Abstract
Suitable formalisms could allow the arguments of a safety case to be checked mechanically. We examine some of the issues in doing so.
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References
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Acknowledgments
My research was supported by NASA cooperative agreements NNX08AC64A and NNX08AY53A, and by National Science Foundation grant CNS-0720908. I am grateful to Robin Bloomfield and his colleagues at Adelard and City University for exposing me to some of these topics and sharing their own ongoing investigations. However, the views expressed here are mine alone and do not represent those of my sponsors or collaborators.
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Rushby, J. (2010). Formalism in Safety Cases. In: Dale, C., Anderson, T. (eds) Making Systems Safer. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_1
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