement of strategies and prioritization of focus for prevention, care, and treatment interventions under the National AIDS Control Programme" (National Aids Control Organisation 2017). This program uses an anonymous surveillance approach to encourage victims to come forward and to self-identify; an approach that proved successful in supporting populations at risk of infection in India.

In the context of Southeast Asia, the HIV Sentinel Surveillance program has been recently used in Cambodia (NCHADS 2006) and Myanmar (National AIDS Programme 2009). A study in Thailand found great value in this approach for reporting the prevalence of HIV in high-risk groups selected from different sentinel sites throughout the country, as an opportunity to provide health officials with information and data about the spread of the disease (Frerichs et al. 1995).

When we apply this same list of recommendations regarding sentinel surveillance to labor exploitation we can identify direct parallels and recommendations for its use. As described earlier, academics and practitioners have highlighted a data-gap in the existing 'passive system' of identification of labor exploitation cases. A sentinel surveillance system could benefit from a centrally coordinated system, that collects, analyses, and acts upon a minimum set of anonymous data from the different sentinel sites. Care must be taken in selecting these sites, as key trends and patterns in the whole population may be missed if the sites are chosen poorly. This information could be used to identify trends and monitor for outbreaks within vulnerable communities. And finally, by using a sentinel surveillance approach to labor exploitation, a core function that should be included is control/response policy, and feedback.

11.2.2 Labor Exploitation and Migration Policy

Southeast Asia's high rates of population mobility in the world are deeply connected to labor migration (Kantayaporn and Siwanart 2013). Within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),[1] the phenomenon of South-South migration was largely amplified with the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 and its provisions for the free movement of labor. The differences in socio-economic conditions between Member States, such as income, living standards, and access to healthcare, made countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand attractive destinations for migrant workers. For instance, the minimum daily wage is three times higher in Thailand than in Myanmar. However, although there is a high demand for labor in these countries, the demand is largely for low-skilled workers, where jobs are mostly "3D jobs"—dirty, dangerous and demeaning—in the fishing and construction industries (Suphanchaimat et al. 2017; Kantayaporn and Siwanart 2013; Graeme 2005).

Within the South-South corridor, practitioners and academics have frequently referred to differences in protection-related labor market regulations, which is a constant challenge for workers in the region (Avato et al. 2010). Hamada expands on this by finding: "... Their conditions are often challenging, and frequently unsafe, and migrant workers have little access to social services such as healthcare and other public services including education for their family members. The current weakness in migration governance, labor laws, and social protection mechanism for migrants moving within south-south migration corridors contributes to these challenges" (2017, p. 3).

Thailand for example, has seen a large influx of migrant workers from its neighbouring countries as well as internal migrants from its own rural areas to the urban and semi-urban areas to meet a demand for cheap labor (Feingold 2010). Fishing, for example, is considered one of the most dangerous occupations in the region as it involves long working hours, physically demanding tasks, lack of availability and use of protective equipment, untrained and inexperienced crew members, and high injury rates and risk of accidents (Suphanchaimat et al. 2017). Some refer to this occupation as "sea slavery" because of the extreme exploitation of migrant workers in the fishing industry (Suphanchaimat et al. 2017).

While it is critical to identify and address structural vulnerabilities such as the legal status of workers, most governments' initial response to trafficking is controlling migration instead of promoting safe migration through the protection of the rights of migrants (UNODC 2017), which leads to ill-conceived migration and anti-trafficking policies. Yeo-Oxenham and Schneider recommend the adoption of a victim-centric approach in current policies for more effective anti-trafficking measures, which can only be possible through partnerships and multi-sector

[1] ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations is a regional intergovernmental organization comprising: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

collaborative strategies (2014). The authors also encourage governments and policymakers to disrupt the status quo rather than using piecemeal solutions that "often act as short-term band aids rather than long-term solutions" (2014, pp. 102–3).

There are several challenges for the creation of efficient migration policies—one is the lack of adequate legislation at the national level and legal framework consistent with national instruments and standards (NCHADS 2006). Another challenge is to address the multiple geographic and legal boundaries within which trafficking happens. Multilateral and cross-sector efforts need to be in place to develop more efficient anti-trafficking strategies (World Health Organization n.d.).

Perhaps the biggest challenge to efficient policies is the lack of comprehensive data (UNODC 2017). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "[t]o be effective, policy development needs to be based upon sound data. Policy announcements must be followed by implementation and enforcement. This requires human and financial resources that collect and analyse data for the purposes of policy development and then turn policy goals into practical measures" (UNODC 2017). Therefore, data constraints can be a difficult barrier to overcome when the problem is untraceable and failed by passive surveillance.

11.3 Apprise

The previous section introduced a sentinel surveillance approach to understanding the current and changing patterns of labor exploitation; and highlighted the problem of data gaps for developing evidence-based policy. In this section, we introduce Apprise, a system we developed as a tool to support:

1. FLRs in their initial screening of workers for indications of labor exploitation.
2. Policymakers with sentinel surveillance of the current and changing patterns of exploitation.

The section will describe the design and development of Apprise and show how this sentinel surveillance approach can address insufficient data regimes. In describing Apprise, we begin with a high-level overview of the technology itself, followed by an account of the process of developing the lists of indicators. This is then followed by some early learnings from our initial pilot of Apprise in Thailand.

11.3.1 Research and Technology Design

We began this research to investigate the role that technology could play to support migrant workers' agency, when in situations of labor exploitation. Our research is rooted in a value sensitive design (VSD) approach to system design, which is defined as "a theoretically grounded approach to the design of technology that accounts for



Fig. 11.2 Participation in consultations by stakeholder (Authors Own)

human values in a principled and systematic manner throughout the design process" (Friedman et al. 2017, p. 2). VSD is based on the understanding that all systems contain the biases and perspectives of the designers, so it integrates "...ethical reflection in the state of design of architectures, requirements, specifications, standards, protocols, incentive structures and institutional arrangements" (Van den Hoven 2007, p. 70).

Our iterative process of co-designing, developing, and evaluating Apprise has continued over a 2-year period, from April 2017. The various consultations and evaluations that took place in the first year of the consultation are summarized in Fig. 11.2, which plots the number of participants in each consultation (with a broad categorization of their affiliations) by date.

From April 2017 to March 2018 we held a series of stakeholder consultations with a broad cross-section of direct (those who are intended to directly make use of a technology) and indirect (those who will be impacted by a technology) stakeholders, including: survivors of exploitation; local and regional NGOs; government officials (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Ministry of Labor, Royal Thai Navy, Command Centre for Combatting Illegal Fishing); and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with mandates in migration and/or trafficking. The consultations took the form of focus groups and interviews, to understand the problems that stakeholders faced in identifying victims of labor exploitation as well as the way that they believed that technology could support them in solving these problems.

While a complete description of this consultation series is out of the scope of this paper, the interested reader can consult our previous work (Thinyane and Bhat 2019)



Fig. 11.3 Apprise mobile app screen flow (**a**) question lists (**b**) language selection (**c**) introductory video (**d**) questions and (**e**) vulnerability calculation

for a full synopsis. In summary, the consultation identified four key problems in victim identification: *communication* between FLRs and migrant workers due to language barriers; *training* in understanding what trafficking 'looked like'; *privacy* concerns that hindered workers from being able to respond truthfully in the initial screening phase of victim identification; and *trust* between the different stakeholders. Expanding on this issue of trust, stakeholders highlighted that even in situations where there was a translator available, there was a lack of trust in the accuracy of the translations provided.

By the end of the first five consultations, we had identified the potential for a mobile application to be used to support communication between FLRs and migrant workers. This application could overcome training issues by providing a list of simple yes/no questions for the migrant worker to answer. These questions were aligned with the current practices of exploitation in the area. They were also translated into multiple languages, so that migrant workers would be able to listen to the questions in their preferred language and answer them using a simple interface (see Fig. 11.3d below). As the practices of exploitation are sector specific, multiple lists of questions were made available, for different work sectors. In our consultations, we also found that many workers do not have access to mobile technology themselves, as exploiters often confiscate their devices so they cannot call for help. The mobile app is therefore installed on the FLRs phone, and when combined with a set of headphones, offer some privacy to workers in the uncontrolled environments that are typical for initial screening interviews to take place in.

To understand the typical usage of Apprise, please refer to Fig. 11.3. Once the FLR has logged in to the system, a screen displays the sector-specific lists of questions available (Fig. 11.3a). The FLR would select the list that is most appropriate, and hand the phone, as well as a set of headphones, to the migrant worker. The migrant worker would then be asked to select their language from the list of flags (Fig. 11.3b). When a flag is selected, the name of the language is played and a continue button appears. The app then plays an introductory video, which describes

who the interviewer is and the purpose of the interview; illustrates how to use the app; and asks for consent to continue (Fig. 11.3c). If the worker agrees to continue with the interview, the app cycles through each of the questions in the list (Fig. 11.3d), providing them with response opportunities of 'yes', 'no', and 'I don't know'. The last question in each list asks the worker if they would like help to leave their work situation now. In the background, each question is associated with a specific indicator of exploitation and severity of exploitation (based on ILO's Indicators of Forced Labor (ILO 2012b)). These two pieces of information are used, along with the workers' responses, to calculate a vulnerability rating for the worker, based on ILO's Hard to See, Harder to Count Methodology (ILO 2012a) for estimating forced labor. Once the final question has been answered, a recording informs the worker of the vulnerability of the situation they are in and provides them with an opportunity to confirm if they want to stay in their work situation. This second confirmation is added after the vulnerability calculation to ensure that workers are in a position to make an informed decision. At this point, the worker is prompted to hand the phone back to the FLR. The FLR is then provided with a summary of the responses (Fig. 11.3e), indicating the overall vulnerability rating and a breakdown of the rating per indicator of exploitation. It also highlights two other key pieces of information: if the worker would like help to exit the situation and if they are under the age of 18. The age of the worker is important for FLRs to understand as it has a direct impact on their duty of care, as well as the types of work that workers are allowed to undertake.[2]

Session information, including the language, time, date, and location of interview and any further notes, are stored on the FLRs device with workers responses until they next log in and have network coverage. When they next login and have access, this data is uploaded to the desktop version of Apprise, into the FLRs account.

For security and privacy reasons, initial screening responses are only shared within the organization that a FLR belongs to. For example, a labor inspector at a government inspection centre would share their screening responses with their immediate supervisor, but not with other inspection centers. An NGO outreach team would share their screening responses with their team head, but not with other NGOs. For accountability and transparency, we also share the interview response with the head of each organization, allowing then to analyse interview responses by time, sector, and geographic location. This supports a more nuanced understanding of the changing practices of exploitation over these different dimensions.

[2]As defined by ILO Minimum Age Convention (C-138) and ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (C-182).

11.3.2 Indicators of Exploitation

Created in the 1950s, the Delphi survey method is a forecasting process framework, which is used to generate consensus among experts on a particular matter (Turoff and Linstone 2002). A Delphi process typically consists of several rounds of questionnaires, which ask participants to rank responses against particular criteria, as well as suggest new/missing responses. These responses are aggregated and shared with the group after each round. While the Delphi method typically uses anonymous surveys, modified Delphi approaches have included in-person consensus meetings (Schneider et al. 2016). The Delphi method has been used in a wide range of fields, including selecting healthcare quality measures (Boulkedid et al. 2011), determining research priorities (Schneider et al. 2016), and forecasting the future of law enforcement (Tafoya 1986). It has also been used successfully by the ILO, who conducted a global study to develop a framework to identify the measures and policy guidance for stakeholders to enable workers in UFW to transition to decent working conditions (ILO 2015, p. 2). ILO formed panels of 220 experts from 32 Member States, used to indicate for a number of indicators whether they were highly significant, significant, or irrelevant. By averaging their ratings, they developed a strength for each indicator. Consensus was measured by the percentage of experts that gave a similar rating.

In developing Apprise, we used a modified Delphi technique to develop the sector specific lists of questions, consisting of five rounds of panels and 178 participants (see Fig. 11.2 for stakeholder participation across sessions). Panels consisted of direct and indirect stakeholders, with some experts serving across multiple sectors, whilst others provided sector specific feedback. Participants feedback was used to "identify, clarify, refine, and finally to gain consensus on the particular issue" (Turoff and Linstone 2002, p. 53). In each round, we organized separate panels with the participants' expertise as well as the social-hierarchical structures present in mind. For example, in round one we held multiple panels or focus groups with participants, where one focused primarily on survivors of exploitation and another on government officials.

When aggregating the responses, we borrowed concepts from the VSD approach underpinning this research, namely value flows and dams (Miller et al. 2007). Value flows prioritize input from participants that is approved by the majority, in a similar way to a traditional Delphi consensus ranking. Value dams, however, remove options for consideration when they are opposed by even a small number of participants. Human welfare, privacy, and autonomy of potential victims were used as the deciding factors to inform each of these decisions.

The results of the process were five expert-developed lists of indicators of labor exploitation for the following sectors: at port/at sea; processing and manufacturing; sexual exploitation; forced begging; and a 'quick list'. The quick list was developed to be used across any sector with a maximum of eight questions, to allow FLRs to screen workers in time sensitive situations. The next section presents findings from an 8-month pilot study of Apprise in four cities in Thailand.

11.4 Pilot Study Findings

From March 2018, we began observing the use of Apprise in the field in three sectors: at port/at sea; processing and manufacturing; and sexual exploitation.[3] This section presents findings from a series of observations and focus group discussions undertaken in the first half of March 2018. Each NGO self-selected to be involved in the pilot and, after consent was given, was subsequently trained on the use of Apprise in the initial screening phase of victim identification. This section reports on the findings of the observations of 22 initial screening sessions across the three sectors. The focus here is on the use of the technology in initial screenings, with a further discussion on the potential use of the data generated by Apprise in a subsequent section.

11.4.1 Increased Breadth of Screening

Participants noted that one of the primary benefits of using Apprise was that they could now interview more workers who they previously were not able to reach. We noticed that comments revolved around two different themes in this category: previously unheard voices and the time sensitive nature of interviews.

A point that was highlighted both in the previously described Delphi rounds as well as by FLRs that we observed using Apprise in their outreach activities, was the importance of amplifying previously unheard voices. Workers often speak different languages and FLRs could never have enough trusted translators or foreknowledge of who they would meet (and their language preference) to ensure they had adequate language skills to communicate with them. FLRs mentioned that previously they often had to exclude workers from interviews based on language skills and that Apprise therefore allowed them to screen a broader audience of workers. In particular, FLRs mentioned that Apprise allowed them to reach out to workers from minority tribes and from countries outside of the ASEAN region. FLRs who work to support exploited sex workers described how migration patterns change quickly within their sector, appearing to be seasonal, based on the preferences of tourists (with the flow of tourists being seasonal itself, based on the holiday periods in their home countries). As an example, in late 2017—early 2018 NGOs mentioned an influx of Kiswahili speaking workers from Eastern Africa and French speaking workers from Francophone African countries. In March 2018, they described meeting a new wave of Spanish speaking workers, predominately from Colombia and neighbouring countries. FLRs could not learn languages quickly enough to be able to have the deep conversations required to establish if someone needs help. They

[3] Prior to undertaking this study, research approval was obtained from the UNU-CS Human Subjects Research Process Board (#201703-01).

Fig. 11.4 Use of Apprise in the field (**a**) in interviewing factory workers (**b**) and at a port

described how Apprise allowed them to reach out to these new populations, supporting them to reach out to these unheard voices.

Another point that the FLRs mentioned was the time sensitive nature of interviews, a problem experienced by each of the FLRs we interviewed. In the case of NGOs, they mentioned that they often only have a short window of time to interview workers, before their supervisor notices their absence or becomes curious about the interaction. In the case of government inspectors at inspection centers, they have a 25-min window of time to complete a host of checks on the work conditions aboard fishing vessels, including screening workers. The inspectors we spoke to suggested that Apprise could help them to interview multiple workers concurrently and use the feedback on the vulnerability calculation screen (Fig. 11.3e) to direct any further interview and investigation. Figure 11.4a shows an NGO volunteer using Apprise to interview two factory workers concurrently. The NGO volunteer sat between them to provide support if it was required and then used the vulnerability calculation screen as a basis for further conversations with the workers.

11.4.2 Trust and Privacy

Across all but one of the observations that we undertook, workers stated a preference for using Apprise for initial screening rather than traditional face-to-face interviews. One worker explained why she felt this, saying "*I don't have to look you in the eyes when answering these private questions if use the app*". Other workers explained that they felt shy to respond to questions when asked face to face. In one case, a sex worker described that he felt Apprise put him more in control of the interview

process, allowing him to repeat questions, take his time to respond, and skip forward and backward through questions without feeling pressure to respond immediately. The NGO worker that was interviewing him mentioned that although they had met with him frequently, he had always withdrawn himself from any interaction. By using Apprise they were able to obtain valuable feedback about his working conditions and if he wanted further help.

One critical factor that was raised in our initial consultation was a lack of privacy during screenings. Participants raised concerns across each sector that traditional screening sessions often happened in front of potential exploiters. In one observation, a local NGO volunteer approached a group of sex workers to ask them for help to test the Apprise app. While she was speaking to them, the author observed that a person, ostensibly their boss, who had been watching the interaction, approached the group and lingered around to attempt to understand what was happening. He asked other workers around if they knew what the conservation was about, then after a few minutes shrugged his shoulders and walked off. While we cannot know what happened after we left, this showed that workers were able to take part in screening sessions without their responses being overseen or overheard.

Within the fishing industry, stakeholders reported that in traditional screenings the manager or skipper was frequently called in to translate questions of FLRs to workers in cases where translators were not available. This obviously raised concerns about the credibility of the screening session itself as well as the results that it obtained. Government labor inspectors took part in a series of trials of Apprise (Fig. 11.4b), using it in their Port In/Port Out inspections as well as part of a series of inspections at sea. Across these sessions, workers and FLRs reported that they were excited about the potential of the app to increase the privacy and credibility of screenings.

11.4.3 Training to Identify Cases of Exploitation

In our discussions with participants, they were impressed with the way that Apprise summarized the responses and highlighted critical areas for further investigation. One participant described that "*the advantage of devices and technology is [the] accuracy [of the] result. When [results were] calculated, [they were] very good*!".

When discussing the benefits of Apprise, the head of one NGO mentioned that for his organization, the primary benefit was that it equipped their volunteers to go out into the community and meet workers without having the same labor law knowledge that he and his core team have. Of course, these volunteers would be able to perform initial screenings, but they would then have to suggest that workers who showed any particular vulnerabilities accompany them to the NGO shelter to meet with trained NGO staff for a further interview. They also suggested that by using Apprise, they would grow their understanding of current patterns of exploitation, helping them to understand what patterns to look for in the field.

11.5 Discussion

The previous section presented some initial findings from the pilot study of Apprise in Thailand. As mentioned earlier, responses are first stored on the FLRs phone after completing an interview, but then uploaded onto the server when the phone is next in network reception. In this section, we discuss implications of the micro-level data obtained from interviews. Before we delve into this, however, the section describes the types of information that is collected, to provide a more complete understanding of the implications it has.

An earlier section presented detail of how the question lists were developed but did not specify the questions and related details that they are comprised of. Each question is associated with a weight, an ILO forced labor category (ILO 2012b), and related law enforcement act.[4] Each question is also translated and recorded into a number of different languages. When a worker responds to a question, the response that was provided and the time that it occurred is also stored. Questions are stored on the server and can be used in multiple lists. For example, a question like "Do you have access to your identity documents?" would be useful across each of the different sectors where exploitation is common. It also means that translations can be shared across the different lists, and comparisons can be made between responses across the different lists (on these common questions). Within a particular sector, comparisons can also be made on responses by: time, language of interview, and location.

With this understanding of the level of data captured, we now turn to a discussion of the implications for sentinel surveillance of labor exploitation, followed more broadly by a discussion of the policy impact that could be made with this information.

11.5.1 Sentinel Surveillance

Over the 2 years that we have worked with FLRs to understand the process of identifying victims of labor exploitation, we noticed that exploiters adapt their practices over time, and in response to changing policies and practices of inspections. As an example, when authorities in Thailand realised that a key indication of exploitation was withholding wages, they made a law that mandated that workers must be paid electronically (rather than cash in hand) to ensure that a record of payments could be established. After a period of time, labor inspectors found that although exploiters could produce deposit slips for workers' accounts, a payment would be deposited into a worker's account (and a deposit slip produced of the transaction), but then withdrawn as the unscrupulous employer had retained all

[4]Each question must be aligned to a law enforcement act, as 'victimhood' in legal terms is an infringement of either criminal or labor law.

workers' ATM cards (supposedly for "safe keeping"). The same salary would be deposited into each worker's account, producing deposit slips for each salary payment, but workers were not paid. The process of legal cat and mouse has continued with new laws and evolving practices of exploitation continuing.

We also noticed that workers are exploited differently based on their nationality.[5] In manufacturing for example, some Burmese women indicated that they were forced to take pregnancy tests, an indication of vulnerability that was not evident in any other people group.

In both these cases, FLRs were trying to keep up with changing practices of exploitation but were always one step behind. We realised the benefit of a system such as Apprise when we could analyse the results of interviews and identify a change in workers responses. When this analysis leads to a perceived change in behaviour of exploiters, Apprise allows users to add a new question to the lists, translate it into multiple languages and push the new changes to FLRs smart phones. The system therefore allows FLRs to be more responsive to changing patterns and develop a nuanced understanding of patterns of exploitation.

We now return to the list of recommendations for sentinel surveillance described in Sect. 2.1, drawing on our findings from this 2-year study.

(a) *Involves a limited number of carefully selected reporting sites where this is a high chance of prevalence*. One of the key questions that we ask ourselves in this research is "who are the people who come into contact with migrant workers in vulnerable situations?". Through our series of consultations with stakeholders in the anti-trafficking community in Thailand, we have identified a wide variety of organizations who have a high chance of coming into contact with this vulnerable population, who are currently using Apprise including: NGOs, government officials, and auditors within supply chains of multinational organizations. The WHO's criteria for selecting sites is that they are "trained to diagnose, treat and report cases" (n.d.), which in this case is handled by Apprise.

(b) *Centrally coordinated system, collecting a minimum set of data, with anonymous testing in sentinel sites for diseases or events*. As described earlier, Apprise is a centrally coordinated system that collects responses to a series of yes/no worded questions (plus language, date, time, and location of interview). Over a series of 12 months, Apprise was refined using a value sensitive design approach (Thinyane and Bhat 2019), to ensure the minimum amount of data was collected that still provided actionable results. Due to the sensitivity of the responses, all information collected using Apprise is anonymous, aiming to ensure little chance of retaliation against workers. This points to the importance of Apprise being designed to support FLRs to help workers to exit vulnerable situations straight after asking for help, as there is no way to correlate responses to interviews back to individual workers.

[5]We use the language selected for interview as a proxy for nationality of worker.



Fig. 11.5 Policy implications of Apprise

(c) *Used to identify trends, and monitor for outbreaks in a community*. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, our use of Apprise in the field over this 2-year engagement has led us to identify changing trends in exploitation. While the current analysis supported by Apprise is superficial, we are extending the system to include machine learning techniques to support deeper analysis of the interview responses, to provide a more nuanced understanding of changing patterns of exploitation.

(d) *Involves a core function of 'action', which consists of three components: control/response, policy, and feedback*. The final component is to result in some kind of action, which will be discussed further in the next section.

11.5.2 Policy Implications of Apprise

We summarize the policy implications stemming from Apprise in Fig. 11.5. Starting from the centre of the image (and as described in the previous sections), Apprise can be used to support proactive screening of migrant workers, with results being stored, and analysed. Once trends and hotspots of labor exploitation have been identified, the critical next phase is to use the findings to formulate responses along the 4 Ps: prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership.

Let us return to the example given in Sect. 11.5.1 of the Burmese factory workers who were forced to take pregnancy tests to situate our discussion of preventative outcomes. Firstly, an understanding of changing patterns of exploitation and current hotspots can be used for prevention activities such as targeting awareness raising campaigns to specific nationalities, regions, and sectors. This information could inform workers of their rights prior to being forced to undertake these invasive tests. While this approach could be useful, a worker may not feel that they have the power to insist that their rights are respected, especially when unequal power dynamics and socio-cultural hierarchies are considered.

Another approach could be to consider protective strategies, such as developing evidence-based laws or policies based on the exploitative trends that have been identified. On further investigation in the case of the Burmese factory workers, the FLRs found that the problem arose due to a lack of policies of what is required in a mandatory health check-up prior to employment. All factory workers were required to have a health check-up, and as the factory did not specify the list of check-ups required, health professionals in Myanmar had a comprehensive suite of tests that they ran (including a mandatory pregnancy test). As a result of using Apprise, the factories involved developed new policies that specified the suite of health checks that were required, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the recruitment agency. As this factory audit occurred within a global supply chain, the new policy was shared as best practice with thousands of other factories within the supply chain. To support fairer migration, findings such as these could be shared more broadly, in forums such as the ASEAN Forum on Migration Labor, or used to inform other bilateral agreements or co-operations on migration.

Practitioners (EJF 2014; Human Rights Watch 2018), governments (US State Dept 2010), and inter-governmental organizations (IOM 2018, p. 201) continue to highlight the importance of proactive and consistent screening of migrant workers in vulnerable situations for signs of exploitation. IOM notes that as victims rarely self-identify, it is critical for law enforcement (and we would add, other relevant anti-trafficking players) to proactively screen workers as part of core protective actions (2018). A key part of this identification is ensuring that FLRs are adequately trained to understand the current practices of exploitation. An obvious link can be made to Apprise, providing both a tool to proactively screen workers; and a tool to identify trends in exploitation. These trends could in turn be used as a basis to educate migrant workers, inform migration policy, and train FLRs.

Accurate patterns of exploitation can also support an informed law enforcement response, by enabling them to more effectively identify and protect victims; and prosecute offenders. Practitioners note that FLRs are often untrained in the current practices of exploiters, and that they "... often operate under false assumptions that only undocumented migrants can be victims of exploitation... [or] focus on the more overt or objective conditions of exploitation, such as forcible confinement or physical mistreatment" (Human Rights Watch 2018). Returning to the case of wage withholding discussed in Sect. 11.5.1, if Apprise were used to identify changing practices of (mis)payment faster than the current response time, this information

could be used to adapt training and proactive screening tools, to ensure more victims are identified.

As labor exploitation and human trafficking often work on global networks, partnership and information sharing are key components of any policy response. One key point to consider when talking about governments' response is who should 'own' the interview responses, and who should be provided access to this data. In Apprise, data is 'owned' by the organization that collects it, with different organizations able to specify their internal sharing policy (share responses with all FLRs, share with direct supervisor and organization administrator, or share with organization administrator only). The system implements various obfuscation techniques, including dropping the accuracy of location data, and being able to hide the identity of different FLRs who interviewed workers when providing access to these other team members. An area that we aim to explore further is how stakeholders would like to share their data, and further methods that could be used to ensure the anonymity and privacy of all stakeholders involved, whilst allowing data to be exchanged to facilitate regional or global patterns of exploitation to be identified.

11.6 Conclusion

The economic, social and political differences between ASEAN countries have caused migration flows to increase in this important South-South corridor. The differences in socio-economic conditions between Member States, such as income, living standards, and access to healthcare, make countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand attractive destinations for migrant workers. The demand for low-skilled workers has resulted in a large influx of migrant workers from neighbouring countries as well as internal migrants from their own rural areas to urban and semi-urban areas. This has resulted in a wide range of exploitative situations, from discrimination and payment under minimum wage, to human trafficking, and forced labor.

This chapter calls for labor exploitation and forced labor to be treated as a public health problem with global scope. It suggests that while understanding prevalence of labor exploitation is important, the focus should be placed on understanding the changing patterns of exploitation that are faced by workers, many of whom migrate in South-South corridors. It suggests that sentinel surveillance, an approach that is used to identify trends in diseases, could also be used to track changing patterns of exploitation, and identify hotspots.

The chapter described Apprise, a tool that we have developed and piloted in Thailand to support FLRs in their initial screening of workers to identify labor exploitation. It has also demonstrated how Apprise can be used by FLRs and policymakers to detect changing patterns of labor exploitation. The high quality, micro-level data generated by Apprise can not only mitigate existing data constraints in the anti-trafficking space, but also provide evidence as a foundation for effective

prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership strategies; leading to improvements in migrant and development policy.

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Chapter 12
Conclusion: Migration in the Global South: Indications for the Global Compact?

Katrin Marchand, Glenn Rayp, and Ilse Ruyssen

Through representative country and case studies, the different contributions in this book aimed at identifying relevant and new aspects of migration in the Global South. Taking stock of them, they can be linked to the following questions:

1. What are the common issues and interests in migration at a Global South level, i.e. to the countries other than the established developed industrialized countries (the initial OECD countries)?
2. To what extent is it relevant to distinguish issues and interests of migration in the Global South from those of the established industrialized countries?
3. Does migration in the Global South require specific and adapted forms of policy and management?

At first view, the impact of migration in the Global South is qualitatively not different from the one in any origin or destination country. In general, migration affects social welfare and well-being through its effects on the interaction (integration) of new and foreign citizens with the local community and its effects on (economic) development. Yet, the shape the two determinants take in countries in the Global South has specific and particular features.

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In his contribution, **Craig Loschmann** points to the impact of refugee flows on the interaction between communities, which is much more present in Global South countries than in the major Northern destination countries of migration, where refugees tend to move intraregionally rather than between continents. Because of different levels of development and public institutions, the local impact of refugee flows can be substantial, though not necessarily negative. Loschmann stresses the heterogeneity rather than the direction of the impacts, which implies that good management of refugee flows can make a substantial difference, even resulting in a net positive effect on local communities. Only when it comes to health and the environment, do most of the studies he discusses seem to find a small negative effect. However, the *perceived* effect of refugee flows on the local community may diverge from the *effective* impact and as such affect social well-being. To cope with this, involving the host community in the management of migration is essential. In some sense, from Loschmann's discussion of the topic, we can conclude that disruptive effects of refugee flows can be controlled by turning them as much as possible into "regular" flows that foster development, allowing immigrants to establish in the host location and providing opportunities to work or to interact with the local community (e.g. the relevance of cash instead of in-kind aid). This is important in view of the average duration of a refugee displacement spell as well.

Overall, Global South countries are countries of net emigration, with more people leaving than arriving. The impact of migration on economic development therefore depends to a large extent on the contribution of expatriates to the origin countries, either through remittances or brain gain. Based on an exhaustive literature review, **Lisa Andersson** and **Melissa Siegel** distinguish four relevant areas. As regards the economic impact, they point out the prevailing role of remittances in contributing to poverty reduction, increasing consumption (but not necessarily investment) and affecting labor supply and financial services, provided the substitution effect of remittances on the latter remains limited. Heterogeneity and inconclusiveness of the impact of remittances is primarily explained by institutional differences. The soundness of the institutions, economic freedom as well as the development of financial services matters. From a global governance point of view, this points to the complementarity and interconnectedness of migration policy (e.g. the implementation of the Global Compact) and development policy. As regards the social and political impact of emigration, remittances in general stimulate enrolment in education (by relieving credit constraints), just like emigration implies a brain gain when the returns on emigration are sufficiently high. The institutional impact of the expat community or return migration, as well as the impact of knowledge diffusion seems, however, unclear. Emigration, if planned, may relieve the pressure on the local environment and hence reduce the willingness to move of the remaining people, which should be kept in mind when considering climate change as a driver of migration.

Similar to the impact of migration in Global South countries, the drivers of migration may be considered in general as similar to those of the OECD countries (i.e. fitting in a push-pull-policy framework) however distinctive in their specific features. Because of its expected incidence and intensity, in particular climate

change may have a much larger impact on migration in the Global South compared to the destination countries in the North and imply in the first place inter-regional rather than inter-continental movement of people as indicated by **Els Bekaert**, **Ilse Ruyssen** and **Sara Salomone**. They point to the relevance of several transmission channels and hence different and complex ways in which climate change affects migration. A distinction has to be made between the direct and indirect impact (on income, liquidity constraints, health or violence), as well as between slow and sudden climate change. From the study of precipitation and temperature, it follows that slow prevails on sudden climate change in its impact on migration and is transmitted in particular through indirect rather than direct channels. Yet the impact of climate change on migration is far from clear. Individual idiosyncrasy is substantial and the link with income level (or economic resources in general) is non-monotonous: whereas climate change seems to imply a reduction of mobility in low-level income countries or of the most destitute, it increases mobility in middle-income countries or of people with a higher level of economic capacity and capabilities. From this follows that the global migration and development policy nexus should be sufficiently ingenuous to take the income specificity of climate change induced behavior into account.

Nidhi Nagabathla and **Cameron Fioret** confirm the complexity of the climate change mechanism from a more in depth study of water-related climate stress (quality, extremes as well as accessibility) as a cause of migration. The comprehensiveness and multi-level character of the policy they advise to manage the water-migration nexus, testifies as well to the heterogeneity of migration behavior that climate determinants induce. However, as indicated in other chapters of the book, labor is probably as strong a driver of migration in the Global South and we should beware of not reducing the migration process to just one potential mechanism.

To the specificities in impact and drivers of migration in the Global South corresponds the much more complex pattern of the migration flows compared to the Northern destination countries. Many countries of the Global South are simultaneously countries of emigration, immigration and transit, as argued by **Chiara Janssen** and **Katrin Marchand** for West-Africa as well as **Zachary Strain** in his chapter on the East and Horn of Africa, notwithstanding the momentaneous differences in the structure of migration between these regions. In West-Africa, Janssen and Marchand find that in addition to conflict, labor is one of the most important historical and present motives for migration, also seasonal and circular, nomadic or cross-border. Intra-regional or -continental movements mainly concern lower-skilled labor to countries with moderately better economic and living conditions. Increasingly, such opportunities are seized by -independently moving- women, which points to the relevance of the gender dimension of migration policy in a Global South context as well. The big cities of the coastal area are large poles of migration attraction, not only for intra-regional mobility, but for intercontinental migration as well. The three corridors they define (the South coastal, “Middle” and Sahelian route) are used for flows of all kinds such that issues of South-South as well as South-North migration get intermingled.

This complexity in the composition of the migration flows is confirmed by Strain's analysis for the eastern part of the African continent, characterized by movements of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants in addition to internally displaced people. Geographically elaborated corridors bring people in all four cardinal directions, both inter-regionally and inter-continentally. Emigration of the last type is found to have increased in recent years, though the majority of the movements remain within the region.

Despite their mixed and complex character, there is a long-developed tradition of migration flow management, not surprisingly in multiple forms that are regionally specific and tailored to the prevailing pattern of flows. **Leiza Brumat** describes 40 years of migration policy in South-America in four waves, the two first of which mainly concern cross-border labor movements, whereas a third generation of policies was more characterized by free movement within the continent and regional convergence in migration policy. She mentions in particular the constitutive dimension of the Residence Agreement that was eventually applied in the whole region. She stresses the role two South-American regional organizations (the Andean Community and Mercosur) have played in the development and evolution of migration policy in the continent that nevertheless kept its fundamental national character. International agreements on migration policy concerned in the first place policy coordination rather than (supra-national) unification. Brumat wonders whether the recent political changes in South-America announce a major policy shift, which would announce a fourth wave. In most scenarios this would mean a return to labor- rather than right-based migration. This is, however, resisted by labor unions who try to maintain their bargaining power by intervening more actively on the regional level and through measures favoring the mobility of the higher skilled. However, a sophisticated and long tradition in regional migration policy is unlikely to disappear.

As migration in Asia is mainly driven by employment opportunities, one can easily understand that migration management in this continent mainly concerns labor issues and the rights of migrant workers. From **Richa Shivakoti's** analysis, it is immediately clear that the institutional framework of migration policy in Asia is substantially different from that in other parts of the world. It can be characterized as a multi-layered governance structure with both a state and non-state led component, yet without an encompassing regional legal body based on international migration conventions. It mainly focuses on regional or sub-regional cooperation based on norms and principles more adapted to the nations' specific situation, indicated by Shivatoki as a migration regime complex. In contrast with the active role they play in South-America, the role of regional organizations is rather to provide the forum for state-led meetings. In addition, regional cooperation also takes the form of regional consultative processes. The most striking feature of migration governance in Asia is probably the substantial involvement of non-state actors, like trade unions, NGOs and migrant organizations, who engage in an autonomous regional cooperation process in particular on labor rights and working conditions. Rather than on its form, Shivatoki argues that priority in Asia should be given to the substance of migration governance, e.g. improving information provisions, creating an insurance system (welfare fund), financial regulations and access to justice.

In two complementary contributions, **Amanda Bisong** on the one hand and **Maud Martens**, **Ilke Adam** and **Florian Trauner** on the other, consider the conflict of interests between the destination countries of the North and the Global South based on the discussion of the implementation of the EU policies on migration, the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) in particular. Though conceived as complementary with and not a substitute for the EU development policy, fears were expressed that the MPF might introduce an EU migration policy compliance conditionality for (additional) development funding. Based on the dominating narratives in the MPF, Martens, Adam and Trauner find that a positive perspective on migration for development is lacking. Emphasis lies on the prevention of migration. Bisong adds that by focusing only on the inter-continental dimension of migration flows, i.e. the Sahel countries (the first to be involved in the MPF) as transit or origin countries of migration to Europe, its potentially distorting impact on the intra-regional migration flows (like described by Janssen and Marchand) risks to be fundamentally neglected. In this sense, the MPF can have a negative impact on development, cooperation or the institutional economic framework of the Sahel countries. Martens, Adam and Trauner propose to give the fourth narrative more weight in the MPF, i.e. acknowledging the positive impact of regular migration on development.

When discussing the impacts of migration, the impacts on migrants themselves should also not be overlooked, especially also in the context of labor migration in the context of the Global South. In their contribution, **Hannah Thinyane and Francisca Sassetti** address the issue of exploitative working conditions in times when booming markets and rapid urbanization have led to a constant demand for cheap labor. In their chapter they introduce a system that is currently being piloted in Thailand to support a sentinel surveillance approach to identify patterns of exploitation. Thinyane and Sassetti argue that information collected through such a system directly from migrant workers can become a critical resource to inform migration policy as the responses provide a nuanced understanding of trends and patterns of exploitation. This shows that technology has increasing potential to facilitate the prevention of new cases of exploitation, protection of victims and prosecution of exploiters.

Overall, we draw two main policy conclusions for migration in Global South countries from the contributions in this book.

First, the need to view migration and development policy as complementary rather than as substitutable and hence to integrate international migration policy and economic development policy. It is straightforward that economic development policy creates opportunities that people will attempt to seize and that will induce them to move. The strength of the labor motive of migration also in a South-South framework witnesses this. Provided that migration can take place in a safe, orderly and regular manner (as demanded in the Global Compact on Migration) it will contribute to the well-functioning and development of the economy in the host country. Sound and transparent institutions will allow the economy in the origin country to benefit from migration through remittances as well. In addition, migration as an inclusive component of development will improve resilience of host and origin countries for sudden and irregular movements of people that are a substantial

component of the complex migration flows in the Global South. Refugees may find the support of networks of their own community abroad more easily. A development policy in function of their integration in the host economy may increase the benefits for the local community and hence the social acceptance of the presence of a refugee community. In (environmentally or other) vulnerable regions, migration relieves the population stress on the environment and contributes directly as well as indirectly (by means of remittances) to the living conditions of the remaining population (see also ACP 2014).

Viewing migration and economic development as complementary is at odds with the dominant perspective, in particular in the developed Northern industrialized countries, to consider economic development as a substitute for migration, by reducing incentives to migrate through local economic growth. While eventually (i.e. in the long-run), economic development and migration are substitutes, in the short and medium run, the link is far from clear, as economic development reduces the poverty constraint to migration. The non-monotonous link between income and mobility also testifies to this. Yet, we do not consider this as particularly problematic. One could link the complementarity of development and migration policy to two-stage mobility, where people would move first within the Global South and next from South to North. Given that we may assume that the latter will be the more skilled, it is the kind of migration that faces socially lesser obstacles in the North.

Second, in function of safe, regular and orderly migration, the relevance of *mini-multilateralism* (Newland 2017) in managing the complex migration flows in the Global South and hence of the regional policy dimension, implying that the UN rather take a position as *wingman* (Thouez 2018). Migration policy in the Global South countries shows the need for policy flexibility and adaptability in view of the complexity and the local characteristics of the flows, as well as the feasibility thereof. Different experiences and practices with migration policy provide a rich portfolio of best practices. A strengthening of the regional dimension and a stronger involvement of regional organizations may also contribute to moderate potential conflict of interest on migration between the Northern industrialized countries and the countries of the South and, as such, strengthen the complementarity between migration and economic development.

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