Abstract
In the setting of cooperation of rational web service agents via coalition formation, we devise an algorithm BSCA-P to form recursively bilateral Shapley value stable coalitions. The main focus lies on privacy aspects: we show that the BSCA-P enables the formation of subgame stable and individually rational coalitions while hiding absolute coalition values and payoffs, as well as allowing for anonymous service requests and access.
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Blankenburg, B., Klusch, M. (2005). BSCA-P: Privacy Preserving Coalition Formation. In: Eymann, T., Klügl, F., Lamersdorf, W., Klusch, M., Huhns, M.N. (eds) Multiagent System Technologies. MATES 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3550. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11550648_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11550648_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28740-7
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