Immigration as a Threat: Explaining the Changing Pattern of Xenophobia in Spain

Abstract

Scenarios of economic crisis and rising unemployment have never been favourable to immigration. However, the desire to tighten up on immigration policy may also arise within the context of economic growth and a drop in the unemployment rate. This article aims to explain the changing pattern of xenophobia and immigration policy in Spain. Opinion polls run in Spain from 1993 to 2012 are analysed and supplemented with survey data from Eurobarometers and qualitative materials from the MEXEES and Living Together projects and the 2011 qualitative Eurobarometer. In line with Group Conflict Theory, the economic recession accentuates the image of immigration as an economic threat, with the consequent increase in xenophobia. However, economic booms in themselves do not determine the acceptance of immigrants. Longitudinal monitoring of public opinion data corroborates the fact that both the feeling of economic threat (Group Conflict Theory) and cultural threat (Social Identity Theory) depend on the perceived presence of immigrants, along with the image and attention paid to immigration in the media and political discourse.

Introduction

Likening immigration to a threat is a well-established approach to explaining racism and xenophobia. This threat may be economic or cultural, based on interests or identities. The Group Conflict Theory (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Allport 1954; Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Tajfel 1982; Bobo 1983, 1999; Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al. 2002; Malchow-Møller et al. 2008; Meuleman et al. 2009) conceptualises ethnic prejudice and anti-immigration sentiment as a defensive reaction to the perception of intergroup competition for scarce goods or the threat to certain interests and privileges. They may be both material (well-paid jobs, social welfare benefits, affordable housing…) and not material (power and status).

The perceived threat is translated into an irrational antipathy and overreaction to the negative consequences of immigration. Its strength is posited as a function of both the relative size of the immigrant group and the depth of the recession (Quillian 1995 ¹; Coenders and Scheepers 1998, 2008; Coenders et al. 2004; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2008). An increase in the relative size of the immigrant population or the magnitude of an economic crisis—or a combination of both—will tend to create greater competition between natives and immigrants over scarce resources. The resulting intergroup tensions can be exploited by anti-immigrant political parties in powerful ways (Della Posta 2013); the most vulnerable groups (the unemployed and those with less education and income) being the group which expresses greater anti‐immigrant feeling (Fetzer 2000; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Kunovich 2002; Scheepers et al. 2002; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2004; Pettigrew et al. 2007; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Gorodzeisky 2011; Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013), including other immigrants themselves (Telles and Ortiz 2011; Kleiner-Liebau 2011; Cea D'Ancona et al. 2013 2013 ²). However, in times of recession, strong feelings of economic insecurity, and the resulting levels of perceived ethnic threat, may also be present among those who are employed, reducing the gap between them and the unemployed (Billiety et al. 2014).

Nevertheless, one’s own personal situation—and on a wider scale—the national economic outlook seems to play only a small role in predicting attitudes towards immigration. The second most established approach to explaining rejection of immigrants and ethnic minorities is the fact that they are seen as a cultural threat to the national identity. Cultural (Zarate et al. 2004; Sniderman et al. 2004; Schneider 2008) or symbolic threats ³ (Stephan et al. 1999) refer to the perception that outgroups adhering to different cultural traditions pose a threat to one’s own world view, which is believed to be morally right (Stephan et al. 1998). According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981), groups perceived as threatening a nation’s distinctive identity are likely to elicit hostility. Opposition to immigration stems just as much from who the immigrants are, especially their ethnic and cultural characteristics: if they are perceived as a threat to national identity. This perception also depends on demographic balance,⁴ but not on the economic context.

The primacy of the cultural over economic concerns is now gaining support when explaining xenophobia. Through the 2002–03 European Social Survey, Sides and Cintrin (2007), and Card et al. (2012) have shown that ‘symbolic’ predispositions, such as preferences for cultural unity have a greater effect than economic dissatisfaction. In the US, using data from the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS), Chandler and Tsai (2001) found that perceived cultural threats (especially to the English language) have the greatest impact upon views on immigration, and respondents who hold more assimilationist views of American identity are more restrictionist.⁵ Other studies, using the 1996 GSS and focus groups (Schildkraut 2005), or the 1996 and 2004 GSS (Wong 2010), have reached a similar conclusion: Americans who take an ethnocultural view of national identity (that is, to be American is to be born in the US and to be Christian) are more supportive of restricting immigration.⁶ This is confirmed in other studies (Verkuyten 2009; Morrison et al. 2010): the perception of cultural threat increases mostly among individuals with a strong national identity.

This article aims to explain the changes in attitudes towards immigration in Spain, a country whose ‘experience with immigration has attracted international attention in recent years, not only for the level of immigration the country sustained over a very short period of time but also for how it dealt with this incoming population’ (Arango 2012: 1). Between 2000⁷ and 2009, Spain’s foreign-born population more than quadrupled, rising from under 1.5 million to over 6.5 million.⁸ During this time, the average annual net inflow of foreign-born individuals was close to 500,000 people, making Spain the second largest recipient of immigrants in absolute terms among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, after the United States. This considerable rise was due to the increased demand for semi-skilled workers in the construction sector (mostly men) and home-help services (mostly women).⁹ However, after 2009, Spain changed both its economic and migratory cycle, showing that the two are interconnected. According to Eurostat, in 2011, Spain recorded the first negative figures (−0.9) in the gross net migration rate since 1993; in 2012, the drop continued, with a rate of −5.1 per thousand, which contrasts with the still positive rate for 2008 (+9.0). This phenomenon is not unique to Spain. In Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal emigration has also increased as a result of the economic crisis (OECD 2012).

Now, let us look at how these changes in migratory and economic cycles have affected attitudes towards immigration. Evidence has come through opinion polls run in Spain from 1993 to 2012. These are supplemented by survey data from Eurobarometers and qualitative materials from MEXEES¹⁰ and Living Together ¹¹ projects and the 2011 qualitative Eurobarometer (TNS Qual 2011). We shall analyse the changing pattern of these feelings of threat (economic and cultural) and how economic and migratory cycles affect them. The main hypothesis would be that the increase in the presence of immigrants affects both threats, although the economic threat is expected to be more sensitive to changes in the economy (in line with Group Conflict Theory). Demographic analysis will be supplemented by references to the policy on immigration, in a search for consistency between policies on immigration and public opinion in Spain.

Changing Attitudes Towards Immigration in Spain

Before analysing the different factors which come together in moulding attitudes towards immigration, it would be wide to offer an overview of how they have evolved in Spain. Figure 1 shows the changes in the three types of attitudes (tolerant, ambivalent and adverse), which are obtained after joint analysis (applying factor, cluster and discriminant analysis) to the set of indicators for xenophobia included in the surveys run by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS).¹² In addition to these surveys are the annual polls which the CIS ran for OBERAXE, from 2007 to 2012, in order to track the development of racism and xenophobia.¹³ All of them are ‘face to face’ surveys on Spaniards aged 18 and over.

Fig. 1

Changes in attitudes towards immigration. Source: CIS 1993–2005 and OBERAXE-CIS 2007–2012 surveys

Figure 1 shows the drop in explicit rejection of immigration from 1993 to 1996, at the same time as ambivalence increased. From 2000, rejection rose, with noticeable increases in 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2011. In 2011, rejection amounted to 40 % of the 2838 Spanish respondents aged 18 and over. But, unlike the 2009 and 2010 surveys, in 2011, this ambivalent profile was closer to tolerance than rejection (see cluster centres in appendix 1); in particular, greater acceptance of living alongside immigrants is highlighted; the approval of immigrants being granted rights, and the fact that they are the least resistant to a multicultural society. In the early years of the economic crisis (2008–2010), however, ambivalence was closer to rejection, due to the change in attitude among the largest ambivalent group: young people. The crisis—and the consequent increase in unemployment—led them to increase the desire of closing doors to immigration, putting an end to the view that immigrants brought job opportunities, and now questioning the need for immigration.

The change in this ambivalent profile in 2011 coincided with increasing education and income; respondents’ position left of centre on the political ideology scale; a greater confidence in people; and less recent experience of unemployment. These variables led to a more open attitude to immigration (as has been seen in the Introduction). The higher average figures define tolerant individuals, while the lower figures define those adverse to or resistant towards immigration (more elderly people; less educated; those in poorer jobs and with lower income; ideologically on the right; firm religious believers; and those distrustful and without personal experience of emigration).

In 2012, express rejection of immigration dropped three points and ambivalence continued to rise, staying as ‘tenuous’ tolerance, in spite of the advance of the recession. What caused the changing pattern of rise and fall in the rejection of immigration is an area which needs to be looked into further. The most notable decrease in rejection from 1993 to 1996 coincided with a combination of higher economic growth (the unemployment rate fell from 23.9 % in 1993 to 10.6 % in 2001) and a political context in favour of tolerance and coexistence that culminated in the declaration of 1995 as the United Nations Year against Intolerance, Racism and Xenophobia, and 1997 as the European Year against Racism (as documented in Cea D’Ancona 2005, 2007). However, from the year 2000, the rejection of immigration increased, coinciding with an explosion¹⁴ in immigration which Spanish society was not ready for. Olzak (1992) had already stated that rapid changes in immigration or economic conditions could affect labour, housing and other markets more strongly than slow development, due to the limited time to absorb the changes. Let us look into the different factors which will enable us to explain the pattern of rejection of immigration in different economic, political¹⁵ and migratory contexts.

The Consideration of Immigration as a Problem and Threat; Its Coincidence with Political Action

The fact that immigration is qualified as a problem and threat is crucial in explaining xenophobia (Cea D’Ancona 2007; Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2010a). This affects the number of immigrants, their differential characteristics vis-a-vis the native population; the economic situation; the news transmitted by the media; political discourse; and the failure of policies on integration. What does the data on opinion show?

It was in September 2006 when immigration ranked as the most serious problem in Spain according to CIS barometers (59 % of responses), with unemployment dropping to second position (42 %). Its rise to principal problem coincided with the ‘boat people’ crisis: in 2006, 31,245 illegal immigrants arrived in the Canary Islands by canoe (in 2005: 4700; in 2012: 3804). The climax was reached in the month of August, with daily news showing shots of the boats: ‘the Canary Islands declare themselves overflowing with the greatest ever flood of immigrants’ (El País, August 21, 2006) or ‘A hundred thousand Africans are waiting in Senegal to cross to the Canaries’ (ABC, August 20, 2006): headlines that encourage ‘the psychosis of invasion’ (Valles et al. 1999) and the subsequent rejection of immigration as the OBERAXE-CIS 2007 survey also shows.

The CIS barometer field work was done from September 18–22, 2006, a week after the government announced that there would be no further regulation of immigrants and that the Law on Foreigners would be reformed to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration. On August 11, 2006, the FRONTEX¹⁶ patrols were introduced, and in 2007, the percentage of illegal immigrants arriving on the Spanish coast fell by 53.9 %. The Africa Plan (2006–2008) also reinforced joint action on border control by the countries of origin and transit, obtaining information on routes and streamlining immediate repatriation procedures (cooperation agreements with Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Guinea (Conakry) and Gambia). This action was directed at improving the local population’s perception of immigration: transmitting to them that illegal immigration flows are under control and that the entry of immigrants is linked to the needs of the labour market. In general, and as Weiner (1999) also bears out, the uncontrollable flood of illegal immigrants and refugees is perceived as more threatening than if the same number entered the country legally.

Two other dates when immigration was a major problem in Spain (albeit second to unemployment in CIS Barometers¹⁷) were the May 2006 (44 %) and November 2005 barometers (40 %). The first coincided with the spread of news of armed robberies on chalets on the outskirts of Barcelona and Madrid by bands of Eastern European criminals (thus reinforcing the association of immigration–crime–violence); the second coincided with the riots of the banlieues in France (October–November 2005),¹⁸ showing the problems of immigrant integration for the second and third generation (who are no longer immigrants in legal terms). Both associations encourage the consideration of immigration as a problem and threat, as expressed in CIS barometers, with the consequent increase in the rejection of immigration.

Fear of More Competition in Employment and Access to Rights

The fact that immigration is considered a threat takes on special importance in four key areas: employment, access to basic social rights, the maintenance of one’s culture and the fear of increased crime. Times of economic crisis and the decline in economic resources and employment tend to activate stereotypes that have traditionally encouraged xenophobic discourse: ‘immigrants take away jobs’ and ‘immigrants contribute to lower wages’. This is evidenced by survey data collected in Spain. Figure 2 shows the upward trend in both beliefs and the decrease in the recognition that ‘immigrants cover necessary jobs’ (which the Spanish do not do). In turn, there is an increase in opinion favourable to the expulsion of immigrants in long-term unemployment (29 % in 2005 to 50 % in 2011, falling to 46 % in 2012),¹⁹ and the discourse of preference in the workplace: ‘when hiring someone, people prefer to hire a Spaniard before an immigrant’ (62 % in 2007, 69 % in 2011 and 2012). These two items are included only in the OBERAXE-CIS surveys.²⁰ Their response is associated with the increase in unemployment in the native and immigrant population: the unemployment rates stood at 11.34 % in 2008, rising to 25.03 % in 2012 when the surveys were run. This notorious increase in the Spanish unemployment rate, which reflects the increasing intensity of the recession, led to political action directed at restricting the entry of immigrants and facilitating their departure from Spain. Among the first measures was the reintroduction of the requirement to have a work contract for Romanians who wanted to enter the country (Order PRE/2072/2011 of July 22)²¹; Romanians are the second largest group in Spain; Moroccans are the first one. Among the second measures were the voluntary return programmes for immigrants. One of the best known was the one under RD 4/2008 of September 19, aimed at linking the migratory flow management with the needs of the labour market.

Fig. 2

Changes in agreement over the effects of immigration on the labour market (percentage of total respondents). Source: CIS 1993–2004 and OBERAXE-CIS 2007–2012 surveys

The contexts of economic crisis and review of the welfare state also raise fears that immigrants limit access to basic social rights for the native population, such as health care and education, in addition to worsening the quality of the care provided. This fear of losing rights to social benefits is also an activator of xenophobia. The Special Eurobarometer 380²² (TNS Opinion & Social 2012) makes Spain the third EU country most in favour of ‘immigrants from non-EU countries holding the same legal rights as the nationals of the country’, with 84 % in agreement, behind Sweden (93 %) and the Netherlands (85 %), and a long way ahead of the European Union as a whole (68 %). Surveys in Spain (Fig. 3) show that opinion in favour of granting rights to immigrants was greater in years of low xenophobia declared in surveys (1995 to 2000). The trend was downward in subsequent years, even though since 2007, the question has specified ‘immigrants permanently settled and legal’ (making a negative response more difficult when the question is dichotomous: in agreement or disagreement). The right which lost most ground was nationalisation, while the vote in municipal elections increased slightly in the most recent surveys.

Fig. 3

Changes in approval of granting rights to immigrants (percentage of total respondents). Source: CIS 1993–2005 and OBERAXE-CIS 2007–2012 surveys

The changes in public opinion on nationality and voting rights for immigrants are in line with the policy actions aimed at tightening up on the criteria for access to nationality and extending the right to vote. In the qualitative Eurobarometer (TNS Qual 2011), the right to vote was considered a sign of equality and inclusiveness (Finland, Bulgaria, Spain and Austria); the ultimate expression of integration (Italy); it creates a sense of belonging to the country where people reside (Malta, Portugal and Austria); it is a positive way for immigrants to show their interest in their host country (Luxembourg, Denmark and Spain).

The right to nationality is restricted in Spain, in line with other European counties, while voting rights are extended. The Organic Law 2/2009, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration, adds the need to prove that they are integrated within Spanish society as a requirement to obtain Spanish nationality. The same Law devotes an article to the rights to ‘public participation’, which includes the right to vote in municipal elections. The exercise of this right for immigrants from non-EU countries is subject to reciprocity agreements with their country of origin, which is considered (Aja et al. 2011; Cachón 2011; Moya and Viñas 2012) discriminatory on the grounds of country of origin. The right to nationality also discriminates by country of origin: it requires 10 years of legal and continuous residence in general (Article 17 of the Civil Code); 5 years for those who have obtained refugee status; 2 years for nationals from Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and the Sephardim (descendants of the Jews expelled from Spain in 1492); and 1 year for those born in Spain or who have been married to a Spaniard for 1 year and are not separated.²³

Before the municipal elections in May 2011, the Spanish government succeeded in getting its parliament to ratify agreements with Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Paraguay, as well as other countries with a much smaller number of its population living in Spain (Norway, Iceland Cape Verde, Trinidad-Tobago, New Zealand). Foreigners from EU countries have the right to vote after registering in the population census and the census of foreign voters. In these elections, four out of ten foreign residents from EU countries and 12 % of non-EU residents voted.

The right of association (the second most approved of by Spaniards) is also crucial for immigrants’ social and political integration (Morales et al. 2009; Massey and Sánchez 2010; Joly and Cachón 2011). Law 2/2009 removed from ‘freedom of association’ the requirement of ‘authorisation to stay or reside in Spain’.²⁴ It states that ‘all foreigners have the right of association under the same conditions as Spaniards’.

The broad support which Spanish society manifests towards extending immigrants’ political rights contrasts, however, with the opinion—also widespread—in favour of Spaniards having preferential access and not only to employment (Fig. 2). These surveys show broad agreement Spaniards have preferential access to basic rights such as attending education centres (60 % in 2007, 2008 and 2012; 63 % in 2010) and healthcare (44 % in 2007–2008; 49 % in 2010 and 2012). This more widespread discourse on preference towards natives as opposed to immigrants is also seen in recent qualitative research in Spain (projects MEXEES) and other European countries (Living Together project). They link this to the growing criticism of affirmative action to assist the integration of immigrants (Sears 1998; Jackson et al. 1998): ‘Such favourable treatment for immigrants is what contributes to us becoming racist’; ‘They give everything to the immigrants’; ‘First, the people at home and then the people from outside’ (Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2010a; Cea D’Ancona et al. 2013).

In Spain, the recession is also contributing to a strengthened view that ‘immigrants receive more than they contribute’.²⁵ This opinion was shared by seven out of ten respondents in 2011 and 2012, while in 2008, the proportion was six out of ten, as can be seen in Fig. 4. This new data is a further indication of how the recession was accentuating the image of immigrants as an economic threat. Public opinion data that also run counter to integration policies (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2007–2010 and 2011–2014), which increase aid to facilitate integration of immigrants. However, surprisingly, far from strengthening this view, it had the effect of weakening the opinion that ‘the government should invest more where there are a lot of immigrants, so that health care (82 % in 2007; 66 in 2012) or the ‘quality of education’ (88 % in 2007; 74 in 2012) doesn’t get any worse’. This slide in agreement coincided with times of economic crisis and budget cuts. The biggest fall was recorded in 2011, when the biggest public spending cuts occurred in Spain and culminated with the enforcement of the Royal Decree 16/2012 of April 20, on urgent measures to ensure the sustainability of the National Health System,²⁶ and RD 14/2012 of April 20, on urgent measures to curb public spending on education. Data on public opinion gathered seven months later (in November 2012) do not disapprove of these prominent cuts in public spending, since the percentage variation is minimal compared with 2011 (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4

Agreement with items in OBERAXE-CIS surveys (total percentage of respondents). Source: OBERAXE-CIS 2007–2012 surveys

Fear of Loss of National Identity

The consideration of immigration as a threat is also reflected in the fear of loss of a country’s cultural identity. As noted by Portes and Rumbaut (2010), periods of intensive immigration are always marked by stiff resistance from the host population who see the waves of newcomers as a threat to the integrity of the national culture. Brücker et al. (2002) connect racial attitudes with the defence of cultural homogeneity; Cachón (2005) with nationalism.²⁷ For Favell (2001), political debates on immigration revolve increasingly around the loss of national identity, the dilemmas over cultural pluralism or the problems of a multicultural society (in specific references to France and Britain). These discussions became paramount in Europe in 2009 and 2010: the defence of national identity in France²⁸; the crisis over multiculturalism in Germany, the UK and Holland²⁹; and banning the burqa in public places, which began in Belgium (in March 2010). In Spain, Lleida was the first city to ban the burqa and niqab in public buildings and amenities (May 28, 2010).³⁰ Other municipalities in Catalonia and Andalusia with a large Muslim population followed suit: described as those traditionally perceived as less ‘integratable’ into Western societies (Schnapper 1994; Sartori 2001; Strabac and Listhung 2008).

The public debates on Muslims that have been most prevalent in Europe have focussed on the Islamic veil; the building of mosques; religious education; fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism (Kleiner-Liebau 2011; Garcés 2011; Álvarez-Miranda 2009; Moreras 2008; Planet 2012). From the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, those of March 11, 2004 in Madrid and July 7, 2005 in London, the mistrust of Muslims increased, as did the belief that Muslims were unwilling to integrate. In Eurobarometer 59.2 (Coenders et al. 2003), the greatest resistance to multicultural society was recorded in Greece, Belgium, Germany and Italy; the least in Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg and Sweden, while rejection of the multicultural model increased significantly in the Netherlands (a point of reference in multiculturalism) and Spain. Spain emerged as the country with the highest increase in the rate of assimilation from 1997 to 2003, close to the UK and Germany.

In 2010, political debates on the burqa ban were very prominent in the Spanish media, although the use of these is unusual in Spain, unlike Holland or the UK. In 2010, El País published 71 articles on the subject: 62 % on the veil, the rest on Ramadan, ablation and arranged marriages. The Catalan newspaper, La Vanguardia, published 33 news items where the Islamic veil appeared, 89 on the complete veil and 41 on the hijab. In 2011, news articles dropped to 11, 35 and 10, respectively; in 2012, the figures were 2, 21 and 14. This protagonism of political debates on the burqa in the media had a significant effect on public opinion: rising Islamophobia and the defence of assimilationism in 2010. The opinion in favour of banning veils in schools and the protest against building mosques increased to fourteen percentage points in 1 year (Fig. 4). The view that ‘immigrants should keep up only aspects of their culture and customs that did not interfere with the rest of the Spaniards’ also increased, but only by four points. All this contributed to the fact that, for the first time, the scale of opposition to a multicultural society did not get any worse and the denial of the desirability of a multicultural society was to become fundamental in shaping attitudes towards immigration in the 2010 survey (Appendix 2). In 2011, political and media-based debates on Muslims decreased, as did Islamophobia (and in 2012), albeit without reaching the figures obtained before 2010.

Fear of an Increase in Crime

Finally, the view that immigration was a threat, and the consequent increase in xenophobia, also affected the fear of increased crime. The OBERAXE-CIS surveys record broad agreement over deporting immigrants who have committed any type of crime: from 68 % of the 2768 respondents in 2008 to 71 % of the 2838 in 2011 and 2012. The expulsion of immigrants with criminal records is covered by Article 89 of the Penal Code (Organic Law 10/1995 of November 23, updated to December 2007): the imprisonment of foreigners not lawfully resident in Spain, if the sentence is less than 6 years, may be substituted by expulsion. Its amended version (Official Parliamentary Bulletin of November 27, 2009) states that where the nature of the offence warrants this, authorities will opt for enforcement of the sentence in Spain. In January 2009, the Brigade for Deportation of Foreign Criminals (BEDEX) was set up. Its tasks include determining whether or not foreign criminals hold a Spanish residence permit and processing their expulsion. On September 16, 2009 the Protocol Ratification Instrument came into force to back up the European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1963, which prohibited group expulsion of foreigners. Under this legislation, a foreigner could be deported only when this was necessary in the interests of public order or for reasons of national security. In 2011, 9114 foreign criminals were deported (918 more than in 2010). In April 2012, the Ministry of the Interior announced that priority would be given to entry into Internment Centres for Foreigners for those with a criminal record.

What Factors Contribute to Increasing the Image of Immigrants as a Threat?

A determining factor is the actual number of immigrants and the characteristics that differentiate them from the native population (ethnicity, religion, culture, behaviour), increasing their visibility. This is corroborated by research done from the perspectives of group conflict and social identity, as seen in the Introduction. The feeling of threat, both economic and cultural, depends on the demographic balance (the relative size of the immigrant group) and its ethnic and cultural visibility.

Figure 5 shows that in Spain, the rejection of immigration increases, as does the perception of an excess number of immigrants. This increases coincide with the rise in criticism of immigration laws as being ‘too tolerant’; the view in favour of facilitating the entry of immigrants ‘only with a contract’³¹; and the decrease in opinion favourable to ‘admitting political exiles on an unrestricted basis’.³² In 2011, the perception of the number of immigrants dropped slightly, at the same time as their actual presence in Spain fell. However, the desire for a tougher immigration policy remained stable.³³ This was not so in 2012, when the perception of the presence of immigrants continued to decline (and in the same proportion as in 2011), although then the drop did, indeed, contribute to the decrease in rejection of immigration and the qualification of immigration laws as too tolerant, as well as the rise in opinion favourable to admitting political exiles on an unrestricted basis. Contributing to this is probably the fact that Spaniards once again see themselves as a country of emigration in a year when media interest has focussed on the return of immigrants to their countries of origin and of Spaniards who emigrate in search of work (especially well-educated young people). It has even been affirmed that in 2012, the media has made emigration by young Spaniards into a kind of media star whose light has blocked out any other aspect of migration’ (Aja et al. 2013: 13).

Fig. 5

Immigration policy: acceptance of immigrants (total percentage of respondents). Source: CIS 1993–2005 and OBERAXE-CIS 2007–2012 surveys

The image that the media project of immigration is another crucial factor in explaining racism and xenophobia (Wieviorka 2009; Igartua et al. 2011; Álvarez 2014), to the point of affirmations that ‘one cannot seriously analyse contemporary racism without examining the influence of the media in the progression, dissemination and also regression of the phenomenon’ (Wieviorka 2009: 145). This negatively affects the emphasis in news; how certain acts and individuals are classified; and the correlation they encourage between specific conduct and nationalities.³⁴

According to the qualitative Eurobarometer (TNS Qual 2011), Europeans (both natives and immigrants) consider that the media portrays a negative image of immigration: they project immigrants in a biased manner and emphasise the negative aspects of immigration. The same is borne out by the MEXEES projects (Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2010a; Cea D’Ancona et al. 2013), where natives and non-natives agree in affirming that the media exaggerate the forms (because not all immigrants are the same) and the content, in subjects that capture their interest. In the words of a young Argentinean, ‘if the media centre on something, that will be the news. The day after tomorrow, if they focus on something else, for example, the price of housing, that will be what people are talking about. Nobody will remember immigration.’ This is a thought that coincides with what has been seen in studies on the influence of the media.

The OBERAXE-CIS surveys of 2010 and later ones include the question of whether ‘the media (TV, radio, press) pay a great deal of, a fair amount of, little or no attention to immigration.’ In 2012, there was a drop in the percentage of those who responded ‘a lot’ (6 % in 2012; 11 in 2010) or ‘a fair amount of attention’ (44 % in 2012; 48 in 2010). In addition, the opinion that the media transmit ‘a rather negative view of immigration’ also dropped (36 % in 2012; 37 in 2010 and 46 in 2009³⁵). Both data should be borne in mind in interpreting less rejection of immigration recorded in the 2012 survey.

Political discourse is another definitive key to how the image of immigration is formed. When it stresses the need to tighten immigration policy, to control or restrict the entry of immigrants, this encourages the belief that there are ‘too many’ immigrants and the consequent rejection of immigration. This is particularly the case when speeches come from similar parties who are given more credibility. In Spain, the increase in people considering immigration as a major problem (in the CIS barometers) coincides with the announcement or implementation of immigrant regularisation processes (2001 and 2004) and the announcement that polices on immigration were to be tightened up (2002,³⁶ 2006). This is because political debates on immigration at that time were increasing and played a greater role in the media. A case in point is the ‘numbers game’, as described by Van Dijk (2003): figures are given in absolute rather than relative terms, to highlight the scale of the number of immigrants. Speeches which underline the failure of immigrant integration that immigrants are ‘a burden on the welfare state’³⁷ and are ‘no longer necessary’ also have their effect. If moderation in political discourse on immigration influenced the decline in xenophobia from 1993, the hardening of political speeches influenced the rise in xenophobia in Spain after 2000.

No xenophobic party has a seat so far in the Spanish Parliament, unlike other European countries. The exception, however, is Catalonia: the Plataforma per Catalunya (PXC) won a total of 65,905 votes in the local and regional elections held on May 22, 2011 (multiplying by five the votes obtained in 2007), increasing their councillors from 17 to 67, with the watchword ‘those at home first’. But as Rydgren (2004) notes, the presence of xenophobic parties contributed to increasing anti-immigration speeches in the other political parties, with the intention of taking votes away from the PXC, thus increasing manifest xenophobia. The electoral use of political speeches against immigration has been featured in the press: ‘One xenophobe, one vote’ (El País, 4/5/2010), highlighted the electoral gains of racist messages; ‘The PP tests out its toughest discourse on immigration in the Catalan campaign’ (El País, 11/11/2010); ‘The PSC hardens its speeches on immigration’ (El País, 16/10/2010). These speeches are easy to devise and can quickly destroy socio-political action aimed at improving the integration of immigrants.

The fact that in Spain there have been no riots on the scale of France or the UK³⁸; and that there has been no aggression towards Muslims after the attacks of March 11, 2004 (unlike the US or the UK after the September 11 attacks of 2001 and July 7, 2005); or violence towards the Roma population (as in the case of Italy, France and Hungary), is due to a number of factors: the fact that first-generation immigrants still predominate; labour segmentation; a large proportion of immigrants are Latin American and European (seen as culturally closer than Muslims); and the relative containment of political speeches, especially after the attacks of March 11 in Madrid (Cachón 2011).

Nor should we forget the integration-based policies implemented to date. In particular, the Strategic Plans for Citizenship and Integration, PECI I,³⁹ and II, nationally, or the various different action taken by town councils and civic associations: Movement against Intolerance; FSG (Roma Secretariat Foundation); the Romani Union; ACCEM; the Red Cross; the CEPAIM Foundation; the MPDL; Welcome Network; and SOS Racism, among others). The first objective of PECI II is the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive strategy against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance, which was finally passed by the Council of Ministers on November 4, 2011. Among its objectives was to improve the recording of racist or xenophobic incidents and create public prosecutors against hate crimes and discrimination. The first public prosecutor was set up in Barcelona in October 2009. In the Migrant Integration Policy Index III (MIPEX 2011), Spain ranked 8th (considering indicators of labour market mobility, family reunification, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination).

Conclusion

The analysis of the changes over time in public opinion on immigration shows the strength of the reality that is built, and even more so at a time of economic uncertainty like the present one, or the previous one at the beginning of the nineties. As was hypothesised, and in line with Group Conflict Theory, the recession activates the image of immigration as an economic threat, with the consequent increase in xenophobia. But economic booms in themselves do not determine the acceptance of immigrants. In periods of broad-based economic growth, as in Spain from 2001 to 2007, the rejection of immigration, far from easing up, increased. The abruptness of the arrival of immigrants, within a very short time frame, led to increased rejection of immigration and the request to tighten up on immigration policy. This once again corroborates the fact that it is the presence of immigrants that is perceived as a determining factor in xenophobia. It feeds the feeling of both economic (Group Conflict Theory) and cultural threat (Social Identity Theory).

The data analysed also point to other key factors such as political action and discourse, along with immigration-related messages transmitted by the media. It would otherwise be hard to understand that in 1993, the 45 % of the 2499 Spaniards surveyed affirmed that the number of immigrants was excessive, when the foreign population with a residence permit in Spain was scarcely more than 1.1 % of the population (Fig. 5). In this over-assessment of the number of immigrants, the continuous flow of news on immigrants (mainly Moroccans) arriving in small boats on the Spanish coasts had its affect (Cea D’Ancona 2005, 2007).

The increase in the rejection of immigration recorded in 2011⁴⁰ coincided with electoral campaigns by city councils and regional parliaments (May 2011) and at national legislative elections (November 2011). As stated by Aja et al. (2011:15), ‘election campaigns provide a scenario which is propitious to the expression of hostile attitudes to immigration, and the more or less open and declared manifestation of trends towards xenophobic initiatives’. Similarly, the increase in the image of immigrants as a cultural threat, and the consequent increase in Islamophobia, recorded in 2010, coincided with action and political discourse which went against the practice of the Muslim religion (banning the burqa in public places and the crisis of multiculturalism in European societies) and its corresponding echo in the media. In the years to follow, this decreased, at the same time as the topic gradually lost its key position in the media (Fig. 4).

Similarly, in the interpretation of the drop of the rejection of immigration recorded in the survey of 2012 (in spite of the scenario of budget restraint and increase in unemployment), the smaller presence and flow of immigrants entering the country must be considered. Coupled with this is the fact that the media began to talk more about emigration than immigration (encouraging natives to put themselves in the position of the outsider). Moreover, there was less discussion in political debate, due to the absence of electoral campaigns. We could also add other factors, such as greater experience of natives and immigrants living alongside each other, and mutual knowledge, also underlined by Allport (1954) and developed in the Intergroup Contact Theory (Pettigrew 1998; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp. 2006). Bear in mind that the 2012 survey included the highest proportion of respondents who had immigrant friends: 46 % compared with 38 in 2007 and 19 in 1993. This is a fact to be considered, though corroboration would require more specific analysis.⁴¹

From this research, we conclude, above all, that there is a need to exercise care over the image of immigration which is transmitted by the media and in political discourse. Both contribute to shaping the collective view of immigration and how is perceived: either as beneficial to economic and population growth in the country, or as a threat to the interests of the host population and immigrants already settled (loss of financial resources, jobs, increased insecurity). The importance of acting on the media was highlighted in the Decalogue which came out of the transnational project Living Together (Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2010b),⁴² whose point number 5 states: ‘To promote the role of the media in fostering respect for and recognition of cultural diversity’. Likewise, the 2nd Expert Seminar on the European Modules on Migrant Integration (Vienna, February 3–4 2011) and the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2011–2014 (PECI II), which recommended following Article 48.1 of Law 7/2010, of March 31 on Audio-visual Communication, and avoiding incitement of hatred, contempt or discrimination on the grounds of birth, race, sex, religion, nationality, political opinion or any other personal or social circumstance. The aim was to improve the public perception of immigration and diversity and its image as transmitted by the media.

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 1 Centres of final cluster analysis (K-means)

Appendix 2

Table 2 Discriminant variables on the attitude to immigration in the 2010 and 2011 CIS-OBERAXE opinion polls