Abstract
There is a great similarity between the Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge scheme [8], the Chaum-Evertse-van de Graaf [4], the Beth [1] and the Guillou-Quisquater [12] schemes. The Feige-Fiat-Shamir [7] and the Desmedt [6] proofs of knowledge also look alike. This suggests that a generalization is overdue. We present a general zero-knowledge proof which encompasses all these schemes.
Some of the results in this paper have been briefly announced at the rump session of Crypto’88.
Research partly done when visiting RHBNC and sponsored by SERC.
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Burmester, M.V.D., Piper, F., Desmedt, Y., Walker, M. (1990). A General Zero-Knowledge Scheme. In: Quisquater, JJ., Vandewalle, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’89. EUROCRYPT 1989. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 434. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46885-4_15
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