Abstract
Security is a concern in the design of smartcards. It is possible to leak much side channel information related to secret key when cryptographic algorithm runs on smartcards. Power analysis attacks are a very strong cryptanalysis by monitoring and analyzing power consumption traces. In this paper, we experiment Exclusive OR operation. We also analyze the tendency of state-of-the-art regarding hardware countermeasures and experiments of Hamming-Weights on power attacks. It can be useful to evaluate a cryptosystem related with hardware security technology.
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Ahn, M., Lee, H. (2006). Experiments and Hardware Countermeasures on Power Analysis Attacks. In: Gavrilova, M., et al. Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA 2006. ICCSA 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11751595_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11751595_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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