Explaining and Comparing Quality of Democracy in Quadruple Helix Structures: The Quality of Democracy in the United States and in Austria, Challenges and Opportunities for Development

Abstract

The analytical research question of this contribution is twofold: (1) to compare the quality of democracy of the USA internationally and to “assess” (evaluate) American democracy, whereas assessing (evaluation) in this scenario refers to putting results of the comparative rating in the form of propositions (theses) for further discussions; (2) this same frame of reference is also being used to compare the quality of democracy in Austria internationally, and to propose more specifically a whole set of reform measures for further improvement of the quality of Austrian democracy in the nearer future. In theoretical and conceptual terms, we refer to a Quadruple-Dimensional structure, also a Quadruple Helix structure (a “Model of Quadruple Helix Structures”) of the four basic dimensions of freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development, for explaining and comparing democracy and quality of democracy. Put in summary, we may conclude: the comparative strengths of the quality of democracy in the USA focus on the dimension of freedom and on the dimension of sustainable development. Further containment of corruption marks potentially a sensitive area and issue for the USA. The comparative weakness of the quality of American democracy lies in the dimension of equality, most importantly income equality. Income inequality defines and represents a major challenge and concern for democracy in the USA. In the “epilogue” to our analysis, we engage in reflecting on Cyberdemocracy and possible ramifications for Knowledge Democracy. We present a few propositions for further discussion and discourse.

1 Introduction: Research Question for the Analysis and Presentation of the Research Design

This contribution focuses on analyzing the quality of democracy of the USA and of Austria by using a comparative approach.¹ Even though comparisons are not the only possible or legitimate method of research, this analysis is based on the opinion that comparisons provide crucial analytical perspectives and learning opportunities. Following is the proposition, put directly forward: national political systems (political systems) are comprehensively understood only by using an international comparative approach. International comparisons (of country-based systems) are common (see the status of comparative politics, for example in Sodaro 2004). Comparisons do not have to be based necessarily on national systems alone, but can also be carried out using “within”-comparisons inside (or beyond) subunits or regional subnational systems, for instance the individual provinces in the case of Austria (Campbell 2007, p. 382).

The pivotal analytical research question of this contribution is twofold: (1) to compare the quality of democracy of the USA internationally and to “assess” (evaluate) American democracy, whereas assessing (evaluation) in this scenario refers to putting results of the comparative rating in the form of propositions (theses) for further discussions; (2) this same frame of reference will also be used to compare the quality of democracy in Austria internationally, and to propose more specifically a whole set of reform measures for further improvement of the quality of Austrian democracy in the nearer future (see also Campbell 2012).² In this line of thinking the USA and Austria mark the two more specific country cases that will be compared in the analysis presented here (they represent the “poles” of our thinking). The national political systems of the USA and Austria are the main references in this case in which American (US) and Austrian democracy and quality of democracy are to be compared with all other member countries of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) and of the European Union (EU15, EU27) for a comparative analysis, thus leading to a country-based comparison of democratic quality.³ Supranational aggregations (like of the whole European Union at EU level) or transnational aggregations (global level) shall not be dealt with. The OECD primarily comprises of the systems of Western Europe (EU as well as Non-EU), North America (the USA and Canada), Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Outside these regions, Israel, Mexico, and Chile are part of the OECD, which highlights the global expansion of OECD. The OECD countries can be majorly determined over the following two features: economically as “advanced economies” (IMF 2011, p. 150), and politically the majority of the OECD countries are determined as “established democracies” or as “Western democracies.” Furthermore, we may also discuss how relevant the concepts of “advanced societies” and “advanced democracies” are (Carayannis and Campbell 2011, p. 367; also Carayannis and Campbell 2012). However, in this context it appears more crucial that the OECD countries (again by the majority) can be seen as an empirical manifestation of liberal democracy, as known in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Ludger Helms (2007, p. 18) pointed out: “For a system to be identified as a liberal democracy, or simply as liberal-democratic, liberal as well as democratic elements have to be realized in adequate volumes.”⁴ Just as decisive is Helms’ (2007, p. 20) statement: “The political systems of Western Europe, North America and Japan examined in this study can be distinguished – despite all the differences – as liberal democracies.” Since the OECD countries are majorly represented by advanced democracies and advanced economies, the OECD countries are very suitable as a Peer Group for the comparisons to be made with the USA and with Austria, in order to carry out a “fair” comparison. For a comparison of the quality of democracy of the USA and of Austria, the “comparative benchmark” must be of the highest possible standard, in order to submit theses questioning about which other democracies can have a positive effect on the American as well as Austrian quality of democracy. Concerning quality of democracy, what can the USA learn from other democracies? This same question may be also applied to Austrian democracy.

The emphasis on the American and Austrian quality of democracy in comparison with OECD will not lie on a time-series pattern; instead it will focus on an indicator-specific system using empirical information available from the latest available year (mostly 2010, referring to data publicly accessible as of early 2012). A broad spectrum of indicators will be considered for this purpose, which appears to be necessary in order to conclude different (underlying) theories and models about quality of democracy. Follow-up studies will certainly be conceivable to integrate this empirically comparative snapshot of the quality of democracy of the USA and of Austria in a broader time perspective. As of January 2012, the OECD has over 34 member countries. These OECD member countries define the primary reference framework for the international comparison in this analysis. Since not every member state of the current EU27 is a member of the OECD, the decision to include the non-OECD-countries of the EU27 countries was made for the country comparison, which therefore results in an expansion of the group of countries to “OECD plus EU27.” These additional countries are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Cyprus. In total, the quality of democracy of the USA and of Austria will be put into comparison with 39 other countries (including the USA and Austria, 40 countries).

Not only there is naturally not only a single democracy theory (theory about quality of democracy), but the field of democratic theories is rather pluralistic and heterogeneous. Various theories and models coexist about democracies (Cunningham 2002; Held 2006; Schmidt 2010). Metaphorically, based on these (partly contradictory) different theories, democracy theory could also be constructed as a meta-theory. Theoretically, democracy can be understood as multi-paradigmatic, meaning that there is not only one (dominant) paradigm for democracy (on paradigms, see also Kuhn 1962). Therefore, we have to state pluralism, competition, coexistence, and co-development of different theories about democracy. Our analysis is based on the additional assumption (which does not have to be shared necessarily) that between democracy theory on the one hand and democracy measurement on the other hand, important (also conceptual) cross-references (and linkages) take place. Within this logic, a further development or improvement of the democracy theory demands a systematic attempt of democracy measurement, regardless of how incomplete or problematic an empirical assessment of democracy is. Just like there is no “perfect” democracy measurement, there is also no “perfect” democracy theory (see for example Campbell and Barth 2009; Lauth et al. 2000; Lauth 2004, 2010, 2011; Munck 2009; Schmidt 2010, pp. 370–398). Theories about the quality of democracy are partly already further developed, than it is often (in popular research) being assumed. One of the most important theory models about the quality of democracy that permits an empirical operationalization comes from Guillermo O’Donnell (2004a). The field of the quality of democracy is no longer a vague one, especially not for OECD-countries.

The further structure of this contribution is divided into the following four sections: in Sect. 4.2, different conceptualizations of democracy are presented, followed by the concrete empirical comparison of the quality of democracy in the USA and in Austria in Sect. 4.3. In the conclusion (Sect. 4.4), an attempt to assess the quality of democracy in the USA and in Austria is being made and opportunities for improving the Austrian democratic quality are presented for further discussion. In the final Sect. 4.5 (epilogue), we also explore possible ramifications of “cyberdemocracy” (Cyberdemocracy) for democracy, quality of democracy and knowledge democracy.

2 Conceptualizing Democracy and the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Equality, Control, and Sustainable Development (Model of Quadruple Helix Structures)

How can democracy and the quality of democracy be conceptualized? Such a (theoretically justified) conceptualization is necessary in order for democracy and the quality of democracy to be subjected to a democracy measurement, whereby democracy measurement, in this case, can be examined along the lines of the definition of democracy (thus democracy measurement to be utilized to improve the democracy theory). Hans-Joachim Lauth (2004, pp. 32–101) suggests in this context a “three dimensional concept of democracy,” which is composed of the following (conceptual) dimensions: equality, freedom, and control (see Fig. 4.1).⁵ Lauth (2004: 96) underlines that these dimensions are “sufficient” to obtain a definition of democracy. The term “dimension” offers a conceptual elegance that can be applied “trans-theoretically,” meaning that different theories of democracy may be put in relation and may be mapped comparatively in reference to those dimensions. Metaphorically formulated, dimensions behave like “building blocks” for theories and theory development.

Fig. 4.1

The basic quadruple-dimensional structure of democracy and the quality of democracy. Source: Authors’ own conceptualization and visualization based on Campbell (2008, p. 32; 2012, p. 296), Campbell and Carayannis (2013a), and for the dimension of "control" on Lauth (2004, pp. 32–101)

Empirically, it should also be added that the traditional public perception of Western Europe indicates that individuals with a more-left political orientation prefer equality, and individuals with a more-right (conservative) political orientation have preferences for freedom (Harding et al. 1986, p. 87). The European left/right axis would translate itself well for the North American contexts by using a liberal/conservative axis (with left = liberal and right = conservative).

With regard to democracy and the quality of democracy, we are confronted with the following point-of-departure question: whether (1) democracy as a key feature or criterion exclusively refers or should refer to the political system or whether (2) democracy should also include social (societal), economic as well as ecological contexts of the political system. This produces implications on the selection of indicators to be used for democracy measurement. How “limited” or “broadly” focused should be the definition of democracy? This is also reflected in the minimalistic versus maximalist democracy theory debate (see for example: Sodaro 2004, pp. 168, 180, and 182). In this regard, various theoretical positions elaborate on this concept. Perhaps, it is (was) from an orthodox-point-of-view-of-theory to limit democracy to the political system (Munck 2009, pp. 126–127). More recent approaches are more sensitive for the contexts of the political system, however, still must establish themselves in the political mainstream debates (see, for example, Stoiber 2011). Nevertheless, explicit theoretical examples are emerging for the purpose of incorporation into the democracy models the social (societal), economic and ecological contexts. The theoretical model of the “Democracy Ranking” is an initiative that represents such an explicit example (Campbell 2008).

Over time, democracy theories are becoming more complex and demanding in nature, regardless, whether the understanding of democracy refers only to the political system or includes also the contexts of the political system. This also reflects on the establishment of democracy models. The most simple democracy model is that of the “electoral democracy” (Helms 2007, p. 19), also known as “voting democracy” (“Wahldemokratie”; Campbell and Barth 2009, p. 212). An electoral democracy focuses on the process of elections, highlights the political rights and refers to providing minimum standards and rights, however, enough to be classified as a democracy. Freedom House (2011a) defines electoral democracy by using the following criteria: “A competitive, multiparty political system”; “Universal adult suffrage for all citizens”; “Regularly contested elections”; and “Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.” The next, qualitatively better level of democracy is the so-called “liberal democracy.” A liberal democracy is characterized by political rights, and more importantly also by civil liberties as well as complex and sophisticated forms of institutionalization. The liberal democracy does not only want to fulfill minimum standards (thresholds), but aims on ascending to the quality and standards of a developed, hence, an advanced democracy. Every liberal democracy is also an electoral democracy, but not every electoral democracy is automatically a liberal democracy. In this regard, Freedom House (2011a) states: “Freedom House’s term ‘electoral democracy’ differs from ‘liberal democracy’ in that the latter also implies the presence of a substantial array of civil liberties. In the survey, all the ‘Free’ countries qualify as both electoral and liberal democracies. By contrast, some ‘Partly Free’ countries qualify as electoral, but not liberal, democracies.” Asserting different (perhaps ideal–typical) conceptual stages of development for a further quality increasing and progressing of democracy, we may put up for discussion the following stages: electoral democracy, liberal democracy and advanced (liberal) democracy with a high quality of democracy.

In Polyarchy, Robert A. Dahl (1971, pp. 2–9) comes to the conclusion that mostly two dimensions suffice in order to be able to describe the functions of democratic regimes: (1) contestation (“public contestation,” “political competition”) as well as (2) participation (“participation,” “inclusiveness,” “right to participate in elections and office”).⁶ Also relevant are Anthony Downs’ eight criteria in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957, pp. 23–24), defining a “democratic government,” but it could be argued that those are affiliated closer with an electoral democracy. In the beginning of the twenty-first century is the conceptual understanding of democracy and the quality of democracy already more differentiated, it can be said that crucial conceptual further developments are in progress. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2004, pp. 22–28) have come up with an “eight dimensions of democratic quality” proposal. These include: (1) rule of law; (2) participation; (3) competition; (4) vertical accountability;⁷ (5) horizontal accountability; (6) freedom; (7) equality; and (8) responsiveness. Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 22) further state: “The multidimensional nature of our framework, and of the growing number of democracy assessments that are being conducted, implies a pluralist notion of democratic quality.” These eight dimensions distinguish themselves conceptually with regards to procedure, content as well as results as the basis (conceptual quality basis) to be used in differentiating the quality of democracy (see Diamond and Morlino 2004, pp. 21–22; 2005; see also Campbell and Barth 2009, pp. 212–213). The “eight dimensions” of Diamond and Morlino may be interpreted as “Secondary Dimensions” of democracy and the quality of democracy for the purpose of democracy measurement (see Figs. 4.2 and 4.3).

Fig. 4.2

Dimensions (Secondary Dimensions) for the Measurement of Democracy and the Quality of Democracy (Part A). Source: Authors’ own conceptualization and visualization based on Dahl (1971), Diamond and Morlino (2004, pp. 20–31; 2005) and Campbell (2008, p. 26)

Fig. 4.3

Dimensions (secondary dimensions) for the measurement of democracy and the quality of democracy (part B). Source: Authors’ own conceptualization and visualization based on Dahl (1971), Diamond and Morlino (2004, pp. 20–31; 2005) and Campbell (2008, p. 26)

“Earlier debates were strongly influenced by a dichotomous understanding that democracies stood in contrast to non-democracies” (Campbell and Barth 2009, p. 210). However, with the quantitative expansion and spreading of democratic regimes, it is more important to differentiate between the qualities of different democracies.⁸ Democracies themselves are subject to further development, which is a continuous process and does not finish upon its establishment. Democracies have to find answers and solutions to new challenges and possible problems. Democracies are in constant need to find and reinvent themselves. Observed over time, different scenarios could take place and could keep a democracy quality going on constantly, democracy quality could erode, but also improve. A betterment of the quality of democracy should be the ultimate aim of a democracy. Earlier ideas about an electoral democracy are becoming outdated and will not suffice in today’s era.

Guillermo O’Donnell (2004a) developed a broad theoretical understanding of democracy and the quality of democracy. In his theoretical approach, quality of democracy develops itself further through an interaction between human development and human rights: “True, in its origin the concept of human development focused mostly on the social and economic context, while the concept of human rights focused mostly on the legal system and on the prevention and redress of state violence” (O’Donnell 2004a, p. 12; O’Donnell 2004b). The human rights differentiate themselves in civil rights, political rights and social rights, in which O’Donnell (2004a, p. 47) assumes and adopts the classification of T. H. Marshall (1964). Human development prompts “…what may be, at least, a minimum set of conditions, or capabilities, that enable human beings to function in ways appropriate to their condition as such beings” (O’Donnell 2004a, p. 12), therefore in accordance with human dignity and, moreover, the possibility of participating realistically in political processes within a democracy. O’Donnell also refers directly to the Human Development Reports with the Human Development Index (HDI) that are being released and published annually by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).⁹ Explicitly, Guillermo O’Donnell (2004a, pp. 11–12) points out: “The concept of human development that has been proposed and widely diffused by UNDP’s Reports and the work of Amartya Sen was a reversal of prevailing views about development. …The concept asks how every individual is doing in relation to the achievement of ‘the most elementary capabilities, such as living a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and enjoying a decent standard of living’” (O’Donnell 2004a, pp. 11–12; UNDP 2000, p. 20). If the implementation of O’Donnell is reflected upon the initial questions asked in this contribution for the conceptualization of democracy and the quality of democracy, it can be interpreted, but also convincingly argued that “sustainable development” can be suggested as an additional dimension (“Basic Dimension”) for democracy, which would be important for the quality of democracy in a global perspective.¹⁰ As a result of the distinction between dimensions (basic dimensions) for democracy and the quality of democracy, the following proposition is put up for debate: in addition to the dimensions of freedom, equality, and control as being suggested by Lauth (2004, pp. 32–101), the dimension of sustainable development should be introduced as a fourth dimension (see again Fig. 4.1). Regarding suggestions for defining sustainable development, Verena Winiwarter and Martin Knoll (2007, pp. 306–307) commented: “In the meantime, as described, multiple definitions for sustainability exist. A fundamental distinction within the definition lies in the question whether only the relation of society with nature or if additionally social and economic factors should be considered.”

There are different theories, conceptual approaches and models for knowledge production and innovation systems. In the Triple Helix model of innovation, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000, p. 112) developed a conceptual architecture for innovation, where they tie together the three helices of academia (higher education), industry (business) and state (government). This conceptual approach was extended by Carayannis and Campbell (2009, 2012, p. 14) in the so-called Quadruple Helix model of innovation systems by adding as a fourth helix the “media-based and culture-based public” as well as “civil society.” The Quadruple Helix, therefore, is broader than the Triple Helix, and contextualizes the Triple Helix, by interpreting Triple Helix as a core model that is being embedded in and by the more comprehensive Quadruple Helix. Furthermore, the next-stage model of the Quintuple Helix model of innovation contextualizes the Quadruple Helix, by bringing in a further new perspective by adding additionally the “natural environment” (natural environments) of society. The Quintuple Helix represents a “five-helix model,” “where the environment or the natural environments represent the fifth helix” (Carayannis and Campbell 2010, p. 61). In trying to emphasize, compare, and contrast the focuses of those different Helix innovation models, we can assert that the Triple Helix concentrates on the knowledge economy, the Quadruple Helix on knowledge society and knowledge democracy, while the Quintuple Helix refers to socio-ecological transitions and the natural environments (Carayannis et al. 2012, p. 4; see also Carayannis and Campbell 2011). For explaining and comparing democracy and the quality of democracy we proposed a “Quadruple-dimensional structure” of four different “basic dimensions” of democracy that are being called freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development (Fig. 4.1 offers a visualization on these). Here, we actually may draw a line of comparison between concepts and models in the theorizing on democracy and democracy quality and the theorizing on knowledge production and innovation systems. This also opens up a window of opportunity for an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaching of democracy as well as of knowledge production and innovation. In conceptual terms, the Quadruple dimensional structure of democracy could also be rearranged (re-architectured) in reference to helices, by this creating a “Model of Quadruple Helix Structures” for democracy and the quality of democracy. The metaphor and visualization in reference to terms of helices emphasizes the fluid and dynamic interaction, overlap, and coevolution of the individual dimensions of democracy. As basic dimensions for democracy we propose (proposed) to identify freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development. Figure 4.4 introduces a possible visualization from a helix perspective for a theoretical framing of democracy.

Fig. 4.4

The quadruple helix structure of the basic dimensions of democracy and the quality of democracy. Source: Authors’ own conceptualization based on Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000, p. 112), Carayannis and Campbell (2012, p. 14), Danilda et al. (2009), Campbell (2008, p. 32) and for the dimension of “control” on Lauth (2004, pp. 32–101)

As already mentioned, equality is often associated closer with left-wing political positions and freedom with right-wing positions. A measure of performance of political and non-political dimensions in relation to sustainable development has the advantage (especially in the case where sustainable development is understood comprehensively) that this procedure is mostly (often) left/right neutral. Such a measure of performance as a basis of the assessment of democracy and quality of democracy offers an additional reference point (“meta-reference point”) outside of usual ideologically-based conflict positions (Campbell 2008, pp. 30–32). It can be argued in a similar manner that the dimension of control mentioned by Lauth (2004, pp. 77–96) positions itself as left-right neutral as well. The definition developed by the “Democracy Ranking” for the quality of democracy is: “Quality of Democracy = (freedom & other characteristics of the political system) & (performance on the nonpolitical dimensions).” This definition is interpreted as a further empirical operationalization step and as a practical application for the measurement of democracy and the quality of democracy respectively which is based on the theory about the quality of democracy by Guillermo O’Donnell. However, the conceptual democracy formula of the Democracy Ranking has been developed independently (Campbell and Sükösd 2002).

Several global initiatives already exist that commit themselves to regular empirical democracy measurement.¹¹ The works of Freedom House (see, for example Gastil 1993) and of the Democracy Ranking shall be elaborated in more detail during the analysis of the quality of democracy in the USA and in Austria. Other initiatives (without claiming entirety) include: Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy¹² (Vanhanen 2000); Polity IV¹³; Democracy Index¹⁴ (EIU 2010); and the Democracy Barometer¹⁵ (Bühlmann et al. 2011) (for a comparison of different initiatives, see Pickel and Pickel 2006, pp. 151–277; and Campbell and Barth 2009, pp. 214–218). The Democracy Barometer provides a “Concept Tree” (“Konzeptbaum”) for the quality of democracy which also consists of the three dimensions of freedom, control, and equality: “The Democracy Barometer assumes that democracy is guaranteed by the three principles of Freedom, Control and Equality.”¹⁶ A strong resemblance with the three (basic) dimensions of democracy by Lauth (2004, pp. 32–101) is evident in which the talk is also about equality, freedom, and control (Fig. 4.1).

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),¹⁷ established in Stockholm, Sweden, dedicated itself to the approach of the Democratic Audit by assessing the quality of democracy. IDEA uses its own State of Democracy (SoD) Assessment Framework for this purpose which is built on the following two principles: “popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers”; and “equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of that control” (IDEA 2008, p. 23). This framework is understood as a further level of operationalization for the democracy assessment of such concepts developed by David Beetham. Beetham (1994, p. 30) argues that a “complete democratic audit” has to cover the following areas: “free and fair elections”; “civil and political rights”; “a democratic society”; and “open and accountable government” (see also Beetham 2004). Beetham has been successively involved in various Democratic Audit Processes in the UK (see, for example Beetham et al. 2002), and moreover (at least for the further conceptual development) he is also committed with IDEA (see again IDEA 2008). The Assessment Framework of IDEA for democracy evaluation has been applied to 21 countries since 2000, though excluding Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.¹⁸

To summarize the current stance of research and studies regarding the quality of democracy of Austria, the mid-1990s provide a useful starting-point. The “Die Qualität der österreichischen Demokratie” (Quality of Democracy in Austria, by Campbell et al. 1996) represented the first attempt to analyze the Austrian quality of democracy, at least from an academic (and sciences-based) point of view. The next, once again systematic approach of evaluation of the Austrian quality of democracy took place in the “Demokratiequalität in Österreich” (Quality of Democracy in Austria, by Campbell and Schaller 2002).¹⁹ In an exclusive chapter contribution from this volume, an attempt was made to understand or to position the quality of democracy of Austria interactively between basic rights or human rights (“Grundrechten”)²⁰ on one hand and power-balancing structures (“Macht-ausbalancierenden Strukturen”)²¹ on the other (Campbell 2002, p. 19). Later studies have already started preferring a comparative approach (see Beck et al. 2003; Fröschl et al. 2008; Barth 2010; Barth 2011).

3 The Quality of Democracy in the USA and in Austria in a Comparative Perspective with the OECD Countries (EU27): A Comparative Empirical View of the American and Austrian Democracy Relating to the Dimensions of Freedom, Equality, Control, and Sustainable Development

The following session validates the quality of democracy in the USA and in Austria through empirical indicators by providing a comparative approach and analysis in order to create a platform to discuss the propositions for assessing and analyzing American and Austrian quality of democracy (as is being attempted finally in Sect. 4.4). Assessment, even more importantly evaluation, is being used here less to provide factual statements, but rather more as a stimulant for discussion and to search for possibilities to improve democracy. Evaluation is therefore meant to provoke democracy learning (“Demokratielernen”). The benchmark for comparison covers all the member states of the OECD, complemented by the remaining member states of the EU27. The chosen time frame is always the last year with available data information (as of early 2012), usually extracted from the year 2010.²² Only available indicators were used and no new indicators were created. This emphasized and emphasizes to refer to already existing knowledge. Indicators being used are from such institutions (organizations) that have a relatively “impartial” (“nonpartisan”) reputation, but also reflect a certain consensual “mainstream” point of view. Possible critical findings weigh even more for this particular reason. That should also underline that the OECD countries have been well documented regarding indicators over a longer period of time (which does not deny the need for new and even better indicators). In order to support a comparative analysis and view, all the indicators have been re-scaled on a rating spectrum from 0–100, in which “0” indicates the worst possible (theoretically and/or empirically) and “100” the best empirical value of measurement for the interpretation of democracy and quality of democracy (in the specific context of our forty-country-sample here).²³ Results of that re-scaling are being represented in Table 4.1. Data in Table 4.2 are arranged somewhat differently: there, the highest observed empirical value still is 100; “0,” however, is not the lowest possible value, but the lowest empirically observed value.²⁴ Mean values in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are not weighted by population. The comparison is based on a total of eleven indicators, in which the majority (more or less) fits nicely or at least convincingly into the four identified (basic) dimensions of democracy (see Fig. 4.1 in Sect. 4.2). Such a broad indicator spectrum is used for an attempt “to determine a multi-layered quality profile of democracies,” and could thus help, as put up for discussion by Hans-Joachim Lauth (2011, p. 49), to develop “qualitative or complex approaches for democracy measurement.” In the subsequent Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the empirical results are provided and in what follows, the exact sources of indicators are being displayed and presented:

Table 4.1 Quality of democracy of the USA in comparison (part A)

Table 4.2 Quality of democracy of the USA in comparison (part B)

• 1. The dimension of freedom: For this, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of press are used as indicators as drawn up yearly by the Freedom House (2011c, d). Civil liberties play an important role, as they help allocate systems between primary electoral democracies and liberal democracies (with a higher quality of democracy). For political rights and civil liberties, the differentiated “aggregate and subcategory scores” are accessed. In some cases, controversial discussions take place concerning the reliability of Freedom House. But it appears that the methodology being used by Freedom House in the previous years has improved and Freedom House operates through a peer-review-process that corresponds to the basic academic standards (Freedom House 2011a). Also, the Freedom House data related to OECD countries are less problematic than the data available regarding non-OECD countries. Moreover, Freedom House rates freedom in multiple countries as higher than that prevailing in the USA itself (see also the discussion by Pickel and Pickel 2006, p. 221; see further more Rosenberger and Seeber 2008). Additionally, data from the Index of Economic Freedom have been added (Heritage Foundation 2011). Regarding economic freedom, there appears to be a conflict or dilemma whether this should influence an evaluation measure (of freedom) of the quality of democracy.

• 2. The dimension of equality: The choice rests on two indicators in this case. Regarding gender equality, the Global Gender Gap Index is referred to, as is being published annually by the World Economic Forum (Hausmann et al. 2011). As a comprehensive measure for gender equality, it covers the following areas: “Economic Participation and Opportunity”; “Educational Attainment”; “Health and Survival”; and “Political Empowerment.” With respect to income equality, the Social and Welfare Statistics of the OECD (2011) are used for reference. Concerning distribution of income, we decided to employ the “Gini coefficient” for the total population (“after taxes and transfers,” as the respective OECD source indicates; OECD 2011).²⁵ The Gini coefficient is also known as the “Gini index.”

• 3. The dimension of control: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is used in this regard, which is published yearly by Transparency International (TI 2011). The CPI aggregates different opinion surveys and ranks countries according to the perceived level of corruption in a country. Corruption is (indirectly) used as an interpretation tool to measure the extent as to which the dimension of control is functioning (or not). The higher the values (data) for the Corruption Perceptions Index in the Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the lower are the levels of perceived corruption.

• 4. The dimension of sustainable development: The first choice rests on the Human Development Index (HDI), which is published regularly by the United Nations Organization (UNDP 2011). The HDI is calculated using the following dimensions: “Long and healthy life,” “Knowledge,” and “A decent standard of living.” The HDI therefore measures human development, which is one of the two basic principles that combine together with human rights to provide and explain the theoretical foundation and theoretical architecture of Guillermo O’Donnell (2004a) regarding the quality of democracy. As a second indicator, the aggregated “total scores” of the Democracy Ranking (2011) are considered. The Democracy Ranking 2011 calculates the average means for the years 2009–2010 and aggregates the different dimensions in the following way (Campbell 2008, p. 34): politics 50 %, and 10 % each for gender, economy, knowledge, health, and environment.²⁶ Thereby, the Democracy Ranking defines and analyzes sustainable development even more comprehensively than the HDI (Human Development Index). The “…Democracy Ranking displays what happens when the freedom ratings of Freedom House and the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program are being pooled together into a comprehensive picture”(Campbell 2011, p. 3).

• 5. Other indicators: Two indicators of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) are adopted in comparing the quality of democracy (Huddleston et al. 2011): The “overall score (with education)” as well as the “access to nationality.” This index therefore measures the integration of immigrants and non-citizens respectively in a society and democracy. At first glance, it is not completely clear in which aforementioned dimensions (freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development) should the MIPEX be allocated. The possibility of multiple allocations is conceivable.

4 Conclusion: Comparative Assessment and Evaluation of the Quality of Democracy in the USA and in Austria and Measures for Improving the Quality of Democracy of Austria

The following central research question coined the analytical procedure of this analysis: to compare the quality of democracy in the USA and in Austria internationally and to “assess” (evaluate) it. For this particular reason, American (US) and Austrian democracy were put in reference to the OECD countries (EU27) with 2010 as the main year in focus. Theoretically, four basic dimensions (freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development) were derived conceptually and allocated to eleven empirical indicators. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (in Sect. 4.3) present the relevant empirical evidence. The main concern is to provide an attempt for the evaluation of American and Austrian quality of democracy through a comparative perspective. In the following, we provide a first assessment for the quality of democracy in the USA, based on the empirical data that is strictly and consistently comparative in nature and character, and put forward first propositions. Afterwards, we focus in greater detail on the quality of Austrian democracy, and engage there also in the formulation of recommendations for democracy quality improvement. In theoretical and conceptual terms, we referred to a Quadruple dimensional structure, also a Quadruple Helix structure (a “Model of Quadruple Helix Structures”) of the four basic dimensions of freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development, for explaining and comparing democracy and the quality of democracy.

For the comparative assessment of the quality of democracy in the USA we can put forward the following tentative propositions. The USA ranks highest on the Human Development Index (dimension of sustainable development) and on political rights, economic freedom, civil liberties, and freedom of press (all dimension of freedom).²⁷ Concerning the dimension of equality, the scoring of the USA is not that good anymore. With regard to gender equality, the USA positions itself slightly above OECD average, but concerning income equality, the USA performs clearly below OECD average. Concerning the perceived corruption, we asserted that this indicator could be assigned to the dimension of control. In reference to the Corruption Perceptions Index, the USA scores higher (meaning to have less perceived corruption) than the OECD average, but behind several of the more developed OECD countries.²⁸ Concerning the data of the Democracy Ranking 2011 (dimension of sustainable development), the USA performs clearly above the OECD average.²⁹ On the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the USA also scores above OECD average.³⁰ Put in summary, we may conclude: the comparative strengths of the quality of democracy in the USA focus on the dimension of freedom and on the dimension of sustainable development. Further containment of corruption marks potentially a sensitive area and issue for the USA. The comparative weakness of the quality of American democracy lies in the dimension of equality, most importantly income equality. Income inequality defines and represents a major challenge and concern for democracy in the USA.

In the following, we want to focus now in more detail on Austrian democracy. For an assessment (evaluation) of the quality of democracy in Austria, we set up for discussion the following propositions in context of a thesis formulation:

• 1. Comparatively, Austria’s quality of democracy yields good results in: political rights and civil liberties (dimension of freedom), income equality (dimension of equality), and within both indicators for the dimension of sustainable development.

• 2. Comparatively, Austria’s quality of democracy yields less good results in: freedom of press and economic freedom (dimension of freedom), gender equality (dimension of equality), and corruption (dimension of control).

• 3. Comparatively, Austria’s quality of democracy yields lower-ranking results in: Both indicators used in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) show a problematic positioning. Austria’s comprehensive rank in the MIPEX is only 26 (out of 33),³¹ and in the category of access to citizenship, Austria ranks only 30 (out of 33)³² (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). However, in relation to this observation, it must be noted that the poor performance of Austria in the MIPEX is not negatively reflected by the Freedom House’s freedom rating in the category of political rights and civil liberties. One proposition would be that the integration of foreigners and of non-citizens (but being born and living exactly in the country, where they are) is not given enough weight (by Freedom House).

The comparative strengths and weaknesses of the Austrian quality of democracy blend themselves differently along the dimensions of freedom and equality. Regarding sustainable development, Austria’s quality of democracy finds itself ranked highly and its position remains robust. Taking the ratings of the Democracy Ranking during the years 2009 and 2010 under consideration (Democracy Ranking 2011), countries like Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland find themselves worldwide on top in the category of sustainable development. Therefore, currently, the Nordic countries provide the global empirical benchmark for democracy development (for a comprehensive and sustainable democracy development). The Nordic countries have impressively demonstrated the level-for-the-quality-of-democracy that is empirically already possible to achieve.³³

As compared with the OECD countries, the quality of democracy in Austria is ranked high to very high, but not in all dimensions and for all indicators. Evidently, for the purpose of a further learning with respect to the quality of democracy in Austria (so the proposition), the identification of the potentially problematic areas appears to be relevant above all, since, naturally, those areas require democratic and political reform. In Austria, necessity for innovation and democracy innovation is drastically needed in freedom of press, gender equality and in fighting and containing corruption. However, the most urgent action plan for Austria’s quality of democracy needs to be implemented particularly in the improvement of integration of immigrants and of non-EU citizens, and a better access to citizenship. Integration policy is also linked, interlinked, and cross-linked with other policy fields such as asylum policy (Rosenberger 2010). Austria’s citizenship law knows no jus soli, but is directed and steered by a pure jus sanguinis policy. Automatic acquisition of Austrian citizenship still only takes place through the Austrian citizenship of the parents (jus sanguinis), whereas birth in Austria (jus soli), also residence during childhood and youth, are being completely ignored. Persons, who are not Austrian citizens, of course can always apply for Austrian citizenship (when specific conditions are being met and fulfilled), but this is something else than an automatic acquisition of citizenship. Therefore, descent (in essence also a biological principle) actually decides about political rights and automatic political participation in Austrian democracy.³⁴ This only can be hardly balanced with the developed quality standards of a democracy in the twenty-first century and, when given further thought, stands finally in contradiction to fairness and universal equality of people and the general application of human rights.³⁵ Reforms in citizenship law in other European countries (like Germany), in the recent years, did not enter into Austrian politics and were not taken up by the Austrian mainstream political discourses.³⁶

Finally, some possibilities for the betterment of the Austrian quality of democracy are to be sketched and presented for discussion:

• 1. Citizenship: The introduction of an equal and equitable jus soli component in Austrian citizenship law, parallel to the current jus sanguinis component, appears to be absolutely necessary. Jus soli would at least imply that a person, who has been born in Austria, is being regarded automatically as an Austrian citizen. Sufficient residence in years during childhood and youth may also be acknowledged. To address the possibility of dual and multiple citizenship, different scenarios are conceivable and naturally legitimate; there are, however, good arguments in favor of introducing and approving dual and multiple citizenship.

• 2. Gender equality, freedom of the press, better integration of immigrants (non-EU citizens) and containment of corruption: These are areas and policy fields of concern in which Austria does not position itself as well as we should expect. Reform of Austrian democracy should therefore focus more intensively on these “hot spot” topics and fields of policy application.³⁷

• 3. Balancing of political power: For Western Europe, Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (2000, p. 589) empirically enumerated and calculated the higher risk ruling parties are exposed to in upcoming elections of losing, rather than maintaining their share of votes. That would, therefore, be a manifestation of the phenomenon of government/opposition cycles and of political swings (left/right swings) that occur regularly in democracies. A particular feature of the Austrian national parliament (“Nationalrat”) is the existence of a “right” mandate majority of center-right and right-wing parties since the parliamentary election of 1983. Conversely, it can be argued that possibly in reaction to the conservative federal governments (in coalition arrangements of ÖVP/FPÖ and ÖVP/BZÖ parties) on the federal level during the years 2000–2007,³⁸ for the first time ever a “left” majority at the sub-federal provincial level resulted after 2005, when the political party composition of the nine provincial parliaments (“Landtage”) is being aggregated together and also is being weighted on the basis of population of these provinces (Campbell 2007, pp. 392–393). The current continuation of grand center coalitions of the center-left social democrats (SPÖ) and the center-right conservatives (ÖVP) on the federal level suggests perhaps a starting erosion of the combined left majorities at the provincial level. For an improved political balance of power the possibilities and recommendations are: increased application of term-limits to political office (also for chancellors and heads of provincial governments, the governors); general elimination of automatic proportional representation of political parties in provincial governments based on the number of their mandates in the provincial parliaments (called in Austria “Proporz”); general introduction of direct popular elections of mayors, possibly also direct popular elections of the heads of provincial governments, i.e., the governors (paralleled by a rearrangement of the current political balance of power on provincial level) (Campbell 2007, p. 402).³⁹

• 4. Referendums: Should a public petition with a minimum number of signatures automatically be subjected to a referendum? (Should the parliament, with a “qualified majority,” be able to object to it?) The following points speak against an increased application of referendums: politics (political cycles) would be too short-lived; blockade of further EU integration processes with an interest in deepening the European Union (by scapegoating EU policies at the national level); a populist abuse of certain political themes (for example against immigrants). However, the fact that the national population or the voters would have the power to put forward a topic on the political agenda which may otherwise would be ignored by the ruling parties (or the parties in parliament), is a point that speaks in favor for the increased application of referendums. Therefore, the specific setting of a minimum number of signatures for a public petition would be an important decision. 250,000 signatures would probably not suffice. 640,000 signatures (around 10 % of the voters in Austria) perhaps may be sufficient. This reference bar could also be raised higher though: for example, to 25 % of the voters (Campbell 2002, p. 39).

• 5. Political education (civic education): In the Austrian education system (for instance the secondary school), political education (civic education) should be introduced comprehensively and uniformly as a distinct subject (“Unterrichtsgegenstand”). Political education would therefore let itself conceive as a form of “democratic education” and may be reconceptualized as a “democracy education” (as well as be renamed this way?).

• 6. “Democratic Audit” of Austria: The political system of Austria, its democracy and quality of democracy, have so far not undergone a systematic democratic audit.⁴⁰ For this purpose, for example the procedure of IDEA could be used and applied (see IDEA 2008; Beetham 1994). However, it would also be possible to hybridize or pool different procedures.⁴¹

5 Epilogue on Cyberdemocracy

The research question of our analysis focused on conceptualizing and measuring quality of democracy. In particular, we put the two country-based democracies of the USA and of Austria into comparison. The OECD countries served as the general frame of reference for context. Now, how does Cyberdemocracy relate to democracy and the quality of democracy? In our opinion, this represents a new and challenging field, which requires further elaboration. The evolution of cyberdemocracy still is at the very beginning. There are all the potentials for surprises in the flow of the coming events. In the following, we want to present a few propositions on cyberdemocracy and the tendencies that are possibly involved and may unfold. These propositions we want to suggest as reference points for further discussions and discourses on cyberdemocracy:

• 1. Cyberdemocracy and Knowledge Democracy: The progress of advanced economies and of quality of democracy depends on knowledge economy, knowledge society, and knowledge democracy, their coevolution and their mutual interlinkages (Carayannis and Campbell 2009, 2010, 2012; Campbell and Carayannis 2013b). The transformation and shifts have been from a knowledge-based economy and society directly to a knowledge economy and knowledge society. Pluralism and heterogeneity are crucial and decisive for progressing quality of democracy. The analogy to knowledge is that advanced knowledge systems are also characterized by a pluralism, diversity and heterogeneity of different knowledge paradigms and innovation paradigms that drive in coevolution the interaction and relationship of competition, cooperation, and learning processes. Cyberdemocracy, in fact, amplifies and accelerates the momentum of knowledge democracy. Cyberdemocracy is connected to democracy by building and by forming IT-based infrastructures and public spaces, where IT (information technology) helps in creating new types and new qualities of public space. The concept and model of the “Quadruple Helix Innovation System” (Carayannis and Campbell 2009, 2012) identifies the “media-based and culture-based public” (in addition to “civil society”) as the one crucial helix or context for carrying on and advancing knowledge production and innovation. Therefore, in these aspects, the cyberdemocracy and knowledge democracy overlap in a conceptual understanding, but also in the manifestation of empirical phenomena. Cyberdemocracy expresses a particular vision, for how knowledge democracy may evolve further in certain and particular characteristics. IT-based public spaces in cyberdemocracy operate nationally and subnationally. Cyberdemocracy, however, also transcends the boundaries of the nation state, as such adding to the building of a transnational, in fact global public space. Public spaces in cyberdemocracy are certainly multilevel (global, national, and subnational). The global and transnational aspect of public space in cyberdemocracy certainly represents this one very new and radical aspect, allowing for a global spreading of knowledge and of high-quality knowledge, in this case enabling continuous flows of knowledge and discourses beyond the limits of the nation state.

• 2. Cyberdemocracy and Governance: Cyberdemocracy appears to have several implications for governance of democracy and governance in democracy. In an etymological understanding, the origin of the word “governance” refers back to ancient Greek (the verb kybernein or κυβερνειν infinitive, kybernao or κυβερνάω first person), where the literal meaning was to steer or to guide a vehicle that was land-based or sea-based (a ship), but Plato already emphasized the idea of governance of men or people. The prefix “cyber” thus explicitly reflects the etymological component of “steering” (Campbell and Carayannis 2013b, p. 3). Based on this assignment, we could paraphrase “cybernetics” as a science of steering. Cybernetics refers to feedback and focuses on regulatory systems, but of course there exist different approaches to cybernetics (Wiener 1948; Umpleby 1990). Cyberdemocracy, therefore, may be understood as a governance of democracy in context of knowledge democracy. This governance can be interested and motivated to use (also to use) new IT-based infrastructures (for example the internet or web) and public spaces for purposes of governance. Furthermore, public spaces (advanced public spaces) also define references for quality of governance in democracy.

• 3. Cyberdemocracy, Global Democracy, and Global Society: The concept of “global democracy” can take different meanings. Global democracy could be translated into regimes and systems of intergovernmental cooperation or supranational integration. This implies to tie global democracy directly to mechanisms of government and governance. Alternatively, we may want to think of global democracy more in terms of an evolving (self-evolving) of a Global Society. Particularly the features of an international knowledge flow and of IT-based infrastructures (and of public spaces), which clearly transcend the borders and boundaries of nation states, support the notions of a global society, where, at least partially, the global society even bypasses the nation state. In that scenario, the global society would develop vis-à-vis the traditional nation state. One consequence of this is that nation states do not have the power anymore of controlling or suppressing successfully the global flow of knowledge. But of course, also the concept of Global Society would have to be translated into a multilevel architecture of arrangements, distinguishing between global, national, and subnational levels within context of the Global Society (global knowledge society).

• 4. Cyberdemocracy and the New Rights and New Freedoms: Cyberdemocracy provides governments in democracies (and in non-democracies) with additional IT-based technical means and capabilities of monitoring the flow of knowledge on the internet. But of course: not everything, which is technically possible, is also feasible in terms of democracy and quality of democracy. This creates a need of restricting (technically possible) monitoring activities of democratic governments. Democratic governments, in fact, should impose on themselves also self-restrictions in that respect.⁴² Where is here the line to be drawn? For example: Does an e-mail qualify, in a legal sense, as a “postcard” or as a “letter”? It is obvious that cyberdemocracy requires a debate and discourse on the New Rights and New Freedoms of citizens in context of knowledge democracy, protecting citizens against monitoring activities of their governments that are at conflict with principles of quality of democracy.